Needs and Means for a Better Workhorse Trade Model

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Princeton Graham Lecture April 19, 2006

Introduction

- The "workhorse models" of trade
 - Partial equilibrium (for trade policies)
 - Ricardian (for comparative advantage)
 - Heckscher-Ohlin(-Samuelson) (HO) (for source of comparative advantage and general equilibrium effects of trade)
 - Krugman/Helpman-Krugman (HK) (for intra-industry trade)
- Of these, the HO model has pride of place
 - Elegant but simple
 - Seemingly general, allowing extensions (e.g., HK) to improve realism when needed

Introduction

- Uses of the HO model
 - As the core model for teaching generalequilibrium trade
 - See Ethier text, Krugman-Obstfeld text, etc.
 - As the main tool for understanding certain issues
 - Trade of, and with, developing countries
 - "Trade and wages"

Introduction

- My reservations about the HO Model: some of its implications are
 - Extreme
 - Implausible
 - Inconvenient to take to data
- My hope for the HO Model: That it can be adapted, <u>simply</u>, to avoid these implications

Outline

- Some Uncomfortable Features of the H-O Model (The "Needs")
- Assorted Potential Fixes (the "Means")
- Elaboration of One of the Them: Increasing Trade Costs
 - How it meets the "needs"
 - Is it a good assumption?

Features of the HO Model

- What <u>IS</u> the HO Model?
 - Homogeneous goods and factors (any numbers > 1)
 - Perfectly competitive markets
 - Production functions
 - Constant returns to scale
 - Non-joint
 - Factors
 - Perfectly mobile across industries
 - Perfectly immobile across countries
 - Countries differ in factor endowments
 - Industries differ in factor intensities
 - Trade costs, if present, are constant (perhaps "iceberg")

- Factor Price Equalization
- Too much trade, in both goods and factors
- Indeterminacy of production and trade (with more goods than factors, if prices align)
- Tendency to specialize (with more goods than factors, if prices don't align)
- Hypersensitivity to prices and trade costs
- Few equilibrium trade flows

- Factor Price Equalization
 - This says: Under free and frictionless trade, countries with sufficiently similar factor endowments will have exactly the same factor prices
 - Implications:
 - Insensitivity to own factor endowments
 - One-to-one sensitivity to foreign factor prices
 - Nontraded goods prices determined entirely by world prices of traded goods and not at all by nontraded good supplies or demands

- Too much trade, in both goods and factor content
 - Trefler's (1995) "Missing Trade"

 Indeterminacy of production and trade (with more goods than factors, if prices align)

3-Good Lerner Diagram: Production Indeterminacy



- Tendency to specialize (with more goods than factors, if prices don't align)
 - Countries have unequal factor prices and therefore produce and trade at most 1 (or F-1) goods in common



- Implications of these more-goods-thanfactors properties:
 - Hypersensitivity to prices and trade costs of production and (what countries) trade

Hypersensitivity to tariff changes

Three-Good Lerner Diagram: Hypersensitivity



Small country facing FPE in rest of world with trade costs initially permitting import of 2 goods, Y and Z Slight change in trade cost of any good can force output of either Y or Z to zero

Examples:

Rise in t_z forces import of Z to zero

Fall in $t_{\rm Z}$ forces import of Y to zero

- Hypersensitivity to prices and trade costs of (with whom countries) trade
 - Hypersensitivity to preferential trading arrangements

Geographic Hypersensitivity to Trade Costs

- Example:
 - 3 Countries, 2 goods
 - Country A is small compared to both B and C
 - B and C have zero trade costs between them
 - A has trade costs with both B and C,
 - but these may be different





Geographic Hypersensitivity to Trade Costs

- Assume:
 - B and C identical, thus same autarky prices
 - A is capital abundant compared to B and C, so A has comparative advantage in X
- Then:
 - A will trade based on 2×2 HO model, exporting X and importing Y
 - With whom A trades depends on trade costs
- Let
 - T_{IJK} be net export of good I from country J to country K, and
 - t_{IJK} be iceberg transport cost for that trade flow

Geographic Hypersensitivity to Trade Costs

T_{XAB} A's trade flows with B and C XAR both change discontinuously $\mathsf{T}_{\mathsf{XAC}}$ at $t_{XAB} = t_{XAC}$ t_{xAB} t_{xac}

Few equilibrium trade flows
 ➢No intra-industry trade

Specialization

- With multiple countries, HO Model with trade costs predicts relatively <u>few</u> bilateral trade flows
- This cannot be seen in the 2×2×2 model, where so few are possible
- As number of countries C grows, number of <u>possible</u> bilateral trade flows grows with square of C. Maximum number of <u>equilibrium</u> trade flows in HO model (except with zero probability) grows only with C.

Specialization

- In Deardorff (2005) I derive that

$$\frac{R_{HO}}{R_{MAX}} \le \frac{G(C-1) + FC - 1}{GC(C-1)}$$

- Where
 - R is the number of active good-origin-destination trade "routes"
 - R_{MAX} = number possible
 - $-R_{HO}$ = max number (except with zero probability) under HO
 - G = Number of goods
 - C = Number of countries
 - F = Number of factors

Specialization

- Reason:
 - Each country will import each good only from the lowest-cost source
 - One country, or
 - Group of countries whose prices and trade costs align exactly for the importer.
 - If trade costs are random, on average the size of such a group is limited by the number of factors.

The "Means"

- Ways to Make HO Behave?
 - Specific factors
 - Armington Preferences
 - Lumpy Countries
 - Monopolistic Competition
 - Heterogeneous Firms
 - Aggregation
 - Increasing Trade Costs

The "Means"

- Not a new question
- CGE modelers have had to deal with it
 - Models based too closely on HO don't fit the data
 - Most obviously (for me, via Bob Stern): Estimates of price elasticities of imports are much smaller than they would be in HO models taken literally
 - due to "hypersensitivity"
 - We've used several of the fixes mentioned here

Specific Factors

- Also called the Ricardo-Viner Model, this was how Samuelson (1971) and Jones (1971) got the HO Model to behave
- Each sector has its own "specific factor"
 - = Factor that is either
 - useless in, or
 - immobile to and from,

all other sectors

Specific Factors

- Implications
 - Supplies likely remain positive at all prices
 - Supplies increase smoothly with price
 - There is no indeterminacy
 - Trade does not equalize factor prices (Hence, "Ohlin was right")

Specific Factors

- Problems
 - Makes perfect sense for short run, but not for long run
 - Doesn't solve problem of hypersensitivity of bilateral trade to trade costs
 - With specific factor in each industry, model no longer "explains" trade, except tautologically: countries export products of their abundant specific factors

Armington Preferences

- Due to Armington (1969), who used it in a macroeconomic, not HO, context
- Products are differentiated by country of origin
- Examples?
 - French wine
 - Italian shoes
 - Swiss watches

Armington Preferences

- Implications
 - Trade need not equalize prices of same "good" from different countries
 - Trade elasticities are much reduced
 - hence all hypersensitivity is eliminated

Armington Preferences

- Problems
 - Trade now depends on preference parameters as well as factor endowments
 - France exports wine because people like French wine, etc.
 - (This is fine in CGE models, which don't seek to explain trade, but use trade data to inform trade policy)
 - Preferences give every country market power in trade

Lumpy Countries

- Due to Courant and Deardorff (1992)
- Countries have multiple regions, across which there is not FPE

Lumpy Countries

- Implications
 - May alter pattern of trade from HO prediction
 - Internal regions may specialize
 - Regional limits on trade? Hence lower elasticities?
 - Specialization at regional level without specialization nationally? Hence less specialization?
 - Continuum of regions?

Lumpy Countries

- Problems?
 - Don't know yet
 - Hardly any of this has been worked out

Monopolistic Competition

- Helpman and Krugman (1985) put this in HO trade models, building on Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz preferences. Romalis (2004) generalized for empirical work
- Goods are differentiated by firm, while firm-level increasing returns limit product variety

Monopolistic Competition

- Implications
 - Most obviously, model explains intra-industry trade
 - Implications for specialization and factor prices are the same as the standard HO Model, so it does not help much with some of that
 - Product-differentiated bilateral exports remain positive from any country that produces, avoiding hypersensitivity to trade costs

Monopolistic Competition

- Problems
 - Plausible for (some) manufactures and services, but not for agricultural products, minerals, or some other inputs
 - Doesn't change extremes of specialization

Heterogeneous Firms

- Melitz (2003) put this into trade theory, following Hopenhayn (1992). Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2005) put it in the HO model
- Individual firms each have a randomly chosen productivity parameter, as well as differentiated products

Heterogeneous Firms

- Implications
 - Industry gets small, but doesn't disappear, when factor prices move against it, since most productive firms survive
 - Thus avoids extremes of specialization
 - Supply responds to prices through entry or survival of less productive firms

Heterogeneous Firms

- Problems
 - Requires firm-level product differentiation as well
 - Thus most appropriate only for manufactures
 - Not (yet?) particularly easy to use

Aggregation

- Davis and Weinstein (2001) suggest this in motivating part of their empirical work
- Observed industries are actually aggregates of unobservable industries with heterogeneous factor intensities

Aggregation

- Implications
 - Observed industries represent different mixes in different countries, leading to cross-country correlation between factor endowments and factor intensities, even with FPE (Davis and Weinstein)
 - In a multi-cone model, even though countries specialize in actual industries, observed industries operate at positive output due to products that unobservably belong to another cone
 - In response to price changes, instead of a whole observed industry responding hypersensitively, only unobserved components do and observed industry responds gradually.

Aggregation

• Problems

This has not been worked out as a formal model (I think)

- I suggested in Deardorff (1984) that HO would be better behaved if trade costs varied appropriately
- Assume that trade costs for a particular good along a particular route (pair of countries) <u>rise</u> with the volume of trade

- Implications
 - This makes bilateral export supply curves upward sloping even when supplies of goods are infinitely elastic
 - Indeterminacy of trade is eliminated
 - Volume of trade may then vary smoothly with size of autarky price differences

- Problems
 - Hard to imagine that this assumption could be valid
 - If anything, transport seems more likely to have decreasing costs, not increasing
- For now, I'll ignore this problem and
 - Explore further the implications
 - Come back at the end to possible reasons for rising trade costs

- Assume:
 - HO model with rising, iceberg, trade costs
 - That is
 - A fraction t of goods that are exported is used up in transit
 - t increases with quantity exported, X: e.g.,

M = X(1-t) = X(1-cX)

 (Could also include another component that is positive for X=0, perhaps rising in distance.)

Implications of Increasing Trade Costs

- Small Country
 - Suppose it faces a single set of given prices,
 p^W, for goods delivered or purchased abroad
 - (Not now plausible in a world of many countries. Prices will be different.)
 - Compare to autarky prices, p^A.
 - Trade pattern: as in HO, following factor-based comparative advantage
 - Domestic prices, p^D, move toward p^W but do not reach them, as t rises to offset |p^W-p^D|

Implications of Increasing Trade Costs

- Small Country Results
 - Trade pattern same as HO
 - But quantity of trade is less than HO
 - Goods prices drawn toward world prices, but not to equality
 - Factor prices drawn toward world factor prices, but also not to equality

Implications of Increasing Trade Costs

- Small Country Results
 - Factor price insensitivity
 - No longer completely insensitive: Change in factor endowment changes <u>both</u> production/trade <u>and</u> factor price.
 - Corollary of one-to-one sensitivity to foreign factor prices also dampened

HO Need

- Factor Price Equalization

• ITC

- No FPE, only a tendency toward it

- HO Need
 - Factor Price Insensitivity to own factor endowments
- ITC
 - Factor prices do respond to changing factor endowments

HO Need

– One-to-one sensitivity to foreign factor prices

- ITC
 - Dependence on foreign factor prices is reduced

- HO Need
 - Nontraded goods prices determined entirely by world prices of traded goods and not at all by nontraded good supplies or demands
- ITC
 - Nontraded good supplies/demands affect factor prices and thus nontraded good prices

HO Need

- Too much trade, in both goods and factors

- ITC
 - Trade is reduced, arbitrarily close to zero

- HO Need
 - Indeterminacy of production and trade (with more goods than factors, if prices align)
- ITC
 - Indeterminacy eliminated, since production and trade can't change without changing prices

- HO Need
 - Tendency to specialize (with more goods than factors, if prices don't align)
- ITC
 - Specialization is unlikely, as it implies high trade and thus high trade costs
 - (two countries with different factor prices can produce many goods in common and trade, since variable trade costs makes up the difference in costs)

- HO Need
 - Hypersensitivity to prices and trade costs of production and (what countries) trade
- ITC
 - Changes in prices and/or trade costs are dampened by trade cost adjustment

HO Need

– Hypersensitivity to tariff changes

- ITC
 - Tariff cut expands imports which expands trade cost to offset the tariff cut

- HO Need
 - Hypersensitivity to prices and trade costs of (with whom countries) trade
- ITC
 - Hypersensitivity of trade partners reduced if each has trade cost dependent on bilateral trade flow

- HO Need
 - Hypersensitivity to preferential trading arrangements
- ITC
 - Preferential tariffs induce offsetting changes in trade costs, dampening the response of trade

- HO Need
 - Few equilibrium trade flows
- ITC
 - More trade flows are likely, since countries can import from and export to multiple partners, as trade costs offset price differences.

HO Need

- No intra-industry trade

• ITC

 Does <u>not</u> yield intra-industry trade (unless perhaps trade cost is negative for low trade!).

- Do Increasing Trade Costs provide a model that is simple enough to be a "workhorse"?
 - Perhaps not, in general
 - I suggest, therefore, an extreme version:
 - Let trade costs rise for such small amounts of trade that effects on factor prices are negligible.
 - Call it <u>The Negligible Trade Model</u>

Features of the Negligible Trade Model

- Factor Prices are approximately those of autarky
- Trade depends, via variable trade costs, on relative autarky prices
- Small effects of trade on factor prices and other variables can be obtained by differentiation from initial autarky equilibrium
- Trade flows depend fairly simply on factor endowments

Implication of Increasing Trade Costs

- Implies that even a small country faces diminishing terms of trade.
- Thus even small country's optimal tariff > 0!
- Reason: rising trade cost is an externality.



Possible Reasons for Increasing Trade Costs

- Congestion
- Trade-specific factors and/or capacity constraints (Coleman 2005)
- Cost of market penetration (geographic or other)

Conclusion

- Increasing trade costs are worth looking into
 - Use trade flow equation to estimate relationship of trade costs to trade
 - If successful, explore more fully the various reasons for increasing trade costs

Acknowledgements

- Thanks, for their input, to
 - Gene Grossman
 - Juan Carlos Hallak
 - Steve Redding
 - Bob Stern
 - Lars Svensson
 - Jim Tybout

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