



P.S. 451/551 PEACE AND WAR. Fall 2017. Tues.-Thurs. 11:00-12:15, Room 1175 Soc. Sci. Bldg.
Honors Seminar. --- (170707) ---

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Hrs.: Mon.&Th. 5:00-5:30 PM, and Tues. 12:15-1:15 PM

Please read this syllabus carefully! It has substantive information, not just dates. For example, it contains many of the points from the first two chapters of Sarkees and Wayman's *Resort to War*, which was once assigned in this course -- but by reading the ideas in the syllabus instead we can save that expense. You are responsible for knowing the contents of the syllabus for the exams, just as you are for the reading assignments; we will go over it thoroughly in class, especially in the first week of the course (when maybe not everyone has the books yet).

WAR IN OUR TIME

This course is a study of the causes of the wars of the modern era. Honors students have a lot of understanding of that era, so you have a good preparation for this course. In the course, I divide the modern into the early modern (1492-1815) and the late, or more fully, modern (1816-present). We will focus mostly on examining the causes of inter-state war, with lesser attention to intra-state war (which is usually called "civil war" by laypersons), non-state war, and extra-state war (usually understood in popular terminology as imperial war and colonial war). One of our themes (as a pre-requisite to explaining war) is that we want to be the first to describe the pattern of war experience of each country in the modern world, systematically, all the way from the age of Columbus up to the present.

In P.S. 451, we will take a scientific approach to the study of war. Therefore, the emphasis will be on studying war in general, rather than any one specific war. Students will be involved in this scientific approach through the readings and a substantial research project, which will culminate in a term paper. Because of the scientific emphasis, little time will be devoted to the study of current events or current wars; at UM-Dearborn, these current wars are covered in such courses as my American Foreign Policy I and II, International Security, and Great Powers classes, and in Prof. Stockton's courses on the Middle East. The attack on the U.S. on Sept. 11th, 2001, as well as the related inter-state wars waged by the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan, nonetheless illustrate the enduring importance of war in our lives today, and also suggest some ways in which warfare may be evolving. And certainly a student's knowledge of specific wars, such as World War I, World War II, and the U.S. wars against Iraq (both in 1990-1991 and 2003 on), is an extremely valuable asset in this course.

From World War I (1914-1918) to the Cold War (1947-1989), warfare and preparation for it dominated the history of the twentieth century. As we entered the 21st century, war seemed, in the view of many observers, to be obsolete (just as it seemed obsolete to many in 1900). Of course, such "optimistic" analysts expected fewer wars. To a degree, there is evidence on their side. For example, recently *The Human Security Report* (2012) reported a decline in armed conflicts, as did Joshua Goldstein (2011) and Steven Pinker (2011).

But, since the end of the Cold War, some have disagreed, and were actually pessimistic about the future. John Mearsheimer (1990), political science professor at the U. of Chicago, said we would "soon miss the Cold War," meaning that in his view the bipolarity of the Cold War had reduced armed conflict. And, if we were to take a look at the future based on that reasoning, then we would soon have more wars. Samuel Huntington (1993 and 1996), another pessimist, said the Cold War would be replaced by a "Clash of Civilizations", and events such as the "war on terror" seem to support his prediction.

Logically, those expecting the decline of war were often arguing that war was becoming more economically ruinous than in the past, or people have become more educated and decent (Pinker), or states have become more Liberal or democratic (Russett and Oneal 2001), or some other fundamental "cause" of war/peace has shifted in a more pacific direction. Logically, those expecting war to continue as before saw the causes of war rooted in more fundamental and unchanging features of the international system.

Just looking at the facts, who was right, Mearsheimer or those who said war was obsolete and disappearing? What does the evidence show? If we demand, as we do in this course, that a true war be sustained and substantial enough to involve at least 1,000 battle deaths (per year), we would find that right now there are about a dozen wars ongoing in the world. Of course, one has to consider that there are wars inside countries (often termed civil wars) and others between independent states (inter-state war). In the 1990s seven inter-state wars broke out, and then there were two inter-state wars from 2000 to 2008 (the U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq). These nine since the end of the Cold War average out to about 3 or 4 per decade. This is actually close to the average rate of war onsets (about 4 or 5 per decade since 1816). Despite, then, such assertions about war's obsolescence or increase, neither the great trouble predicted by Mearsheimer ("we will soon miss the Cold War"), nor the substantial decrease predicted by the other side seem to have materialized. But then, from the 2003 U.S. war over Iraq to the 2015 war between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, an unusual period of twelve years elapsed between inter-state wars. This is the longest break in war onsets since the eighteen-year period from 1828 to 1846. As for civil wars, there are now about one-dozen intra-state wars going on. That's a large number by historic standards of 1816 to the present. How do the "war is becoming obsolete" scholars deal with this problem? Sometimes they say there is a decline in civil war. Compared to when? Compared to the 1990s, when 41 intra-state wars broke out -- a record for the last two centuries.

Overall, my co-authors and I (Sarkees, Wayman, and Singer 2003; Sarkees and Wayman 2010) report a mixed picture, with some decreases in war over the past two hundred years (especially in extra-state war), and other increases. My most recent publication (Wayman 2014), examining 48 tests of war trends over the past 200 years, finds twelve significant signs of decreasing war, versus eight signs of increase, a small advantage to the optimists. Not everyone wants to think that the answer is so complicated. So the debate continues.

What about the immediate future? Of course now we have the prospect of something like a "war" of the U.S. against the global terrorists and those nation-states who support these terrorists, perhaps lasting for decades. Wars involving great powers and other heavily armed states are becoming scarcer, but potentially more destructive. India and Pakistan are both nuclear powers who might wage a potentially major war against each other. Russia and Ukraine are close to an inter-state war right now, over the Russian-speaking territories of the eastern Ukraine, and there was a similar armed conflict, about one-third the size of a war, between Russia and Georgia in 2008. There is some growing danger of a small war between Japan and China over the disputed islands in the seas between them. It is hard to deny that there might be a war soon between North Korea and a U.S.-led coalition. All these facts make it interesting, relevant, and important to understand what causes war and what conditions may warn us that a war is about to occur--and perhaps allow us to prevent it.

Until recently, no one knew much scientific about peace. Mostly, peace was treated as just the absence of war. Then, expanding on ideas introduced by Kenneth Boulding (1978), Goertz, Diehl and Balas wrote *The Puzzle of Peace* (Oxford, 2016). Like Boulding, they saw peace as made up of a continuum from what Boulding called unstable peace between two countries (war could occasionally still break out) to stable peace (war would simply not occur at all), and like Boulding they saw this coming from the development of a norm against territorial conquest. But they developed the ideas more fully than Boulding had, and their book was even a finalist for the Woodrow Wilson prize for best book in political science that year. They claim that their system helps us understand better the decline of war since 1945. We will read their book at the end of the course, and it helps make the course title, "Peace and War", more meaningful. Also, I think, helps us better understand what is going on in the world in the twenty-first century.

References for this section:

- Boulding, Kenneth (1978) *Stable Peace*. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press.
Goldstein, Joshua (2011) *Winning the War on War*. N.Y.: Dutton.
Human Security Report Project (2012) *Human Security Report 2012*. Vancouver: Human Security Press.
Huntington, Samuel (1993) "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72 (No. 3): 22-49.

- Huntington, Samuel (1996) *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. N.Y.: Simon and Schuster.
- Mearsheimer, John (1990) "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War," *Atlantic Monthly* 266 (No. 2): 35-50.
- Pinker, Stephen (2011) *The Better Angels of Our Nature*. N.Y.: Viking.
- Russett, Bruce, and John Oneal (2001) *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations*. N.Y.: W.W. Norton.
- Sarkees, Meredith, Frank Wayman, and J. David Singer (2003) "Inter-State, Intra-State, and Extra-State Wars: A Comprehensive Look at their Distribution over Time, 1816-1997," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 47: 49-70.
- Sarkees, Meredith, and Frank Wayman (2010) *Resort to War: A Data Guide to Inter-State, Extra-State, Intra-State, and Non-State Wars, 1816-2007*. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.
- Wayman, Frank (2014) "From Altruism to the Future Frequency of War," in Frank Whelon Wayman, Paul R. Williamson, Solomon W. Polachek, and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, eds., *Predicting the Future in Science, Economics, and Politics*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.

DECISIONS TO GO TO WAR

This course focuses on the reasons nations go to war, and the conditions at the time. Going to war involves decisions. In one fairly well-known example, on Jan. 16, 1991, the United States and its allies formally went to war--against Iraq in the Gulf War. As with most such decisions, this had profound effects on the lives of millions of people for years to come. In order for war to occur, Iraq and the U.S. both had to decide not to back down from their negotiating position (the U.S. position that the Iraqis must withdraw entirely from occupied Kuwait, the Iraqi position that they would not withdraw). The causes of war, then, would seem to include a belief on each side that it can do better by fighting than by backing down to the other side's demands.

In P.S. 451, Peace and War, our purpose is to reach an understanding of the factors influencing such decisions to go to war. In other words, the course is an examination of the causes of war and of the means of securing peace. The course will emphasize the contributions from a variety of disciplines, such as economics, history, political science, and psychology, to the study of these issues.

Since the advent of nuclear weapons, war has emerged as perhaps the greatest threat to our survival as a species. How wars occur and how they might be prevented are thus vital subjects of investigation. The course is designed to stimulate student interest in a series of approaches to the origins of war. The writings on the topic extend at least as far back as Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*, and contributions have been made by an extremely diverse group of scholars. Students who seek a comprehensive view of the subject must consider what disciplines have the most to offer, and hence must begin to see how a variety of specialties would be relevant to an understanding of a social problem. The course term paper project is designed to allow each student to explore one approach to questions of war and peace.

The literature on this topic would fill a small library. One annotated bibliography we can use (Robert Woito, *To End War*) is itself 755 pages, and would be longer if updated! Here's what we read:

BOOKS TO PURCHASE:

Students should purchase and read:

John Vasquez and Marie Henehan, eds., *The Scientific Study of Peace and War* (Lexington Books, available at Amazon.com, alibris, ABE books, etc.); also in our campus bookstore.

Paul Huth, *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War*. Yale Univ. Press. (available at Amazon.com, alibris, ABE books, etc.);

Gary Goertz, Paul F. Diehl, and Alexandru Balas, *The Puzzle of Peace*. Oxford: Oxford U. Press. (Probably best purchased at our campus bookstore); and

a course-pack.

ONLY RECOMMENDED:

Meredith Sarkees and Frank Wayman, *Resort to War* (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2010).

For course packs, please contact Dollar Bill Copy in Ann Arbor. \$Bill can be reached at 1-877-738-9200, or at www.dollarbillcopying.com. At the website, go to order products on line, then to the order course packs on line bar, then to UM-D, then to the course number. After selecting all those things, proceed to order, give mailing info., credit card, and \$Bill ships next day UPS to your address.

TERM PAPER ASSIGNMENT FOR THE COURSE:

Students will also select a topic for a term paper, examine the annotated bibliography, and spend the much of the term preparing a short (no more than ten pages) paper and oral report.

RESERVE ITEMS FROM THE CORRELATES OF WAR PROJECT (COW):

To assist you in writing your papers, several Correlates of War Project data bases are available. There are three places to go to obtain these crucial data.

1. **COW WEBSITE DATA.** A convenient source for some important COW data (notably, system membership, inter-state war, and militarized dispute data) is the Project website www.correlatesofwar.org

A little academic history -- the COW project's inception at University of Michigan, and subsequent moves to Penn State, the University of Illinois, and the Univ. of California-Davis:

Of note to us, the COW project was at University of Michigan, from its inception in 1963 until the transfer of the project to Penn State in March 2001. During those 38 years at Michigan, the Project Director was Prof. J. David Singer. Since then, Singer has been succeeded by four shorter-term leaders, namely Stuart Bremer, Scott Bennett, Paul Diehl, and Zeev Maoz. When they were COW directors, Bremer and Bennett were both at Penn State University. Diehl, who was at Illinois, is the immediate-past director; he served an 8-year term till 2012. Zeev Maoz, of University of California-Davis, is the current director, and has been in office for the last five years. Since the time that he took over briefly from Bremer as overall Director, Bennett has continued to serve as associate director for data management. Hence, the Penn State data site has been maintained over the years by COW data czars and Directors, Prof. Stuart Bremer (deceased in 2004) and his successor Prof. Scott Bennett (interim 2002-2004). They have an important research group on war and peace at Penn State, and one member of that group is Peace Science Society President Dr. Glenn Palmer; he is host for the MID data set, one of the largest COW jobs. At the time of the Project transfer in 2001, at a special meeting to mark the occasion, Stuart Bremer, the newly inaugurated director of the project at Penn State, announced that he was signalling the transfer by calling the Penn State era of the project the COW-2 project; hence the website will usually be marked as the COW2 website. At the time of Bremer's premature illness and death, Scott Bennett was named the director of the COW2 project, with the announcement of his leadership occurring at the time of the time of the Peace Science Society annual meeting, in Tucson in November 2002. Bennett made it clear he did not want to be the permanent director.

At the start of 2005, Dr. Paul Diehl, of the U. of Illinois, was named the new permanent director, and the "COW2" reverted to simply "COW." While this has all become a multi-university network, it is of interest to us that all the main players have had some connection to the University of Michigan (e.g., Diehl and Bennett and Maoz have Ph.D.s from here, and Bremer was a professor here).

There are COW data hosts, responsible for specific COW datasets. Volker Kraus and Phil Schafer are data hosts for state system membership; this is the most fundamental COW dataset, for if you do not know which states exist, you cannot know if there was an inter-state war (between two of them), an intra-state war (within one of them), or something else. Meredith Sarkees, Jeff Dixon, and I are war data hosts. That leads to the second source for the data:

2. **THE LATEST, FROM OUR BOOK, *Resort to War*.** This covers 1815-2007 (inclusive). Comprehensive data for Jan. 1, 2008-present are available on our own campus for students enrolled in our course. All these UM-Dearborn data are at best preliminary COW data, since they have not been approved yet by COW, but they do follow COW definitions. These data include restricted information, still being refined and validated, and hence are not available on the web. Because it is based on such up-to-date research, this material has been made available to students doing specific research projects for term papers.

3. REALLY OLD PRINT COPIES OF COW DATA. Working with large data matrices on line can be hard. An introductory way to get acquainted with the COW data is to consult the hard copies of printouts that are in my office. These include:

A list of all nation-states in the international system, 1816-present, with their dates of system membership and their COW nation number (useful for identification purposes).

A list, in chronological order, of all militarized disputes in the interstate system 1816-1976. Included are, first, the states on the initiating side, and, then, the states on the target side, with the highest level of hostilities reached by each state. (Note that the side initiating a war might or might not be the side that initiated the militarized dispute that gave rise to the war.) These files have been specially edited for our course, and do not contain all the participant nations on each side, but only the most important participants.

A list of the economic, military, and demographic capabilities of each member state of the international system, for each year, 1816-1976.

These COW printouts only contain data for the period 1816-1976. Nonetheless, they are an excellent place to start as they allow you to visualize the data before trying to access them via computer. A problem is encountered from time to time with the library; therefore, these materials will also be available in a limited way in my outer office (room 2164 SSB).

GRADING

The first exam is scheduled for Thurs., Oct. 19th. The second exam is scheduled for Tues., Nov. 14th. The third exam will be in the final exam week. The first exam counts for 25% of the grade. The second and third exams will count for 16.5% percent of the grade each.

The first half of these exams will be one essay question, selected from a list of a few questions to be distributed a week prior to the test. See last pages of syllabus for probable questions. The second half of these exams will be multiple choice questions, testing your knowledge of the readings, lectures, and other class activities.

The term paper will count for 30 percent of the grade. (Graduate students taking PS 551 are expected to write a more extensive and in-depth paper than those taking the course for undergraduate credit; as of this going to press, there are none enrolled in fall 2015, honors.) **The term paper will be due on Thurs., Nov. 30th at 11:00 AM.**

Class participation and attendance will count for twelve percent of the grade.

No alternatives to these exam and paper due dates will be permitted except for documented medical emergencies. Also, UM-D makes reasonable accommodations for persons with documented disabilities. Students should register with the Disability Resource Services Office within the first few weeks of the semester to be eligible for services that semester. There may be occasional quizzes, each counting one to five percent of the grade (these percentages would be taken out of the weight of the three exams).

Any late assignment without a signed letter from an M.D. or equivalent authority will result in a two-notch reduction in grade for that exam (e.g., from B- to straight C). Also, UM-D makes reasonable accommodations for persons with documented disabilities.

I have been asked by the Provost to include the following statement (which should go without saying): The University of Michigan values academic honesty and integrity. Each student has a responsibility to understand, accept, and comply with the University's standards of academic conduct as set forth in the Code of Academic Conduct, as well as policies established by the schools and colleges. Cheating, collusion, misconduct, fabrication, and plagiarism are considered serious offenses. Violations will not be tolerated and may result in penalties up to and

including expulsion from the University. Other administrators think it is important that you be told what our bureaucratic goals are, so I have been told to place this website in the syllabus:
<http://www.casl.umd.umich.edu/politicalsciences/>

ON E-MAIL ETIQUETTE:

While e-mail has become a very important means of communication between students and faculty, it is important to observe appropriate norms of behavior. Because of the threat from viruses and similar plagues, I do not open emails that do not have your name as the sender, or emails that do not have a subject heading that indicates a topic related to you and the course. I also do not open e-mail attachments that you and I have not agreed to exchange in advance. This means your e-mail must actually be readable by me when I click on it; in other words, when I open an e-mail and there is no text because all the text has been placed in an attachment, I do not open the attachment. Please respect these requests of mine if you wish to contact me, and I look forward to hearing from you. Finally, on some of my computers I use the 2003 version of Microsoft Office, the one that has 3-digit suffixes such as .doc, .xls, and so on; I will not be able to receive any files, even if we have agreed to exchange their content, that have a 4-digit suffix (such as .docx). So if you have the newer version of Microsoft software, just save them as the older version, with the 3-digit suffix. Thank you!

SCHEDULE OF READINGS

Complete Reading By Sept. 12th: A Wayman and Schafer handout will be provided, on wars of the past eight years (since *Resort to War*).

In class, we will consider, among other things:

1. a term paper by Scott Gibbons (class handout), showing the way for some class term papers;
2. the Reiter, Stam, and Horowitz (Oct. 2014) *Journal of Conflict Resolution* article's appendix, at <http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/suppl/2014/10/16/0022002714553107.DC1/JCRRSHappendix8-14-14.pdf>
3. the Wayman and Schafer draft list of wars Jan. 1, 2008-Aug. 31, 2015 (noted several lines above); and
4. Wayman, "Rummel and Singer, DON and COW: To What Extent Should We Focus on the Regime, or the Interstate System?" (for 2016 publication in a book by Nils Petter Gleditsch; to be passed out in class for your reading assignment).

By Sept. 19th: Vasquez and Henehan, preface, introduction, appendix, and bibliography; read in Vasquez and Henehan to select a term paper topic. The appendix, Bremer, et al., "The Scientific Study of War: A Learning Package," is the best guide on the methodology needed to do a good term paper in the causes of war. We will try to find time for a report on Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and John Vasquez, eds., *Conflict, War, and Peace* (Los Angeles: CQ Press division of Sage Publications, 2014).

The causes of an important classical war: Kagan, *Origins of the Peloponnesian War*, last chapter (course pack). This appears on pp. 313-319 of the course pack.

By Sept. 26th:

Adequacy of realism, the traditional grand paradigm explaining war: Vasquez, *Power of Power Politics* (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998), pp. 19-39, 369-386. The Vasquez reading is pp. 321-342 of the course pack.

Alliances and War: Levy chapter, Vasquez and Henehan, ch. 1.

Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War: Huth, chs. 1-2 (pp. 1-27).

Term paper topic to be submitted to Prof. Wayman by end of class, Oct. 3rd.

By Oct. 3rd: Absolute Power Corrupts Absolutely, and is the main cause of war and genocide: R.J. Rummel, *Death by Government*, pp. 1-43. (course pack). The Rummel entry begins on p. 343 of the course pack.

Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War: Huth, ch. 3 (pp. 28-55).

A Grand Theory Integrating the Causes of War into One Framework: (In typescript in course pack): Wayman, *War and Theory in World Politics*, chapter 3, "Through the Looking Glass". (class handout)

By Oct. 10th:

Vasquez and Henehan, ch. 3: Michael Wallace, "Armaments and Escalation: Two Competing Hypotheses".

Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War: Huth, ch. 4 (pp. 56-84).

By Oct. 17th: Vasquez and Henehan, ch. 4. A reply to Michael Wallace by Paul Diehl, "Arms Races and Escalation: A Closer Look".

Power and War, at the Systemic and Dyadic Levels: Wayman, *War and Theory in World Politics*, chapters 4 and 5. These two chs. are now in ms. form as Wayman, "Bipolarity and War" and "Power Shifts and War" (future ch. 4 is in Vasquez and Henehan, as *chapter 8*; future ch. 5 is handout, from London '89 or Claremont '93 conferences).

Fall Study Break is Oct. 16th & 17th

The FIRST EXAM, covering the above material, will be on Oct. 19th.

By Oct. 24th: Vasquez and Henehan, ch. 5: Russell Leng, "When Will They Ever Learn: Coercive Bargaining in Recurrent Crises."

By Oct. 31st:

Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War: Huth, ch. 5 (pp. 85-148).

James Morrow, "The Ongoing Game-Theoretic Revolution," in Manus Midlarsky, ed., *Handbook of War Studies II* (Univ. of Michigan Press, 2000), pp. 164-192. (COURSE-PACK)

By Nov. 7th: Vasquez and Henehan, ch. 7: Siverson and King, "Alliances and the Expansion of War."

Huth, ch. 6 (pp. 149-198). Sarkees and Wayman, *Resort to War*, ch. 4.

Stuart Bremer, "Who Fights Whom, When, Where, and Why?" in John Vasquez, *What Do We Know about War?*, pp. 23-36. (course pack, pp. 391-398)

The SECOND EXAM, covering the material since Oct. 24-27, will be on Nov. 14th.

THANKSGIVING IS NOV. 23RD

By Nov. 14th: Vasquez and Henehan, chs. 8: Wayman, "Bipolarity and War". Sarkees and Wayman, *Resort to War*, ch. 6.

By Nov. 28th: Goertz, Diehl, and Balas book, *The Puzzle of Peace*.

The term paper will be due on Thurs., Nov. 30th, at 11 AM.

TURN IN TWO COPIES OF YOUR TERM PAPER. ALSO, TURN IN WITH YOUR PAPER A COPY OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION.

By Dec. 5th: Vasquez and Henahan, ch. 10, by Wallenstein; and ch. 14, by Vasquez.

Wayman, *War and Theory in World Politics*, chs. 9 and 11, as published in: "Rivalries: Recurrent Disputes and Explaining War," in John Vasquez, *What Do We Know about War?*, pp. 219-234. (course pack)

By Dec. 12th: Vasquez and Henahan, chs. 11-12; Rosen, and Organski and Kugler. Sarkees and Wayman, *Resort to War*, ch. 6. Sarkees and Wayman, *Resort to War*, ch. 7.

Huth, ch. 7 (pp. 199-220).

Vasquez and Henahan, ch. 9, by Midlarsky

Vasquez and Henahan, chs. 13, article by Rasler and Thompson.

The last day of classes for our class is Tues., Dec. 12th (the campus study day being Wed., Dec. 13th).

THE LAST EXAM IS IN FINAL EXAM WEEK (Tues., Dec. 19th, 11:30 AM)

PLAN AHEAD FOR THESE DEADLINES: EXTENSIONS OF THESE DATES WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE.

TYPES OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE

WAR (to us in this course) is sustained combat resulting in substantial casualties. The Correlates of War (COW) project has "operationalized" this as involving at least 1,000 battle-related deaths. Because of this focus on battle deaths, our concept of warfare excludes such deaths as the Jews killed in the Holocaust and the Japanese civilians killed at Hiroshima. The COW battle-death threshold is understood to be 1,000 battle deaths within a year's time (and not just a calendar year, but any 365-day period). Slaughters of defenseless people are called "democide" by the scholar R.J. Rummel. His intent in coining the term "democide" is to generalize from the familiar term genocide. Genocide is more narrow; it would include the Holocaust but not Hiroshima. Democide encompasses all "cold blooded" killing of defenseless people. Democide thus covers the mass killings that would be left out of the counts of battle deaths (Wayman and Tago 2010). Our course will not get too pre-occupied with the instances of democide, so that we can focus on war.

The definition of war from Hobbes' *Leviathan* is as follows: "War consists not in battle only, but in a tract of time wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known." (in Part I, chapter 13, "Of the Natural Condition of Mankind as Concerning Their Felicity and Misery", on pp. 106-107 of the Bobbs-Merrill edition, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1958). This definition allows for many types of war, from the "hot wars" studied by COW to conditions such as the Cold War between the U.S. and Soviet Union (from 1947 to 1989). The only trouble with Hobbes' definition is that, for the scientific study of war, it is hard to pin down when there is such a state of war, and for that reason we do not use it in the research examined in our course. Nonetheless, it remains important as capturing the full breadth of what we perhaps ideally would like to be able to understand, describe and explain.

In this course, we distinguish external from internal war. **INTERNAL WAR**, sometimes called civil war, **involves combat between people of the same independent (or "autonomous") political entity**. The political entity can be a pre-national state. An example would be the Ottoman Empire, or Ethiopia under Haile Selassie. More commonly during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the political entity will be a nation-state, such as the United States, or, occasionally, a multi-national state, such as the Soviet Union. Internal wars have occurred for many centuries. **In the post-1816 period, according to the COW Project terminology, there is an inter-state system, and these internal wars (inside state system members) are called intra-state war.**

Historical examples of such internal war are the French, Russian, and Chinese Revolutions of 1789-1804, 1917-1920, and 1911-1949, as well as the American Civil War of 1861-1865. Recent examples of intra-state wars

include the Hutu vs. Tutsi wars in Rwanda and Burundi -- wars which helped set the stage for the bloody Rwanda genocide of 1994. Note, however, that the concept of '**revolution**' often extends to include what are called colonial wars. The term 'revolution' also has broader connotations, discussed below. The point for now is that from 1816 on, the COW project has identified all members of the inter-state system, and wars within these states are intra-state wars.

What about the term "**civil war**"? You may have noticed that I haven't used it much. Many people would use "civil war" as a synonym for intra-state war; me, too. COW traditionally did so (Small and Singer 1982). But, in a revision of its labelling, described in *Resort to War*, COW now stipulates that a "civil war" must have the government as one of the combatants. War between two factions, with the government on the sidelines, would be intra-state, but would not be "civil" by this somewhat quirky new definition. For example, in 1987-1984 (war # 846) fighting between the African National Congress and Inkatha in South Africa was (in new COW terminology) inter-communal, not civil, intra-state war. Yet, to keep matters really confusing, COW calls any intra-state war that has substantial outside intervention an "internationalized civil war." To clean up such potential self-contradiction by COW, I am making one modification in the COW terminology, for our syllabus. I will be using "civil war" as a synonym for intra-state war. What, then, to call intra-state **wars between a government and rebels within the country**? I'll call them **revolts**. Since 1980, there have been 91 intra-state wars (Sarkees and Wayman, 2010: 440-480), eight of which have been inter-communal, and the remaining 83 of which have been revolts.

EXTERNAL WAR, also commonly known as international war, consists of war between one autonomous political entity and another. In the COW Project, since 1816, such external wars are called **inter-state war** if there is a **COW state system member on each side**. The COW project distinguishes **inter-state war** from **extra-state war**. **Extra-state wars are between a state and some other political entity outside the state's borders. Almost always, the extra-state wars have involved an outside entity that is being absorbed as a colony (imperial war) or struggling for independence (colonial war).** Nowadays, with colonialism frowned upon, extra-state wars no longer tend to involve traditional colonialism, and, for instance, the U.S., at the end of 2008 as Obama became President, was fighting an extra-state war in Afghanistan -- without trying to colonize Afghanistan.

Inter-state wars include World Wars I and II, as well as the Korean War and interstate aspects of the Vietnam War. **Imperial wars** include the war between the British and Zulus in 1879. **Colonial wars** include the American war of independence, commonly called the American Revolution (1776-1783), and the Algerian war of independence against France (1954-1962).

While the above summaries are a good introduction, for the full and precise definition of inter-state, extra-state war, and intra-state war, see the *Resort to War* book (Sarkees and Wayman 2010).

"**Rebellions**" or "**insurgencies**," in my terminology, are any wars between a government and its subjects. These are of two types -- revolts and colonial wars. Another possible word for some rebellions or insurgencies is "**revolutions**." It is probably wise to use revolution sparingly, because it carries the idea of not only fighting, but also fundamental change, not only in the political system but also in society. In Latin America, for example, there would be many insurgencies, but only a handful of revolutions. The few Latin American revolutions would include the Mexican Revolution in the early 20th century, and the Cuban Revolution under Fidel Castro.

THE EXPANDED COW TYPOLOGY: INTER-STATE, INTRA-STATE, EXTRA-STATE, AND INTER-COMMUNAL and other NON-STATE WARS

The struggle between the U.S. and al Qaeda illustrates how war is changing. It is not a classic inter-state war, because al Qaeda is not a sovereign state. The same could be said between Israel and Hamas in Gaza in 2008-2009. Neither of these may be big enough to be a war, but they are still important. The Israel-Hamas armed conflict of 2014 appears to be large enough to have crossed the threshold to war (1,000 battle dead). The traditional COW war typology, used in almost all of our readings, was designed for the 1816-1965 world -- a world dominated by inter-state wars between the major power members of the interstate system; this traditional typology dominated research conducted in the late 20th century. An expanded COW typology was then released (Sarkees, Wayman, and Singer 2003: 60), designed to cover war in a more consistent and comprehensive way, and refined in *Resort to War* chs. 1-2. To sum up the alterations:

Inter-state wars remained the same in their definition and treatment throughout the history of the Correlates of War Project.

The other category of international wars has been altered somewhat. In the set of external or international wars, the COW project has distinguished **inter-state war** from either "**extra-systemic**" war or "**extra-state war**." **Extra-systemic war** involves combat between a member of the interstate system and some other political *entity outside its "metropole" (meaning core area)*. For example, the battle of General Custer against Sitting Bull would be (were it big enough to be a war) extra-systemic because it was way out in the territories, beyond the metropole, or core area, of the U.S. back then. **Extra-state wars are similar to extra-systemic, but not exactly the same. Extra-state wars are between a state and some other political entity outside the state's borders.**

What some would call internal or civil wars were called "civil wars" in the traditional typology [e.g., in Small and Singer, *Resort to Arms* (1982)]; and I retain that language in this course. In a shift in terminology in the new typology, these events are called intra-state wars. Consistent with this terminology, the intra-state wars include some wars, such as between the U.S. and the Sioux Indians, that would have been called extra-systemic in the traditional COW typology; while imperial attacks on Indian territory, they are "intra-state" in the sense of occurring within the diplomatically recognized boundaries of a sovereign member of the interstate system (in this case the U.S.). The remaining extra-systemic wars, after some twenty Sioux-type wars were removed, have been labelled "extra-state."

Finally, in creating the new, expanded typology of war, an entirely novel category, war between two tribes or other non-state actors outside a state's boundaries, has added. These are called non-state wars. Non-state wars can be between two autonomous political entities that will soon be states. These can be called proto-states that are almost qualified to be members of the state system. In such situations they are external wars, similar in many ways to interstate war. In other situations, this would be an internal war, in that the two non-state actors are fighting with each other inside a sovereign unit that has not yet been counted as a state system member by COW.

In still other cases, of what would be an extremely weak sense of non-state war, we would be really dealing with "inter-communal" wars, which are only non-state in the attenuated sense that they are between non-state actors, but not in the strong sense that they are also occurring outside of state territory. Such wars are called "inter-communal" and are included in the intra-state war classification of COW, in which they constitute about ten percent of the recent intra-state wars.

During 1816-2007 inclusive, there have been 334 intra-state wars, 163 extra-state wars, 95 inter-state wars, and 62 non-state wars (Sarkees and Wayman 2010: 75, 194, 342-346, 486). If a war is between two non-state actors, as this term is commonly used in the international relations literature, an interesting question is whether it is inside a state or outside a state. If inside one state, it is treated as an "inter-communal" type of intra-state war. Only if it is between two non-state actors *and waged outside any state's boundaries* is it called **non-state in the COW lexicon** (Sarkees and Wayman, *Resort to War*, 2010). As for the 62 non-state wars, even though they are non-state, and mostly in the 19th century, we've got battle death estimates for both sides in 24 of them, measuring relative suffering on both sides, battle death estimates for one side only in five more, and total battle deaths in 12 more.

Many of these 62 non-state wars, including especially those in China and in Central America in the 19th century, are fought in what eventually becomes state territory. What should a Latin Americanist think of the non-state war, "The Bolivian Conquest of Peru, 1835-1836"? (Sarkees and Wayman 2010: 498-499, non-state war # 1518) Is it similar or different to the non-state war #1518, "The Argentine-Ranquelles Indians War of 1833-1834", or the "Argentine War for Unity" of 1829-1831? (Sarkees and Wayman 2010: 498) Doesn't the first one seem like an external war, and the latter two more like internal wars? Doesn't this decision involve some sense that Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia, post-Bolivar, are each autonomous political units? Although it is a bit tricky to associate a proto-state waging war with a specific future state, my estimate is that about 30 of the 62 non-state wars involve actors who could be called incubating-states (such as China, Bolivia, Peru, and Argentina), proto-states, and future state system members. For instance, China, not a state till 1860, is in some of these non-state wars. Before 1816, we have no COW-defined state on Chinese territory. Using the autonomous political unit of China (#710, China), we can trace China as a governed unit all the way back to 1492. This allows me to classify its non-state wars as involving China. This process is extremely pertinent to Latin American wars, as most of the controversial cases of states and war

classifications in the literature on COW involve Latin American sovereignties that were not treated by COW as states until far into their independence (because of either insufficient diplomatic recognition or population). Overall, out of the 62 non-state wars, there are 14 non-state wars in Latin America; all these occur in the 19th century, because of COW's delayed recognition of Latin American sovereignty.

Next we come to some wars that are at the boundary between international and civil:

INTERNATIONALIZED CIVIL WARS: Probably the most famous civil war in the last half of the twentieth century was the Vietnamese civil war; it is an example of an *internationalized civil war* -- i.e., a civil war in which at least one outside state intervened. Specifically, the civil war was in South Vietnam (a COW state system member at the time), but gradually the U.S. and North Vietnam, outside states, both intervened. Incidentally, they eventually intervened so much that they were doing the bulk of the fighting, and it was no longer even a civil war at all, but evolved in 1965 into an inter-state war. Another important point of clarification about the Vietnam War: even if only *one* of the outsiders (North Vietnam or the U.S.) had intervened back when it was a civil war, that would have been enough to make it an internationalized civil war. Recently, wars have increasingly been internationalized civil; the civil war in Angola in the 1970s is an interesting example, because of intervention by Cuba on the government side and South Africa on the rebel side. Since then, a large percentage (at least a quarter) of civil wars have been internationalized. While we are not focusing much on civil war in the course, we will consider the international intervention in a few recent internationalized civil wars, such as Angola, in which interstate conflict became almost as important as the underlying civil war. Small and Singer (1982: 219) specify an exact threshold at which an intra-state war becomes an "internationalized civil war": "direct military participation of such a magnitude that either 1,000 troops are committed to the combat zone or, if the force is smaller or the size unknown, 100 deaths are sustained."

Hybridized Wars: As foreign involvement in an intra-state war becomes larger and larger, it may reach a point at which the foreign power is doing the bulk of the fighting. In such a case, the war transforms from an intra-state war to an inter-state war (if the foreign power intervenes against another state, such as the U.S. vs. North Vietnam in 1965-1973) or an extra-state war (if the foreign power is fighting against rebels, as the U.S. vs. Iraqi rebels or the U.S. against Afghan rebels in the first decade of the 21st century). In the COW project, a war cannot be two wars at the same time, so it is not possible for the Vietnam War to be both a civil war between the S. Vietnam government and the Vietcong, on the one hand, and an inter-state war between N. Vietnam and the U.S. Therefore, in 1965, it transforms from a civil war to an inter-state war, when the bulk of the fighting shifts. In *Resort to War* (Sarkees and Wayman 2010: 59-60) there is a useful table of all such war transformations. Out of the 655 wars, there are 43 wars that have such a metamorphosis. Of those forty-three, 5 are in Latin America. For instance, the Franco-Mexican War of 1862-1867 transforms from an inter-state to an intra-state war after the French flee. Or, to take another example, the Spanish-Cuban extra-state War of 1895-1898 transforms into the Spanish-American inter-state War, leading to Cuban independence, after the U.S. intervenes on the side of the Cuban rebels.

MILITARIZED INTERSTATE DISPUTES AND ENDURING RIVALRIES: The Correlates of War Project has identified about 2,000 militarized interstate disputes from the Congress of Vienna to the end of the Soviet Union (i.e., 1816-1992), plus another thousand or so (on which more information was gathered) that have happened in the years since then. While the war data have now been updated through to Dec. 31, 2007, the MID data continue to 2010; to give a sense of the scale of these efforts, it cost about \$1,000,000 to provide the 1993-2001 MID update. A militarized interstate dispute is a international conflict that has involved either the explicit threat to use force, the display of force, or the use of force short of war. (See Gochman and Maoz, "Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976," in Small and Singer, *International War*, pp. 44-52.) When two nation-states have repeated militarized disputes, with less than five years between disputes, the COW project refers to such disputes as an enduring rivalry. And about 90 of these disputes have resulted in an interstate war.

TERM PAPERS

The *New York Times* ran an Aug. 11, 2015, article, "Heck of a Class Project: An 'Affordable, Robust, Compact' Fusion Reactor Design, Buildable in a Decade" describing an M.I.T. and RPI student project to design small reactors

to produce electricity from nuclear fusion. We have a similar aim in PS 451 -- to do studies that are practical and contribute to the growth of human knowledge about an interesting and important problem.

I have found that some students like to do primary research like historians, and others like to look for patterns, like a political scientist. Let us call the first type of paper "training in primary research" and the second type "hypothesis tests":

(1) Training in primary research. Papers of this sort will bring research up to date. For example, one project will be to update the Sarkees-Wayman war lists, which need to be brought from 2007 towards 2017 with the aid of the new data. Another project is to document as thoroughly as possible, by archival work at the University of Michigan Graduate Library, the about 500 early-modern wars (1492-1815); and there is still work to be done on the 1816-2007 wars. Of course, some wars, like World War II, are documented well enough for most of our purposes, but others, such as wars involving South African tribes and central Asian khanates in the 19th century, are not well documented at all. A good project for a term paper would be to xerox and bring in (with 2 copies) pages of books that report or reveal, **for extra-state wars, which side first crossed the border and which side first initiated the major fighting, and which side won and which side lost.** A good paper might look at several similar wars (e.g., wars in South Asia) and document them. I have also initiated a project to identify all the approximately 400-500 early-modern wars (1495-1815). To document, for a country like Russia, all its early modern wars, by bringing in from the library xeroxes of text identifying battle deaths in them, who started each, who won each, would be a possible primary research project this term; for the early-modern wars, a good place to start is Jack Levy, *War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975*. This work began with winter 2012 term papers and is grouped by nation (e.g., wars of Russia). Levy is very helpful because he uses the COW definition of war, but his war lists only include a war if at least one great power was a war participant, and he basically covers European wars. Pitrim Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, Vol. III, is a bit broader in coverage, and has war fatality and casualty figures. Three other books have the advantage of being global in coverage, but they are not as systematic as Levy, so their information is usually just a starting point for us. See Micheal Clodfelter, *Warfare and Armed Conflicts*, 2nd edition; George Kohn, *Dictionary of Wars*, 3rd edition, which is less valuable; and Charles Phillips and Alan Axelrod, *Encyclopedia of Wars*. The resulting term paper generally lists in chronological order the wars of a country, with who initiated and who won each, and some patterns (e.g., UK initiated 75% of the wars it was in during the period studied, and won 60% of those wars it initiated).

(2) Hypothesis Tests.

Especially for us, living in the second half of the twentieth century, when the next nuclear war could be the last, the most crucial questions to ask about war are the two interrelated ones, why do wars occur, and, knowing this, how can they be prevented? Hence, term papers will focus on why wars occur. The papers will each be an empirical investigation of a topic currently of interest to scholars and not fully understood. The topics selected must be manageable enough for a one-semester project. Given these goals and constraints, available data, and the above definitions of various types of international conflict, term paper topics might include the following questions: Is war on the increase or decrease?

What are the trends in extra-state or extrasystemic (imperial and colonial) war, 1816-present?

What is the relationship between extra-state and interstate war, 1816-present?

Are interstate wars more likely in multipolar than bipolar systems, 1500-1990? What about unipolar systems (like today's)?

Do totalitarian regimes account for twentieth century battle deaths?

Do democracies ever fight each other?

Do power transitions lead to war, 1816-1997?

Do power shifts lead to war, 1816-1997?

Does superior capability deter aggression by a revisionist, 1816-1997?

Does inferior capability lead to capitulation, 1816-1997?

Over the centuries of the modern era, has there been a change in the percentage of successful secession movements that are the result of a war (as opposed to the peaceful secessions)?

Does overwhelming preponderance lead to peace, 1816-1997?

Do initiators win wars?

Are initiators of wars also initiators of the MIDs leading to the war?

Does superior capability lead to victory in wars, both long and short?

Does lateral pressure lead to war, 1816-1990?

How war prone is the Middle East (or some other region) compared to other regions of the globe, since 1816?

How war prone are certain countries and sets of countries, compared to others, in the entire modern era since 1492?

See Vasquez and Henehan for additional ideas.

As this list suggests, all term papers must be analyses of how some factor produces or is associated with the onset of war or the escalation of interstate violence. Good rules on how to do such a paper are provided in the last chapter of Vasquez and Henehan. All papers must be centered around the analysis of Correlates of War project data. Your term paper analysis must be an original look at data involving the relationship between war or interstate violence, on the one hand, and some predictor of it, on the other. Your analysis must be based on your own research, not a table or set of tables from someone else's research.

YOUR RESPONSIBILITIES: ON WRITING

Undergraduate education is, for most students, a preparation for professional responsibilities in the working world. One important part of this preparation is the development of the ability to write effectively and the habit of working to perfect one's written work. This is a primary purpose of the term paper. Therefore, there is no distinction between doing a good job on the paper, on the one hand, and writing well, on the other. All papers should be thoroughly rewritten before submission, so that they are well organized, well written, and free of grammatical, spelling, and even typographical errors. Grades will be marked down for grammatical, typographical, stylistic, and spelling errors. Consult a manual on writing, such as the *Harbrace College Handbook*, the *MLA Handbook*, or the *Chicago Manual of Style* before starting your paper. Another excellent source is Strunk and White's *The Elements of Style*, which describes how to write well.

NOTE: If you do not properly attribute a quotation or an idea, you are committing plagiarism. To plagiarize is "to steal and pass off as one's own the ideas and words of another." [*Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary*, (Springfield, MA, 1965), p. 646.] Plagiarism is unethical. Anyone found plagiarizing will be given an E for that assignment.

THE WARS WE STUDY

The most up-to-date list and description of wars is in Sarkees and Wayman's *Resort to War*. Earlier versions of the COW war lists, however, provide useful snapshots of what we have learned. Interstate wars since the Napoleonic era are listed on pp. 28-30 of Small and Singer's *International War*, and that list is very valuable because it ranks wars in

intensity, showing which ones have been most deadly per day, and which less so. Other useful older versions of the war lists, including the participants on the winning and losing sides, are contained in Singer and Small, *The Wages of War* (N.Y.: John Wiley, 1972), pp. 60-69, and in Small and Singer, *Resort to Arms* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1982), pp. 82-95. *Resort to Arms*, published later, lists some international wars that occurred subsequent to the publication of *The Wages of War*, and includes the first COW list of civil wars.

Do all types of war have the same root causes, or are some types of war caused by different factors than other types? As part of the academic division of labor, civil wars are studied by scholars in comparative politics, while interstate wars are studied by scholars of international politics. But is this split justified? No one has yet explained why interstate wars would have different causes than extrasystemic or civil wars. A few extrasystemic wars, and even a couple of civil wars that were similar in etiology to interstate wars, may be suitable for inclusion in studies of the causes of as examined in our course. Two examples of the former would be the Opium Wars, between China and Britain, fought in the nineteenth century before China was classified as a member of the interstate system. An example of the latter (qualifying civil wars) would be the U.S. Civil War, which is perhaps more accurately called by its Southern name, the War between the States. In the study of any extrasystemic or civil war, care must be taken to justify why it is appropriate for inclusion within the bounds of the theoretical explanations of war examined in our course.

FRAMEWORKS FOR EXPLAINING WAR:

Various frameworks have been used by scholars to account for interstate war. Four common ones we will discuss are as follows:

ISSUES FRAMEWORK

The first framework focuses on the issues at stake between the two sides in the conflict. Are the issues predominantly territorial (a boundary dispute), ethnic (involving dissident minorities in one or both of the states), economic, strategic, or ideological? Do the issues seem to lend themselves to compromise, or do they seem to involve fundamental disagreements that cannot be compromised (e.g., because they involve conflicting moral views)? Is there a past history of the rivalry that has poisoned relations so that compromise is very difficult? Is it possible to identify a status quo side that wants to keep things as they are, and a revisionist power that wants to fundamentally change the status quo? This framework can be used to explain a number of aspects of dispute outcomes. For example, does the existence of a certain type of issue (say, ideological) make war more likely? Or, if there is a revisionist power, is it the one that escalates the dispute to war? The most notable study of international issues is Mansbach and Vasquez, *In Search of Theory: A New Paradigm for Global Politics*. Problems with the issues framework are that issues listed as causes of war have often divided countries for years before the war occurred, issues are often just propaganda, and issue differences between nations are very hard to verify and accurately measure.

Ideally, this scholars using this paradigm should be able to answer each of the following questions, for wars in general and for any specific war: Did economic conflict exist between the two sides? Was this powerful enough to help account for the war? Were there ethnic conflicts that can help account for the war? Territorial disputes? Struggles between revolutionary states and non-revolutionary neighbors? Were there ideological differences between the two states? Did regime types play a role in the onset of war (democratic dyads don't fight, but dictatorial vs. dictatorial and dictatorial vs. democratic wars frequently occur)? Were the issues dividing the two sides especially difficult to achieve compromise on, and if so, in what way? Did this difficulty in reaching compromise help cause the war? Did the decision makers see prevailing in the matter at issue as a gain so great that it outweighed the cost of fighting? Or did the cost of war seem greater than the possible gains? Did these cost-benefit calculations play any role in the outbreak of war?

CAPABILITIES AND COALITIONS, OR REALIST, FRAMEWORK

The second framework emphasizes the material capabilities available to each side in the dispute. Which side is stronger? Is there an arms race? Is there a power transition occurring between the two sides, or about to occur

between the two sides? Are there allies or military assistance that complicate this picture, and if so, how does this affect the capability balance, arms race, and/or power transition? This framework can be used to explain such things as the timing of war; for instance, a nation about to be overtaken in a power transition may decide to attack an enduring rival while there is still a good chance to win. The realist paradigm is by far the dominant paradigm adopted by those who seriously study causes of war, and it has been so for over 2,000 years, since the time of Thucydides. Ideally, scholars using this approach should be able to answer each of the following questions: Was there a power transition before war? Did this help cause war? Was there overwhelming preponderance or equality between the two sides? Did the war come about in part because of equality? What pertinent alliances existed? How did alliances affect the outbreak of war? For instance, what role did alliances play in these calculations of which side is ahead, and which side is gaining on the other? Did alliances help deter attack, and thus help prevent war? Or did alliances just entangle third parties in a two-party dispute, and this widen the war?

Turning to the system level: Was the system multipolar or bipolar? Did multipolarity play a role in causing the war? Was the system bipolarized? Did bipolarization play a role in causing the war?

A NOTE ON REALISM:

Students in the past have been curious about political realism (which is described in more detail in PS 371, International Politics). The realist framework, dating back to Thucydides, is the oldest of the four we are considering. It is called the realist framework because it is drawn from the realist theory of international politics; this theory is summarized in the reading by Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff in Small and Singer (1989: 212-216).

The realist theory attempts to describe how states do behave, and to prescribe how they ought to behave. The descriptive side of realist theory is sometimes called the 'realpolitik' model. Realism emphasizes the anarchic nature of the international system, in which there is no effective legislature, no effective judiciary, and no effective police force. In such a system, according to the realpolitik model, nation-states will pursue their own national interests, and will conceive these national interests in terms of military power. Nation-states will be fearful of conquest by other nations, and will therefore build up national capabilities (including armaments) and form coalitions (including military alliances) to protect themselves. This will be especially true when the system contains one or more revisionist states. Revisionist states are states willing to use force to overthrow the status quo; classic revisionist states were Germany, Italy, and Japan just before and during World War II. Realists are skeptical of international law, of the United Nations, and of any ideals (such as communism, world brotherhood, or environmentalism) that attempt to transcend or replace nationalism.

The realist theory has had a great impact on U.S. foreign policy officials since World War II, and has been used to justify much of U.S. foreign policy. Leading practitioners of political realism have included Henry Kissinger, Richard Nixon, and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Leading opponents have included Jimmy Carter, who tried to pursue a more idealistic foreign policy, but kept Brzezinski around because he wanted to hedge his bets. Realist critics charge that Carter's idealist policy was bad for U.S. interests, because it led to the overthrow of the Shah of Iran by the Ayatollah, the overthrow of Somocho by the Sandinistas, and a treaty turning over the Panama Canal to what was soon to be the Noriega government. Important academic realists include Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, and John Mearsheimer.

Because of the unparalleled impact of the realist framework on academics and policy makers, the realist framework merits serious attention. Variables such as material capabilities and alliance memberships are emphasized by realists. Often, the Correlates of War project has investigated the degree to which realist assumptions about the world and the causes of war are correct.

CRISIS BEHAVIOR FRAMEWORK

The third framework emphasizes the resolve and belligerence of the two sides. Which side escalates to the higher level in disputes? Which side escalates faster? Which side is willing to negotiate? Which side initiates most of the incidents? This framework would be useful in explaining such outcomes as which side wins and which side loses.

Does a particular pattern of escalation seem particularly effective, ineffective, or counter-productive compared to alternative patterns? This framework has been popular in recent years with scholars such as Russell Leng, who have applied it to the study of interstate crises, such as the Cuban Missiles crisis and the Gulf Crisis.

Ideally, scholars using this approach should be able to answer each of the following questions: Did communications become shorter and more stereotyped during the crisis, and did this contribute to the onset of war? Did the two sides fail to communicate clearly with each other, so that misunderstanding of what was being said led to war? Did the decision makers overperceive the other side's hostility, and did this help lead to war? Did the decision makers underperceive their own hostility, and did this help cause the war? Did the decision makers escalate, play tit-for-tat, or de-escalate in response to the other side's moves, and did this pattern play a role in the onset of the war? Did either side under-perceive the hostility of the other side, and therefore fail to be tough enough to deter the other side from attacking? Did the war result from a failure to deter?

DETERRENCE FRAMEWORK

In many ways, the deterrence framework overlaps heavily with, and draws upon, the realist and crisis behavior frameworks. Deterrence is the use of a threat to prevent a nation-state from doing something (in this case, attacking you) that it otherwise was going to do. In this framework, we need to ask such questions as: Was there a clear intent to attack? Can this be inferred from explicit threats and troop movements (the threat to use force and the display of force), or from a valid "reading of the minds" of the decision makers? Was a clear threat made by the would-be attacker? How was it communicated (usually by words such as "this would be viewed as a grave matter" and by actions)? Was the threat credible? Did the target, or its allies, make counter-threats? How clearly? How were they communicated? Were they credible? Did they involve compellance as well as deterrence? What was at stake? If the counter-threats were being made by an ally, how strong were the ties (military, cultural, and economic) between the target and its ally (or allies)? This framework is perhaps the most promising one, drawing as it does on the emerging fields of game theory and decision theory. A leading example of it is Huth's book, *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War*.

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ESSAY EXAM QUESTIONS:

P.S. 451 Peace and War. **Exam #1**, 010208. Prof. F. Wayman
Prepare 25 minute answers to each of the following questions. One will be on the exam.

1. Discuss the findings of Michael Wallace, who argued that arms races led to war and that military strength did not prevent attack by revisionist states. Do you agree or disagree with Wallace? Be sure to include the ideas and research of Diehl, Weede, Vasquez and Henehan, and others.

2. Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the realist paradigm for studying the causes of war. What is the realist approach, and what is the evidence for and against it?

What are the realist explanations of the causes of war? List some realist hypotheses and discuss their plausibility and how well they each square with the evidence.

3. What is deterrence, and what makes extended, immediate deterrence work? (Be sure to discuss all the main findings of Paul Huth.)

4. What is the relationship of the state to the patterns of modern war?

P.S. 451 Peace and War **Exam #2** 010422 Prof. Wayman Essay Section (30 minutes)

Prepare 30 minute answers to each of the following questions. One of them will be on the exam.

1. Since 1945 there has been an unprecedented period of peace among the great powers. Agree or disagree with that statement, and support your position, including in your discussion the effect of nuclear weapons, the impact of democratization, and linkages to other factors of your choosing, such as displacement and polarity/polarization.

2. How does the international system affect the onset and spread of war?

P.S. 451 Peace and War **Exam #3** 010422 Prof. Wayman Essay Section (30 minutes)

Prepare 30 minute answers to each of the following questions. One of them will be on the exam.

1. Present a general overview of the causes of war, taking into account the process that leads to war (Vasquez, "Steps to War"), and the four frameworks from Wayman's chapter ("Rivalries").

2. Based on the readings and lectures, what would you say we know about the causes of war? What important questions remain unanswered concerning the causes of war? Be sure to include a discussion of Stuart Bremer's "Who Fights Whom, When, Where, and Why?"

3. Describe Singer and Small's Correlates of War project, examining its scope, defining its key concepts, and assessing how it is related to efforts to understand the causes of war. You may want to discuss the summary of the March 2001 Penn State conference, compiled by Prof. Wayman and distributed in class.

4. What are the main points of Goertz, Diehl, and Balas in *The Puzzle of Peace*? What does it teach us that we didn't already know from the other readings in the course?

UM-Dearborn-mandated statements:

Goals and Rules:

I have been asked by the Provost to include the following statement (which should go without saying): The University of Michigan values academic honesty and integrity. Each student has a responsibility to understand, accept, and comply with the University's standards of academic conduct as set forth in the Code of Academic Conduct, as well as policies established by the schools and colleges. Cheating, collusion, misconduct, fabrication, and plagiarism are considered serious offenses. Violations will not be tolerated and may result in penalties up to and including expulsion from the University. Our administrators think it is important that you be told what our bureaucratic goals are, so I have been told to place this sort of information in the syllabus:

Campus Honors Program: Core Learning Outcomes

1. Written and Verbal Communications:

Communicate clearly in writing and public speaking.

Compose analyses of challenging texts in thesis-driven academic essays.

Compose advanced, inquiry-oriented papers, demonstrating comprehension of relevant primary and secondary sources and academic genres.

2. Critical Thinking:

Raise good questions.

Evaluate relevant texts in terms of authors' theses, assumptions, evidence, and inferences.

Consider counterevidence in response to ongoing reading.

Draw well-reasoned conclusions that address the implications of findings.

3. Integrative, Comparative, and Creative Thinking:

Compare different historical contexts and ideas.

Assess one's own assumptions.

Create ways of integrating contrasting information on contexts and theories.

4. Written and Verbal Communications:

Recognize problems that inhibit use of intellectual standards in thinking.

Identify and discuss reasonable solutions.

Work and communicate with others in solving problems.

RULES FOR TURNING IN MAJOR/TERM PAPERS: TURN IN TWO PRINTED AND ONE EMAILED COPY (3 IN ALL).

Grading Scale:

Grading of the exams and of the term papers is on a basis of absolute quality rather than a curve. Grades of A correspond to a GPA of 4.0, B is a 3.0, C is a 2.0, and so on down through D (1.0) and E or F (0). Class participation grade takes into account attendance, formulating good questions, effectiveness in any class presentations, and participating constructively in class discussion.

University Attendance Policy:

A student is expected to attend every class and laboratory for which he or she has registered. Each instructor may make known to the student his or her policy with respect to absences in the course. It is the student's responsibility to be aware of this policy. The instructor makes the final decision to excuse or not to excuse an absence. An instructor is entitled to give a failing grade (E) for excessive absences or an Unofficial Drop (UE) for a student who stops attending class at some point during the semester.

Academic Integrity Policy:

The University of Michigan-Dearborn values academic honesty and integrity. Each student has a responsibility to understand, accept, and comply with the University's standards of academic conduct as set forth by the Code of Academic Conduct (<http://umdearborn.edu/697817/>), as well as policies established by each college. Cheating, collusion, misconduct, fabrication, and plagiarism are considered serious offenses and violations can result in penalties up to and including expulsion from the University.

Disability Statement:

The University will make reasonable accommodations for persons with documented disabilities. Students need to register with Disability Resource Services (DRS) every semester they are enrolled. DRS is located in Counseling & Support Services, 2157 UC (http://www.umd.umich.edu/cs_disability/). To be assured of having services when they are needed, students should register no later than the end of the add/drop deadline of each term. If you have a disability that necessitates an accommodation or adjustment to the academic requirements stated in this syllabus, you must register with DRS as described above and notify your professor.

Safety:

All students are strongly encouraged to register in the campus Emergency Alert System, for communications during an emergency. The following link includes information on registering as well as safety and emergency procedures information:
<http://umemergencyalert.umd.umich.edu/> Finally, all students are also encouraged to program 911 and UM-Dearborn's Public Safety phone number (313) 593-5333 into personal cell phones. In case of emergency, first dial 911 and then if the situation allows call UM-Dearborn Public Safety.

MISSED DEADLINES AND ACCOMODATIONS:

No late work will be accepted without a physician's letter or similar documentation.