anonymously on the websites of Romanian newspapers as a source of data on contemporary opinions and memories (chapter seven). Such a critique would be fair; anybody who has read such comments knows that there is a strong self-selection bias among those who choose to leave postings (extreme nationalists and "professional victims" are particularly drawn to such chat boards).

Beyond these minor quibbles, the strength of Bucur's cultural history cannot be questioned. However, the shift in tone, method, and content that characterizes the final chapter, which focuses on commemoration since the end of Communist rule, may disappoint some students of contemporary Romanian politics. In the chapter, Bucur takes aim at Romania's post-Communist intellectual and cultural elite. She essentially argues that leading public intellectuals, such as author and publisher Gabriel Liiceanu, have an obligation to encourage public reflection over questions of responsibility for crimes committed during the wars (particularly in Transnistria). However, intellectual elites have largely abdicated that responsibility and, instead, chosen to focus their writings and commemoration projects on (their own) suffering under Communist rule (pp. 238-39, 241-43). Bucur's reaction to this privileging of the Communist era is a simple refusal to engage debates over the merits of commemorating Communist rule in Romania. While perhaps understandable, this is a disappointing omission. Debates over the need for public confrontation with Communist past dominated the Romanian political scene between 2005 and 2007, and Bucur's nuanced understanding of the dynamics of collective commemoration puts her in a uniquely strong position to assess the interests that underwrote efforts from President Traian Băsescu, and others, to initiate public reckoning with the Communist past.

Bucur's unwillingness to extend her analysis to contemporary memory politics may ultimately serve to limit the audience of *Heroes and Victims*. However, even as it stands, the depth of the analysis provided, and Bucur's capacity to weave together history, anthropology, and narrative story-telling, means that this impressive work should appeal to graduate students and researchers who have an interest in Central and East European history and historiography. It should also prove engaging for historians whose research may lie outside the region, but who are interested in the growing and engaging literature on collective commemoration and collective memory.

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Sorrowful shores: violence, ethnicity, and the end of the Ottoman Empire, 1912–1923, by Ryan Gingeras, New York: Oxford University Press, 256 pages, US\$99.00, ISBN 978-0199561520.

This is a most welcome addition to the analysis of a much understudied period of contemporary Turkish history, namely the formative years of the Turkish nation-state extending from 1912 – before the advent of the 1919 Independence Struggle – to 1923 when the

Turkish Republic was formally proclaimed. Given that the Republican archives have still not yet been fully opened to scholarly analysis, Gingeras presents a meticulous study of what exists not only in Turkey, but also abroad as he portrays what transpired from the standpoint of four significant communities, the Armenians and Greek Rums on the one side and the Circassians and the Albanians on the other. Even though these communities have often been portrayed in contemporary historical analysis in conflict with each other, especially given the role played by the Circassians in the destruction of the Armenians, Gingeras presents a much more nuanced analysis as he points to the "mass disenfranchisement and liquidation of home populations" by the state (p. viii).

The study focuses on a region of the Ottoman Empire – soon to become Republican Turkey - that has also been much understudied, namely the south Marmara region in the west quite close to the imperial capital of Istanbul. This region received a lot of immigration during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century's that produced a veritable mix of native Armenians and Greek Rums joined by Muslim north Caucasian (Circassian) and Albanian migrants. Especially noteworthy in this process was the fact that the Circassians and Albanians then became "the highest ranking officials and officers as well as the most insidious bandits and rebels (p. 2)." How this ethnic and religious mix came into being in the region is analyzed in chapter one, leading in chapter two to the study of the ensuing polarization during World War I - the Greek Rums and Armenians were forcibly removed from the region and the Circassians and Albanians developed disparate visions within their own communities. Chapters three and four trace how the birth of the national movement on the one hand, and the almost simultaneous emergence of the loyalist opposition on the other, impacted this intra-ethnic polarization. For example, some Circassians were recruited as assassins into the clandestine service of the Special Organization initially established by the Young Turks; at the same time, other Circassians served as loyalist opponents in the service of the Ottoman sultan. The ensuing havoc became even more convoluted with the Greek occupation of the region in the aftermath of World War I when the Ottoman Empire was formally defeated by the Allied Powers. It was also in this particular context that the Circassians of the region who had become a formidable force started to engage in a separatist movement, a process aptly analyzed in chapter five. Chapter six illustrates how after the occupying Greek forces were ultimately defeated by the Turkish nationalists, the subsequent Turkish nation-building process ultimately liquidated the Circassians and the Albanians through often violent deportations.

Among the many contributions of this valuable book, one should especially note the hitherto inadequately studied fates of the Muslim migrant communities. Nation-state rhetoric tends to whitewash all differences among its citizens and hides the violence that often accompanies state-building processes. Even though the violence confronted by the Armenians, Greek Rums, and Circassians in this process has been separately analyzed, Gingeras provides the scholarly community with the first comparative study. He demonstrates that what has been perceived as separate instances of suffering by disparate communities in fact has an inherent unifying theme: these were all instances of the violence accompanying a state-building process. This process wreaked havoc particularly on those communities considered as the "other" by the dominant Muslim Turkish majority governing both the Ottoman Empire and later the ensuing Turkish nation-state. Even though different communities encountered disparate degrees of suffering in that the annihilation of the Armenians and the violent forced removal of the Greek Rums diverge from the polarized loyalties of the Circassians that also largely destroyed their community, it is nevertheless refreshing to have all of them contextualized and analyzed within a particular geographic region.

Also fascinating in Gingeras's study is the manner in which he provides a detailed analysis of the origins of the much discussed but rather poorly analyzed clandestine service, namely the Special Organization (*Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*) of the Committee of Union and Progress of the Young Turks. This clandestine service was not only active during the nationalist movement, but later formed the seeds of the National Intelligence Organization (*Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı*) that is still in existence in Turkey today. Still much contested in contemporary Turkey is the nature of the clandestine activities this organization engages in. Gingeras reveals that "the culture of paramilitarism" that emerged between 1912 and 1923 continues to shape the contemporary paramilitaristic activities of this organization (p. 169). Also significant in this context is Gingeras's assertion that "class and regional associations rather than the forces of nationalism and Islam" swayed the allegiances of Muslim Circassian or Albanian immigrants (p. 168). Such an insight inevitably leads to the question of how these class and regional associations play out in contemporary Turkey today. It would be most interesting if, in his future work, Gingeras brings his initial study of these origins to the contemporary era.

In summary, this book provides most valuable insight into the nation-building process in the Ottoman Empire as it gradually and painfully transformed into the Turkish Republic. As such, it is a must-read for all those interested in the workings of nations and nationalism in general, and scholars focusing on the Turkish nation-building process in particular.

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The resurrection and collapse of empire in Habsburg Serbia, 1914–1918, by Jonathan E. Gumz, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009, xii + 275 pp. + illustrations, US\$80.00, ISBN 978-0521896276

Jonathan Gumz's new book offers a comprehensive and highly stimulating analysis of a topic ripe for exactly that: the occupation of Serbia by the Habsburg military during the First World War. The author challenges the argument that that war's various occupations in Europe are best understood as "part of a continuum of occupation experiences" (p. 10) world-wide and were uniformly part of an evolving process that included colonization and which became more radical over time leading into World War II. He contends instead that the one he examined derived from specific circumstances and does not fit the standard characterization.

Gumz explains that the occupation saw the Habsburg Army carry out a particular vision of governance, one that grew out of its understanding of how a state should exercise its authority in lands it controlled. The occupation was part of a counterrevolutionary struggle that the Habsburg Army waged in all the territories where it operated, whether foreign or domestic. The army considered itself hostile to civil society, above politics, objective, just, and anational, and thus opposed representative government, liberalism, and nationalism. The only legitimate sovereign authority was that of the monarch, and the Army was his instrument for keeping order and meting out justice.

In terms of the conduct of war, the Army had a specific goal: preserving the traditional, legally defined (by international law) distinction between civilian and combatant. This