CHAPTER 2

The Decline of the Ottoman Empire and the Emergence of Greek, Armenian, Turkish, and Arab Nationalisms

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In the late nineteenth century, a Muslim army physician commented on how the attempts to salvage the empire led ironically to its demise by generating disparate identities, including his own Turkish one. He stated:[1]

> We saw that a Circassian club had opened in our neighborhood. Then an Albanian association was formed. Soon after, an Arab philanthropic society appeared! . . . Circassians wanted their freedom, as did the Albanians. The members of all these clubs were graduates of our own schools. . . . Hence the Bulgarian . . . Albanian . . . Arab independence movements were all manned by those reared and educated in our country, our schools . . . I am dying for the Turkish cause, but I am carrying this cause like a secret bowl in me. I do not tell about it to anyone. For I know that if we do that, our action will legitimate the explication of the inner thoughts of the others. And that would mean the fragmentation, the extinction of the empire.

In spite of the precautions of the physician, the ensuing polarization generated Greek, Armenian, Turkish, and Arab[2] nationalisms. This chapter focuses on the emergence of these nationalisms through time and in comparison to one another. It argues that structures, visions, and organizations interact to construct nationalisms. Specifically, political structures combine with visions of history within the context of specific organizations to produce Greek, Armenian, Turkish, and Arab nationalisms.

While the historical phenomena of war, commerce, and reform movements determine the structure of nationalisms, the new visions of history, literature, and education gave meaning to them. The political mobilization during these phenomena and around these visions occurred as a consequence of the new organizational forms of philanthropic associations, secret societies, and political parties. It was thus the interaction of these three elements of structures, visions, and organizations within the historical context of Ottoman decline that determined the specific forms and trajectories of emergent nationalisms.

Although these nationalisms have been studied separately, there are no existing surveys that problematize and comparatively analyze their disparate destinies. Yet a comparative analysis of the social construction of these four nationalisms might illuminate why nationalisms acquire a particular shape, trajectory, and outcome. Among the four nationalisms, Greek nationalism was the first to become established with ample European support of its independence in the early nineteenth century; the Armenian nationalist movement, which developed almost a century later, faced a harsher, polarized, and more nationalistic Ottoman state that totally destroyed it. The Arab nationalist movement, which emerged in early twentieth century and gained momentum during and after the First World War, led, with Western help, to the secession of the Arab provinces from the empire. Escalating military defeats and social polarization enabled Turkish nationalism to gradually triumph over Ottomanism, culminating in the foundation of a Turkish nation-state on the ruins of the empire.

MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS OF NATIONALISM AND THE OTTOMAN CONTEXT

The current literature on nationalism articulates the structural, cultural and organizational dimensions employed here. Scholars who trace the historical formation of nationalism[3] often emphasize the institutions and organizational framework through which nationalisms become publicly visible. Tracing the roots of the word *nation* to the Latin root *nasci* "to be born," implying the idea of a people of common breed or place of origin, Leonard Tivey[4] focuses, for instance, on how the state employs educational institutions, a system of citizenship to create such imagined unity, and uniformity of origin. Peter Alter[5] traces the emergence of the nation-states to the Congress of Vienna and emphasizes how nations create their own definition through the Western European historical transformation. Anthony Smith focuses instead on the spread[6] of nationalism "from its French and English heartlands" to seeds planted in Germany, Hungary, and Italy, which then, in turn, serve as models for the nationalisms of Serbia, Greece and others. In studying nationalism among the smaller European nations, Miroslav Hroch[7] focuses on the social actors and the processes through which nationalism mobilizes society; he emphasizes the significance of the interaction between the urban strata, especially the new social groups of the bourgeoisie and the professionals with new material interests, with the countryside.

Scholars who focus on the meaning systems that generate and interpret nationalism emphasize especially the role of culture in producing the spectrum of nationalisms.[8] Ernest Gellner identifies[9] homogeneity, literacy, and anonymity as the traits of nationalism where men profess political loyalty to a culture, often transmitted through education. The sense of solidarity, common culture, and national consciousness often defines the elements that gradually bind a community of people into a nation.[10] Anthony Smith delves[11] into the construction of nationalism and highlights ethnicity as the significant category through which communities generate "common myths of descent, shared historical memories, a common culture, an association with a recognized territory and a sense of solidarity." Geoff Eley[12] problematizes the ahistoricity often embedded in the formulation of nationalism[13] when he reconceptualizes nationality as a "complex, uneven unpredictable process forged from an interaction of cultural coalescence and specific political intervention." Benedict Anderson's work focuses on the imagined nature of this newly created political community, "imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign . . . as a cultural artefact of a particular kind,"[14] that spreads out to Asia and Africa where its constructed nature becomes even more apparent. Even though the organizational elements within which these nationalisms take shape are not extensively discussed in and of themselves, all the scholars also take notice of the philanthropic and secret societies and political parties that help reproduce nationalisms.

Structure, cultural processes, and organizational forms interact within a historical framework to produce different constructions of nationalisms. The nationalisms produced in the Ottoman Empire do indeed follow such a pattern. The Ottoman Empire, founded in the late-thirteenth-century in Asia Minor, was ruling over parts of the Balkans, Crimea, Asia Minor, the Fertile Crescent, and North Africa in the eighteenth and part of the nineteenth centuries and gradually disintegrated in the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as Greek, Armenian, Turkish, and Arab nationalisms emerged from within. The empire ended officially in 1922 as it was replaced by the Turkish Republic.

What was the effect of the Ottoman social structure on how the four nationalisms emerged? The Ottoman social structure[15] was theoretically

based on the personal delegation of authority by the sultan. Those who administered the sultan's delegated authority were the "rulers" who dispensed justice, governed the provinces, recruited soldiers, and collected taxes. In return for carrying out these services, the officials received grants and revenues, did not pay taxes, wore distinct clothing, carried arms, and had an exclusive educational and legal system. The rest of society without the sultan's delegated authority made up the "ruled" who had no access to the sultan's authority or thereby to any of the privileges associated with it. They were subdivided along the lines of religion and settlement into Muslim and non-Muslim, town people and peasants, and sedentary and nomadic people, each with different tax obligations. The significant divide among the Greek and Armenian nationalisms on the one side and the Turkish and Arab nationalisms on the other emerged from the fact that religion was the fixed requirement for joining the ranks of the rulers—being a Muslim was the most important requirement in reaching the highest echelons of the Ottoman social structure. Such a divide categorically placed the non-Muslims of the empire among the ruled—only under exceptional circumstances and through display of skills could a select number of Ottoman minorities join the ranks of the rulers.

The Ottoman social structural location of the non-Muslim religious minorities within the ruled informed the organizational basis of the subsequent Greek and Armenian nationalisms. The Ottoman minorities had protected legal status as a religious community; each was granted some internal autonomy and had to pay special protection and military exemption in return.[16] This internal autonomy often comprised the right to designate communal administrators to oversee communal property, to adjudicate conflict within the community, and to represent the community to the Ottoman state at large. The Ottoman religious minorities[17] mainly comprised the Greeks, Armenians, Jews, and Arab Christians[18] in the provinces. All Orthodox Christians, including the Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians, Melkites, Rumanians and Albanians were placed under the authority of the Greek patriarch, and the non-Orthodox Christian subjects,[19] comprising the Armenian, Ethiopian, Syrian Jacobite, Georgian, Chaldean, and Coptic communities, came under the jurisdiction of the Armenian patriarch.[20] Hence Greeks and Armenians became the two ethnoreligious categories in the empire as the religious elements identifying these minority groups combined with cultural ones: sumptuary and legal codes, codes on the use of space carefully defined and reflected this basic separation. The restrictions placed upon the minorities prevented them from developing social ties with the Muslims through marriage, inheritance, or attending same places of worship or bathhouses. Such restrictions, whether present in theory or in practice,

delineated and maintained the boundaries of minorities as a separate social group[21] and led them instead to develop social ties with other non-Muslims who were either members of other Ottoman minorities or with foreign residents who were often connected to European powers.

The Ottoman social structure affected the developing Greek and Armenian nationalisms in a manner quite different from the Turkish and Arab ones. Turks and Arabs were predominantly Muslim and therefore united as one within the large community of believers, a community that overlooked ethnic, racial, and other divides from within the congregation. They in theory appeared as actors equally eligible for recruitment as the officials of the empire. It was this unity, one that did not exist with the Ottoman Greeks and Armenians, that gave their nationalist movements a different slant. The Ottoman ethnoreligious divide certainly inhibited the mobilization of nineteenth- and twentieth-century emergent nationalisms around a common vision. Still, one factor that united the experiences of actors in all four nationalisms was that in each case those social actors who initially drew power from the sultan lost out.

PATTERNS OF EMERGENT NATIONALISMS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

The communication revolution that occurred with the establishment of the newspapers, the development of the telegraph and the railroad system, and the linkage of ports and hinterland escalated the impact of the interaction of the structural, cultural, and organizational elements that shaped the emergent nationalisms in the Ottoman Empire. Social and political interactions within and across social groups occurred at a much accelerated pace and promptly transformed existing arrangements.

Structures of War, Commerce, and Reform

The wars involving the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries stemmed mostly from the "Eastern question," referring to the quandaries faced by England, France, Austria, Germany, and Russia, in locating the Ottoman Empire within their realignment of political and economic spheres of influence throughout the world. Many wars were fought among the European powers, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire to delineate the boundaries of this realignment. As economic influence interacted with political might, European powers intervened more in the future course of the Ottoman Empire. The European need for both raw material and new markets led to increased European economic penetration and the subsequent weakening of Ottoman trade

and production. Another European intervention was its support of social reforms; France and England urged social reforms onto the Ottoman Empire to overcome its increasing political, economic, and social weaknesses. It was within this context of war, commerce, and reform that the course of Greek, Armenian, Turkish, and Arab nationalisms started to take shape.

War, Foreign Policy, and Population Movements The late nineteenth century was a period of significant political conflicts and ensuing population movements. As wars polarized states and social groups within them, and as population movements and foreign policies advocated social realignments along lines of shared language, religion, and ethnicities, the potential conditions of nationalism, of shared characteristics across a social expanse started to emerge. The Ottoman wars of the nineteenth century evolved around the Eastern question; the Russian Empire was the main adversary of the European powers often taking sides as befitting their political interests. The rapid succession of wars with Russia in 1877–78, Greece in 1897, Italy in 1911, and the two Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913, in addition to rebellions[22] sapped the strength, morale, and manpower of the Ottoman army. Also, the Ottoman Empire had to hand Cyprus over to British administration and, in 1881–82, had to accept the imposition of the French protectorate over Tunisia and the British occupation over Egypt.

What effect did these wars have upon emergent Ottoman nationalisms? Polarization within the Ottoman Greek and Armenian communities escalated, and communal divides started to emerge between those siding with the Ottoman state against those preferring foreign protection; those opposing the Ottoman state often actively volunteered in wars to fight against the Ottomans. During the Crimean War between the Ottomans and Russians, for instance, a Greek volunteer region was sworn in to assist in the Russian defense of Sebastopol.[23] Similarly,[24] in the Russian-Ottoman War of 1877–78, several thousand Armenian men in Constantinople volunteered to serve in the Ottoman army of the eastern front, while the Armenians of the Russian Empire volunteered on the other side.[25] The effects of these wars were different in the case of the Ottoman Turks and Arabs; the continuous Ottoman defeats and the internal rebellions consolidated the power of the ethnic Turkish and militaristic elements within the government as the Young Turk ideology of Ottomanism was gradually replaced by pan-Turkism—the cultural and economic policy of Turkification quickly intensified throughout the empire.[26] The severe Ottoman defeats especially against Italy and against the Balkan states strengthened the belief among the Ottoman Arabs that the empire might no longer be powerful enough to control the non-

Turkish regions of the empire; the Ottoman losses against Russia especially alarmed the Ottoman Arabs and alerted them to the possibility that Western powers, especially France, might occupy Syria.[27]

The main European foreign policy concern was to contain the rising challenge of the Russian, German, and Austro-Hungarian Empires. This military need was compounded with an economic one as the various powers tried to parcel out the raw materials and new markets located outside of Europe. The Ottoman Empire was thus faced with a political and economic context that was continually shifting. Different communities in the empire came to terms with these shifts in different ways. The Ottoman Greeks managed to forge a small independent Greek kingdom in 1830 partially as a consequence of this policy impasse. The Ottoman Armenians instead attempted to mobilize European political support for additional communal reforms.[28] For instance, in the 1878 Treaty of San Stephano that the Ottomans had to sign with the victorious Russians, the Armenians persuaded the Russian government to insert article 16 whereby the Ottomans were obliged to promise immediate reform in the Armenian provinces.[29] The Armenian patriarch also presented the Great Powers with a program of administrative autonomy within the Ottoman Empire after this war.[30]

The Russian foreign policy of encouraging the settlement of Ottoman Christian populations on its lands was the most successful in terms of propagating Greek and Armenian nationalisms. This measure, coupled with the effect of population movements as a consequence of Ottoman defeats, constructed and consolidated new homogenized Greek and Armenian identities. These Russian attempts started as early as the eighteenth century; on 19 April 1795, for instance, the Russian empress, Catherine II, sent a decree to the Russian ambassador at Constantinople translated to modern Greek, to be disseminated among the Ottoman Greeks declaring "the provision of permanent quarters on the outskirts of Odessa for those Greeks and Albanians who had taken refuge in South Russia following their service with the Russian forces during the war with the Ottoman empire, and invited persons from the Aegean islands and elsewhere who might want to settle in the town itself."[31] Similarly, after the Russian-Ottoman war of 1828–29, there was an outward movement of the Ottoman Greek population to Russia countered by the inward movement of the Russian Muslim population.[32]

The Russian invitation and Ottoman hostility also lured many Ottoman Armenians. In 1779, Catherine II invited Armenians from Crimea, then still outside the empire, to settle in Nakhichevan near the mouth of the Don. The colony was granted a charter settlement that was then extended to the colonies in Karasubazar, Staryi Kim, and Grigoropol; many founders of ethnic nationalism such as Mikael Nalban-

dian emerged from these Armenian settlements.[33] Similarly, in 1829, at least one hundred thousand Ottoman Armenians migrated to Russia—eventually there were half as many Armenians in Russia as in the Ottoman Empire.[34] At the conclusion of the 1829 Russian-Ottoman War, more than two hundred thousand Armenians arrived in Erevan and Nakhichevan from Beyazid and Kars.[35]

As the Ottoman Greeks and Armenians moved away from the empire, and as the Russian expanded at the expense of the Ottomans, the Ottoman Turks acquired, for the first time, a demographic majority in the empire—a development that fostered Turkish nationalism. Before 1876, no nationality[36] had been a majority in the Ottoman Empire, and most groups were, in addition, widely dispersed and mixed throughout, a factor that had helped sustain the multinational character of the empire. This started to change in the late eighteenth century, however. The first wave of Turkish Muslim immigration into the Ottoman Empire came from the Crimea as Russia annexed it in 1783, and shortly thereafter from the Volga-Ural area. The second wave came from the Caucasus, where most immigrants were Circassians and Turkish-speaking Nogays. The Russian advances into Central Asia in the 1860s and the ensuing appeals for help by the Turkish khanates in Turkestan certainly increased sentiments about Turkish identity in the Ottoman Empire.[37] After 1878, many Muslims[38] from the regions north of the Black Sea, the Kuban, the Crimea, the Caucasus, and Transcaucasia moved into the Ottoman Empire as these lands were gradually lost to Russia. The contestation of Ottoman territories by Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria also prompted a migration of Turks and Muslims to the empire.[39] The total number of these Turkish immigrations to Rumelia and Anatolia[40] might have reached 2 million in number.

Commerce, Foreign Protection, and Trade Networks Changing commercial patterns between Europe and the Ottoman Empire, the ability of the European powers to ensure foreign protection to Ottoman minorities who conducted business with them, and the trade networks that the minority merchants established were significant factors in generating the resources for the development of all four Ottoman nationalisms. The Ottoman Turks and Muslim Arabs did not benefit from the changing patterns of commerce as much as the Greeks and Armenians; in the case of the Ottoman Turks, the commercial successes of the Ottoman minorities generated enmity and fostered Turkish nationalism.

The European demand for Balkan food and raw materials and the availability of cheap manufactured European goods transformed commercial relations in the eighteenth century both within Europe and outside. In the Ottoman Empire, these changing conditions altered the agricultural trade relations, as well as the relations with the state; prebendalism emerged, production for an international market ensued, and the Ottoman state started to lose control over the production and exchange process.[41] One significant indication of this Ottoman loss of control was the foreign protection[42] the European powers were now able to offer Ottoman subjects who had commercial transactions with them. The Ottoman subjects they selected for these privileged positions were often their coreligionists, namely Ottoman Greeks and Armenians who also cultivated their ethnic and family ties and networks in Europe. It was especially in the Greek and Armenian diaspora communities that the first seeds of national identity were planted.

The Ottoman Greeks benefitted from the opening of trading rights in Habsburg domains to Ottoman subjects in 1699 with the Treaty of Carlowitz to establish banks and commercial houses in Vienna; they also profited from the decline of Venice and Genoa as levantine traders.[43] The opening up of the Black Sea trade to the Russians by the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca of 1774, the convention of Aynalıkavak of 1779, and the Russian-Ottoman commercial treaty of 1783 gave a substantial boost to the Greek merchants; many undertook much of the commerce under the Russian flag[44] since it facilitated their passage through the straits as the Ottomans were treaty-bound to admit all Russian ships.[45] The Greek merchant community of Odessa, which both used the Russian trade privileges and had access through networks and language skills access to Ottoman trade, prospered especially during 1801–5. The French revolutionary wars and the Continental blockade in 1806 and the frequent Russian-Ottoman wars made Greeks the principal carriers of southern Russian produce to Western Europe and the Ottoman Empire, mostly in contrabandal form. At the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the Greek merchant marine[46] was estimated at a thousand ships; the profit margin was consistently more than 100 percent.

The diaspora Greek merchant communities then started to form their own organizations; for instance, the one in Odessa[47] established, with other European merchants, the first commercial insurance company, its own commercial association by 1808, and its own bank and insurance firm by 1817.[48] Substantial Greek diaspora communities were to be found in Italy, in particular in Venice, Trieste, and Livorno, and in other parts of the Mediterranean; in the late eighteenth century, Greek merchants established a mercantile network in the eastern Mediterranean, the Balkans, and as far afield as India; in the nineteenth century, migration occurred to Egypt and southern Russia. These merchants provided a subvention for the publication of translations, especially of a secular nature, financed schools, colleges, and libraries in their native towns and islands, and sponsored the education abroad of promising young

Greeks.[49] The concentration of financial, organizational, and human resources in these diaspora communities,[50] and the changing trade patterns prepared the ground for the Greek independence movement. It was especially the decline in commercial income after 1850 whereby the average profit fell to 15 percent that marginalized many merchants in these communities who in turn became more willing to join or support secret societies espousing for alternate visions.[51]

The Ottoman Armenians who had been active in trade and agricultural production in Asia Minor and the Fertile Crescent also benefitted, like the Greeks, from the changing trade patterns and the Safavid decline in the East. They were also active in the West; Armenian merchants founded many commercial establishments in most European ports including Marseilles and Amsterdam; in Amsterdam alone, there were some 60 such establishments by 1660.[52] Their position improved even more in the nineteenth century as they became intendants of customhouses, bankers to local pashas, purveyors of luxury goods, minters of coins and practitioners of long-distance trade.[53] The overwhelming majority of the Ottoman Armenian population in the major cities consisted of artisans and merchants whose increased affluence led to their challenge against the power structure within the Ottoman Armenian community. After their first participation in the election of a new catholicos in 1725, this group of merchants and artisans actively supported educational institutions and demanded equal representation in communal affairs. These activities led to new conceptions of self-rule and to the eventual establishment of the Armenian constitution.[54]

The most significant merchant diaspora communities that also affected the course of development of the Armenian national movement were located in India and Russia. The Armenian diaspora community of Madras was composed primarily of wealthy merchants trading in Europe and the Far East who were, like their Greek counterparts, very active in philanthropy.[55] In addition to subsidizing and producing many literary activities, they helped establish, for instance, a press and a paper factory in Echmiadzin in 1774, an Armenian school in Europe; they also promoted secular education.[56] In 1773, the Madras group published a detailed constitution for the proposed independent[57] Armenia. The Armenians in Russia were also a significant community that grew populous along the borders with the Ottoman Empire as the Russians evicted them from the Crimea and settled them in the southern Caucasus in Tostov-on-Don, in an Armenian colony, New Nakhichevan. In 1769, these Armenians presented, without success,[58] a plan to Empress Catherine II on how to free Armenia and recreate an Armenian state. Yet detailed visions of an independent Armenian state continued to be elaborated upon until the establishment of the Armenian Republic within the Soviet Union.

The Unionists who were in power in the Ottoman Empire in the early twentieth century resented the Greco-Armenian domination[59] in Ottoman trade and wanted to raise the Muslims to at least the same level of prosperity. The vast debt[60] to Europe that the Ottoman Empire had immersed itself in during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries also accentuated the resentment against the Greco-Armenian domination. Ottoman borrowing, which had begun in 1854, led in 1881 to Ottoman insolvency and the establishment of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration through which European powers administered and took over the Ottoman domestic revenues. After the Europeans, Ottoman minorities held most positions of responsibility in the Public Debt Administration. It was this economic intervention coupled with minority domination that provided support to the Turkish nationalist faction in the Ottoman government. Another factor that enhanced this radicalization was the trade boycotts that the Ottomans engaged in against the Austrians and Greeks. Austrian goods were boycotted in 1908 upon the Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina; similarly, a general boycott of Greek commerce was undertaken during the 1909 declaration by Crete to unite with Greece.[61] These boycotts led the Unionists to conclude that only a national economy and a Turkish bourgeoisie could withstand foreign intervention and domination. In resettling the hundreds of thousands of refugees who had fled the Balkans, the Ottoman government did indeed activate this policy as it consciously placed Turks in jobs monopolized by the Greeks.[62] The increasing economic disadvantages felt by the Muslim elements in the empire, coupled with the attempts to generate a Turkish national bourgeoisie, thus accelerated the emergence of a Turkish national movement.[63]

In the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, the move from locally manufactured goods to purchases of food and raw materials in exchange for European manufactured goods altered the nature of the trade. As more and more agricultural regions were linked to the world market, mostly the Arab Christians[64] in the local population learned international trade and finance and also often entered foreign protection.[65] Christians of Aleppo profited from the great prosperity of the city's trade in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; the later emigrations of Arab Christians to Livorno, the center of the Levant trade, and to Egypt, where the persecuted Greek Catholics settled, also extended and maintained trade networks. Once again, the prospering Arab Christian community engaged in sponsoring literary activities, printing newspapers, and, in general, started to articulate the consciousness of an Arab culture and civilization that looked beyond the Muslim-Christian divide.

Ottoman Reforms, Ottomanism, and Communal Tensions The Ottoman attempt to contain the separation of especially the non-Muslim populations of the empire led to a series of reforms[66] that were based on Western conceptions of human rights and guaranteed the security of life, honor, and property to all Ottoman subjects regardless of religious affiliation; the communal definition of identity was thus replaced by one based on individual rights. In addition to these fundamental rights,[67] the Ottoman reforms also introduced Western-style transformations through the establishment of governmental institutions such as ministries, military reforms, and technological innovations such as telegraphs and railroad networks in an attempt to catch up with the rising West.

These reforms generated social polarization in the sphere of Western-style political representation, however. In the case of the Greeks, Armenians, and later the Arabs, the inability of the Ottoman government to secure them equal political representation with the Turks led to disputes, discontent, and eventual alienation. The inherent stratification among the minorities of, in that order, the Ottoman Greeks, Armenians, and Jews was also overturned by the reforms.[68] Different minority communities, especially the Greeks, were upset by this loss of prestige and often stated that they would prefer the dominance of Muslims to the new equality with Ottoman Armenians and Jews. The introduction of Western-style institutions, technology, and media produced among Greeks, Armenians, Turks, and Arabs a new Ottoman citizen who believed in individual rights, was knowledgeable about the Western political conceptions through which to acquire them, and was also willing and able to formulate alternate social systems if the present ones failed to work.

Problems with the political representation of non-Muslims in public institutions demonstrate the magnitude of the structural resistance to Ottoman reforms. In the case of the newly founded Ottoman assembly, for instance, minority representation still remained corporate as Ottoman officials assigned minorities or reassessed the presence of minorities in public life according to their population proportions.[69] Similarly, in 1845, when the sultan asked for representatives from all provinces to be sent to the capital for advice, "all members were reimbursed for their expenses, the Christians at only half the rate of the Muslims."[70] The promised equality that did not easily translate into practice led the non-Muslims to pay more for military exemption, and they could not attain government posts to the same degree as Muslims.[71] The 1908 elections held in the empire after the accession of the Young Turks to power raised the hope of the minorities in finally achieving political equality. Non-Muslim communities, with their long tradition of communal elections, were much better prepared to participate and "could therefore expect to elect candidates far out of proportion to the size of their population merely through the process of mobilization and voter turnout."[72] Still, at the polls, a large number of minorities were not allowed to vote because they could not establish their Ottoman citizenship—indeed, many were foreign subjects or had been unregistered in an attempt to evade taxation. The Greek and Armenian leaders at the capital joined forces to protest the elections, without any success.[73]

Ottoman reforms also prompted greater distinctions between the secular and spiritual spheres within minority communities as they restricted[74] the absolute control of the Greek and Armenian patriarchs and instead enhanced secularization and increased mass participation in communal affairs.[75] This shift faced the active resistance of the religious leadership and the communal elites who derived their power from their association with the Ottoman sultan. Yet the growing influence of the entrepreneurial elites and the secular intelligentsia challenged more and more successfully the traditionalist ideological position of the Orthodox patriarchate.[76]

An additional source of challenge to the Greek Orthodox hierarchy in the empire was the establishment of patriarchates in the Russian Empire and the Greek kingdom, measures that challenged the sole patriarchal leadership of Constantinople in communal matters.[77] This challenge forced the leadership to reject the parochial, ethnic tendencies and appeal instead to the universalist religious loyalties of all Orthodox Christians. The bureaucratic caste of Phanariots,[78] who had a lucrative monopoly of political power and its economic perquisites in the Danubian principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, were also wedded to the status quo and joined the religious leadership in resisting the reforms.[79] The real hold of the Phanariots on the church was political and financial—political because of the sultan's delegation of authority, and financial because the church, chronically in debt, used the Phanariots as its bankers, and all ecclesiastical offices were sold for ready cash.[80] The power of these two groups nevertheless started to erode with the increased wealth of the merchants and the continuous political challenges provided by the newly founded Greek state.

The exclusive hold of the Armenian Apostolic church also came under a number of challenges, both without and within: Catholic and Protestant missionaries continued their activities, often successfully, among the Armenians, and, within the church, the Romanizing influences necessitated the constant renegotiation of religious boundaries. The internal religious disputes, which had continued since the advent of Catholicism,[81] resulted in 1830 in the establishment of an Ottoman Catholic community separate from the patriarchate; communal tensions

increased as some leaders such as the Düzians gave considerable assistance to the Catholic Armenians, while others such as Amira Bezjian supported the Armenian church.[82] The papal Armenian clergy were also divided into two factions, the party of Collegians based in Rome and named after the College of Propaganda in that city, and the Mkhit'arists headquartered at the convent of St. Lazarus in Venice, which adhered to the traditions of the national church much more. Many meetings took place in Constantinople to overcome these divides, but without success.[83] This period also coincided with the emergence of Protestantism in 1831 which led to new conflicts and disturbances, resulting in the emergence of an Ottoman Protestant community in 1847.[84]

The intracommunal tension was significant in the case of the Ottoman Armenians as well. The Armenian community had, similar to the Phanariots, the amiras who were high government functionaries, businessmen, and bankers mostly engaged in the finance of the Ottoman Empire;[85] their wealth and power in the government also translated to positions of power in the community as their opinions were sought on the selection of the patriarch, and they financed[86] religious, educational, and charitable causes.[87] It was the abolition of Ottoman tax-farming that limited the economic power of the banker amiras and thereby undermined their communal power as they no longer could underwrite many of the communal expenses. What ensued was an increase in the power of the artisans, although the power conflict between the two groups continued throughout the century.[88] The urban-rural divide compounded by class also introduced additional tensions to political representation within the Armenian community: the Constantinople Armenians, who comprised less than 10 percent of the Ottoman Armenian population, were powerful in opposing the revolutionary movement. They had five-sevenths of total representation in the communal assembly,[89] as opposed to the meager two-sevenths representation of the Ottoman provinces, which contained over 90 percent of the Armenian population.[90] The inability of the Ottoman state to accommodate Armenian demands and the internal tensions led to the Zeitun rebellion on 1862, which became the first in a series of insurrections against the Ottoman state. The Sasun rebellion of 1894 and the second Zeitun rebellion of 1895 further polarized the Armenians and the Ottoman state and led to Ottoman persecutions in retaliation.[91]

The effects of the reforms on the Ottoman Muslims were largely negative. The Ottoman Muslims interpreted the rights promised to the minorities as a loss of their privileged position in the empire. In many Ottoman provinces, ranging from Manisa, Denizli, Nazilli, Diyarbakır, Harput, Mardin, Maraş, and Varna to Golos, tensions between the Muslims and minorities escalated, often leading to skirmishes, especially

during and after religious holidays and ceremonies or over commercial transactions across groups. This strife in turn created divisions among the Muslims as some wanted to unite around the banner of Islamism, while others supported Ottomanism, which assumed that all divisions in the empire could be overcome by strict adherence to the reforms. The strife among the opposing factions of Islamists and Ottomanists and the continuing rebellions within the empire of both Muslims and others sapped the strength of both parties. As a consequence, the leadership role of the Turkish element[92] in the empire became more and more pronounced.[93]

The other effect of the Ottoman reforms was the creation of the first generation of young military officers, officials, and intellectuals who were all trained in the new Western-style institutions that the reforms had instigated. These officers challenged the status quo with their newly acquired knowledge; they replaced the legitimacy of experience attained through serving in regiments (*alaylı*) with knowledge acquired through schooling on military affairs (*mektepli*).[94] Even though most indeed lacked training and experience, the officers firmly believed that their knowledge would naturally overcome this weakness; they defined their identity in terms of Turkish language and history.[95] Even though the Ottoman state continued to advocate a policy of Ottomanism to unite the disparate elements of the empire, many officials such as the grand vezir, Ali Pasha, in 1867 believed that "the Ottoman Turks were best fitted to govern the empire."[96] When these officers did indeed take over after 1908, they transformed the largely cultural nationalism into a political one, thereby weighing in on the ethnic Turkish nationalist elements among the ruling cadre.

The negative reaction of the Ottoman Muslims to the reforms also extended to the Arab provinces of the empire as these produced anti-Christian riots in Aleppo in 1850, Nablus in 1856, and Damascus in 1860.[97] The increase in Christian prosperity, social and cultural ascendancy, and their new freedom to ring church bells, carry crosses, and erect new Christian establishments increased the hostilities. During the same period, during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II, there was an attempt made to give Arabs equal standing in the Ottoman structure of rule, an attempt that was discontinued by the Union and Progress Committee that deposed the sultan. Abdülhamid II selected Arabs such as Abu al-Sayyadi and Zafir al-Madani to serve as his advisors; in addition, the administrative structure of the empire was altered to make Arab provinces provinces of the first order,[98] enabling administrators appointed there to draw higher salaries.[99]

When the Union and Progress Committee reestablished constitutional rule in the empire in 1908, later deposed the Ottoman sultan,

Abdülhamid II, in 1909, and reinstigated reforms, the Ottoman Arabs still shared high hopes in the possible union in progress within the empire. These instances were also coupled with the Arab realization of the futility of equal representation in Ottoman politics with the Ottoman Turks. Even though the Young Turk movement officially had the policy of equality of treatment among all Ottoman ethnoreligious groups, the confidential correspondence demonstrated this not to be the case: the Young Turks often used derogatory phrases for the Arabs to whom they saw themselves as bringing civilization and protection against Western imperialism.[100] This was also reflected in their decisions concerning the Ottoman Arabs. During the elections, the number of Arab delegates selected for the Ottoman assembly was much lower than their population proportion dictated; the ensuing the high-level administrative appointments of the empire also went disproportionately to ethnic Turks.[101]

The administrative centralization of the Arab provinces was probably the most significant reform that fostered Arab consciousness. The appointment in the Arab provinces of Turkish higher officials unacquainted with Arabic and the use of Turkish as the language of government in the law courts and principal public services instigated protests.[102] One additional expression of this discontent was a student protest in Beirut over the appointment of "a man from Anatolia" as professor of Arabic at the state preparatory school as the students wanted a Syrian to be appointed to the position.[103] Eventually the differences between the Syrian-Arab notables who were becoming more and more independent through agricultural production and trade and the members of the Committee of Union and Progress at the capital became too vast to be contained within the existing political structure.

Visions of History, Literature, and Education

The transformations through war, commerce, and reform certainly set the parameters within which nationalisms emerged. Yet it was the new interpretations offered by historical visions, literary interpretations, and educational innovations that endowed the structural transformations with meaning. As history and religion created new visions of the future, as literature and linguistics generated new realms of meanings, and as education and the print media reproduced entire sets of alternate images of society, the Greek, Armenian, Turkish, and Arab nationalisms acquired a boundless spirit that recaptured the past, present, and future.

The official Ottoman visions of history, literature, and education aimed to preserve the empire by focusing on Ottomanism, which hoped to save the multinational empire by granting rights to all its decisions

without distinction on basis of religion or race. There were some minorities[104] and Ottoman officials who believed in and advocated Ottomanism, mostly because of the implied and largely imagined secularism within. The idea of Ottomanism gained ascendancy in the empire after the 1908 revolution; in July 1908, all the ethnic and religious communities greeted the restoration of the constitution with great enthusiasm as Muslims and Christians fraternized in the streets.[105] Yet this policy could not sustain itself against escalating Ottoman defeats that polarized the social groups and eventually gave way to the emergent nationalisms.[106]

Historical Repertoires and Religious Interpretations History intertwined with religion reinterpreted the past and recast the future, thereby shifting the existing boundaries of meaning. In the recovery of the past, the Greek nationalist movement had two alternate visions, one grounded on Byzantinism promoted at the capital, and the other based on Hellenism advanced at the peninsula.[107] The Phanariots and the upper Greek clergy of the patriarchate both residing in Constantinople aspired for the restoration of the Byzantine Empire. Imagining a Christian, preferably Orthodox-dominated multinational and theocratic regime based on Turkish-Hellenic participation, they promoted Greek-Ottoman cooperation. This gradualist approach of conquest from within gained credibility with the 1897 Greek defeat by the Ottomans and also accounted for the initial interaction of the Ottoman Greeks with the liberal elements in the Committee of Union and Progress.[108] The Unionists had taken the initiative for the contact specifically to ask for their cooperation for the establishment of a constitutional regime.[109] Yet, as the Unionists became more radicalized especially after the Balkan wars in 1912, and as the Greeks of the peninsula followed their own path, these Ottoman Greeks of the capital lost ground.

The predominant myth created in the Balkan lands was based on a Hellenic past that could both potentially unite ethnic communities in the Balkans and at the same time provide an alternate source of legitimation to the movement in the Balkans, one independent from the Phanariots in Constantinople. The Hellenes[110] included all the descendants of classical Greeks,[111] all those who had culturally experienced a Greek past, including, besides the Greeks, the Rumanians, Bulgarians, Albanians, and Serbs. This development was followed by the emergence of the *megali idea*, the grandiose vision of restoring the former Byzantine empire emerged once more, but this time under the leadership of the Hellenes.[112] Yet such a vision was dispelled during the nineteenth century as all groups formed their own visions—the Greeks had underestimated the strength of ethnic divides.[113] The Russian interest in the area also weaved, at times, new possible saviors[114] into the existing myths of the

past; particular among them was "the legend of the *xanthon genos*, a fair-haired race of liberators from the north," who widely became identified with the Russians.[115] This identification was also fostered by the idea of a Christian crusade to restore Byzantium, which had sustained the Greek hopes for centuries.[116] The Russian empress, Catherine the Great, even contemplated a restored Byzantine Empire, which included the Slav as well as the Greek Orthodox populations of the Ottoman Empire and centered on Constantinople with her Greek-speaking grandson Constantine as the emperor. Yet this vision too shattered as the European forces diligently checked Russian advances. Hence, in the end, the Greeks established their own kingdom with British support.

The Armenians similarly sought for saviors to bring back the Armenian kingdom during the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries. These attempts were often led by Catholic missionaries. When King Louis XIV of France contemplated the idea of a new crusade to the East to liberate the Holy Land and all territories once ruled by the Latin princes, his agents and missionaries tried to coax the Armenians that salvation would come from the Franks.[117] When the next attempt, in 1678 to seek aid for Armenia from the pope and France, proved fruitless, the delegation sought help in Dusseldorf from Prince Johann-Wilhelm of the Palatinate by promising him the Armenian throne; this attempt too eventually failed.[118] The Armenians next started putting their faith in a geographically proximate, swiftly rising Russia, and indeed it was in this context that the Armenian republic was formed after the First World War within the new Soviet state.

The reinterpretation of history was especially significant in the emergence of Turkish nationalism. Traditional Ottoman histories did not at all mention the history of Turks before their adoption of Islam but traced instead the genealogy to a tribe of Kayı Khan, a branch of Oğuz Turks, descendants in turn of Japhet, son of Noah.[119] Yet a change in these perceptions occurred in the mid-nineteenth century when Ahmed Cevdet Pasha argued that the Arabs and Turks were the two great nations to rule the Islamic world. Later, more and more studies[120] were conducted into the history of the Turks before their tenth-century conversion into Islam. Süleyman Pasha, a general and minister of military schools, attempted to introduce Turkism[121] by writing a history of the Turks based, for the first time, on Chinese sources—an attempt he undertook after saying that "the need for histories could not be met by translations, because all history books written in Europe were full of calumnies either of our religion or of our nationality."[122] He made the Ottomans aware that the Hiung-nu of Chinese history were the first forefathers of the Turks. At the same time, traveler and Orientalist Arminian Hermann Vambery contended that all Turkic groups

belonged to one race, subdivided according to physical traits and customs.[123] The disastrous drought of 1872 followed by another drought alerted the Ottomans to the significance of a homeland, of Anatolia, the land on which the Ottoman Empire was founded, to their "homeland brothers who raise most of our soldiers and most of our laborers."[124] This was followed by the claim that all Anatolians were racially of Turkish stock, going back to before the entrance of Ottomans. An immediate Turkish homeland was thus established with Anatolians as true bearers of an uncorrupted Turkish culture. These historical links with the pre-Islamic past that unified all the Turks ultimately led the Ottoman general Enver Pasha on an ill-fated campaign[125] after the First World War to establish on the ashes of the Ottoman Empire a Turkish one along the silk trade route from Adrianople to China, with its capital in Samarkand. This vision was arrested by Soviet Russia in 1922 when Enver died in battle. What was left instead was an amended form of Turkish nationalism that was geographically limited to Anatolia.

In their task to educate both the Turks and the Europeans about the great Turkish history, the new generation of Ottoman Turkish historians started to compare the roles of Arabs and Turks in Islamic history, where many pointed out that "those who fought to protect Islam for seven or eight hundred years were not Arabs but Turks."[126] The first communal leader to call on the Arabs to secede from the Ottoman Empire was the exiled Maronite leader Yusuf Karam, who wrote to Amir 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri during the 1877–78 Ottoman-Russian War about the necessity of Arab independence and suggested an Arab confederation where each unit was to be headed by an independent amir.[127] This was followed by the correlation of Arabism with early Islam by thinkers such as Muhammad 'Abduh and his disciple Rashid Rıda.[128] Similarly, many others emphasized the theme of Islamic regeneration[129] in works that were secretly and very widely distributed throughout Syria. Another theme that developed in the movement was the illegitimacy of despotic rule to criticize Ottoman rule over Arab lands; in addition, some advocated[130] the abolition of the Ottoman sultan's title to the caliphate and the setting up of a Quraishi-born Arab (i.e., one of belonging to the same tribe of the Prophet) as caliph in Mecca.[131] Still others attempted to bring in constitutional rule to the empire based on the Islamic concept of the necessity for deliberative consultation (*shura*). Some lodged Arab distinctness in Arab culture, and others, in the Islamic Arabic religion. The large number of Arab Christians focused on the contributions of Arab civilization and culture independently of religion.[132] It was within this Muslim-Christian tension that Arab nationalism developed and later splintered due to competing European interests in the region.

The new nationalist visions often entered a tenuous relationship with those who had traditionally had control over meaning creation: the religious establishment and its clergy. Often, while the upper clergy attempted to maintain the status quo, the lower clergy provided direct or indirect support to independence movements. Still, the movement did indeed cost the lives of higher clergy;[133] a number of bishops and Phanariot grandees were also executed.[134] Many of the more independent bishops and priests in the Balkans were enlisted in the secret societies of the Greek independence movement; on Mount Athos, during the first decade of the Greek war, about half the monks left to serve in the uprising in various ways that were officially denied them.[135] After the creation of the Greek state, the bishops started to avoid the Greek patriarchate in Constantinople and even omitted mentioning his name in their liturgy; the church in Greece separated from the patriarchate in Constantinople in 1833.[136] The Greek revolution also capitalized on religious symbols to mobilize the masses;[137] the Greek flag emerged when the Metropolitan Germanos of Old Patras raised a banner with the cross on it at the monastery of Ayia Lavra.[138]

The newly emerging rituals of the Armenian liberation movement similarly drew upon former religious ones. Those devoted to the liberation movement, called it, for instance, the Holy Task (*Soorb Gords*), referred to the volunteers as disciples, and duplicated the baptism of Christ in inducting members. On the eve of battle, the volunteers took communion and heard speeches on the glories of martyrdom.[139] As there were originally no leaders accepted by all, the first leadership of the Armenian movement also came from the church.[140] In the Armenian case, it was the attempts of the Armenian Catholic priest Mkhit'ar Sepasdat'si (1676–1749),[141] who founded the Mkhit'arist order in Constantinople in 1701, that produced an Armenian literary awakening, one that would spark the historical visions of an Armenian past and prepare the grounds for a consistent effort to accomplish such a future. Priest Mkhit'ar stated that in achieving such an enlightenment, he "would sacrifice neither his nation to his religion nor his religion to his nation."[142] Yet the Armenian case also displayed the first tension between the religious and the secular because of the influence of socialism where anticlerical, secular nationalists often blamed the church for the disorganized state the Armenian community was in.[143]

The role of religion in the Turkish and Arab nationalisms was much more tenuous. The dervishes from Central Asia who had retained tekkes in Constantinople were significant in developing the conception of a Turkish culture; the sheikh of one such place, Buharalı Süleyman Efendi, published in 1882 a book on the Chagatay language and Ottoman Turkish, introducing Ottomans to the literary language of the eastern

Turks and claiming it to be the linguistic origin of Ottoman Turkish. Another member published a Chagatay dictionary.[144] Yet the Young Turk movement ultimately developed in opposition to Sultan Abdülhamid II who had advocated Islamism and therefore assumed, along with other factors such as the inherent dominance of Ottoman Turks in the movement, an antireligious and eventually pro-Turkish stand. Religion again played a tenuous role in the case of Arab nationalism because of the large active population of Arab Christians. The actual connection between Islam and Arabs was therefore problematized; Shakib Arslan, for instance, stressed the bond of Islam and rejected both the partisan bond of nationalism and the idea that Arabs have a special status in Islam.[145]

Literary Interpretations and Linguistic Remappings Even though the Greek language was the commercial lingua franca of most of the Balkan merchants, and in the fifty years before the Greek War of Independence, any person residing in the Balkans who wanted an education had to study at a Greek school, the Greek language and literature were still unable to unite all the Balkan peoples.[146] Instead, it was the European recreation of their Hellenic past that endowed the Greek language and literature with a sense of distinctness and emancipatory power deriving from the past. Indeed, a person living in Europe, Adamantios Korais, first edited and translated the authors of ancient Greece to form a library of twenty-six volumes to demonstrate the vitality of the Hellenic spirit; he was also the first scholar to use modern Greek as a literary language.[147] Still, in the 1830s, when the Austrian historian J. P. Fallmayer contested on linguistic grounds that the Greeks were the lineal descendants of the ancient, he caused an uproar among the new Greek intelligentsia.[148] Even though the Greek language eventually generated a sense of ethnic identity, it also had to come to terms with the tension between the ancient and modern Greek.[149]

Literature and linguistic innovations created a sense of unity among the Armenians during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[150] The Armenian debate on language[151] that generated the Armenian literary Renaissance entailed the use of classical Armenian (*grabar*) of the church,[152] which was unintelligible to the common people as opposed to the vernacular spoken by the people (*ashkharabar*). The Armenian Renaissance[153] that occurred between 1843 and 1915 revived the vernacular into a vehicle of literary expression, and with the publication of many journals, the vernacular[154] indeed surpassed[155] the classical language and became the linguistic medium of the national movement. It was the activities of the Armenian Catholic Mkhit'arist order in Venice and Vienna that had provided the foundation of this literary renaissance;

the Mkhit'arists had been the first ones to deliver both to Europe and to the Armenians themselves the long-lost knowledge of an Armenian past.[156] Supplementing the work done by church leaders in publishing religious tracts, the Mkhit'arists had translated, and continued to translate, many inaccessible manuscripts to easily readable volumes on history, linguistics, lexicography, numismatics, and theology; they had also published a grammar of modern Armenian to familiarize the Armenians with the laws of their own vernacular.[157] From the publication of Armenian classics, the Mkhit'arists had moved on to the translation of Greek and Latin masterpieces, also introducing Armenian readers to many non-Armenian languages through grammars and bilingual and trilingual dictionaries. In addition, many playwrights among them emphasized dramas glorifying religion, human virtues, and patriotism.[158] Translations of the works of modern Italian, English, and French authors by others followed.[159]

Even though these translations into Armenian did create a sense of literature, it was with the production of original works that the Armenians interpreted the new meanings with which they were now surrounded. Some scholars distanced themselves from translations by becoming critical[160] of the excessive European influence.[161] Even though only four Armenian novels were written until 1864, others started soon thereafter experimenting with different literary genres, including the epic, romantic drama, short story, and novel; these forms also created a very vibrant Armenian theater.[162] Because of the increasing body of literature in Turkish with Armenian script in the midnineteenth century, many Ottoman officials, including Reshid Pasha, learned the Armenian alphabet to follow this literature.[163] In the body of literature that thus started to emerge, Armenian nationalism fluctuated between love of fatherland (*hayrenasirutiun*), which had a distinctly defined land and advanced the people as the dominant force in liberating this land, and love of nation (*azgasirutiun*), which was much more abstract and timeless.[164] It was the love of the nation that was forever instilled through everlasting images; the pictures and poems of Mikael Nalbandian, which were secretly circulated among the Armenians, captured the passion behind this love, especially in his poem entitled "Liberty":[165]

> Then the words that first I spoke
> Were not "father, mother, dear,"
> "Liberty!" the accents broke
> In my infant utterance clear.[166]

Through the combination of a linguistic revival of the vernacular and a new literary narrative, the Armenian national movement was able to develop new images of emancipation. Yet these images, though very vivid, did not always contain specifically marked territories of the fatherland and often remained abstract.

In the context of Turkish nationalism, the word for nation, *vatan*, shifted in meaning in the last years of the eighteenth century after the French revolution from its original meaning of one's place of birth to evoking sentimental attachment and ethnic pride in a tangible and visible place.[167] It was once more a total linguistic transformation that commenced with the dissection of the Ottoman language into its Turkish, Persian, and Arabic parts and culminated with the attempts to recapture the pure Turkish component. In late nineteenth century, Ahmet Vefik Pasha, an Ottoman statesman, translated *Şecere-i Türki* (The genealogies of Turks) into Istanbul Turkish and compiled a Turkish lexicon entitled *Lehçe-i Osmani* (The Ottoman dialect); he also proved that the Turkish spoken in the empire was a dialect of Turkish of which there were other dialects throughout the world.[168] Süleyman Pasha identified the Ottoman tongue as being composed of three languages, namely Turkish, Arabic, and Persian, and wrote a book specifically on Turkish grammar[169] entitled *Sarf-ı Türki* (grammar of the Turks). He stated explicitly[170] that "it is incorrect to speak of Ottoman literature, just as it is wrong to call our language the Ottoman language and our nation the Ottoman nation. The term Ottoman is only the name of our state, while the name of our nation is Turk. Consequently, our language is the Turkish language and our literature is Turkish literature." In language and literature, the separation between Ottoman and Turkish thus commenced. It was in this context that a campaign for the purification of the Turkish language began, an attempt to eliminate all words derived from Arabic and Persian roots and replace them with ancient Turkish root-words or with new words created out of Turkish roots and new particles. [171]

The treatises on Turkish nationalism originated both in the works of European Orientalists and among the scholars of the Turkish diaspora community from Russia.[172] Leon Cahun's *Introduction a l'histoire de l'Asie: Turcs et Mongols des origines a 1405* (Introduction to the history of Asia: The origins of Turks and Mongols in 1405) published in 1896 was translated into Turkish by Necip Asım Bey; with his appendix on Turks, the book aroused interest on Turkism in all quarters.[173] In it, Cahun claimed a theory of a Turanian race as the forerunner of civilization in Europe. An earlier publication, Joseph de Guignes's *Histoire generale des Huns, des Turcs, des Mongoles, et autres Tartares occidentaux* (The general history of the Huns, Turks, Mongols, and other Western Tartars), emphasized the role of the Turks in Asia before their conversion to Islam. Another significant book was published in 1869 by

Mustafa Celaleddin Pasha,[174] entitled *Les Turcs anciens et modernes* (Turks old and new), where he articulated the Turkish contributions to civilization and stressed their racial origins. Within the Turkish diaspora community in Russia, Mirza Fethali Ahundov wrote plays in Azerbaijani Turkish and developed nationalist themes. İsmail Gasprinsky, the publisher of a prominent Crimean newspaper *Terciiman* advocated unity in language, thought, and action and promoted a union for all the Turkic groups in Russia under the spiritual guidance of Ottoman Turkey.[175] Hüseynizade Ali Bey, a recent Azeri immigrant from Baku, taught the principles of Turkism at the Ottoman Military Medical School and advocated the unification of all Turks.[176] Related to him was Yusuf Akçura, who considered Ottomanism, rejected it because it minimized the rights of Turks, criticized pan-Islamism for antagonizing non-Muslim groups in the Ottoman Empire, and lauded Turkism for offering the only opportunity for union.[177] Through these intellectuals, the Ottoman Turks started to acquire a new sense of their national identity.

Writings on Turkish nationalism in both prose and poetry began to appear in the Ottoman Empire soon thereafter. Namık Kemal,[178] a literary figure, formed the vision and kindled the passion for the Turkish fatherland; his composition of the first Turkish drama *Vatan Yahud Silistre* glorified patriotism and death for the sake of the fatherland.[179] Ziya Gökalp, one of the intellectual founders of Turkish nationalism, transferred to the nation all the divine qualities and replaced the belief in God with the belief in nation so that nationalism actually became a religion.[180] He advocated that Turks accept only the material achievements and scientific methods from Western civilization, and from Islam, only religious beliefs, without its political, legal, and social traditions, stating that "we are of the Turkish nation (*millet*), of the Islamic religious community (*ümmet*), and of Western civilization (*medeniyet*)."[181] Yet the combination of these factors ultimately gave an advantage to the westernized Muslim Turks of the empire over the other social groups, excluded the Ottoman religious minorities, and created an ethnically based Turkish nationalism.

The employment of the term *qawm*, "a people," to refer to the Arabs, leading to the emergence of the concept of *qawmiya* for Arab nationalism, can be traced to the works of al-Zahrawi. He was also able to employ the Arabic language as a symbol in locating the boundaries of these people by pointing out that 50 to 60 million people whose lands were "all contiguous and separated by no body of water other than the Suez Canal" spoke Arabic and thereby formed a natural group.[182] Visions of Arab patriotism were further developed through the works of scholars such as Rifa'a al-Tahtawi, Muhammad 'Abduh and 'Abd Allah al-Nadim.[183] In composing a patriotic poem, Tahtawi linguistically reinterpreted the love of the homeland in the Prophetic tradition "Love of the homeland is an article of faith" into the recurring refrain "Love of the homelands is an article of faith," referring now to a physical space populated by Arabs united by a shared language, a sovereign, a system of government, and the guidance of sacred law.[184] 'Abduh expounded on the role of the homeland as the foundation of political life; the homeland now became a social space where one traced one's descent, had one's rights protected and obligations known, and kept secure life, family, and property. 'Abd Allah al-Nadim developed the idea of the bond of homeland (*al-jami'a al-wataniya*) to appeal for unity and a brotherhood of patriotism among the various religious communities by identifying all as sons of the land. Hence *homeland* acquired more and more a new meaning and an imagined space.

The idea of homeland (*watan*) developed into patriotism (*wataniya*) among the writings of Arab intellectuals in the second half of the nineteenth century, such as those of Butrus al-Bustani and Ibrahim al-Yaziji.[185] When lecturing in Beirut in 1859 on Arabic literature, Bustani[186] differentiated the Arabs from non-Arabs by using the term *Sons of Arabs* (*Abna al-Arab*) and compared their current unsatisfactory performance in philosophy, science, and arts with those of their glorious ancestors. The past glory of the Arabs was also captured by the poems of Ibrahim al-Yaziji, who in two separate odes stated:[187]

> O Arab folk so noble: Hail!
> O'er your abodes clouds prevail.
>
> Awaken, O Arabs, and leave slumber aside,
> As danger's flood washes your knees in its tide!

The discussion of past glories now became reinterpreted in new literary genres. The rediscovery and publication of Arab classics by Western Orientalists aided this revival of Arabic literature as did mission schools. Groups of writers gathered in this milieu to rediscover the past, reinterpret it according to the changing conditions of the future, and create new Arabic literary forms such as the poetic drama, the novel, and the romantic autobiography.[188] Together with this literature flourished visions of a renewed Arab civilization that would once more unite its inhabitants as it had done in the past.

Educational Innovations and the Print Media The establishment of Western-style education was also significant in the creation of new visions. The nineteenth[189] century was significant in terms of the foreign missions[190] and minority and state-sponsored schools, all of which introduced Western-style education to Ottoman society. The English and

American Protestants were especially active in bringing the "pure doctrine" of Christianity to predominantly the Ottoman Christians through establishing many philanthropic and educational missions.[191] The Ottoman state and minority schools also offered Western-style education, thereby breaking the monopoly of the religious institutions over education. The new Western-style knowledge brought with it Enlightenment concepts and notions of citizenship and provided the Ottomans with conceptual tools to create new meanings.

The most enlightened and liberal sections of the Greek nationalists[192] comprised members of the medical, legal, and literary professions, all of whom shared a Western-style education and the Enlightenment vision embedded within it. Most were trained at the University of Athens, founded soon after liberation in 1837, which aimed to re-Hellenize the entire Greek world and attracted students throughout the Balkans; it defined Greek as the mother of wisdom that, through the civilizing mission of Greek culture and language, would wake all the Balkans from their "deep slumber of ignorance."[193] The textbooks employed in Greek education also aimed to create a national identity; Greek educators employed[194] the textbook *O Gerosthatis* by Melas where the main character, after and in spite of extensive travels in Europe, retains his classical Greek knowledge and his faith and ultimately brings back wisdom to the Greek youth, saying, in his last breath to a school instructor that "the principal and ultimate purpose of all your efforts and all your teachings should be the education of the Greek youth according to the way of Christ and for the benefit of the motherland." Still, the emergence of Western-style education became very significant in the declining fortunes of the church as the motherland replaced religion. As national revival gathered momentum, the church identified more with educational obscurantism and political reaction and conducted heresy trials, the burning of offending books, and opposition to the increasing emphasis on the natural sciences and Greece's classical heritage. Even though one patriarch questioned "what benefit the youth derived from learning numbers, algebra and a myriad such things, if in speech they were barbaric, if they had no idea of religion, and if their morals were degenerate,"[195] the Enlightenment philosophy and science triumphed over morals, and the new Western-style education persevered. The Greek state then established schools embedded with this new vision for the Ottoman Greeks still in the empire.

The circulation and reproduction of these new ideas occurred through the print media. Greek printing escalated in the nineteenth century[196] as some 1,300 titles appeared during the first two decades.[197] Even though 180 out of the 228 publications in Greek between 1700 and 1730 were concerned with religious issues, from 1780 through 1790,

the publication of religious and secular themes was at par, 157 religious to 153 secular themes.[198] Many translations, literary journals, newspapers, and pamphlets were printed during the same period. Hence there was an escalation of print media both in quantity and in terms of the coverage of secular issues. For instance, in 1797, a printing house printed Rhigas's revolutionary manifesto, "which contained a proclamation, a declaration of the rights of man, a Greek constitution, and a martial hymn calling on the Balkan Christians to fight for liberty."[199] Similarly, a literary journal, *Mercure savant*, was published in Vienna in 1811 devoted to Greek interests, and it was widely read throughout Europe.[200] Through such media, the visions of the Greek nation multiplied throughout time and space.

Many Ottoman Armenians sent their children to Europe for education, first for religious education and, after the eighteenth century, for studying liberal arts and professions. Here, they came under the influence of the Mikhit'arists who established schools throughout Europe. In 1846, for instance, the Muradian school of the Mikhit'arists transferred its forty students from Padua to Paris; many of the students actively participated in French political demonstrations. The Mkhit'arist students in Venice similarly attained a patriotic sentiment from those like Manzoni, Mazzini, and Garibaldi.[201] In the empire, it was the activities of the Armenian community and missionaries that provided Western-style education to the Ottoman Armenians. With this education came the conception of a national identity; for instance, the 1884 novel by Krikor Zohrab entitled *A Vanished Generation* criticized the abysmal ignorance of things Armenian by students attending foreign schools and stated that, in the case of a French boarding school for girls, "every little stream, mountain, and valley, the most obscure hamlet [in France] were known to this Armenian girl, who was ignorant of, and did not wish to know, about her native Ararat."[202] Zohrab advocated using the knowledge and experience of the Europeans, but within the framework set by Armenian culture and history. As early as 1846, the Armenian newspaper in Constantinople, *Hayastan*, stated:[203] "Wake up, Armenian nation, from your death-inviting slumber of ignorance; remember your past glory, mourn your present state of wretchedness and heed the example of other enlightened nations: take care of your schools, learn other useful languages and liberal sciences (professions) . . . only then can you reach the goal of happiness." The role of the Armenian church in this process was filled with conflict. Armenian communal administration divided into the spiritual and civil in 1847 whereby the civil council, consisting of twenty lay members,[204] looked after secular education, communal property, and justice, and the spiritual council was concerned with dogma, ordination of clergy, and religious education.[205] The threat

of the Catholic and Protestant missionaries generated and sustained the Armenian patriarchs' interest in publishing old Armenian polemic literature to sustain the community's interest in orthodoxy and to combat the Catholic and Protestant discourse.[206] Still, the scientific knowledge and the professional training offered by Western-style education gradually eclipsed the role of the church in the Armenian case as well.

The Armenian print media diffused these new visions. Armenian journalism[207] in the Ottoman Empire proceeded with the establishment of an Armenian section in Armeno-Turkish called "Lroy Gir Meci Terut'ean Osmanean" in 1832 in the first official newspaper of the Ottoman Empire, *Le Moniteur Ottoman*.[208] Utujian published his *Massis* (Ararat) for a long run between 1853 and 1908; there were also the journals *Aravelian Mamoul* (The Orient express), *Portz* (Essay), and *Hairenik* (Fatherland) published around the same time. These journals mostly aimed to bring the old and the new together without provoking radical social changes. They provided a public forum for the discussion of politics, history, economics, and philosophy.[209] All Armenian literary activities in the empire had a very strong utilitarian bent: they were all geared to aid the nation, and art for art's sake was considered a luxury.[210] It was outside the empire that the nationalist passion developed through the print media. The four periodicals of the Mikhit'arists in Europe were also intended to keep the Armenians abreast of world developments.[211] Similarly, the Armenian students in St. Petersburg and Moscow admired the sacrifices of the Balkan peoples to establish political independence from the Ottoman Empire and printed and distributed brochures on the Greek and Bulgarian revolutions. Revolution after the Balkan example seemed the most expedient road to freedom.[212]

The Ottoman sultan introduced Western-style schools into the empire to train a new cadre with skills and expertise to take on the military challenges of Europe. Yet the Enlightenment knowledge taught at these schools created new visions and led the new cadre to develop allegiances not to the sultan but instead to the abstract notion of the nation. As the ideology of Ottomanism failed, the conception of the nation became more and more defined along ethnic lines as the Turkish nation. The debate over the language of instruction signified this transformation: even though French had been the teaching medium, in the midnineteenth century attempts to replace French with Turkish gained dominance.[213] The publication of Turkish grammar books and dictionaries followed. Next came the debate in the purification of the Turkish language and the role of Arabic words within it.[214] The emerging nationalists advocated a pure Turkish language, one solely based on Turkic roots.

The next debate to follow concerned the possibility of abandoning the Arabic script in favor of the Latin one. The Turkish language did

indeed become a rallying point around which Turkish nationalism solidified. By 1876, the newly drawn constitution stated for the first time in Ottoman history that Turkish was the official language of the state and made its knowledge a requirement for the members of parliament and officials.[215] What followed was the educational policy adopted by the Committee of Union and Progress in 1911 to employ the Turkish language in all the schools of the empire, with the aim to "denationalize all the non-Turkish communities and instill patriotism among the Turks."[216] The Ottomans indeed recognized the significance of language, especially as it was employed in the educational system to reproduce new meanings and new visions, ones that now put the non-Turks of the empire at a disadvantage.

The many scientific journals established at the time with the explicit aim of following the Western technological developments in addition to those that explicitly debated historical and cultural issues[217] helped set the ideological parameters of Turkish nationalism. The new visionaries were certainly secular and Western oriented; science, technology, and progress emerged as the new ideals, followed by the increased spread of biological materialism and scientific objectivity, and loyalty to the state and rationality in administration became the new maxims.[218] Positivism and realism brought, after the 1860s, a new world view, a new vision based on a scientific analysis of social relations.[219] Among the many publications of the Turkish nationalists such as *Büyük Duygu* (The great sentiment), *Türk İli* (The land of the Turks) and *Turan* (the mythical homeland of the Turks), the most significant was that of the *Türk Yurdu* (Homeland of the Turks) in 1911, a weekly periodical that set itself as an objective "to create an ideal acceptable to all the Turks, defend the political and economic interests of the Turkish elements in the Ottoman empire, and strive for the progress and strengthening of the Turkish national spirit among the Ottoman Turks."[220] Its call for solidarity gradually converted to an appeal for action, slowly endowing the new rational and secular cadres with a sense of historical and cultural mission.

It was after the Egyptian occupation of Syria that Western-style education became a significant source of social change as French Jesuits and American Presbyterians competed for influence by establishing schools.[221] Once the Ottomans resumed rule, the Ottoman sultan, in an attempt to gain loyalties across generations, encouraged the local Arab notables to send their sons to be educated at the capital and founded[222] many Western-style schools in Syria, including the lower elementary (*sıbyaniye*), secondary (*sultaniye*), and military preparatory schools. In all these schools, even though the language of instruction was Turkish with some French, with Arabic receiving only scant attention, many of the graduates, especially those trained at the capital, became very active

in the Arab movement. The missionary schools, unlike the Ottoman state schools, accorded Arabic a privileged position in the curriculum; indeed it was among the graduates of the Syrian Protestant College—founded in Beirut in 1866, the first of its kind, with Arabic as the language of instruction—and the Jesuit Universite Saint-Joseph—established in 1865—that the main cadre of the Arab national movement formed.[223] Hence the expansion of Western-style education awakened and intensified, this time, the Arab national consciousness. Secular teachers at these institutions as well as the graduates who were taught public administration, civil law, and military science created new visions of the future of the Arab world.

This escalating interest in education brought with it an increase in the number of Arabic printing presses as the schools needed manuals for instruction. In compiling these works and thus indirectly reviving Arab literature, the schools also secured the services of scholars such as Nasif Yaziji and Butrus Bustani, who started the first[224] political newspaper, *Clarion of Syria*, in the Arab world and started spreading Enlightenment ideas of tolerance and patriotism.[225] Butrus Bustani also published *al-Jinan*, a political and literary review,[226] which used, for the first time, the motto "Patriotism is an article of faith." The independent political newspaper and the literary and scientific periodical were the two new types of publications[227] that appeared in Arabic in the 1870s.[228] It was especially after the suspension of the Ottoman constitution in 1877 that Arab demands for reforms started to be circulated through the print media. One of the earliest Arabic papers in Beirut, *Lisan-ul-Hal*, published by Khalil Sarkis, contained many articles on these reforms.[229] After 1908, the print media played a significant role in fostering a Syrian public opinion in favor of Arabism. The most influential among these was *al-Muqtabas* (The quoter), edited by Muhammad Kurd 'Ali a former supporter of the Committee of Union and Progress and a member of the Arab Revival Society.[230] From 1909 through 1914, in spite of strict Ottoman censorship, about sixty new newspapers were established in Beirut and about forty in Baghdad. Although these were short-lived, they nevertheless generated a lively forum for the discussion of new political scenarios.[231]

In all, visions of history and literature played a very significant role in creating and determining new meanings and their boundaries, which were then reproduced through the educational system. It was the combination of structural conditions with the new universe of meaning that generated the nationalisms in the Ottoman Empire. Yet this combination of structure and meaning had to be combined with a third factor, that of organization, in setting the parameters for the final course the nationalisms undertook.

Organizations for Political Change

The structures of war, commerce, and reforms thus interacted with visions of history, literature, and commerce to give meaning to the Greek, Armenian, Turkish, and Arab nationalisms; yet both needed a third and crucial factor in determining the trajectories these nationalisms took: an organizational base. It was through the establishment of philanthropic associations, secret societies, and political parties that people became mobilized and transformed into nationally conscious citizens.

Philanthropic Associations These associations, often established in the Enlightenment spirit to improve social conditions, were significant in mobilizing people and resources and in identifying their target population in terms of certain "national" characteristics. In the case of the Greek national movement, philanthropic associations first formed in Europe around the conception of a Greek civilization that had been the cradle of the current European one. The philhellenic movement, which encaptured this sentiment of a consuming love for Greece, a sentiment nourished and strengthened by romanticism, emerged in the second and third decades of the nineteenth century. Even though the philhellenes were at first much more interested in the historical sites and literature than the Greek nationalist movement,[232] the arrival of Lord Byron and his poetry led them to start to perceive the Greeks as people and Greece as a land. As a consequence, in the 1820s, European *philhellenic societies* were established in Madrid, Stuttgart, Munich, Darmstadt, Zurich, Berne, Genoa, Paris, and Marseilles to raise money for the Greek war of independence against the Ottomans and for the relief[233] of its victims.[234] Their efforts continued the work started by an earlier[235] organization, the London Greek Committee, which was established in 1823 when twenty-five friends of Greece issued an appeal to the known philhellenes; this committee grew in size to eighty-five before the end of the year. Among its members were many peers and other nobility, professionals, poets, clergy, and literary people; the list included a future prime minister, a past and a future lord chancellor, and the former lord mayor of London.[236] The London Greek Committee ordered two sailing ships from America. It had to sell the first to finance the second, the *Hope*, which was renamed the *Hellas* and became the flagship of the Greek fleet.[237] Yet the rest of their efforts were ineffectual and did little financially to further the Greek cause, except to light and create a vision in Europe for an independent Greece. The philanthropic activities of the Ottoman Greeks remained largely confined to the capital; the Constantinople Literary Society provided an intellectual leavening to the Greek community as it coordinated educational activities and provided a cultural model for the dispersed centers of Hellenism.[238]

The most significant philanthropic society in the Armenian national movement was also formed abroad in Paris in 1849 by "the Young Armenians," named after the Young Ottomans, who had come into contact with the Western world and subsequently wanted to transform their community. Many had studied in Paris, acquainted themselves with European political systems and progressive ideas, and had come to appreciate the French Revolution, the positivism of August Comte, and the ideas of Lamartine, Victor Hugo, and Alfred de Musset among others. As a consequence, they formed the Ararat Society (*Araratean Enkerut'iwn*) as a nonsectarian and nonpolitical organization with the aim "to bring progress to the Armenian nation and to provide for all its needs."[239] The Ottoman Armenians also formed many educational societies within the boundaries of the empire; the most outstanding among these was the United Societies, which came into existence in 1880 by the union of three organizations (*Ararathian, Tebrotzasiratz Arevelian,* and *Cilician*), all of which were active in opening schools in the provinces. Another educational society, the Altruistic Society (*Andznever*) was established in Constantinople in the 1860s; defining literacy as a solution to poverty, the members of this organization aimed to teach the Armenian language to the migrant Armenian workers at the capital. The Benevolent Union, founded[240] in Constantinople in 1860, similarly attempted to improve the financial and social conditions of the nation through education and agricultural innovations; it set up a model farm in Cilicia, for instance, to educate Armenian farmers in scientific agriculture.[241]

The philanthropic associations founded by the Ottoman Turks were also external in origin. The first such independent Ottoman association was to be the "Beşiktaş group," which was founded in 1826 and named after the İstanbul neighborhood where most of the members resided. The members, who were mostly Ottoman state officials and religious scholars, met regularly with the explicit purpose of "learning and teaching among all those individuals longing for science and education."[242] Later, it was the Turks from outside the empire who had migrated during the last decades of the nineteenth century that founded in the capital the associations of Tatar immigrants, students originating from Russia or the Crimea, and the Bukharan Benevolent Society. These eventually widened their membership base by addressing significant cultural and historical issues on the ethnic origins of the Turks. One of the associations founded in 1908 soon after the Young Turk revolution was the Association of Turks (*Türk Derneği*), which aimed "to study and impart all the written works and activities, past and present, of the Turkish peoples in archeology, history, linguistics, literature, ethnography, ethnology, sociology, civilization, and the old and new geography of Turkish lands." [243]

Meanwhile, many societies such as the Ottoman Medical Society (*Cemiyet-i Tıbbiye-i Osmaniye*) and Ottoman Scientific Society (*Cemiyet-i İlmiye-i Osmaniye*) undertook the task of finding Turkish equivalents for modern scientific and technical terms. The efforts mounted in constructing the Turkish identity escalated after the Balkan Wars; three such new philanthropic organizations espousing Turkish nationalism were the Homeland of the Turks (*Türk Yurdu*) established in 1911; the Hearth of the Turks (*Türk Ocağı*), which was a semisecret club set by medical and other students; and the Turkish Association for Knowledge (*Türk Bilgi Derneği*), formed in 1913 under the patronage of the Young Turks' Committee of Union and Progress.[244] All of these societies published profusely and gradually developed a body of knowledge on which rested the social and historical origins of Turkish nationalism.

The Arab philanthropic organizations that generated the Arab national movement were mainly formed in the provinces of the empire, often with missionary support. The first one, founded by Yaziji and Bustani in 1847 in Beirut with Protestant encouragement was the Society of Refinement (*Jam'iyat al-tahdhib*); it was established to discuss topics ranging from language and literature to patriotism and the revival of past glories. Arab Christians formed the majority of its members.[245] The Jesuits followed suit by supporting the establishment in 1850 of the Oriental Society (*Jam'iyat al-sharqiya*) along similar lines.[246] The Syrian Scientific Society (*Jam'iyat al-'ilmiya al-suriya*) was also founded in 1852 with the aim to disseminate knowledge in the sciences and arts, especially in terms of the historical contribution of the Arabs to these fields;[247] it explicitly overlooked religious and political issues in an attempt to overcome sectarian differences. Such activities took a political bent as the twentieth century commenced and spread to Europe. In Najib Azuri,[248] a Christian Arab, had founded in 1904 a society known as League of the Arab Nation (*Ligue de la Patrie Arabe*), which declared as its aim the freedom of Syria and Iraq from Ottoman domination and attempted to incite Arabs to achieving this aim.[249]

The first Arab society founded at the capital was the Ottoman Arab Fraternity (*al-Ikha' al-'Arabi al-'Uthmani*); it explicitly attempted to actualize an Ottoman democracy[250] that the Committee of Union and Progress had envisioned when it came to power in 1908. In 1909, another such society, the Literary Club (*al-Muntada al-Adabi*) was founded in Constantinople by officials, scholars, and students equipped with a library and a hostel. In the ensuing general elections to the Ottoman assembly, when the Turks were grossly overrepresented at the expense of all other ethnoreligious groups, including the Arabs, all the Arab organizations of the empire started protests. Another society estab-

lished in 1907 in Cairo was the Society of the Ottoman Council (*Jam'iyyat al-Shura al-'Uthmaniyya*) with the equal participation of Arabs, Turks, Albanians, Kurds, and Armenians, both Muslim and Christian; the aim of the society was to unite all the nationalities of the empire and establish a constitutional regime.[251]

Branches were set throughout the Arab countries as well. Even though the Committee of Union and Progress invited them to join their organization at the capital, the council in Egypt turned the offer down and argued that, unlike the CUP, they were including in practice as well in theory all nationalities and not restricting upper echelons to Turks. The Beirut Reform Society (*Jam'iyat Bayrut al-Islahiya*), which was established in the era of broadening calls for reform after the failure of the Ottoman forces in the Balkan War and the fall of the Unionist government, advocated reliance on internal strength of the homeland within the general context of the empire. During the same period, in 1913, the Basra Reform Society was formed, patterned after the one in Beirut. Because of the ensuing unrest, all such organizations were banned eight months later.[252]

Secret Societies The nationalist reactions against French domination during the Napoleonic era and the failed expectations of many social groups after the Congress of Vienna in 1815 had led to the emergence of secret societies in Europe. The structure of these societies were based on patterns borrowed from Freemasonry. They were very significant organizations in resisting existing state control by withholding information through close networks. Masonic lodges were established in Corfu in 1811 by Count Romas, with other similar lodges in the Ionian Islands, Lefkas, Paris, and Moscow during the same period.[253]

The first Greek secret society that laid the organizational groundwork for the Greek nationalist movement was the Friendly Society (*Philiki Etairia*) founded in Odessa in 1814 with the explicit aim to liberate the motherland through armed revolt; among the membership, more than half were merchants.[254] Secret words and complicated codes were a part of every function; orders from the governing body always came in code signed with a seal bearing sixteen compartments containing sixteen initials. These messages were brought to the other members[255] through networks of well-paid agents known as apostles who spread the Gospel throughout Ottoman territory. Even though the element of secrecy and of imagined leadership by Alexander I, the emperor of Russia, strengthened the society,[256] it disintegrated when the Greek revolt began as many clan-based loyalties and local ties came to play.

Many secret societies formed among the Ottoman Armenians after their escalating persecution in the 1860s. The uprisings in Zeitun, Van,

and Erzurum and the escalating Kurdish aggression led to the establishment in 1872 of the Union of Salvation (*Miuthiun I Perkuthiun*)[257] among the Ottoman Armenians of the Van province for self-protection. Similarly, in 1880, two years after another Ottoman aggression, a group formed in Erzurum, the Defenders of the Fatherland. The 1878 persecutions in Van resulted in the formation of three Armenian revolutionary groups,[258] the Armenagan, which provided general education for the public, trained an Armenian self-defense unit, and aimed to win the right for self-rule through revolution; the Black Cross Society (*Sev Khatch Kazmakerputhiun*),[259] where a group of young Armenians vowed to protect their unarmed compatriots by the use of armed force; and the Protectors of the Fatherland[260] (*Pashtpan Haireniats*), which, approved by the Armenian patriarch in Constantinople,[261] armed the inhabitants for defense against future attacks by Turks, Kurds, and Circassians.[262] Even though these secret societies, mostly formed in the eastern provinces in Erzurum and Van, mobilized the Ottoman Armenians around the national cause of self-preservation, the weak connections with the Armenians at the capital and the vigilant control of the Ottoman state often curbed their impact.

The first clandestine opposition organization in the empire was the Patriotic Alliance (*İttifak-ı Hürriyet*), which was established during the summer of 1865; it changed its name to the Young Ottoman Society[263] in 1867. All who joined had ideas of constitutionalism and popular representation and wanted to transform Ottoman rule into a constitutional one. Facing increasing persecution by the Ottoman government, many of its members started to escape to Europe in the late 1860s. Later, with the accession of Abdülhamid II and the abolition of the constitution and the assembly, many constitutionalists, including three members of the royal family, Damad Celaleddin Pasha, the sultan's brother-in-law, and his two sons, Sabaheddin and Lütfullah, also fled to Europe. The first secret society, founded by the Ottoman military cadets in 1889, which was also the most significant one in that it assumed legitimacy and political power within two decades, was the Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti*). Mobilizing adherents among the junior military and civilian bureaucrats, dissident intellectuals in exile, and the emergent middle class, the secret society initially aimed for a policy of Ottomanism to keep the empire together where all social groups would be equal.

It soon became evident that this pluralist policy did not take ground in practice; first Muslims, then Ottoman Turks were favored over other groups. The members circulated a confidential correspondence in 1897 stating "our aim is great union. For that reason you may allow Christians to become members of the Committee. But do not give the secret

numbers of the Committee correspondence to them! Only show them the published materials of the committee."[264] The committee became further radicalized in its policies during the early twentieth century: in its 1911 convention, it decided to strive for the universal advancement of the Turkish language, sent agents to Albania, Afghanistan, and Azerbaijan, and established branches in the Caucasus and Turkestan. Similarly, in the 1913 convention, it decided to pursue the cultural and economic policy of Turkification.[265]

The first mention of a possible secret society in Syria took place in 1879 when the British ambassador had a conversation with the Ottoman governor of Syria, Midhat Pasha, and asked him if there were truly a great Arab conspiracy with branches in Aleppo, Mosul, Baghdad, Medina, and Mecca. The response[266] was in the affirmative that indeed an Arab state headed by Amir 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri was contemplated, but no action had been yet taken. This amir had established a philanthropic society, the Society of Good Intentions (*Jam'iyyat al-Maqasid al-Khayriyya*), to invest money received from the government and rich local notables to establish schools for the education of Arab youth and to found a printing house to publish textbooks in Arabic. Even when the Ottoman state abolished this society for its alleged separationist[267] activities, the members continued to meet in secret circles to study Arabic history, language, and literature and to spread Arabism among the youth. Another similar secret society in Beirut was formed by twelve Christian graduates of the Syrian Protestant College of Beirut advocating an independent Arab state.[268] In recruiting members and mobilizing against the Ottomans, these graduates united with the Muslims through the cultural ties they all shared in Arabism. Within a couple of years, they started distributing placards[269] throughout Syrian towns, which described the magnificent past of the Arabs and demanded autonomy for Syria. The newly appointed Hamdi Pasha pressured the secret society to stop its activities. Another significant organization, Comite Turco-Syrien, became public a few years after its inception with participants and activities ranging from Europe, to the Ottoman capital, to Syria. Reformist in nature, the organization was eventually absorbed into the Committee of Union and Progress.[270]

The most significant secret society for Arab nationalism formed at the Ottoman capital was the Society of the Arab Revival (*al-Nahda al-'Arabiyya*). Formed in 1906 by Arab students,[271] the aim of the society was "making the intellectual Arab youth aware of their Arabism and to encourage them to cooperate in improving Ottoman society, whose righteousness was dependent on that of Arab society from the Taurus mountains to Bab al-Mandib." Even though the society became legal after the Young Turks assumed power, the escalating Turkification of

the government led first to a name change, to the Society of the Syrian Revival, which localized the ambitions of the group, and later to a gradual disintegration under Ottoman censorship, which resulted in the departure of many members to secret societies.

Two secret societies were significant in the emergence of Arab nationalism. The one formed in 1909, entitled al-Qahtaniya after one of the legendary ancestors of the Arab race, aimed to transform the Ottoman Empire into a dual monarchy, a Turco-Arab empire fashioned after the Austro-Hungarian federal model.[272] Recruiting from among the members of the Ottoman Arab Brotherhood (*al-Ikha al-'Arabi al-'Uthmani*), which was founded after the proclamation of the Ottoman constitution, this new secret society included many high-ranking Arab officers in the Ottoman army. Still, its activities ceased after a year when they were betrayed to the Ottoman administration.[273] In its stead formed the Covenant (*al-'Ahd*), which, aiming to establish an Arab Kingdom within a wider Ottoman Empire, explicitly recruited soldiers and formed branches throughout Syria. Many members[274] of this association formed the seeds of the first Arab nationalists in Syria and became the first generation leaders of the post-World War I Arab states. The other association, the Young Arab Society (*Jam'iyat al-'Arabiya al-Fatat*), was founded[275] in Paris in 1911 by seven young Arab Muslims all studying at the French capital—their objective was liberation from Turkish or any other alien domination and the placement of the Arab nation in the ranks of living nations.

The most significant activity of the Arab societies organized abroad was the Arab Congress of Paris held in 18–23 June 1913, which formed a general platform for the Arab demands of the Ottoman Empire.[276] Even though the manifest aim was to confirm the social and political solidarity of the Arab nation uniting both Christians and Muslims and to profess loyalty and allegiance to the Ottoman Empire, the Ottomans attempted to sow dissension among the participants and offered 'Abd al-Hamid Zahrawi, the president of the Paris Congress, a seat in the prestigious Ottoman senate, a position he accepted after breaking with his allies.[277] These secret societies started to strive for independence after World War I; most members of the Syrian elite started to identify with Arabism after the 1918 occupation of the European and Sharifian[278] troops of the Syrian provinces, a development that they rightfully identified as the final defeat of the Ottoman Empire.

Political Parties Political parties were significant as the organizational form for the total mobilization of the populace around the national cause. In the case of the Greek nationalist movement, secret societies immediately transformed into political parties within the newly inde-

pendent Greece and therefore decreased the incentive among the Ottoman Greek organizations to have political parties, as there already were some in the newly independent Greek state. The Armenian, Turkish, and Arab nationalisms, however, did indeed witness the formation of political parties to further their national cause.

The two major Armenian political parties,[279] both initially founded outside the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire but soon embarked upon political activities within, were the *Hnchak* (Bell) Party,[280] founded in Geneva in 1887, and the *Dashnaksutiun* (Armenian Revolutionary Federation),[281] established in Tiflis in 1890. The Hnchaks, whose immediate objective was the political and national independence of Ottoman Armenia, chose Constantinople as the center of their organization and activity and recruited seven hundred members within seven months: most of these members were professionals working in foreign consulates and maritime companies. In 1890, they organized the demonstration of Kum Kapu to force the sultan into carrying out the promised reforms and to gain the support of the European powers. Hoping to synchronize their efforts, they joined in 1891 the Oriental Federation, which was composed of Macedonian, Albanian, Cretan, and Greek revolutionaries; they also placed placards throughout the empire to mobilize others against government oppression.

In a protest against the Ottoman sultan's refusal to decree reforms, the Hnchaks also staged a demonstration in Bab-ı Ali, the center of Ottoman government in Constantinople in 1895. The demonstration led to much bloodshed but also alerted the European powers to the Armenian demands and forced the Ottoman sultan, Abdülhamid II, to sign the Armenian reform program. A split occurred within the Hnchak Party in 1896 over whether socialism was compatible with Armenian nationalism and over what tactics to follow in achieving independence. Although the Hnchaks were also interested in national liberation, they placed class interests over national interests, unlike the Dashnaks who placed the interests of the Armenian nation above all. Ultimately, it was the Dashnak Party formed in Russian Armenia that rose to predominance.

The Dashnaksutiun party was formed in reaction to the closing of Armenian schools by the Tsar's edict and the Guilizar incident where an Armenian peasant girl was raped by a Kurdish chief.[282] Even though the headquarters of the Dashnak Party was to be Trabzon, Tiflis nevertheless remained the operating center. It was then that Sarkis Googoonian, a young student, approached the party and volunteered to cross the border to the Ottoman Empire with 125 comrades to protect the Ottoman Armenians against persecution. Even though the mission got underway, it was the Russian border patrols who attacked and arrested them

before crossing the border, and the attempt went no further.[283] The other major accomplishment of the party was the seizure of the Ottoman bank in Constantinople by twenty-six revolutionaries on 26 August 1896 to force the Ottoman government to carry out reforms in the provinces that would protect Armenian lives. After the intervention of the Russian consul, the revolutionaries were given a safe passage to Europe.[284]

The party also produced the first significant fighting units of the Armenians, the first volunteer fighters who would defend Armenian rights by killing the enemy or die fighting initially in the Ottoman Empire and later, at the beginning of the twentieth century, in Russia against forceful Russification. They also attempted in 1905, with other organizations, the assassination of Sultan Abdülhamid, without success, and joined the dissenting[285] elements against Hamidian rule. Indeed, when the sultan was deposed in 1908, whereby the Dashnaksutiun "laid down its arms and joined wholeheartedly in parliamentary cooperation."[286] Of the twelve Armenian deputies to the newly elected Ottoman parliament, six were members of the party, and the Dashnaksutiun soon thereafter became the central political power of the Armenian community.[287] The aim of the party now was to realize autonomy with peaceful coexistence; indeed the official committee of the Dashnaksutiun made another public announcement with the Committee of Union and Progress, stating that "the two organizations declare that they are in harmony concerning the increasing of the provincial rights which will guarantee the general progress of the Ottoman fatherland."[288] Yet the promised self-rule in the provinces did not materialize; the radicalization of politics, the return of the Ottoman government to oppression, and the continued and even harsher persecution of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire soon put an end to all these endeavors.

The most significant political party in the empire was that established by the formerly secret society of the Committee of Union and Progress.[289] Upon assuming power in 1908, the Unionists fell quickly into disarray for two reasons; they had not defined future aims other than the restoration of the constitution and were therefore suddenly faced with power struggles among the factions, especially over the appointments of the ministers of war and marine that effectively controlled the armed forces. The other reason was external: the crises of the Bulgarian independence, the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, and the decision of Crete to join Greece all came in October 1908 and effectively destroyed the chance of the Unionists to formulate adequate policies.

In addition, the tension over the division of power between the committee, which just claimed to be the guardian of the constitution, and the Ottoman sultan led to many additional tensions, among them the estab-

lishment in 1908 of the Liberal Union (*Osmanlı Ahrar Fırkası*) as an opposition party. The membership of the Liberal Union came largely from the prosperous and conservative elements and wanted decentralization in government, with a laissez-faire economic system and virtual autonomy for ethnic groups—a policy that won them the support of the non-Turkish elements of the empire. Another political organization that formed was the Muhammedan Union (*İttihad-ı Muhammedi*), which championed Islamic orthodoxy, argued that national union must be based on the ideal of Islam, and opposed modernization that displaced the Sheriat. The political conundrum between the Unionists, Liberals, and traditionalists was resolved with the march in 1909 of the army in Macedonia to the capital as the Action Army (*Hareket Ordusu*); ultimately, the Unionists eliminated the other parties as their political control of the Unionists over the army proved too strong to be overcome. And their adoption of the policy of Turkification strengthened the stronghold of Turkish nationalist groups at the expense of others.

Arabism did not necessarily mean Arab nationalism but instead support for the Entente Liberal Party (*Hürriyet ve İtilaf*), which advocated administrative decentralization, some local autonomy, respect for the empire's nationalities, and protection of democratic freedoms.[290] Still, the significant political party among the Ottoman Arabs was the Ottoman Decentralization Party (*al-Hizb al-Lamarkaziya al-Idariya al-'Uthmani*), which was founded in Cairo in 1912 with the aim to advocate decentralization both among the rulers of Turkey and the Arabs; the motto of the party was "Religion is for God, homeland is for all."[291] The party surmised that the Ottoman Empire could be better defended against European attacks if it were decentralized and each province organized in self-defense—a stand that was in direct opposition with the Unionist vision, which saw the solution in increased centralization. The party nevertheless asked for wider administrative authority and for Arabic as the official language of the province and as one of the official languages of the Ottoman Parliament. The Arab National Congress in Paris in 1913 reiterated these demands as they called for the introduction of reforms, proportionate representation in the administration, and the recognition of Arabic as an official language of equal stature with Turkish.[292]

Even though the Unionists attempted to recruit Ottoman Arabs into their ranks by promising Arabic instruction in schools and Arab representation in the Senate, they were not able to keep these promises.[293] Instead, most of the Arab officials in high administrative positions both at the capital and the provinces were purged between 1908 and 1914.[294] Within this context, the escalating Turkification policies of the Unionists further intensified the political transition[295] from the Arab decentralization movement to independence; it was the Ottoman Empire's entry in World War I that ultimately launched the Arab independence movement. On the eve of the war, Cemal Pasha, who took over the command of the Fourth Army in the Syrian province and started his rule with a policy of tolerance and clemency emphasizing the commonalities of the Arabs and Turks, soon ordered executions and deportations toward Arab leaders in an attempt to contain them and to prevent their collaboration with foreign powers[296] against the empire.

After World War I, as Ottoman forces were driven out of Syria in October 1918, the Allies took over and established three administrations, the British in Palestine, the French in Lebanon and along the Northern coast, and the Arabs in the interior from Aleppo in the north to Aqaba in the south; Britain and France ultimately divided the country between them, partitioning the Ottoman province of Syria into four entities, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan.[297] The result of the opposition in Syria to the European and Sharifian[298] occupation was the formation in 1919 of the National Party (*al-Hizb al-watani*), which asked for full Syrian independence within its national boundaries.[299]

CONCLUSION

The combination of war, commerce, and reforms that transformed existing social relations thus interacted with new visions painted by history, literature, and education and, under the parameters set by the existing organizations of philanthropic and secret societies and political parties, determined the patterns the nationalisms within the Ottoman Empire took. There was also an element of continuity among the different nationalisms, as ideas and social practices germinated, diffused, and transformed from one context to another; as one scholar points out, "one nationalism begat a competing nationalism. One nationality's claims to a better position stimulated rival claims by its neighbors."[300]

Empires often lacked the tools with which to contain these nationalisms; they were founded on principles of social power that privileged lineage and proximity to the center and built on carefully defined and segmented social groups whose boundaries were carefully guarded. When the Enlightenment ideas of citizenry that strove at least for political equality (even though initially restricted only to urban males with property) diffused from the United States, France, and Haiti to the rest of the world, the empires had a difficult time containing these principles and what they implied. The privileging of lineage and proximity to the center hindered the principle of political citizenry based on equal access to resources throughout the land; the segmented social groups had taken

roots in the societal structure to such a degree that the empires could not, in spite of many attempts, transform these groups they had tried so hard to contain into the imagined community of a federal political entity. Even though such a federal entity might have theoretically prevented the emergence of nationalist movements, the increased political conflict over territorial control resulting in frequent wars radicalized the existing movements foreclosed that possibility.

Ultimately, what determined the form and trajectory of the Greek, Armenian, Turkish, and Arab nationalisms? This comparative analysis reveals two significant insights. One is that the form all these Middle Eastern nationalisms took contained many similarities in structure, meaning, and organization. The epistemological shadow of the nation-state on historical scholarship has obfuscated this commonality in form and has instead treated each nationalism as unique, thereby highlighting difference at the expense of similarity. Once analyzed within a comparative context, not only do similarities among Middle Eastern nationalisms become evident, but one also starts to observe patterns between the Middle Eastern nationalisms and those occurring elsewhere. Indeed, the observation of one scholar,[301] made in the context of Western Europe, becomes relevant to the Middle East as well when he states that "the emergence of nineteenth century nationalities was no natural or logical development from a series of objective and empirically observable characteristics of human populations, like a common territory, language or religion," but "bore a far more arbitrary and less predictable relationship to existing patterns of social organization."

The question of a comparative analysis of the trajectories of these Middle Eastern nationalisms is harder to analyze, since the concept of trajectory contains within it the element of historical process, of transformation, which in turn entails many interactions. Still, however, the comparative analysis of Greek, Armenian, Turkish, and Arab nationalisms reveals the significance of the historical context that patterns these interactions. This article has argued that the interaction of three historically contextualized patterns determine the trajectory of each Middle Eastern nationalism: (i) the structures of war, commerce, and reform; (ii) the meanings set by history, literature, and education; and (iii) the organizational framework provided by philanthropic and secret societies and political parties.

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NOTES

1. See Nur 1992, pp. 268, 330.

2. Even though Egypt was also significant in the emergence of Arab nationalism, it was unique because of the relative independence of the khedive

from the Ottoman state; this chapter focuses instead on Arab nationalism that emerges in the Ottoman province of Syria, as it is more indicative of the social forces in Ottoman society that led to the formation of the movement. For further information on Egyptian nationalism, see especially Saab 1958, p. 209.

3. See, for instance, Tilly 1975; Tivey 1981; Carr 1983; Smith 1983, 1986, 1988, 1994; Hroch 1985; Mann 1986; Alter 1989; Hobsbawm 1990; and Brubaker 1992 for a survey of the literature.

4. See Tivey 1981, pp. 4–5.

5. See Alter 1989, pp. 60, 96.

6. See Smith 1983, p. 28. Smith further identifies four historical patterns to state and nation formation; (i) the Western model whereby the state and nation emerge together as dynastic-territorial states are built around an ethnic core that forms ties with other ethnic groups; (ii) the immigrant model where small groups form a state and absorb waves of new immigrants, as, for example, in the United States; (iii) the ethnic model where the ethnic group exists in varying degrees of completeness and self-consciousness prior to the advent of nationalism, which transforms these groups into nations with their own territories, economies, legal rights, and education systems, as in Greece for instance; and (iv) the colonial model where a modern state imposes from above a national identity on many ethnic communities and categories, as in the instance of Kenya. See Smith 1986, pp. 241–42.

7. Hroch 1985, pp. 8–9, 129–31.

8. See, for instance, Kamenka 1976; Seton-Watson 1977; Eley 1981; Gellner 1982, 1983; Anderson 1983; Smith 1987; Chatterjee 1993; Balaghi 1994; and Gillis 1994.

9. See Greenfeld 1992.

10. See, for instance, Seton-Watson 1977, p. 15.

11. The quotation is from Smith 1986, p. 245. He then analyzes nationalism as a "political myth" whereby a community creates an imagined national past. Indeed, it is the *ethnie*, "the collective cultural units and sentiments of previous eras " that creates the sense of ethnic origin of nations. Such an ethnie forms and reproduces itself through sedentarization and nostalgia, organized religion, and inter-state warfare." See Smith 1987, pp. 13, 32–41, and 1988, p. 1.

12. See Eley 1981, p. 91.

13. The transition from ethnicity to nationality occurs through the interaction of the global political and ideological situation, the inflexibility of dominant nationalities and their states, and the changing composition of the intelligentsia. See Eley 1981, p. 99.

14. Refer to Anderson 1991, p. 13.

15. See Göçek 1996 for a more detailed analysis of the Ottoman social structure and specifically the location of religious minorities and other social groups within it.

16. See Braude and Lewis 1982, p. 5.

17. Sociologically, a "minority" is a social group that does not equally share in the societal power structure. Hence a group can be numerically large, such as Blacks in South Africa or women, but still not share in the power structure equally. The Ottoman term for religious minorities is *zimmi* or *dhimmi*.

18. This book, focusing on the central lands of the empire rather than the Arab provinces, studies the Ottoman Greeks, Armenians, and Jews more than the Arab Christians. Yet the Arab Christians were a significant social force in the provinces, particularly in the nineteenth century. For an extensive analysis of Arab Christians, see studies such as those of Bakhit 1972, Braude and Lewis 1973, Cohen 1984 and 1973, Fawaz 1983, Hourani 1957, Hunter 1984, Masters 1988, Owen 1981, and Rafeq 1966 and 1977.

19. The Ottoman Armenians who had originally been under the jurisdiction of the Greek patriarch had their own patriarchate established in 1461 whereby the Armenian patriarch had all the rights and responsibilities of the Greek one. Thenceforth, all Christians professing the diophysitic doctrine remained under the jurisdiction of the Greek patriarch and the monophysitic doctrine under the Armenian patriarch. See Etmekjian 1964, p. 83.

20. See Artinian 1975, p. 3.

21. The minorities could escape these restrictions through one channel: conversion. Ottoman religious minorities sometimes converted to Islam either to enjoy the social rights of the Muslims or sometimes to marry a Muslim.

22. The rebellion in Greece of Ali Pasha of Ioannina was very significant in diverting the attention of the Ottoman state away from the local Greek mobilization for independence. During 1821–25, Sultan Mahmud II sent Muhammad Ali to crush the Greek rebellion, an intervention that the Syrian Arabs also encountered in 1831–40, this time without Ottoman consent. Although the Egyptian occupation was short-lived, it nevertheless opened the road to the Arab resurrection; during the occupation, for instance, the Amir Bashir of Lebanon emphasized the possibility of an Arab empire to mobilize support for the Egyptian army. See Dakin 1973a, pp. 57, 67; Clogg 1973, p. 5; Antonius 1969, pp. 26, 30, 35, and Duri 1987, p. 145.

23. See Clogg 1992, p. 60.

24. After the emergence of Bonaparte, in 1800, an Armenian priest, Hakovb Tjerpetian Shahaniants, suggested that the Armenians make contact with Napoleon's armies in Egypt or Syria as they were moving toward Cilicia. It was rumored that Napoleon was interested in Armenians as possible agents in furthering his interests of invading India through the Caucasus: indeed, he attempted in 1803 to take the Christians of Syria and Armenia under his protection. See Nalbandian 1963, pp. 37–38.

25. Ter Minassian 1984, p. 16, and Etmekjian 1976b, p. 48.

26. In addition, the diplomacy of the Balkan wars convinced the Young Turks that Europe would no longer intervene to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire if the Ottomans could not do so themselves. See Ahmad 1966, p. 321.

27. See especially Duri 1987, p. 164.

28. In 1827, the Tengerian brothers in Constantinople announced to the Ottoman sultan that the eastern Armenians who were fighting during the 1826–28 war between Russia and Persia on the side of the Russians were soon planning to engage in hostilities against the Ottoman sultan—at a time when the Greek war of independence was in progress. The Tengerian brothers used this

occasion to ask the Ottoman sultan to grant the Ottoman Armenian community additional privileges, especially the papal Armenians the right to establish their own community. Yet the plan backfired, as the Ottomans banished all the papal Armenians, including the Tengerian family, especially after the Ottoman defeat at Navarino, which turned the Ottomans against all European powers. See Arpee 1909, pp. 55–56.

29. According to the article, the Russians would have the power to monitor the reforms. At the Congress of Berlin, England and France saw this clause as an expansion of Russian power and changed it to article 61, one that had much less accountability for the Ottomans, which resulted in many Ottoman persecutions against the Armenians after Russian withdrawal. See Aharonian 1989, pp. 34–37, and Etmekjian 1964, p. 131.

30. Article 61 of the 1878 Berlin Treaty repeated but watered down the promise of article 16 of the Treaty of San Stefano, but none was ever carried out. See Ter Minassian 1984, pp. 4–5.

31. See Karidis 1981, p. 112.

32. See Augustinos 1992, p. 30.

33. See Megrian 1973, p. 9, and Shmavonian 1983, pp. 36–37.

34. See Atamian 1955, p. 70.

35. See Bournoutian 1983: 14.

36. The Ottoman Turks comprised 35 percent of the population, with the others following, in descending order, Arabs (13.8 percent), Rumanians (11.4 percent), Bulgarians (7.8 percent), Serb-Croatians (7 percent), Armenians (6.5 percent), Greeks (5.5 percent), Albanians (3.1 percent), Kurds (2.6 percent), and Circassians (2.6 percent). See Davison 1977, pp. 29–30.

37. Modest military assistance was sent to Kashgar in 1875, but later appeals were not answered. See Kushner 1977, p. 11.

38. A significant factor in this migration was that of the flight of intellectuals from the Turkish provinces of the Russian Empire, mainly the Crimea, Central Asia, and the Volga region, including those most affected by the nationalist movements in Russia. See Kushner 1977, pp. 11–12.

39. See Ahmad 1982, p. 416.

40. While most originally settled in Rumelia, the Ottoman Empire encouraged them to move to Anatolia by offering them under the 1857 refugee code land and exemptions from taxes and conscription for twelve years compared to six if they settled in Rumelia. For further information, see Yapp 1987, pp. 121–22.

41. See ibid., p. 59.

42. At its inception, this protection was limited to Ottoman minorities who were locally recruited for service to Western powers "as vice-consuls, interpreters, commercial agents and more menial employs." Yet the scope eventually expanded to cover thousands. Non-Muslim merchants started accepting foreign citizenship more and more frequently until 1869 when the Ottoman citizenship law was introduced. See Davison 1982, p. 32 and Ahmad 1982, p. 404.

43. See Dakin 1973a, p. 21.

44. The Greeks acquired the right to fly under the Russian flag and the protection of Russian consuls in 1779. See Dakin 1973, p. 21.

45. See Karidis 1981, p. 124.

46. By 1813, there were 615 Greek ships amounting to 155, 500 tonnes and 38,00 seamen involved in the trade of the region, a factor that aided the independence war. See Yapp 1987, p. 57.

47. The revolt in the principalities in 1821, the commencement of the Greek War of Independence in 1821–27 and the Ottoman-Russian War of 1828–29 brought further population growth to the Greek diaspora community of Odessa. See Karidis 1981, p. 117.

48. See ibid., p. 127.

49. For further information, see Clogg 1981, pp. 98–99; 1992, pp. 4, 27.

50. As in the case of the community of Sibiu (Hermannstadt) in Transylvania, these diaspora communities often had their own Greek church, priest to conduct the rituals, a teacher and a school house for education. The Greek merchant company elected a president and a council that often ran the town; hence they were miniature national societies. See Frangos 1973, pp. 91–92.

51. See Clogg 1981, pp. 94, 104, and Frangos 1973, p. 93.

52. See Etmekjian 1964, p. 60.

53. See Braude and Lewis 1982, p. 21.

54. See Artinian 1989, pp. 7–8, 27–29, 81–91, and 1981, p. 193.

55. See Nalbandian 1963, pp. 34–36.

56. See Etmekjian 1964, pp. 69–71.

57. Within the Madras community, Joseph Emin called for the liberation of Armenia, Shameer Shameerian suggested and financed the use of printed works to spread the idea of political freedom, and both believed that King Heraclius II of Georgia should lead the independence movement but with a republican state and constitution as the result. For further information, see Caprielian 1975, pp. 151–52.

58. Because Armenia was not considered strategically vital to Russia, the creation of an independent Armenia was not in the interest of imperial Russia. See Capraelian 1975, pp. 153–55.

59. The actual capital investment in the Ottoman Empire in 1914 demonstrates this domination: the Ottoman Greeks controlled 50 percent of such investment, Armenians 20 percent, Ottoman Turks 15 percent, foreign nationals 10 percent, and Jews 5 percent (Alexandris 1983, p. 32).

60. By 1914 the Middle East owed Europe about 500 million English pounds, about half of which was accounted for by governments. See Yapp 1987, p. 31.

61. See Ahmad 1982, p. 427.

62. See ibid., pp. 414, 417.

63. For further information on this emergence, see Toprak 1982.

64. In Lebanon, the Christian community was likewise enriched by increased silk cultivation. See Hourani 1957, p. 104.

65. See Yapp 1987, p. 132; Hourani 1957, p. 117; 1968, pp. 60–61.

66. The centralization policy of Sultan Mahmud II (1808–39) restored government authority and ensured the effectiveness of these reforms. This centralization policy drew very much upon the French concept of nation, attempted to unify the empire around the government in Constantinople. See Arai 1992, p. 2.

67. The 1839 Noble Rescript of the Rose Chamber, the 1856 Imperial Rescript, and the 1876 Ottoman constitution accompanied by the establishment of the first Ottoman parliament in 1877 spelled out these reforms. The sultan declared in 1830, for instance, that "his affection and sense of justice for all of his (Muslim, Christian, and Jewish) subjects was strong and indeed they were all his children." See Karal 1982, pp. 388, 389–95. The 1839 rescript stated that "the Muslim and other peoples (*ahali-i islam ve milel-i saire*) who are among the subjects of our imperial sultanate shall be the object of our favors without exception." See Ma'oz 1968, p. 22.

68. See Gülsoy 1991, p. 446.

69. See Davison 1968, p. 104.

70. See Augustinos 1992, p. 60.

71. One must note that individual minorities did indeed penetrate the system often and acquired positions of power, but they were the exception rather than the rule.

72. See Ahmad 1982, p. 407.

73. See ibid., p. 408.

74. After the 1856 proclamation, as an assembly composed of seven metropolitans and twenty-one lay members (ten from the capital and eleven from provinces) met at the capital to determine the structure of new communal representation, six archbishops resigned in protest. Still, a permanent mixed council of four bishops and eight lay members was successfully established. See Alexandris 1983, p. 33.

75. See Augustinos 1992, p. 189, and Gülsoy 1991, p. 445.

76. See Alexandris 1983, pp. 32–33.

77. See ibid., p. 37.

78. The Phanariots were originally drawn from families of Greek or Hellenized Romanian and Albanian origin. From the eighteenth century onwards, the princes governing Wallachia and Moldavia were selected from among Phanariots, who slowly started to cultivate a myth of aristocratic Byzantine ancestry. Hence, the Phanariots, "not by virtue for their descent, but by the virtue of their position in the Ottoman empire, the sources of their wealth, and their close identification with the church, represented a Byzantine tradition that was basically anti-national." See Mango 1973, pp. 44, 59.

79. Clogg 1982, p. 192; 1992, pp. 21, 29; Mango 1973, p. 42.

80. See Mango 1973, p. 48.

81. It was the lack of legal protection that challenged the existence of the Catholic Armenians the most. To secede from one community to join one not officially recognized by the government equaled renunciation of all civil rights and privileges and exposed the offender to the grim consequences of being outlaws. See Artinian 1989, p. 33.

82. See Etmekjian 1964, p.163.

83. See Artinian 1989, p. 39, and 1975, p. 6, and also Arpee 1909, pp. 43, 51.

84. See Etmekjian 1964, p. 86, and Nalbandian 1963, p. 42.

85. Two brothers, the Düzians, were appointed superintendents of the Ottoman imperial bank, while another, Amira Bezjian, became the sultan's confidante and financial advisor. Mahmud II raised him to the rank of a member of the imperial court and gave him the privilege of sharing in the deliberations of the imperial divan; within the Armenian community, he also presided over the patriarch's advisory board and supported many educational, philanthropic, and religious enterprises. Others reached prominent positions later on. See Arpee 1909, p. 53, and Etmekjian 1964, p. 82.

86. For instance, the three architects of the Hovhannes Serverian, Garabed Balian, and Boghos Odian had sent Nahabed Rusinian, one of the most radical and dedicated participants in the Western Armenian Renaissance, to Paris, where, between 1840 and 1851, he studied and became acquainted with social and political issues. Upon his return, he worked indefatigably "for the national welfare, serving on many committees, participating as a member on the national administration, and translating French literary pieces." See Etmekjian 1964, p. 106.

87. For more information, see Barsoumian 1979.

88. See Artinian 1989, pp. 53–57.

89. The debates within the assembly were nevertheless significant in the negotiation of the boundaries of the complaints the Armenians should report to the Ottoman government. As always, the boundaries between criticism and the implication of the desire for autonomy were unclear and, indeed in 1876, a Turkish newspaper, *Basiret* (insight), publicly accused the Armenians of disloyalty. Soon thereafter the meetings of the Armenian assembly were closed to the public. See Etmekjian 1976a, pp. 288–89, and 1976b, pp. 39–41, 46.

90. See Artinian 1989, p. 94, and Atamian 1955, p. 118.

91. See Nalbandian 1963, pp. 127–28, and Hovannisian 1967.

92. Cemal Pasha, for instance, stated "speaking for myself, I am primarily an Ottoman, but I do not forget that I am a Turk, and nothing can shake my belief that the Turkish Race is the foundation stone of the Ottoman empire . . . in its origins the Ottoman empire is a Turkish creation. The quotation is in Landau 1981, p. 50."

93. See Gökalp 1968, p. 8, and Heyd 1950, p. 71.

94. See Akşin 1987, pp. 11–13.

95. See Ahmad 1968, p. 21, and 1969, p. 17.

96. See Etmekjian 1972, p. 16.

97. See Ma'oz 1968, p. 49 and 1982, pp. 96–105.

98. The Ottoman redrawing of Syria in 1887 into the provinces of Aleppo, Beirut, and Syria in an attempt to standardize rule and have governor generals appointed by and directly responsible to the capital increased unrest, one that was constantly stirred up by the European powers. The division of Lebanon into two separate districts along ethnoreligious lines into Christian and Druze polarized matters even further. See Antonius 1969, pp. 56 and 65–66.

99. For more information, refer to Hanioğlu 1995.

100. See Hanioğlu 1991, pp. 31–32.

101. This Turkification was more a result of political changes in the Ottoman ruling cadre—since the inner circle was mostly Turkish, when political replacements were necessary to solidify power over the administration, the positions became filled more and more by Turks at the expense of Arabs. See Khalidi 1991a, p. x.

102. See Antonius 1969, p. 87, and Khoury 1983, p. 17.

103. See Khalidi 1977, pp. 215–16.

104. Moiz Cohen, who later assumed the name Munis Tekinalp, believed in both Ottoman and Turkish nationalism. Committed to Turkish language and culture and to the fusion of minorities into the larger Turkish nation, Cohen attempted to further Turkify the empire. There were still others such as James Sanua, a Jew active in Egyptian nationalism, and Michel Aflak, a Christian in Syria, who served similar functions. See Landau 1981, pp. 3–7, 15.

105. See Ahmad 1982, p. 401.

106. A significant opposing force that also started to emerge was Islamism; this ideology argued that Islam needed to retain its position of influence on politics and society in the empire and thus form a significant link among the Muslim nations within and outside the borders. It also failed to sustain itself against emerging ethnic nationalisms.

107. See Smith 1986, p. 249.

108. See Alexandris 1983, pp. 37–41.

109. See Panayotopoulos 1980a, pp. 87–95.

110. Before the War of Independence, the term denoted "a mythical people of superhuman strength and stature who were imagined to have lived in Greece in the dim and distant past." It was only in the 1820s that it came again into current use. The quotation is from Dakin 1973a, p. 22; see also Kakridis 1963, p. 251.

111. During the war of Independence in 1821, the Greeks issued an appeal to the European courts, stating, "Greece, our mother, was the lamp that illuminated you; on this ground she reckons on your active philanthropy. Arms, money, and counsel, are what she expects from you." The quotation is cited in Dakin 1973a, p. 59, and 1973b, p. 162.

112. For further information, refer to Clogg 1992, p. 60, Tatsios 1984, Dakin 1973a, p. 316, and Panayotopoulos 1980b, p. 335.

113. See Frazee 1969, p. 15, Clogg 1973, p. 27, and Dakin 1955, pp. 10–11.

114. The French annexation of the Ionian islands by the Treaty of Campo Formia in 1797 had briefly raised among the Greeks hopes of Bonaparte as a savior; yet this interest gradually waned. See Clogg 1973, p. 26.

115. See Clogg 1992, p. 17.

116. See Nicolopoulos 1985, p. 42.

117. Indeed, among several plans put forth was a book entitled *La Turquie Chretienne sous la Protection de Louis le Grand, protecteur unique du christianisme en Orient* (Christian Turks under the protection of Louis XIV, the singular protector of Christianity in the East). See Etmekjian 1964, pp. 57–60.

118. The delegation was headed by Catholicos Hagop, and a layperson, Israel Ori, conducted the negotiations from the princes of Karabagh. With the German prince's support, Ori set out in 1698 to enlist the aid of Leopold of Austria and Peter the Great of Russia but died in Astrakhan in 1711 as Peter the Great's special ambassador to the Persian shah. The War of Spanish Succession and the Russian war with Sweden had prevented the development of this course of action. See Caprielian 1975, p. 149, and Etmekjian 1964, pp. 62–63.

119. See Kushner 1977, pp. 27–28.

120. Ottoman history textbooks reflected this change; even though one in 1877 did not mention the Turkish ancestry, another written a decade later did speak of the Turks, Chinese, and Indians as the three great nations of Asia. See Kushner 1977, p. 29.

121. One needs to distinguish, however, Turkism, a movement "to unite, physically, culturally or both, all peoples of proven or alleged Turkic origins, living both within and outside the frontiers of the Ottoman empire," and Turanism, which has as its chief objective "rapprochement and ultimately union among all peoples whose origins are purported to extend back to Turan, an undefined . . . area in the steppes of Central Asia." See Landau 1981, p. 1.

122. See Gökalp 1968, pp. 3–4.

123. See Landau 1981, p. 2.

124. See Kushner 1977, p. 51.

125. In 1918, when the war concluded, Enver ordered all Turkish officers be left in command of Azerbaijan and Northern Caucasus troops and that Azerbaijan be cleared of all Russians and Armenians to ensure Turkic-Turkish territorial continuity. In 1919, the propaganda to save Turkestan continued throughout Central Asia, calling upon all Muslims and Turks to secure the continuation of the Ottoman Empire. The arrival of Enver himself in Central Asia in 1921 and his assumption of the title of emir of Turkestan was the culmination of the Turkish movement. See Landau 1981, pp. 51–55.

126. See Kushner 1977, p. 34.

127. See Tauber 1993, p. 246.

128. Rida stated "Have we said . . . 'Is it possible to restore the glory of the East through the strength of Islam?' Yes! a thousand times yes!" The quotation is in Dawn 1973, p. 134; see also Duri 1987, p. 186.

129. 'Abdul-Rahman Kawakebi, for instance, wrote a work entitled *Umm al-Qura* (a name in the Qur'an as one of the designations of Mecca), about an imagined symposium on the destiny of Islam by twenty-two fictitious characters convened in Mecca for the pilgrimage who then decided to found a society for the regeneration of Islam. Most of the book entailed a verbatim report of the imagined proceedings. See Antonius 1969, p. 96.

130. The book was entitled *Tabai el-Istibdad* (the attributes of despotism). This book was a translation of V. Alfieri's *Della Tiranide* which had first been translated into Ottoman Turkish by Abdullah Cevdet in 1897 and then into Arabic by Kawakabi. See Hanioğlu 1995 for a more detailed discussion.

131. See Saab 1958, p. 204.

132. Many Christian Arabs such as Ibrahim al-Yaziji, Adib Ishaq, Nadrah Matran, and Ahmad Faris Ishyaq who actually converted to Islam identified themselves with the civilization of the East and with Arabism. See Dawn 1973, pp. 140–43. In the context of Egypt, the son of the ruler Muhammad 'Ali, who was a Muslim but not an Arab (but instead a Turk), claimed fictitious Arab identity by association, stating that he "came to Egypt as a child and his blood had since been colored completely Arab by the Egyptian sun." See Hourani 1983, p. 261, and Antonius 1969, p. 28.

133. One case in point was that of the ecumenical patriarch Grigoros V who was hanged on April 1821 at one of the gates of the patriarchate in Con-

stantinople for failing to guide and guarantee the loyalty of his flock. When the Russian tsar protested the action, the Ottoman sultan stated that the patriarch was punished as an individual rebel and traitor, as the head of the nation, and not as a dignitary of the church—hence the sultan declared he was fighting rebellion, not the Orthodox Church. The patriarch's corpse, then dragged to the Golden Horn, was picked up by the Greek crew of a Russian ship and taken to Odessa. Fifty years later, in 1871, the body was returned to Greece, and in 1921, on the hundredth anniversary of his martyrdom, he was proclaimed a saint.

134. See Clogg 1992, pp. 36–37, Dakin 1973, p. 60, and Frazee 1969, pp. 27–39.

135. It is interesting to note, however, that the Latin Catholics, fearing what may happen to them in a Greek state dominated by the Orthodox, maintained a neutral position and paid their dues to the sultan during the first years of the war. Similarly, when efforts were made to get the former Greek patriarch, Gregorius, now exiled on Mount Athos, to join, although he refused to take an oath that agreed to absolute obedience to a mysterious leader, he did nothing to discourage the society's activities. See Frazee 1969, pp. 41–42.

136. See Frazee 1969, pp. 12–13, 44, and Sherrard 1973, p. 183.

137. For instance, crosses were put on Ottoman mosques, the monks of Megaspelaion led the army in the hymn of the Trisaryon, and priests baptized some Muslim children as a reprisal for the Muslims having circumcised some Greek boys. Also, in the first year of conflict, Greek bishops were often called upon to take the lead in both military and civil affairs.

138. See Frazee 1969, pp. 19–21.

139. See Libaridian 1981, pp. 164–65.

140. The role played by the various patriarchs of Constantinople, the Caucasian Nerses Ashtaraketsi, and Khrimian Hairik were especially noteworthy. See Suny 1993, p. 20.

141. After starting his religious order in Constantinople in 1701, Mkhit'ar moved to Morea, which was under Venetian rule in 1703 when the persecution of the Armenian Catholics in the Ottoman Empire escalated. After establishing a monastery in Modon in 1712, threatened by the impending occupation of Morea by the Ottomans, Mkhit'ar moved to Venice and leased the island of St. Lazarus in 1717. Mkhit'ar received only Armenian youth into his monastery; he did not distinguish rich or poor but chose the youngest.

142. The quotation is from Etmekjian 1964, p. 72. See also Nalbandian 1963, pp. 30–40; Goode 1970, pp. 29–39; Arpee 1909, pp.17–20; Adalian 1992, pp. 11–15; and Bardakjian 1976.

143. The novelist Hagop Melik-Hagopian (1835–88), known as Raffi, noted: "O fathers! O forefathers! I drink this glass, but not as a toast to your remains. Had you built fortresses instead of monasteries with which your country is full; had you bought guns and ammunition instead of squandering fortunes on holy urns; had you burned gunpowder instead of perfumy incense at the holy altars, our country would have been more fortunate than she is today. . . . From these very monasteries the doom of our country was sealed." The quotation is in Atamian 1955, pp. 78–79.

144. See Kushner 1977, p. 13.

145. See Duri 1987, pp. 204–5.

146. See Clogg 1982, p. 188, and Mackridge 1981, p. 66.

147. See Frazee 1969, p. 10.

148. See Clogg 1992, p. 2.

149. See Augustinos 1992, pp. 170–71.

150. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, "Armenians were still a people fragmented by geography, social class, even by language and religious affiliation." See Suny 1983, p. 24.

151. Armenians also had two major literary languages, eastern and western Armenian, in addition to many dialects and local variants.

152. Since the Bible, which was translated into classical Armenian in the first half of the fifth century, had been inaccessible to the common people, the priests who had to conduct the services fully controlled religious knowledge. See Arpee 1909, p. 13.

153. The exact dates were marked by the date of the publication of the Mkhit'arist publication *Polyhistory* in 1843 and 1915. See Etmekjian 1964, pp. 73–74, 98–99.

154. The romantic interest in the folk (*azgayin*) literature in the midnineteenth century had started to flourish among students at the University of Dorpat. See Shmavonian 1983, pp. 35–39.

155. The tension between classical Armenian and the vernacular was settled in favor of the latter when in 1866 Aydinian, a Viennese Mkhit'arist, published his grammar of the vernacular after laboring over it for twenty years. See Bardakjian 1976, pp. 9–10.

156. In an interesting twist, Lord Byron, who participated in the Greek Independence movement, presented himself in 1816 at the St. Lazaro convent of the Mkhit'arists to study the mysteries of the East; he learned enough Armenian to compose poetry. See Adalian 1992, p. 19.

157. See Oshagan 1983a, p. 63, and Adalian 1992, pp. 11, 61.

158. See Bardakjian 1976, pp. 11–12.

159. See Etmekjian 1964, pp. 154–55.

160. Many Armenians were critical of the degree of French influence; in 1874, Mamourian complained that Armenian "political, religious, moral, literary, educational, commercial, and artistic life are at a standstill, stagnating." In 1885, Eghia Demirdjibashian wrote that "a large and valuable portion of the Armenian nation, its eyes and its hands, its heart and its brain, its body and soul live for France." The quotations are in Oshagan 1983a, p. 70.

161. See Oshagan 1983b, p. 68.

162. The foundations of this theater had been laid the by the Mkhit'arist translations of classical Armenian literature and first emerged in Venice at the Mkhit'arist monastery in 1753. See Etmekjian 1964, p. 198.

163. See Etmekjian 1976c, p. 175.

164. For further information, see Libaridian 1983.

165. The poem can be found in Atamian 1955, p. 80.

166. The other stanzas are:

"Liberty!" The voice of Doom
Echoed to me from above,
"Wilt thou swear until the tomb
Liberty to serve and love?"

Till I die, or meet my doom,
On the shameful gallows tree.
Till the portals of the tomb,
I will shout forth "Liberty!"

167. See Lewis 1988, pp. 40–41.

168. See Gökalp 1968, p. 3.

169. The first systematic grammar of Turkish had been published in Europe in 1832. See Kushner 1977, p. 9.

170. See Gökalp 1968, pp. 4–5.

171. See ibid., pp. 6–7.

172. It was the Russification policy of Alexander II that pushed the Turkish intelligentsia to the Ottoman Empire. See Georgeon 1986, p. 15.

173. See Landau 1981, p. 29.

174. It is interesting to note that the former name of Mustafa Celaleddin Pasha, who was of Polish origin, was Constantin Borczeki; he immigrated to the Ottoman Empire in 1848.

175. See Landau 1981, p. 10, and Kushner 1977, pp. 11–13.

176. See Gökalp 1968, p. 5.

177. See Landau 1981, p. 14, and Devlet 1987, p. 23.

178. Namık Kemal also put the word *la Liberte* beside the title of his newspaper *Hürriyet* (Freedom), tried to introduce the concept of consultation (*meşveret*) into Ottoman politics, and searched for the equality of man before Islamic law.

179. See Arai 1992, p. 1.

180. Gökalp's definition of a nation was "a society consisting of people who speak the same language, have had the same education and are united in their religious, moral and aesthetic ideals—in short, those who have a common culture and religion." The quotation is in Heyd 1950, p. 63; see also Heyd 1950, p. 57. In another instance, he stated that nationality was based solely on upbringing—an argument that potentially could unite the disparate elements of an empire. See Parla 1985, p. 10.

181. See Parla 1985, p. 25.

182. See Duri 1987, p. 195.

183. See Hourani 1962, pp. 69–82; Dawn 1973, p. 123; 1991, p. 4; and Duri 1987, pp. 156–57.

184. Tahtawi had spent 1826 through 1831 in France, and it was there that he developed his conception of patriotism.

185. See Saab 1958, pp. 201–2; Hourani 1962, pp. 99–102; Dawn 1973, pp. 138–39; Abu-Manneh 1980, pp. 287–304; and Duri 1987, pp. 188–89.

186. He also signed his addresses as "he who loves his country" (*muhibb al-watan*).

187. The odes are cited in Duri 1987, p. 162.

188. See Hourani 1954, p. 36.

189. The first Protestant missionary societies entering the Ottoman Empire were the Church Missionary Society of the Church of England in 1815 and the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions in 1818. See Arpee 1909, p. 93.

190. The missionary schools established throughout the Ottoman Empire were training grounds for new cohorts trained within the Enlightenment vision of Western secularist thought. See Mackridge 1981, p. 65. Legally, in the eyes of the Ottoman state, the missionaries were denationalized and therefore without the protection of states, unless the treaty between the Ottoman Empire and the pertinent state contained a clause specifically recognizing missionary endeavors as a legitimate pursuit worthy of protection. The American missionaries suffered from this clause. See Kutvirt 1984, p. 46.

191. See Augustinos 1992, pp. 114–15.

192. See ibid., p. 198.

193. See Clogg 1973, p. 20, and 1992, p. 50.

194. See Augustinos 1992, pp. 171–72.

195. See Clogg 1973, p. 18.

196. Many Greek books in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were printed in Venice, Vienna, Leipzig, Bucharest, Jassy and later Constantinople, Corfu, Chios, and Ayvalık.

197. From 1700 through 1725 there were a total of 107 books (80 religion, 10 grammar, and 17 miscellaneous); from 1776 through 1800 the total had reached 749, and the proportions had also changed (395 religion, 104 grammar, and 250 miscellaneous). Better still, the Greek publications from 1800 through 1820 easily surpassed 1,300. See Koumarianou 1973, pp. 70, 83. One significant category was books published for a specifically merchant readership, including a commercial encyclopedia. See Clogg 1981, pp. 96–97.

198. See Dakin 1973, p. 23.

199. See ibid., p. 28.

200. See Frazee 1969, p. 10.

201. See Etmekjian 1964, pp. 94–96.

202. See ibid., p. 172.

203. See Libaridian 1983, p. 76.

204. It was the new Armenian middle class, comprising professionals, literati, and small manufacturers who began the process of secularization and democratization of Armenian institutions. See Libaridian 1983 p. 75.

205. See Artinian 1989, p. 73.

206. See Etmekjian 1964, p. 69.

207. The first Armenian periodical appeared in Madras, India, in 1794 published by a priest. See Etmekjian 1964, p. 136. The first Armenian journal in Russia, *Govgas* (Caucasus) appeared in 1846 but was closed a year later for political reasons; the other journal, *Ararat*, was an Armenian translation of its counterpart. Yet the most significant journal was *Hiusisapile* (Aureola), which, as the title indicated, saw Russia as the northern sun around which Armenian hopes for salvation glimmered. Rather than an independent Armenia, it argued for the benevolent protection of Russia. See Atamian 1955, pp. 73–74.

208. See Artinian 1989, p. 68.

209. See Nalbandian 1963, pp. 52–53, 57, and Atamian 1955, p. 83.

210. See Etmekjian 1964, p. 140.

211. See Bardakjian 1976, p. 19.

212. See Nalbandian 1963, p. 141.

213. The evolution of Turcology in the latter part of the nineteenth century was also significant in leading native scholars to rediscover "their past history, the riches of their language and the beauty of their literature." See Landau 1981, p. 29.

214. This development also led to the differentiation of Arabic as a literary language versus Arabic as a religious language, leading to the separation of language and religion. See Kushner 1977, pp. 67–68.

215. See Kushner 1977, pp. 77, 93, for a more detailed discussion of the significance of language.

216. See Landau 1981, p. 47.

217. The Ottoman censorship on political matters also led to the flourishing of historical and cultural issues in the newspapers, to many debates that often disguised the political controversy embedded within them. For instance, a discussion of the influence of Arabic literature and history on the Ottomans often veiled the larger question of the future trajectory of the Ottoman Empire. See Kushner 1977, p. 15.

218. See Hanioğlu 1985, pp. 21, 57.

219. See Mardin 1983, p. 50.

220. See Landau 1981, p. 43.

221. See Antonius 1969, pp. 36–37.

222. From the early 1860s, the monopolization of the religious establishment over the educational system ended as state secondary schools were founded. See Khoury 1983, p. 29.

223. See especially Antonius 1969, p. 80; Zeine 1973, p. 40; and Mousa 1977, p. 240.

224. The first nonofficial political publication was *Mirat al-Ahwal*, by Rizq Allah Hassun of Aleppo in 1854, followed in 1858 by Kahlil al-Khuri's *Hadiqat al-Akhbar*. In 1860, Butrus al-Bustani's *Nafir Suriya* followed. See Farah 1977, p. 154.

225. See Antonius 1969, pp. 42, 48–50, and Dawn 1973, p. 132.

226. Ibrahim Yazeji, a member and son of Nasif, composed a poem in this review in the form of an ode to patriotism, singing of the glories of Arab literature, the achievements of the Arab race, and of a future they needed to construct away from sectarian dissensions and Ottoman misgovernment.

227. The Arab publications abroad also included *'Atarid* and *Birjis Baris* in 1858, published respectively in Marseilles and Paris. See Farah 1977, p. 154.

228. See Hourani 1962, p. 245.

229. See Zeine 1973, p. 50.

230. See Khoury 1983, p. 60.

231. See Hourani 1962, p. 281.

232. They "loved the Greece of their dreams: the land, the language, the antiquities, but not the people." See Woodhouse 1969, p. 39.

233. See Clogg 1992, p. 37, Dakin 1973, p. 108, and Woodhouse 1969, pp. 73–75. There was also a belief in Benthamite doctrine whereby "given printing presses, schools, post offices, hospitals, model prisons and scientific instruments, it was assumed that the political and moral situation of Greece would improve as rapidly as the military," as stated in Dakin 1973, p. 114.

234. See Clogg 1992, p. 37; Dakin 1973, p. 108; and Woodhouse 1969, pp. 73–75.

235. There were also three even earlier though somewhat ineffectual organizations; one was the Greek-Speaking Guest House founded in 1807 in Paris by Choiseul-Gouffier aimed to organize a Greek rising; the second was the Phoenix, which was reputedly established in Russia by Alexander Mavrokordatos during his exile to found a Greek state. See Dakin 1973, p. 41. The third was the Philomuse Society, founded by Ionnis Kapodistrias, the Russian minister in Vienna and the future president of Greece, to "organize a group of men who would provide funds for Greek students to attend German and Italian universities and provide for a national revival through education." Frazee 1969, p. 11; also see Dakin 1973, p. 41.

236. See Dimaras 1973, p. 205, and Woodhouse 1969, pp. 71–75.

237. See Woodhouse 1969, p. 133.

238. See Augustinos 1992, p. 180.

239. See Artinian 1989, pp. 64–65.

240. Some members of the Benevolent Union proceeded in 1862 to form a Masonic Lodge (Haik-Orion) as a branch of the Odd Fellows Lodge of England. The leader, Serovbe Aznavur, predicted that the fraternal, benevolent manner of the lodge could unite the Muslims, Christians, and Jews. A similar Masonic Ser Lodge was established in 1866 in Constantinople with the explicit aim of bringing solidarity and brotherhood among the Armenians. See Nalbandian 1963, p. 75.

241. See Libaridian 1983, p. 77, and Nalbandian 1963, pp. 51–52; 71–72.

242. See İhsanoğlu 1987, pp. 49–50.

243. The quotation is in Landau 1981, pp. 38–39; see also Landau 1981, p. 34, and Arai 1992, p. 48.

244. See Kushner 1977, p. 57; Arai 1992, p. 71; Landau 1981, pp. 39–40; and Kuran 1968, pp. 109–17.

245. See Antonius 1969, pp. 51–53.

246. Another such society, the Literary Authority (Al-'Umda al-adabiya), attempted to cross sectarian lines and disseminate Arab literary works. See Duri 1987, p. 161.

247. In 1867, this society was recognized as a branch of the Ottoman Scientific Society. This society was termed, by one scholar, the "first outward manifestation of a collective national consciousness." The quotation is from Antonius 1969, p. 54; see also Duri 1987, 161.

248. Azuri also published a book in French entitled *Le Reveil de la Nation* (The awakening of the nation) in 1904 and a monthly review *l'Independance Arab* (Arab independence) in 1907.

249. See Saab 1958, p. 207, and Antonius 1969, p. 98.

250. A significant development that had preceded this one was the foundation in the provinces in 1905 of the Ottoman Shura Society (*Jam'iyat al-shura al-'uthmaniya*) by Rıda and Rafiq al"Azm to oppose the despotism of the

Ottoman sultan and to restore the constitution based on the Islamic concept of deliberative consultation (*shura*).

251. See Tauber 1993, pp. 51–52.

252. See Antonius 1969, pp. 104–8, and Duri 1987, pp. 222–24, 280, 286.

253. See Woodhouse 1973, p. 106; Dakin 1973, p. 41; Frazee 1969, p. 11.

254. See Clogg 1981, p. 103; 1992, p. 32; Dakin 1973, pp. 41, 44–45; Frangos 1973, pp. 87–103; and Frazee 1969, pp. 11–13.

255. Every member who was initiated "promised on his knees unconditional obedience to his superiors, even if he had to kill members of his own family." Frazee 1969, p. 12; see also Dakin 1973, pp. 44–45.

256. The society failed to recruit members in the substantial and older Greek merchant communities of London, Paris, Marseilles, and Amsterdam—fourteen were recruited in Italy. Since their development "fell halfway between more advanced organizations like the Italian Carbonari and the Russian Decembrists and those that Eric Hobsbawm called 'primitive rebels,'" they failed to sustain themselves through time. Also, even though the society had a vision of liberation, it had no blueprint of what might follow afterward. See Frangos 1973, p. 95.

257. This union had relations with the Russian government and the Russian Armenian organizations of the Goodwill Society (*Barenepatak Enkeruthiun*) and the Devotion to the Fatherland Bureau (*Kontora Haireniats Siro*). Russian Armenians, under the influence of Russian revolutionary populism (*narodnichestvo*), similarly started to form secret circles in the 1880s to discuss the liberation of those Armenians across the Arax River in the Ottoman Empire. See Nalbandian 1963, pp. 80–82 and Suny 1979, p. 134.

258. Its leader, Mekertitch Portugalian, believed that "freedom could not be achieved without bloodshed, as evinced by the experiences of other Ottoman subjects such as the Greeks." Nalbandian 1963, p. 94.

259. Its members were sworn to secrecy, and those who broke their oath were marked with a "Black Cross" and immediately put to death (Nalbandian 1963, 84).

260. Its activities were discontinued two years later, however, when the Ottoman government discovered and sentenced 75 members to long jail terms. Gradually, most were released through the efforts of the patriarch. See Nalbandian 1963, pp. 85–89.

261. Even though the Protestant Armenians also established a secret society in 1836, the Evangelical Union, the Armenian patriarch soon started a campaign against them and issued a patriarchal bull forbidding them from any publications. See Kutvirt 1984, p. 45, and Arpee 1909, p. 99.

262. See Etmekjian 1964, p. 132; Nalbandian 1963, pp. 82, 90–103; Atamian 1955, pp. 92–93; and Ter Minassian 1984, p. 5.

263. The Young Ottomans, as they were called, fashioned themselves after the Young France, Spain, and Italy, which had fought against the restoration. See Mardin 1962, pp. 10–11.

264. Quoted in Hanioğlu 1991, p. 43.

265. See Landau 1981, pp. 49–50.

266. It might have been in Midhat Pasha's interest to exaggerate the threat in order to get the Ottoman sultan to increase the pasha's authority; it was possibly a combination of the activities of both societies along with the passive encouragement of the pasha that produced these placards. The sultan's suspicions about the pasha's ambitions led to his reappointment to Smyrna. See Duri 1987, pp. 167–71, and Tauber 1993, pp. 13, 18–19, 43.

267. Their aim was not secession but instead the establishment of a decentralized regime in which the rights of the Arabs in government would be assured and Arabic considered an official language in the Arab provinces of the empire. See Tauber 1993, p. 45.

268. It was the preaching of Elias Habbalin, a Maronite who taught French at the college and was very much influenced by French revolutionary ideas, that led to the formation of the society. See Tauber 1993, pp. 15–17; Antonius 1969, pp. 80–84; Zeine 1973, pp. 47, 55–59.

269. In these placards "headed by a picture of a sword, they called for all to take their fate in their own hands" and also "expressed their readiness to sacrifice themselves for their homeland." In late December 1880, two additional placards emerged that now had two swords and were addressed to the "sons of the fatherland" (*watan*). See Tauber 1993, p. 17.

270. See Hanioğlu 1995, pp. 44–49.

271. The elected leader, Muhibb al-Din, had been attending a Western-style school in Damascus when he was caught with forbidden books in his possession, among them works of the Turkish patriot Namık Kemal, and forced to transfer to Beirut from where he proceeded to the Ottoman capital; his lodges were used by Arab students as a meeting place to read forbidden material. The society defined Arabism as the noblest element in Islamic society because of the initial entrusting of Allah to the Arabs to carry the Islamic message and now gave the Arab youth the responsibility of Islamic renewal. See Hourani 1962, pp. 275; Tauber 1993, p. 46; Khoury 1983, pp. 64; Duri 1987, pp. 220–21; the quotation is in Tauber 1993, p. 47.

272. See Hourani 1962, p. 285; Antonius 1969, pp. 110–11; Tauber 1993, pp. 248–49: Zeine 1973, pp. 82–83.

273. See Saab 1958, p. 226; Dawn 1973, pp. 148–49; Khoury 1983, pp. 64–65; and Duri 1987, p. 222.

274. A complete list of the pre-1914 members of the Ottoman Decentralization Society, al-Fatat, and al-'Ahd is a complete roster of the members of the Arab nationalist societies before 1914; they contained both upper-class and middle-class elements among their ranks. While the most common occupation among the Arab nationalists was the army officer, pro-Ottomans often held administrative government positions. See Dawn 1973, pp. 152, 165–69; see also Antonius 1969, pp. 119; Saab 1958, pp. 240–55; Duri 1987, pp. 224–25.

275. The aims of this society were clearly defined as indicated in its manifesto, which stated that the Arabs "wished to detach themselves from the worm-eaten Ottoman trunk . . . to form themselves into a new Arab empire extending to its natural frontiers, from the valleys of Tigris and Euphrates to the Isthmus of Suez, and from the Mediterranean to the Sea of Oman . . . governed by the constitutional and liberal monarchy of an Arabian Sultan." The quotation is in Saab 1958, pp. 207–8; see also Tauber 1993, p. 248, and Antonius 1969, p. 111. It was this organization that selected in March 1914 the col-

ors of the Arab flag—white, black, and green. See Mousa 1977, p. 243.

276. See Saab 1958, p. 233; Khoury 1983, p. 65; 1987, p. 29; Duri 1987, p. 288; Zeine 1973, p. 92; and Tibi 1981, pp. 110–13.

277. See Khoury 1983, p. 66.

278. Because the Ottomans had suppressed Arabist political activities in Syria, the Arab revolt that erupted occurred in the Hijaz, led by non-Syrian Arabs rather than the Syrian Arabists. Yet the short-lived rule of Faysal in Syria (October 1918–July 1920) very much alienated the Damascus notables who were staunch opponents of the Hashemite family from whom Faysal had descended. Faysal tried to replace them in government with young lower-class military and civilian recruits. It was this opposition that also built the Syrian-Arab nationalist movement in that those forces who wanted an Arab kingdom under an Arab caliph such as the Sharif of Mecca clashed with those who wanted an independent Syria. See Khoury 1983, pp. 75–76, 78–80, and Hourani 1962, p. 289.

279. In the 1880s in Saint Petersburg and Moscow, there were numerous small organizations imbued with the ideals of the Greek emancipatory movement; it was through these organizations, among which was the Patriots Union, that the seeds of the Armenian political parties were sown.

280. The name *Hnchak* was taken from a political journal, and the intellectual orientation was "influenced to a great degree by the tenets of the social democratic revolutionary ideals promulgated by the early Marxists and proto-Marxists." Atamian 1955, p. 94; see also Nalbandian 1964, pp. 104–31, 151–78; 1963, pp. 108, 117–29; Walker 1979, p. 242.

281. Suny 1993, p. 24, and Ter Minassian 1984, p. 9.

282. It was the formation of the Young Armenia group in Tiflis that led to the emergence of the Dashnaksutiun—it sought the political and economic freedom of Ottoman Armenia. See Nalbandian 1963, pp. 132–39, 151–78; Atamian 1955, p. 102; Ter Minassian 1984, p. 11.

283. The expeditionary force and its flag bore the letters M.H., symbolizing Mother Armenia (*Mayr Hayastan*) or Union of Patriots (*Miuthiun Hairenaserneri*); it carried a flag sewn by the young Armenian women of Kars. The flag also had five stars surrounding the number *61* (symbolizing five of the Armenian provinces and article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin) on one side, and the slogan of the times Revenge! Revenge! (*Vrezh! Vrezh!*) and a skull on the other. See Nalbandian 1963, pp. 145–48, 158, and Atamian 1955, p. 106.

284. See Walker 1979, p. 253; Nalbandian 1963, pp. 176–78; and Atamian 1955, pp. 107–8.

285. It is interesting to note that in 1907 they agreed to and signed a proclamation with the Young Turks to depose the sultan, make radical changes in the existing form of government, and establish a system of representative government for all minorities. The signatories of the proclamation summarize the dissenting elements in the Ottoman Empire: they were the Community of Union and Progress, Ottoman Union for Privat Initiative and Decentralization (*Teşebbüs-i Şahsi ve Adem-i Merkeziyet*), Armenian Revolutionary Federation (*Dashnaksoutyun*), the Ottoman Union Committee of Egypt, the Jewish Committee of Egypt publishing the journal *La-Vara*, the editorial staff of *Khilafat-Hilafet* (an Ottoman-Arabic journal), the editorial staff of *Armenia* (an Armenian journal published in Marseilles), the editorial staff of *Rasmig* (a Varna-based Armenian journal), and the editorial staff of *Hairenik* (American organ of the Dashanksoutyun).

286. The quotation is from Nalbandian 1963, p. 172.

287. The last significant Armenian party to be established in the Ottoman Empire, in Alexandria, Egypt, was the *Ramgavar* (Armenian Constitutional Democratic Party), which officially proclaimed to cease being a revolutionary group and started to work for maintaining Ottoman unity in a constitutional setting. Yet, as such, it was not fully differentiated from the Dashnaks and, in addition, did not have representation in the Ottoman parliament. See Atamian 1955, pp. 165–68.

288. Atamian 1955, p. 161.

289. See, for instance, Ahmad 1968, pp. 22, 28, 34, and 1969, p. 21.

290. See Khalidi 1991, p. 62.

291. For a more extensive discussion, see Antonius 1969, p. 109; Khoury 1983, p. 36; Duri 1987, p. 277; Mousa 1977, p. 243; and Saab 1958, p. 229.

292. See Tibi 1981, pp. 110–12.

293. Indeed, in the first elections after CUP victory, of the 250 parliamentary members elected, only 60 were Arabs while 140 were Turks. Arabs were systematically excluded from governmental positions. See Tauber 1993, p. 56.

294. See Haddad 1994, pp. 205–6, 211.

295. The shift can be observed through the Young Arab Society's placard, "The Three Outcries": the first called for administrative autonomy after the Italian attack on Tripoli; the second directed to the sons of Arabs everywhere after the Ottoman promulgation of the Law on Provinces in 1913 to support the reform movement; and the final third, addressing the sons of the nation following the First Arab Congress, openly stated the increasing doubts about Ottoman reforms. See Duri 1987, pp. 294–98.

296. Indeed, the Allied Powers actively encouraged Arab opposition to Ottoman rule and fostered ambitions of independence. See Zeine 1973, pp. 109–15.

297. See Mousa 1977, pp. 251–54.

298. The role of the Sharifian occupation in the development of Arab nationalism has long been debated; some see their adoption of Arabism over Ottomanism as a political move to achieve more control over inner fractions. Even though Faysal was declared constitutional monarch of Syria on 8 March 1920, he had to leave office four months later as the French forces occupied Damascus. See Dawn 1973, pp. 1–53.

299. See Khoury 1983, p. 90.

300. See Suny 1993, p. 27.

301. See Eley 1981, p. 90.