"The Ottoman Empire's Negotiation of Western Liberal Imperialism"

Fatma Müge Göçek and Murat Özyüksel

Western liberal imperialism has often been analyzed in relation to its point of origin, namely Western Europe. There are fewer studies on its impact on the rest of the world, especially studies narrated from the vantage point of the 'receiving' empires such as the Ottoman, Persian and the Chinese. This oversight may partly be due to the fact that almost all of them met their demise at either the end of World War I or closely thereafter. Yet such analyses are necessary precisely because of the common unfortunate fate of these empires, a fate that ultimately articulates the destructive impact of Western European liberal imperialism. In this article, we study the impact of Western liberal imperialism on the Ottoman Empire. After briefly discussing the definition and dimensions of Western European liberal imperialism, we focus on its impact especially in relation to the economic, political and cultural spheres.

Our argument is as follows: first, we contend that the impact of Western European imperialism on all these domains was polarizing and destabilizing. We then claim that this polarization produced disparate consequences in each sphere. Economic polarization produced a progressively wealthy non-Muslim bourgeoisie dependent on its interactions with Western Europe on the one side and an increasingly impoverished Muslim officialdom dependent on the revenue-poor Ottoman state on the other. Political polarization led all Ottoman collectivities to question their identity, namely who they were as individuals and as a community. Even though the state elites attempted to develop and sustain an overarching Ottoman and then Muslim identity, such endeavors could not contain the emergence of separatist movements throughout imperial lands. Finally, cultural polarization set in as especially the non-Muslim bourgeoisie as well as Westernized Muslim elites started to adopt 'civilized' norms, values and public behavior. The 'splendid spaces' created at urban centers for their interaction contained all of the 'modern' Western amenities such as spacious stone buildings, paved, well-lit, clean streets and Western attire. Such spaces were visibly distinct from Muslim neighborhoods with their wooden houses, dark, dusty streets. Ottoman state and society were unsuccessful in negotiating the impact of polarized lifestyles. As a consequence of these polarizations, the Ottoman imperial structure perished as Turkish nationalism gradually swept it aside for good.

Defining Liberal Imperialism

Historically, liberal imperialism refers to that particular stage of Western European domestic and interstate relations that succeeded the mercantile imperialism of the 1830s.[1] While scholars agreed on what comprised 'liberal' and 'imperialism' as two distinct concepts, they were, and still are, in much less agreement over the combination, namely 'liberal imperialism.' Peter Jacobson argues that at the end of the nineteenth century, British statesman Rosebery defined liberalism domestically as 'a large policy of justice for all classes,' and imperialism internationally as 'the maintenance and consolidation of the empire.' Hence a liberal imperialist would be 'a liberal in domestic politics, and an imperialist in foreign and colonial questions.'[2]

Yet such a conceptualization contained an inherent contradiction in that domestic and international matters were often intertwined. It was also difficult to continue arguing domestically for one set of principles and internationally for another. This discrepancy initially led to the legitimation of Western European intervention as a 'civilizing mission.' The universally defined Enlightenment mission of spreading reason and material and moral progress throughout the world was reinterpreted as delivering the Western conception to the rest of the world for the latter's benefit. Yet as the locals received Western intervention not under conditions of their own choosing, and as Western European progress failed to produce the same success under local conditions, the civilizing aspect of the mission came under question. As a consequence, Western European liberals gradually emerged as imperialism's sharpest critics as well as its most prominent defenders.[3] The content of the mission gradually transformed over the course of the nineteenth century from a universalist to a culturalist stance: 'Whereas earlier reform-oriented imperialist ideologies conceived of native societies as in need of radical

[1] R. Keily *Rethinking Imperialism* London, 2010, pp. 5-6. The following period from the 1880s to 1940s is defined as the period of classical imperialism.

[2] Peter Jacobson 'Rosebery and Liberal Imperialism, 1899 - 1903.' *The Journal of British Studies* 13/1 (1973): 83-107. See page 88 for the quotation. Michael Doyle defines empire and imperialism as 'effective control, whether formal or informal, of a subordinated society by an imperial society.' See M. Doyle *Empires* Ithaca, 1986, pp. 11, 30. More specifically, he suggests that '[e]mpire is a relationship, formal and informal, in which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another political society. It can be achieved by force, by political collaboration, by economic, social or cultural dependence.' See M. Doyle *Empires* Ithaca, 1986, p. 11, 30. Other scholars approach imperialism simply as the process or policy of establishing or maintaining an empire. In this way, imperialism describes the mechanisms by which one country or region came to dominate another. See R. Kiely *Rethinking Imperialism* London, 2010, pp. 2-3. Another possible definition is to consider broad trans-historical definitions such as the one given by Doyle in relation to a specific historical episode or, in Marxian terms, as a special stage in the development of capitalism. See Alex Callinicos *Imperialism and Global Political Economy* Cambridge, 2009, p. 3.

[3] Jennifer Pitts *A turn to empire: the rise of imperial liberalism in Britain and France* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005.

reconstruction along Western lines, late imperial thinking questioned both the practicality and theoretical underpinnings…[and] instead of the universalist project of civilization, a new emphasis on the cultural differences between peoples came to the fore.[4]

Yet this was yet another way through which Western European dominance was sustained throughout the world. As Edward Said aptly notes, 'in 1800 Western powers claimed 55% but actually held about 35% of the earth; by 1878 that proportion was 65% and by 1914, 85% as [these countries were held in the form of] colonies, protectorates, dependencies, dominions and commonwealths.'[5] It is in this context that Said's concept of Orientalism makes sense. Unable to justify their global imperialist hegemony in terms of the civilizing mission, Western European states instead turned not only to the observation, but also the justification and reification of cultural difference -- at the expense of similarity -- between the West and the rest. Yet, subtly but powerfully, the message sent insinuated that Western cultures were superior to the cultures of the rest. As a consequence, Western knowledge itself turned into a force that emanated and became reproduced in non-Western contexts in a manner that delegitimated local knowledge and practices. Building on Foucault, Said suggested that Orientalist discourse was not, as it was often claimed by Europeans, just a 'fantasy' or idea about the Orient 'with no corresponding reality.'[6] It constituted reality by regulating, ordering, and defining its existence. It gained practical effects not only by informing individual's actions, but also by operating through a wide-range of social institutions:

> "Orientalism can be defined as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient…by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient."

Said also drew on Foucault's notion that discourse not only created its object, but also its subject. Hence Orientalism was just as much about constructing Western culture and identity as it was about 'dominating' and 'restructuring' the Orient; it constructed both its object (Orient) and its subject (West). Said therefore argued that the Orient and the West had to be both studied simultaneously; Orientalism impacted Western states and societies just as much as it did the rest. In relation to the power differential between the Orient and the West, Said turned to Gramsci's

[4] Karuna Mantena *Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the ends of liberal imperialism* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010.
[5] Edward Said *Culture and Imperialism* New York: Knopf 1994, p. 8.
[6] E. Said *Orientalism* New York, 1978, pp. 3, 5-7.

concept of hegemony. The West's Orientalist discourse determined history not because it was a more accurate representation of reality than the Orient's, but because it was undergirded by Western political and economic hegemony. Thus non-Western discourses about the West, or even the Orient, did not and still do not triumph, indeed do not even seem to exist, because they lacked and still lack the hegemonic political and economic power that undergirds the ability to represent. Such Western hegemony also accounted for the persistence of the Orientalist discourse for well over a century.

This imperialist reach through culture also did not necessitate direct Western European rule. Western dominance could be reproduced by colonizing the knowledge systems of local countries where the latter readily accepted the superiority of the former and spent their entire lives struggling to be like the West. Said's observation also points out to the possible ways out of this domination: not only do local countries have to be studied in their own terms by critically analyzing both their similarities and differences from the West, but the tensions and discrepancies within the Western European conceptualization also need to be brought to the fore. And such comparative studies of the West with the rest have brought forward the critical stand on liberal imperialism that the authors of this article also adapt. Cases in point are works by Roger Fletcher, Matthew Fitzpatrick and Peter van der Veer on Germany and Britain.[7] Fletcher argues that in the case of the 1890s Wilhelmine Germany, it is impossible to identify a coherent imperial vision both in theory and in practice. Fitzpatrick approaches Western German imperialism in a larger historical context to demonstrate how the imperialist project actually helped define German nationhood at the center, thereby viewing imperialism as a nation-building strategy. Van der Veer takes this approach to Britain as he demonstrates how the national culture in both Britain and India developed in relation to their shared experience.

The emergence of that Western hegemony can be traced through the late 19th century Western European liberal imperialism based on protectionism at home and monopoly trading practices abroad. Such imperialism hindered capital accumulation in the periphery because it did not allow the rest of the world to catch up and ultimately challenge the West. With protectionism at home and territorial expansion abroad, the West was able to extend its liberal

[7] Roger Fletcher 'Revisionism and Wilhelmine Imperialism.' *Journal of Contemporary History* 23/3 (1988): 347-366, esp. p. 349; Matthew Fitzpatrick *Liberal imperialism in Germany: expansionism and nationalism, 1848-1884* London: Berghahn. 2008, esp. pp. 5-6; Peter van der Veer *Imperial encounters: religion and modernity in India and Britain* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001, esp. pp. 1-3.

imperialism to the rest of the world for its advantage and the rest of the world's loss.[8] Empirically, if one assumes the level of British industrialization to be approximately 100 in 1913, Western European countries as a whole increased their industrialization from 73 in 1830 to 143 in 1860, to 481 by 1900 and 863 by 1913. This was partially because these countries were not interested in promoting industrialization; their priority instead was to extract surplus produce and labor, import manufactured products from each other and invest only in their colonies settled by European populations.[9] As a consequence, 'while Europe and the US protected themselves through imposing high tariffs on British imports India was not allowed to pursue such a policy…African countries and the Middle East suffered a similar fate as they de-industrialized.'[10]

Underdevelopment occurred in the non-Western world precisely because non-Western exports were not on the whole necessary for the developed Western European world. Yet the non-Western world gradually became entirely dependent on these Western European exports. This increasingly skewed economic development also impacted the relative political power and might of the countries of the world. The concomitant industrialization of warfare especially through the mass production of weapons such as the breech-loading rifle and the machine gun, the emergence of armored ships and eventually tanks gave Western Europe a distinct advantage. Such industrialization of the tools of collective violence was also accompanied by increases in the mobility of humans, goods and information due to the construction of railways, steamships, and telegraphs. As a consequence of these technological developments, inventions, the military power of all states became directly dependent on their level of industrialization. The ensuing race not only pitted the leading empires against each other, but forced those that had not adequately industrialized to purchase vast amounts of Western-produced armaments, a process that almost bankrupted them. Such dire economic consequences also combined with the Great Depression between 1873 and 1896 that further impoverished non-Western countries while enriching the Western European ones.

The rising prominence of the principles of liberal imperialism from the 1840s to the 1870s has to be approached through this vantage point. We argue that liberal imperialism was predicated on three dimensions, *economically* on the illusion of free trade, *politically* on the

[8] R. Kiely 2010, pp. 81, 84, 87.
[9] M. Barratt-Brown *After Imperialism* London, 1970, p. 110.
[10] P. Bairoch *Economics and World History* London, 1993, pp. 90-1. See also P. O'Brien 'Colonies in a globalizing economy, 1815-1948.' Pp. 223-64 in B. Gills and W. Thompson, eds. *Globalization and Global History* London, 2006.

fabrication of the civilizing mission for equality of all, and *culturally* on the construction of a modern life-style reproduced and sustained by education.[11] In this essay, we focus on these three spheres of social activity as they impacted the Ottoman Empire: *free markets* enabled Western-produced manufactured industrial goods to fully penetrate especially non-Western states and societies (hence the economic impact); *individual legal and political rights* helped transform imperial subjects and protected communities into consuming citizens (hence the political impact); and *participatory spaces* where such consuming citizens could participate to publicly display their new 'civilized' style of life (hence the cultural impact).

Parameters of the Impact of Western European Liberal Imperialism on the Ottoman Empire

The impact of Western European liberalism on the Ottoman Empire first necessitates the periodization of the empire in terms of significant turning points and social actors engaged in negotiating them. The Ottoman state and its non-Muslim subjects emerged as the two prominent social actors. While these non-Muslim subjects were dominant in negotiating the economic impact, the state took the lead in determining the nature of the political and cultural impact. This negotiation crystallized around *three significant turning points: (i)* The *1838 Trade Agreement* that abolished customs duties and the ensuing *1839 Reform Edict* that guaranteed rights to all subjects; (ii) The *1876 Constitutional Revolution* followed within the same year by the re-establishment of the autocratic rule of sultan Abdülhamid II; and (iii) The *1829 Public Dress Code* that replaced difference in clothing with a uniform one for all Ottoman subjects.

Economically, the sixteenth-century price revolution in Europe started to erode the Ottoman social structure due to the particular stand of the Ottoman state. This stand eventually led to the gradual destruction of first the rural agricultural system followed by the elimination of the urban guild system. Unlike Western Europe where such devolution produced the bourgeoisie that eventually assumed political control, in the Ottoman case, the state's continuing hold on the economic and political resources made the emergence of such an independent bourgeoisie impossible. The accumulated wealth was not invested in industrialization, but instead in establishing non-profit foundations and usury. During this debilitating process, the emerging Ottoman bourgeoisie did so dependent on Western European economy in the form of non-

[11] R. Kiely 2010, pp. 31-2.

Muslim economic bourgeoisie on the one side, and dependent on the Ottoman state on the other in the form of Muslim political bourgeoisie.[12] Significant in this process was the *1838 Trade agreement and Capitulations* that the Ottoman state signed with Western Europe. The trade agreement effectively brought the economic upheaval originating in the sixteenth century to an end as the Ottoman state literally eliminated all trade barriers with Western Europe, a process that wrought havoc with the existing rural and urban social order leading to the eventual demise of the empire.

Politically, Western European liberal imperialism advocated equal legal rights for all who had to be represented and protected by the political system. The Ottoman political order was predicated on disparate Muslim and non-Muslim communities governed in accordance with the legal principles of the *sharia* based on the Qur'an. While the order sustained and reproduced the dominance of the Muslims, it nevertheless protected the non-Muslim subjects within the boundaries of their separate communities. Yet the vision of universal equality undermined the legal separation inherent within the Ottoman political order as both the progressive non-Muslim intellectuals and reformist Muslim state officials started instead to advocate increased and equal political participation. The Muslim state officials took the lead in gradually actualizing the *1876 Constitutional Revolution* whereby an Ottoman parliament as well as legal reforms that guaranteed equal legal rights to all subjects, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, was established. Preceded by the two imperial reform edicts in1839 and 1856, this gradual political transformation led Muslim state officials' rise to prominence at the expense of the sultan and his household. Non-Muslim subjects gradually lost the traditional legal protection offered to their communities while the state failed to protect their legal rights as individual Ottoman citizens. This initial political upheaval in 1876 turned out to be a temporary one as sultan Abdülhamid II exploited the 1876-78 disastrous war with Russia to wrest power away from the state officials. He closed down the Ottoman Assembly for three decades and arrested, imprisoned and ultimately executed its prominent leaders such as Mithat Pasha. The autocratic phase also turned out to be temporary, however. In 1909, Abdülhamid II was dethroned by the Young Turks and their Committee and Progress (hereafter CUP). This political takeover not only passed power back to the Ottoman state bureaucracy, but did so conclusively and irreversibly. In the

[12] Fatma Müge Göçek *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire: Ottoman Westernization and Social Change*, New York: Oxford University Press,1996.

meanwhile, the non-Muslim subjects who could not attain political power suffered the most as they were gradually liquidated through deportations, massacres and population exchange. This long and arduous process of political turmoil ultimately ended in the demise of the Ottoman Empire shortly after the end of World War I.

Culturally, Western European liberal imperialism also promoted the creation of new public spaces where the emergent citizens could actualize their participation within the social order. The Ottoman intellectual space generated by the expanding print press and especially newspapers; space for entertainment embedded within theaters, restaurants and hotels; and explicitly urban physical space such as newly-constructed large public squares amenable to popular mass demonstrations came to the fore. Perhaps the most significant development in this context was the *1829 abolition of the strict public dress code* by the Ottoman state. Until then, each and every social group within the empire had been carefully identified and thereby restricted through their particular attire. Muslims and non-Muslims wore headgears, robes and shoes in different colors and any intransigence was punished by the state. Yet in 1829, sultan Mahmud II initially abolished these carefully kept cultural markers in the name of equality. From then on, the Ottoman state regulated solely the outfits of all its officials who were required to wear the fez, frock coat and pants. As hopefully others in the civilian sphere also mimicked this new outfit, the Ottoman imperial system based on difference in attire would be replaced by uniform attire, thereby physically creating one, undifferentiated Ottoman subjecthood. Hence the 1829 attire law attempted to physically actualize what the1839, 1856 and 1876 imperial reforms tried to accomplish through legal means. Yet problems emerged once again. The Ottoman public sphere no longer differentiated especially the non-Muslim subjects from the Muslim ones. The abolition of these social markers further amplified the divide between the urban rich affiliated with Western Europe one the one side and the rural poor solely embedded in local, provincial networks on the other. Over time, this divide evolved into one with the urban, Western-attired, 'modern and civilized' Muslim officials and non-Muslims on the one side, and the traditionally-attired 'conservative, backward' Muslim Ottoman subjects on the other. This cultural polarization in turn led first to skirmishes and then violence between these two 'modern' and 'traditional' social groups. The non-Muslim subjects once again bore the brunt of this violence and their ranks eroded as a consequence.

In summary then, the Ottoman negotiation of Western liberal imperialism thus created economic, political and cultural polarization, a polarization that eventually led to the demise of the empire. The next section of the article discusses this gradual polarization in more detail.

Economic Polarization as a Consequence of the Ottoman Negotiation of Western European Liberal Imperialism

Economic practices in Western Europe always interacted positively with the state, as the interests of the emergent bourgeoisie and the state went hand in hand as the former assumed power over the latter. Yet this was not the case in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman state practice over the economy was to merely control the latter in accordance with its own interests. The Ottoman economy was thus perceived as a resource base for especially the administrative and military expenses of the state. Agricultural revenues made up the main chunk of state income and trade and commerce was controlled by the non-Muslim subjects who were prevented from full and continued participation in the state bureaucracy. This strict Ottoman division of labor between the non-Muslim economic actors and Muslim political ones ultimately hindered the formation of an independent Ottoman bourgeoisie that could challenge and assume power over the state. The non-Muslim subjects who could have potentially transformed into an independent economic bourgeoisie lacked the political power to take over the state because as protected religious communities they could not bear arms and assume administrative positions within the state: the latter were almost exclusively reserved from Muslims. As a consequence, the only social group capable of challenging the sultan's control over the state came from within: reformist Muslim state officials gradually challenged the sultan and politically assumed power, thereby forming a rather unique state-dependent 'political' bourgeoisie. Their political power was predicated on their bureaucratic position and their priority was therefore not to abolish the existing Ottoman political order but to reform it. As state bureaucrats, they lacked the independent economic resources as well as economic skills that were necessary for the formation of an independent bourgeoisie. They thus replicated the sultan's stand in relation to the Ottoman economy: they were not intent on building alliances with the non-Muslim economic bourgeoisie, but instead on controlling and repressing them in accordance with the needs of the state bureaucracy. Just as it had been during the earlier centuries under the sultans' rule also during the period of reformist state officials, any attempt undertaken by either non-Muslim tradesmen or

merchants in the cities, or by predominantly Muslim notables in the countryside to accumulate economic resources independent of the state were immediately cut down through confiscations. As a consequence, it was extremely challenging if not impossible for these economic actors to follow the example of their Western European counterparts in transforming their economic resources to political ones. Yet a significant consequence of the 1839 political reforms was the abolition of such state confiscations. Even then, however, the significant economic wealth that was accumulated by the urban-based non-Muslim merchants and their rural Muslim counterparts could not be invested in ways that translated into political power. The urban-based non-Muslim subjects lacked such power due to the structural divide within the Ottoman social system; the rural-based Muslim notables tried but could not have permanent access to the political power of their urban counterparts located within the state bureaucracy due to center-periphery tensions. As a consequence, the ensuing economic polarization after the reforms led not to the transformation of the social order, but instead to its demise.

Origins: Sixteenth-century European Price Revolution As soon as the Ottoman state was initially founded in late thirteenth century as a principality in western Asia Minor, its fortuitous location on the historic trade route between the east and west benefited it economically. Asia Minor contained many inns, caravanserais and extensive postal and security systems along established trade roads and routes. As the Ottoman state expanded over the ensuing centuries, it employed significant sea ports like the ones on the Red Sea, Gulf of Basra and Lebanon as well as land routes through Asia Minor to sustain its economic resources.

Economically, Ottoman urban production was organized through the guild system that was very strictly controlled by the state. This state-control was due to the necessity to procure the necessary staples for the population of the imperial capital, for the sultan's palace as well for the large army and the navy. The most significant element of such urban control was the regulation of prices whereby production was determined by the demands of the state, undermining the guilds' capacity to specialize in manufacturing new products. Concomitantly, domestic trade was likewise controlled by the state through the organization of domestic customs duties. During the 15th century when Ottoman trade with the east was still vibrant, some local merchants engaged especially in long-distance trade had been able to accumulate significant economic resources. There were, for instance, initiatives in manufacturing goods in cities like Salonika, Bursa, Adrianople and the capital city Istanbul through the *verlag* (putting out) system. Yet the

embryonic initiatives of such merchants could have only expanded at the expense of the well-organized guild system. Unlike the case in Western Europe, the Ottoman guild system was able to resist such incursions due to the strong support of the state. This strong state alliance with the guilds thus undermined the development of an embryonic bourgeois class. Instead, these enterprising Ottoman merchants were forced to invest their accumulated wealth not in manufacturing goods, but instead in buying land, giving out loans at usurious rates, or in speculating in rare commodities. The state confiscation of large fortunes also complemented this process, leading many wealthy subjects to invest their economic capital beyond the reach of the state in non-profit foundations. Agriculturally, all land in the Ottoman imperial domains belonged in essence to the sultan who in turn authorized usufructary rights to local cultivators. The initial land system termed *tımar* demanded the procurement of a certain number of mounted cavalries to the state in return for land use. The Ottoman land system thus protected the interests of the tax-farmers instead of the peasants working the land. As a consequence, peasants losing land had to stay and work locally; had they migrated to urban centers like their Western European counterparts did, they also could not find jobs in specialized manufacturing because guild masters were prohibited from engaging in such activities. Hence no migrant surplus labor flooded the Ottoman cities and towns to then find employment in specialized manufactures.[13]

The sixteenth century was a significant turning point for the Ottoman economy due to the developments taking place in Western Europe. Europeans engaged in overseas explorations out of economic necessity. By reaching India through the south of the African continent, they undermined the Ottoman trade monopoly over the land trade routes between the east and the west. By mistakenly 'discovering' the American continent during this process, they also accessed vast amounts of gold and silver that were then infused into the European continent. The end-result of the process was inflation in the prices of all goods. While the trade routes under Ottoman control decreased in significance, the European price inflation led Ottoman staples and raw materials to be attracted to Europe. Even though the Ottoman state domestically dictated the prices, the European merchants could now offer prices for the same goods that were dramatically higher. As a consequence, the Ottoman state failed to successfully monitor the economy and

[13] Had the accumulated wealth transformed into the bourgeoisie, it would have fought against the obstacles of the guild system to generate accumulation of capital and of the transformation of the land system into private property to generate free labor. The proclamation of laws and foundation of institutions by the state in support of the bourgeoisie would have then followed suit.

prevent the smuggling of goods out the empire. As the Ottoman guilds could no longer procure the raw materials necessary for their manufactures, urban production within the empire started to decline. Even though the Ottoman state banned the export of many raw materials, they did so without avail as the market forces prevailed and goods flooded out of the empire into Western Europe. Contemporaneous state documents reveal the extent of such smuggling. In Keşan, for instance, even state officials were involved in dealing in contraband goods as stocks of grain were taken out to the coastal areas in convoys and loaded onto smugglers' ships.

Yet the gradual decline in Ottoman manufacturing was not solely an end-result of this unpreventable flight of domestically produced raw materials to Western Europe. Also significant was the changing trade relations between the Ottoman state and Western Europe. The Ottoman state traditionally regarded foreign trade as a tool to prevent scarcity and famine on imperial lands and therefore encouraged imports while restricting exports. In addition, such imports generated revenues through the customs duties that foreign merchants had to pay the state. As a consequence, it granted trade capitulations to Western European merchants almost from its inception as an empire.[14] Even though the impact had been minimal until the sixteenth century, it became dramatic as a consequence of ensuing Western European transformations. As Western European states started to produce cheap, high-quality products in abundance, they were initially unable to find adequate markets for them due to their mercantilist economic policies of protecting their own domestic production with very stringent customs barriers. The Ottoman economic state policy of capitulations that was diametrically opposed to mercantilism generated the market conditions that Western European states tried so hard to access.[15] Thus cheaply manufactured Western European goods penetrated the Ottoman market in abundance and the Ottoman populace started to consume these goods in large quantities, thereby undermining Ottoman manufacturing. Hence long before the Industrial Revolution, the Ottoman trade pattern with Western Europe was based on the import of Western European manufactured goods and the

[14] The first capitulation dated back to 1352 and was given to Genoa. Later in the 16th century sultan Suleiman the Magnificent granted similar capitulations to King Francis I whereby the French subjects could travel in Ottoman lands under the king's laws outside of the sultan's legal and fiscal jurisdiction. This unilateral act intended to benefit the Ottoman state initially lapsed on the death of the sultan granting it. In 1740, however, in gratitude of diplomatic aid, capitulations to the French were made permanent. Persons with capitulatory status also enjoyed full exemption from Ottoman taxes and customs duties. See Donald Quataert *The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 77-8.

[15] Another reason the Ottoman state granted capitulations was to re-attract and re-establish the interstate trade that had started to swerve toward the Atlantic.

export of raw materials. Another factor that caused havoc with the Ottoman financial system was the warfare technology that started to transform during the seventeenth century. The necessity to have a disciplined army trained throughout the year made the Ottoman practice of recruiting mounted cavalries through the *tımar* system redundant. When the standing Ottoman army could no longer be recruited from the provinces in this manner, the salaries necessitated by the army started to expand by leaps and bounds generating significant budget deficits.

The economic reaction of the Ottoman state to these developments was to issue more coins from the same amount of silver at a time when the empire was flooded by Western European silver coins of American origin. As a consequence, the prices of goods escalated just as Ottoman military expenses compounded. The only economic solution the Ottoman state could find was to transform its land system into the *iltizam* practice whereby the usufructary rights to land were now farmed out to the highest bidder for periods ranging from one to three years. This transformation in land use provided a great opportunity for those domestic entrepreneurs who had accrued wealth through trade, usury or holding state office. Such entrepreneurs who could not invest their wealth in economic production could now invest in land for quick profits. Yet even though the *iltizam* practice did indeed generate cash for the state, it did so at a tremendous cost to peasants. Peasants could no longer till the land themselves and instead had to work under the exploitation of land holders (*mültezim*) who tried to maximize their profits in the shortest possible time. As peasants were pressured to leave their lands and mounted cavalries abandoned, some of the now landless peasants joined the now dismissed cavalries to engage in local brigandage such as the *Celali* revolts. The rest migrated to urban centers like their European counterparts had done earlier. Yet unlike the latter, however, they could not find employment and therefore enrolled in religious schools (*medrese*), thereby increasing the restless, dissatisfied urban masses. These religious students soon started to raid the mansions of the rich state officials, wealthy merchants and tax collectors, carrying the rural unrest to the urban areas. Others joined the same large households of rich state officials as private mercenaries.

The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were marked by such political turmoil as the central power of the sultan started to devolve. Especially significant in this process was the ability of the newly rich, almost exclusively Muslim land holders to pass their tax-farming privileges from one generation to the other. Strong provincial families that started to emerge as a consequence turned over a portion of the collected taxes to the state while retaining an even

larger portion for their own use.[16] The transformation of the *iltizam* to the *malikane* land tenure system had a significant detrimental impact on the peasants as short-term use was replaced by long life-long tenure. They also increased their wealth by engaging in local and inter-state trade. For instance, the Balkan families located near ports expanded wool and grain cultivation to then start exporting these raw materials to Western European countries. This imbalance between the Ottoman imperial center and the provinces was accompanied by escalating Ottoman military defeats. The 1808 Promissory Note of Alliance signed between these families and the sultan officially recognized the increased power of the latter. Yet this devolution of Ottoman imperial power was again temporary as the provinces could not convert their accumulated economic wealth into political power in the long term.[17]

1838 Trade Agreement and Capitulations. At the onset of the nineteenth century, Britain, Russia, France, and Austria comprised the main state actors that interacted with the Ottoman Empire. The politics of these European powers toward the Ottoman Empire differed considerably from each other, however, as each had competitive policies with regard to what was later defined as 'the Eastern Question.' This Question was, in fact, borne out of these conflicting European interests as they entered the period of industrial capitalism. The most significant economic development was the rapid industrialization of England and her increasing commercial-industrial supremacy; a development that in turn stimulated political, military, and economic competition throughout Western Europe. In the specific context of the Middle East, Russia was also among the main contenders for power and a prominent state actor since it wanted to monitor the Ottoman Empire's Bosporus and Dardanelle straits that controlled Russia's access to the Mediterranean.[18] Britain and France also struggled for economic and political supremacy in the region as a part of their larger struggle for global dominance.

Even though Napoleon's 1798 expedition to Egypt failed, France made one last attempt in the 1830s to undermine British hegemony by -- albeit unsuccessfully -- backing Mehmet Ali Pasha, the reform-minded Ottoman governor of Egypt against the Ottoman sultan. The threat

[16] Significant among such provincial families were the Çapanoğulları and Karaosmanoğluları in Asia Minor and like the Rizvanbegoviç in the Balkans.
[17] For more information see Ozyuksel, *Feodalite ve Osmanlı Toplumu*, İstanbul: Der'in Yayınları, 2007, pp. 198-255
[18] The policies Russia adopted varied from the defeat and partition of the Empire to the establishment of a virtual protectorate over a weak and subservient Ottoman state. See İlkay Sunar, "State and economy in the Ottoman Empire", *The Ottoman Empire and the World – Economy*, ed. Huri İslamoğlu –İnan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, p.77.

posed by Mehmet Ali Pasha against the empire emerged in the context of the 1821-30 Greek war of independence. In 1824, sultan Mahmud II invited the governor to repress the Greek rebellion with his powerful fleet and army. Even though the initial intervention was successful, in 1827 the combined British, French and Russian squadrons annihilated the Ottoman Egyptian navy at Navarino. Three years later, the 1830 Treaty of London acknowledged the formation of a new state in the southern area of modern Greece. The governor asked the Ottoman sultan for the compensation of his losses and when he realized that none were forthcoming, sent his son Ibrahim Pasha with an army against the sultan in 1832. The Ottoman forces were unable to prevent the son's march into central Asia Minor. Even though the sultan asked for help from the Western European states, only Russia was forthcoming, forcing the Ottoman sultan to sign the 1833 Hünkar İskelesi Friendship Treaty with Russia. This Ottoman diplomatic move put Britain on alert, leading to the subsequent signing of the 1838 Anglo-Ottoman alliance, accompanied by a trade agreement and capitulations.[19] The 1838 Trade Agreement totally liberalized Ottoman foreign trade as export bans, the state monopoly over Ottoman trade and domestic customs duties were all abolished.

It is necessary to point out that the Ottoman state signed this destructive trade agreement with Britain that eliminated all Ottoman customs duties not for economic, but political reasons. As Ottoman chroniclers Cevdet Pasha and Lütfi Efendi note, the 1838 Trade Agreement was a political maneuver to garner Western European support against Mehmet Ali Pasha, the Ottoman governor of Egypt.[20] At the time, the Ottoman state was intent on destroying the trade advantage of Mehmet Ali Pasha who had accumulated vast economic resources through his country's trade with Western Europe, resources he then employed to build a string Western-style military. Even though this move by the Ottoman state did certainly wreak economic havoc in Egypt thereby containing its military expansion, it did so at the eventual expense of the Ottoman Empire.

---

[19] The remorse felt by the British cabinet for leaving the Ottoman state alone and thereby forcing them into an agreement with Russia is best expressed by Lord Palmerstone who stated that 'No British cabinet at any period…ever made so great a mistake in regard to foreign affairs.'The British Foreign Minister also emphasized the significance of the integration of the Ottoman economy for Britain as follows: 'If, from a political point of view, the independence of Turkey is of great importance, in a commercial sense, it is of no less importance. It is quite true that with no other country is our trade so liberally permitted and carried on as with Turkey.' G.D. Clayton, *Britain and the Eastern Question: Missolonghi to Gallipoli*, London: University of LondonPress, pp 63, 90. In 1838, Ibrahim Pasha again threatened to be then faced by a coalition of Russia, Prussia, Austria and Britain that thoroughly defeated him.

[20] Taner Timur 'Osmanlı ve Batılılaşma (Westernization and the Ottomans).' In *Osmanlı Çalışmaları* Ankara, 1989, p. 86.

Indeed, with the 1838 Trade Agreement and the ensuing 1839 reform edict, the Ottoman Empire started for the first time to rely on Western European powers for its own land integrity and did so at the expense of the Ottoman economic structure. The income distribution of the empire polarized and especially Muslim guildsmen and peasants became increasingly impoverished.[21]

Yet the British merchants taking advantage of the 1838 Trade Agreement with the Ottoman Empire faced yet another obstacle that hindered their access to the domestic markets: transportation. The Ottoman imperial lands lacked the necessary infrastructure that would enable the trade in English goods. The most rational solution to this problem was Britain's eventual acquisition of railroad privileges within the Ottoman Empire. The political conjuncture was once again very amenable: the 1856 Ottoman war with Russia over the Crimea necessitated Western European support and Britain stepped in, providing direct military support to the Ottoman Empire in return for such privileges. The subsequent British construction of the İzmir-Aydın and the İzmir-Kasaba railroads along the Aegean coast enabled the quick spread of British influence in the region. Railroad construction and subsequent surge in British trade was quickly followed by investments in other areas such as mining and municipal services.[22] The Ottoman state also benefited from this development in that the transportation problem within the empire was largely overcome, security established and productivity enhanced. In a short while, the trade capacity of the Aegean port of Smyrna overtook that of the port of the imperial capital of İstanbul.[23]

Dependent Ottoman Economic Development Since the increase in productivity was indexed to the British industry, the local Ottoman producers started to be directly impacted by the British economic cycles. Cotton production that the British promoted in the region provides an excellent example to this economic dependency. Cotton shortage that emerged as a consequence of the American Civil War had forced British industrialists to search for new places to cultivate cotton. Based on the report of the British Consul in Smyrna, the Manchester Cotton Purchase Association decided to support cotton production in the Aegean regionof the Ottoman

[21] This Ottoman impoverishment was also due to the construction of the Suez Canal in 1869 as the canal diverted overland trade routes as all Ottoman cities suffered from the diversion of the trade of Iraq, Arabia and Iran to the canal. Soon thereafter, Britain occupied the already weakened Egypt.
[22] Şevket Pamuk, 'Osmanlı Imparatorluğu'nda Yabancı Sermaye: Sektörlere ve Sermayeyi İhraç Eden Ülkelere Göre Dağılımı (1854-1914) (Foreign Capital in the Ottoman Empire distributed in accordance to Sectors and Countries that Export Capital, 1854-1914) *ODTÜ Gelişme Dergisi* 1978 Özel Sayısı, p. 148.
[23] Yaqub N. Karkar *Railway Development in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1914*, New York, 1972, p. 79.

Empire. The association not only distributed free cotton seeds, subsidized the purchase of local machinery and established local courses to raise the local production quality, but also supported the İzmir-Aydın railroad. The Aegean regions experiencing an increase in cotton production were also those located along this railroad. Another example demonstrating how closely the Ottoman economy became linked to the British one relates to emery stone production. These were produced in the Aegean region by the British, transported by British-built railroads, and finally exported in full to Britain. Manganese, antimuan ore, chrome and borax comprise the other minerals produced in the region solely in accordance with the demands of the British industry with no impact whatsoever on the local regional economy. As a consequence of this British-dependent economic development, the economic activities of the Aegean region mimicked the British economic cycles of crisis and prosperity with a two-year lag.[24]

Another significant consequence of this process of Ottoman economic penetration spearheaded by British railroad construction was the emergence of a non-Muslim bourgeoisie dependent on Western Europe. Even though railroads had been built, it was not easy for European merchants to internally market to the Ottoman consumer the goods they brought to the Smyrna port to then gather and deliver the raw materials produced by the peasants to the port. They needed intermediaries who could facilitate this process. Ottoman non-Muslims not only knew the languages spoken within and outside the empire, but they were also culturally attuned to the taste of Ottoman consumers. Even though they were ideal candidates, As Ottoman subjects, the local non-Muslims were subject to the legal system of the empire and did not benefit from the European trade privileges. Another practice that emerged around this time was the transfer of European capitulatory trade rights to Ottoman non-Muslim minorities as Western European states granted them passports, thereby relieving them of the Ottoman tax burdens. It was in this context that the Ottoman non-Muslims started to play a significant role in acting as 'middle-men,' one that was increasingly resented as they accumulated economic wealth at a time when the majority of the Muslim populace indexed to Ottoman state growth was increasingly

[24] Orhan Kurmuş,*Emperyalizmin Türkiye'ye Girişi*, İstanbul: Bilim Yayınları, 1974, pp. .88-98, 242, 248 forward. The British also built railroads on the European lands of the Ottoman Empire with similar economic intentions. Of these, the Köstence-Çernavoda railroad line remained within the borders of Romania in the aftermath of the 1878 war with Russia. The Varna-Rusçuk line was opened to transportation in 1866. These railroads not only energized trade, but also escalated the surge of nationalism in the region. The Varna-Rusçuk line was turned over to Bulgaria by the 1878 Berlin Treaty signed at the end of the war with Russia. See Bilmez Bülent Can *Demiryolundan Petrole Chester Projesi (1908-1923) (From Railroads to Petroleum: The Chester Projcst 1908-23),* İstanbul, 2000, p. 44.

impoverished. The subsequent gradual polarization between those segments of Ottoman society and especially the non-Muslims who successfully integrated with Western European liberal imperialism and the rest of the imperial populace only increased over time.

Such immense external pressure on the Ottoman state combined with emergent nationalist movements and increased decentralization of power could have easily precipitated in the collapse of the empire at a much earlier time. Yet this did not occur because of the continued competition among Western European powers. The Ottoman state survived for almost another century as it sought alliances that pitted Western European powers against each other. It thus became skilled not in economic policy, but in diplomacy, an area that was much more in tune with the skills of those Muslim officials who controlled the political power in the empire. Yet the price of this political survival was the underdevelopment of the Ottoman economy. The prevention of military and administrative collapse also required measures for the centralization and rationalization of political authority in general, and a modernized army, reformed bureaucracy and a uniform tax system in particular. Even though these were actualized to a certain degree, the pressures brought upon by the provincial notables persisted. Sultan Mahmud II was successful in eliminating the military power of the provincial notables and initiating military and administrative reforms in the first half of the nineteenth century. Yet the sultans and their reformist officials lacked the economic vision that could provide an adequate tax basis for the sustenance of the empire.

A case in point is the 1858 promulgation of the land code that for the first time recognized private property in the empire. The land code intended to secure peasant landholdings by granting them direct titles, eliminating in the process all intermediaries who were enriched at the expense of the peasants. The outcome, however, was not the elimination of such intermediaries, but instead the consolidation of land under the ownership of Muslim provincial notables since the local power of these notables forced the peasants to turn their lands over to the former. Increased reliance on merchants designed to bypass the provincial notables and to also generate increasing revenue for the state also failed because non-Muslim merchants had already developed strong alliances with Western European states. As a consequence, the few Muslim merchants who had managed to stay active were the ones who were eliminated in the process. In addition, even though escalated trade with Europe in general and the British in particular subjected the peasantry to increasing commercialization, it nevertheless did generate money-rent

for the Ottoman state. The adverse economic consequences of this temporary material gain were, however, much more far-reaching. Eventually, the Muslim merchant class was eliminated, the Ottoman crafts industry destroyed, and the Ottoman economy peripheralized.[25]

Another adverse consequence of the imbalance between increasing export production accompanied by growing demands for import was the generation of a severe balance-of-payments problem. Ottoman state officials attempted to cope with these problems by borrowing from the European states. The outcome was disastrous: caught in an increasing spiral of debts, the Ottoman state was eventually overwhelmed by financial troubles, and, finally, subordinated to the control of the creditor nations, which further undermined the tax bases by appropriating an important portion of the surplus directly from the population. This new situation emerged in 1875 after the Ottoman state declared that it was going to decrease the payment of the due loans by half. As a consequence, the Public Debt Administration (*Düyun-u Umumiye İdaresi* -- hereafter PDA) was established in 1882 with the authority to collect significant revenue sources of the empire. Given the financial security and control of PDA, Western foreign capital once again started to find it desirable to invest in the empire.[26] By that time, however, the Ottoman economy had become fully dependent on Western Europe. As Western Europeans took over all the significant economic enterprises of the empire with the aid of their Ottoman non-Muslim intermediaries, all that was left for the rest of the Muslim populace was resentment, one that eventually turned into fervent nationalism.

1914 Abolition of the Trade Capitulations The younger generation of future state officials educated in the sultan's Western-style educational institutions established pledged allegiance not to the Ottoman dynasty but instead to the state over which the sultan ruled. The autocratic rule of the sultan gave way to the second Constitutional Revolution in 1908 as these future state officials accompanied by military officers whose interests were not as vested in the imperial structure as their earlier forefathers once again wrested power away from the sultan. The ensuing war with Italy over Tripoli and the disastrous Balkan Wars of 1912 quickly established the demographic dominance of the Muslims in the empire. Most of the western imperial lands lost in the Balkans were densely populated by non-Muslims. As they separated from the empire and Muslim subjects formed the majority in numbers as well as in political power, the younger

[25] For more information see Sunar, p. 77-81.
[26] Donald C. Blaisdell, *European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire, A Study of the Establishment, Activities, and Significance of the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt*, New York, 1929, pp. 108-147.

generation of officials was able to take a much stronger stand against Western European states and their non-Muslim intermediaries in the empire. Employing the excuse of World War I, the Ottoman state unilaterally abolished the capitulations in 1914. Ottoman Armenians of the empire were either massacred or expelled from 1915-1917; forced deportations dramatically reduced the numbers of Ottoman Greek Rum. In an another decade, the Ottoman Empire became a page in history as the Turkish Republic was founded on the imperial heartlands in 1923.

Political Polarization as a Consequence of the Ottoman Negotiation of Western European Liberal Imperialism

Politically, the Enlightenment vision universal rights for all humankind that was an element in Western European liberal imperialism also had a significant impact on the Ottoman Empire, especially in terms of legal and political restructuring. Even though liberal imperialism supported such a transformation in its attempts to create markets of consuming citizens, what universal rights meant and how they could be locally negotiated created problems. In the Ottoman case, the Western-style reforms introduced by the state in especially the military and administrative institutions eventually generated the social group of reformist state officials who aimed to sustain the empire through undertaking substantive changes that would grant equal rights to all Ottoman subjects. As the Ottoman social structure had been predicated on Islamic religious principles, however, such a change proved especially challenging. Even though Ottoman Muslims always enjoyed certain rights and privileges, this was not the case for the non-Muslim subjects who were treated, in accordance to the vision of universal rights, as second-class citizens. Hence all the reforms undertaken in 1839, 1856 and 1876 attempted to guarantee equal rights to non-Muslim subjects as individuals. Such attempts were resisted and challenged by the Muslims who were not content with losing their privileged status within the Ottoman social system. The consequence was enhanced polarization between the Muslim and non-Muslim citizens. Still, the state-initiated legal and political reforms did eventually increase the participation of all Ottoman subjects in the political structure. The 1876 Constitutional Reform was especially significant in this context as it led for the first time to the establishment of a constitution, albeit one that still was not able to hold the sultan accountable to the citizens. The task of creating a uniform body of Ottoman citizens continued to be challenging for the state.

The endeavors of especially sultan Abdulhamid II to create a common identity should be noted in particular. The sultan employed the common theme of first Ottomanism and then Islam as the ideological anchors in creating such an identity; he also established Western-style educational institutions with the intent to create citizens loyal to his person and dynasty. In the end, however, his attempts failed to take root as many social groups, both Muslim and especially non-Muslim, instead engaged in separatist movements to create their own nation-states. Among them, the reformist state officials whose ranks expanded over time to include many younger state bureaucrats and military officials started instead to coalesce around a proto-Turkish identity. Rather then pledging allegiance to the sultan, they instead professed loyalty to the state. What therefore followed in the aftermath of the second constitutional revolution in 1908 when they assumed power was proto-Turkish nationalism. Even though it was not explicitly stated as such, non-Muslim subjects were politically marginalized and excluded from the new body politic of the future nation, leading to violence against non-Muslim citizens. Hence liberal imperialism had once again penetrated and destabilized the existing social and political structure.

Origins: Emergence of Reformist State Officials New set of diplomatic skills necessitated to negotiate with Western Europe brought about the gradual ascendance to the empire of a new set of political actors, namely the reformist state officials. Trained and equipped with 'Western' skills in diplomacy and administration, these actors attempted to wrest power away from the sultan and his loyal household, establishing in the process the first semi-independent Ottoman governance. The 1839 abolition of political executions of powerful officials (*siyaseten katl*) as well as the abolition of the ensuing confiscation of their wealth contributed to the poverty of the state treasury, but nevertheless enriched the succeeding generation of reformist state officials. Of such leading officials like Mustafa Reşit, Ali, Fuat and later Mithat Pashas, Mustafa Reşit Pasha's wealth was acknowledged to be even greater than that of the French Rothschilds. Yet rather than investing their newly accrued wealth in trade or economic production, these state officials instead engaged in conspicuous consumption, building magnificent mansions along the Bosporus.

The same also held true for the newly enriched Ottoman non-Muslims engaged in economic interaction with Western Europe. They too could not invest their accumulated wealth in economic innovations or industrial production. Instead they were limited to representing European companies in the empire and engaging in conspicuous consumption like their reformist

Muslim counterparts. In the meanwhile, among the dissatisfied social groups of the empire were, in addition to increasingly economically marginalized Muslim producers, the religious elite (*ulema*) as well as the provincial notables (*eşraf*). Another significant component comprised the millions of impoverished Muslim refugees that poured into the empire from the Balkans, Caucasus and Crimea as the physical boundaries of the empire shrunk. Among the social groups enriched through their interaction with liberal imperialism, it was not the state bureaucrats who were resented the most -- since the social order naturalized Muslim structural domination -- but instead the non-Muslims. Their recently given political rights undermined the very same Muslim domination.

1839 and 1856 Reforms leading to the 1876 Constitutional Revolution Significant among the reformist state officials were Mustafa Reşit Pasha active in the promulgation of the first empire-wide reform act of 1839 named the *Tanzimat* (namely 'reordering and reform') as well as Ali and Fuat Pashas who were in turn succeeded by another person significant in generating the first 1876 constitutional revolution, namely Mithat Pasha. Even though these political reformers helped undertake the bureaucratic reorganization of the empire, their attempts failed in bringing about the envisioned political equality on two grounds: they were unable to get rid of the inherent structural inequality between the Muslim and non-Muslim subjects and they could not wrest ultimate power away from the sultan himself.

The inability of the reformist bureaucrats to wrest power away from the sultan led to their eventual demise in 1878 as sultan Abdülhamid II employed the occasion of the disastrous Ottoman defeat by the Russians to once again centralize power and authority in his person for the next three decades. These three decades were extremely significant in the life-course of the empire. Even though the sultan did indeed attempt to preserve the empire, the resources available to him were increasingly scant. Especially the industrialized nature of warfare necessitated the purchase of armaments from the West, ones that not only had to be imported to the empire but in the process also drained the Ottoman treasury. As a consequence, the sultan employed the diplomacy of pitting Western European states against each other to sustain the empire. Given the political pressures to establish equality, he also focused on creating a common political identity that could unite all his subjects, Muslim and non-Muslim alike.

Constructing an Ottoman Imperial Identity The vision of the Ottoman sultan was not predicated on developing a contractual relationship with his subjects but instead autocratic in

nature. Even though reformist state officials advocated constitutional rule, the majority of Muslim imperial subjects were indifferent to it because the existing system sustained their naturalized dominance. And it was this dynamic that helped the sultan sustain his autocratic rule for three more decades. In doing so, however, he had to construct an imperial identity that would unify his subjects against the threat posed by the vision of equal rights, a vision that could lead instead to separatist movements. It was in this context that the Ottoman sultans started to employ the title of the 'caliph' of all Muslims. The caliphate had initially been assumed by the Ottoman Empire after the 1520 defeat of the Mamluks in Egypt by sultan Selim I. Yet it then fell into disuse as the empire expanded westward toward Christian territory. Then, after the disastrous Ottoman defeat of the 1768-74 war with Russia, the newly enthroned sultan Abdülhamid I claimed to be the caliph of the Crimean Tatars in order to bolster the legitimacy of his rule vis-à-vis Russia. In addition, as more and more Muslim states fell under European imperialism during the course of the nineteenth century, sultan Abdülhamid II was the first Ottoman sultan to employ the title more and more as a defensive identity-building measure.[27]

Another significant factor that supported such use was the changing demographic composition of the empire. Especially in the aftermath of the 1878 Ottoman defeat by Russia as the approximately 5.5 million Christian subjects who had lived in the Balkans were lost, about more than 20 million subjects of the 25 million total population now comprised of Muslims.[28] Hence in the 1880's, the Ottoman Empire thus assumed a more Asiatic and more Muslim character as Muslim subjects became a majority for the first time in Ottoman history. The sultan relied on this development to emphasize the religion of Islam as a connecting force defining Ottoman identity. As such, the previous attempts of reformist state officials in promoting secular Ottomanism as the ideological glue holding the empire together was replaced by an Islamist one. The new policy was thus a pragmatic one that legitimated autocratic rule, exploited Muslim symbols and highlighted the Muslim identity of the empire to retain the imperial lands where Muslims lived. According to sultan Abdülhamid II, the Ottoman Empire was like an august sycamore tree; the loss of the Balkans lands of the empire was akin to the shedding of rotten

[27] Quataert 2000, p. 82.
[28] Bayram Kodaman *Sultan II. Abdülhamid Devri Doğu Anadolu Politikası (The Eastern Anatolian Policy during the reign of sultan Abdülhamid II)* Ankara 1987, p. 82. Commenting on the same topic, François Francois Georgeon notes that 'the proportion of the Muslims in the empire increased from 65% to 76% within a matter of years. Now, the empire was a state where three-quarters of the population were Muslim.' See François Georgeon, 'Son Canlanış (1878-1908) (The Last Revival, 1878-1908).' In *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi II (History of the Ottoman Empire II)* Robert Mantran, ed. İstanbul 1995, p. 148.

branches.[29] The tree trunk comprising of the Muslim lands had to be preserved at all costs.[30] Within this framework, the trunk could only be salvaged through a pro-Islamic policy. The sultan therefore started to honor prominent Muslim scholars, opened new mosques, published and distributed carefully prepared books on Islam, celebrated religious holidays with increased pomp, and prohibited the sale of alcohol in Muslim neighborhoods.[31] The significant leaders of religious orders like the Rifai and Kadiri were invited to the imperial capital, bestowed with significant resources and often sent throughout the world as propagandists for the sultan.[32] The sultan also sent envoys to countries with large Muslim populations under Western European rule such as Egypt, India and China to conduct propaganda on behalf of the caliph and also provided subventions for pro-Islamic publications in these countries. Other actions the sultan undertook included the close attention paid to the Tatar, Mongol, Georgian and Circassian Muslim refugees from Russia, the generous gifts bestowed upon the pilgrims to the imperial capital from Hokand, Hive and Bukhara, and the manner in which religious leaders such as great Arab scholar Sheikh Ebülhüda, Sheikh Muslim subjects became a majority for the first time in Ottoman history Rahmetullah, Sayyid Hüseyn el-Cisr and Muhammed Zafir employed against the French and the British. The name of the Muslim caliph started to be included in the Friday prayers of all the Muslim countries.[33]

Western European powers interpreted the interaction of sultan Abdülhamid II as 'pan-Islamism' and frequently expressed their anxiety over it.[34] This anxiety was obviously predicated on the presence of significant Muslim populations in the colonies of the Western imperial powers. Indeed, of the contemporaneous world population of approximately 300 million Muslims, only about 20 million lived in the Ottoman Empire. The rest of the colonized

---

[29] Haluk Ülman *Birinci Dünya Savaşı'na Giden Yol (The Path leading to World War I)* Ankara, 1973, p. 144.

[30] The sultan's German adviser Von der Goltz Pasha likewise conjectured that the total agreement of the Arab subjects with the caliph was far more important and crucial than the loss of a part of the Balkans. Goltz Pasha further stated that the Ottoman capital had to be relocated in Anatolia in order to unite the Muslim subjects and the lands on which they dwelled. The Pasha later suggested the establishment of a Turkish-Arab empire akin to the Austro-Hungarian model.

[31] For detailed information, see Cezmi Eraslan, *II.Abdülhamid ve İslam Birliği*, İstanbul, 1992, pp. 217-227.

[32] Şerif Mardin writes that sultan Abdülhamit II sustained his pro-Islamist policy 'in Central Asia, North Africa and the Far East through such agents.' See Şerif Mardin 'İslamcılık (Islamism).' In *Türkiye'de Din ve Siyaset (Religion and Politics in Turkey),* M. Türköne and T. Önder, eds. İstanbul, 1991, p.16.

[33] For instance, in Zanzibar Friday prayers were delivered in the name of sultan Abdülhamid II until 1910. See İlber Ortaylı '19. Yüzyılda Panislamizm ve Osmanlı Hilafeti (Panislamism and the Ottoman Caliphate in the 19th Century.' *Türkiye Günlüğü* 31 (1994), p. 27. Indeed, the sultan wanted to transform his Yıldız Palace into 'the Vatican of Islam.'

[34] Orhan Koloğlu *Abdülhamit Gerçeği (The Reality of Abdülhamit II)* İstanbul 1987, pp. 193-200 ; see also by the same author 'Dünya Siyaseti ve İslâm Birliği (Islamic Unity and World Politics).' *Tarih ve Toplum* 83 (1990), p.13.

Muslims could not but put their hopes for liberation in the only sovereign Muslim country, namely the Ottoman state. Indeed, for the speedily colonized Muslim countries, 'the existence of the Ottoman state provided, beyond the hope of sovereignty, the only source of consolation for their broken honor.'[35] Many colonized Muslim countries had contacted the Ottoman state asking for help, some even stating that they were ready to accept the sovereignty of the caliph in their country. These impossible expectations were partially due to the fact that the world Muslims exaggerated the power and authority of both the Ottoman sultan as well as the institution of the caliphate.[36] Hence the sultan's foreign policy initiatives to counter-balance the destructive impact of liberal imperialism interacted with the initiatives of the now colonized Muslims of the world.

The French state first became agitated when the Muslim rulers of Samara, Java and Camorra islands contacted the Ottoman sultan with the proposal to establish a united front against the penetration of Western liberal imperialism. Given that the Algerian and Tunisian refugees at the Ottoman imperial capital had played a significant role in the rebellions in Algiers and Tunis further worried the French state.[37] Likewise the French consular reports from Jeddah identified the local Şazeliye-Medeniye and Rifaiye religious orders as 'the extremely powerful and dangerous tools of the Ottoman state due to the special protection from above [that is, the sultan].'[38] The radical essays of truly pan-Islamist writers like Jelaleddin Afghani certainly supported the anxieties of Western imperialism. In addition to France, Britain that had also been upset by the 1857 Muslim rebellion was concerned that sultan Abdulhamid II as the caliph could potentially unite all the Muslims. The same concern was also valid for Russia that had colonized the Muslim peoples of Central Asia. Yet such imagined actions could not have been expected from a pragmatic sultan like Abdülhamid II who was keenly aware of the boundaries of his power and who therefore focused solely on what he already possessed. Still, he did capitalize on

---

[35] Mümtaz'er Türköne *Siyasi İdeoloji Olarak İslamcılığın Doğuşu (The Emergence of Islamism as a Political Ideology)* İstanbul, 1991, p.171. Concerning how the colonized Muslim countries' interests in the Ottoman Empire preceded sultan Abdülhamid II's rule, see pages 145-171.
For the account of a Muslim merchant from India in relation to how the dreams he had founded on the caliphate dissipated after his visit to the imperial capital and his astonishment at the great discrepancy between the level of governance at the seat of Islam as opposed to British rule in India, see Arnold J. Toynbee *1920'lerde Türkiye: Hilafetin İlgası (Turkey in the 1920s: The Abolition of the Caliphate)* İstanbul, 1998, p. 55. [36] Also see Chedo Mijatovich 'Abd ul Hamid' *Die Zukunft* 47 (1908), p. 296.
[37] Kemâl H. Karpat, "Pan-İslamizm ve İkinci Abdülhamid: Yanlış Bir Görüşün Düzeltilmesi (Pan-Islamism and Abdülhamid II: The Correction of an Erroneous View." *Türk Dünyasını Araştırmaları Dergisi* 47 (1987), p. 27.
[38] İhsan Süreyya Sırma 'Ondokuzuncu Yüzyıl Osmanlı Siyasetinde Büyük Rol Oynayan Tarikatlara Dair Bir Vesika (A Document concerning the Religious Orders that Played a Significant Role in 19th Century Ottoman Policy).' *İstanbul Üniversitesi, Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi* 31 (1977),, p.186.

the pan-Islamist phobia of the West. Another proof of Abdulhamid's use of Islam as a pragmatic tool is the way in which he actually sequestered true pan-Islamists. A case in point is Cemalettin Afghani whom the sultan brought to his capital with many promises to then put him in a golden cage.'[39]

Unlike the Ottoman sultan, the German state did indeed display radical pan-Islamism as a part of the European imperialist competition, especially to provoke and scare the British. The German emperor Kaiser Wilhelm II visited the sultan and delivered a speech in Damascus where he declared himself the protector of the 300 million world Muslims. This move too was predicated on the fact that the majority of these Muslims were under French, British and Russian colonial rule.[40] The German political elites pursued this pan-Islamist dream into World War I, a dream that was also shared by Enver Pasha who mobilized the secret paramilitary Special Organization to incite rebellions in Muslim colonies of the Allied Powers and later traveled to Central Asia himself without success.[41] The real reason of the sultan's employment of an Islamist policy was perhaps best understood by Von der Goltz Pasha who stated that sultan Abdülhamid II 'attempted to regain the prestige he had lost in front of the Christian/European powers by increasing his influence in the Muslim world with the intent to 'conquer the domestic lands.'[42] Hence the sultan's intent was pragmative and proactive; he wanted to mobilize the Muslims within the imperial borders around the caliphate and to thus further legitimate his dynastic rule over them. Given that the non-Muslim subjects of the empire had dwindled, the Muslim identity of the majority of the remaining subjects could have been a uniting force that prevented the diffusion of separatist nationalist ideas to Muslim communities such as the Arab, Kurds and Albanians.

The sultan also employed Western technology to his advantage in keeping the Arab provinces in general and the sacred religious sites of Mecca and Medina in particular under

---

[39] Koloğlu pp. 200-212; Karpat pp. 13-4 and 28. The exact quotation from the sultan's memoir is as follows: 'I knew Cemalettin Afghani quite well. He was in Egypt and he was a dangerous man. He had once proposed to me to get all Central Asian Muslims to rebel by pretending to be the *mahdi* (prophesied redeemer of Islam). I knew I would not have been capable to do so. He was also in the pay of the British and the British had prepared the man to test me.' See İsmet Bozdağ *Sultan Abdülhamid'in Hatıra Defteri (The Memoirs of sultan Abdülhamid II)* İstanbul, 1985, p. 73.

[40] For an interesting report penned by the famous German Orientalist Max von Oppenheimer to Kaiser Wilhelm asking the latter to motivate sultan Abdülhamid II toward adopting a pan-Islamist policy, see report dated 22 June 1907, Berlin, Politisches Archiv des Auswaertigen Amtes, Türkei 152.

[41] See Philip H. Stoddard *Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa (The Special Organization)* İstanbul 1993, pp. 59, 93, 94, 15-6, 20 and 31.

[42] *Neue Freie Presse* 3 September 1908.

Ottoman rule by constructing the Hedjaz railway. Such a railroad would connect the sacred cities to Damascus and enable the easy travel of thousands of Muslim pilgrims, thereby building support and cooperation within the Muslim world. After all, about 80,000 pilgrims set out annually from Iran and another 15,000 from India, and a fifth of these lost their lives during the pilgrimage.[43] The news of the construction of the Hedjaz railroad was covered extensively and enthusiastically by all Muslim newspapers throughout the world. The sultan also attempted to counter the anti-Ottoman propaganda supported by the British by establishing and supporting local Arab newspapers active in counter-propaganda. The Ottoman state-supported newspapers instead promoted the legality of the Ottoman caliph.[44] The Ottoman sultan alos took a stnad against the claims that the caliphate had to belong to a member of the Quraysh tribe of the prophet Muhammad; publications supporting such a stand were severely censored by the Ottoman state and prevented from entering the imperial domains.[45] Other Ottoman intellectuals like Lütfi Pasha also supported the sultan by arguing that the caliphate belonged to the largest Muslim state in the world which was the Ottoman Empire.[46]

Education to Produce Loyal Citizens Perhaps the most significant endeavor where the Ottoman sultans employed elements of Western liberal imperialism to sustain their own rule was the establishment of Western-style educational institutions with the intent to create loyal Ottoman citizens.[47] In France, schools were established to train the officers while in Prussia and Sweden they were founded to train men for positions in the bureaucratic service. These were significant in countries which, like the Ottoman Empire, did not possess significant manufacturing or commercial activities. The abysmal performance of the Ottoman military against Mehmet Ali's forces and at the 1855 Crimean War was due to the lack of trained officers; the army had a high command and common soldiers but almost nothing in-between. In addition, schools for the Muslim subjects had been greatly outnumbered by the foreign, missionary and community schools established for the non-Muslim subjects of the empire. Under sultan Mahmud II, attempts to launch a military education system comprised of sending in 1827 some

---

[43] Hugo Grothe *Meine Studienreise durch Vorderasien, 1906-1907* Halle 1908, p. 38 and H. Von Kleist 'Die Hedjasbahn.' *Asien* 6(1906), p. 84.
[44] Azmi Özcan *Pan-İslamizm, Osmanlı Devleti, Hindistan Müslümanları ve İngiltere (1877 -1914) (Pan-Islamism, the Ottoman State, Indians Muslims and Britain, 1877-1914)* İstanbul 1992, pp.172-3; Deringil p. 57; Kayalı p. 45.
[45] Ortaylı '19. Yüzyılda... (In the 19th Century…),' pp. 27-8.
[46] Eraslan p. 195; Hulusi Yavuz *Osmanlı Devleti ve İslamiyet (Ottoman State and Islam)* İstanbul 1991, pp. 95-110.
[47] David B. Ralston *Importing the European Army: The Introduction of European Military Techniques and Institutions into the Extra-European World, 1600-1914* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990, pp. 11, 62-9.

young men to Europe (Paris, London and Vienna) for military education and establishing a military academy at the capital in 1834. Even before the military academy, the sultan had opened a military medical school to train surgeons and health officers for his army, accompanying the earlier-established Naval and Military Engineering Schools. These educational initiatives were followed by the founding of the Military Staff College in 1849 and the Civil Service School in 1859.[48] In 1855 the army formed their own network of schools by establishing one high school in each army district. In 1865 an Ottoman school was established in Paris to prepare students for entrance into the St. Cyr, Polytechnique and the other Grandes Ecoles. By the last decades of the nineteenth century, the younger, school-educated officers came increasingly from the provincial lower middle classes; hence the military education provided social mobility.[49] By 1897, there were some 29 secondary schools with a population of 8250 feeding their graduates to the military and civil service schools. The graduates of these schools formed a new professional group of state officials. Unlike their predecessors, these officers had less of a stake in the status quo and had received a Western secular education that developed their loyalty not to the sultan, but instead the Ottoman state that they were certain could be saved through additional Western-style reforms such as the creation of a constitution and re-establishment of the Ottoman Assembly.

Another significant educational endeavor sultan Abdülhamid II undertook to perhaps prevent the separatist tendencies particularly among the Arabs was the establishment of a 'School for Tribes (*Aşiret Mektebi*)' with the intent to recruit, train and thereby socialize into the Ottoman social structure the sons of significant Arab tribal leaders. These future leaders would learn Turkish and develop loyalty to the Ottoman sultan and caliph.[50] It was especially the Arab appreciation in the recruitment of 48 Arab students to the Ottoman War Academy that led the

[48]During this time, secondary schools (10-15 year old) also increased. By the Crimean war, there were some 60 in the entire empire attended by some 3,350 students while some 16,750 were enrolled in medreses or advanced theological schools.

[49] At these schools all students had to wear uniforms and at advanced schools army officers made up the teaching faculty. Mathematics, gunnery and other technical subjects and later military history, languages and literature were taught from a military point of view. Army also set up its own translation offices and printing presses for the books it used.

[50] Auler Pascha *Die Hedschasbahn*, p. 64; Kodaman, p. 89. For detailed information, see Bayram Kodaman «II. Abdülhamid ve Aşiret Mektebi (Sultan Abdulhamid II and the School for Tribes).' *Türk Kültürü Araştırmaları* XV/1-2 (1976).

sultan to found such a school.[51] The sultan considered that such integration into the Ottoman system would also prevent the insistence of the Arab intellectuals for education in their own language and thereby prevent the emergence of separatist movements. Other Ottoman state measures taken to integrate the Arab provinces into the empire against the centripetal forces of liberal imperialism included increased financial investment in the infrastructure, appointment of able administrators, inclusion of the Arabs within the Ottoman ruling elite, and the recruitment of Arab officers for the Ottoman army.[52] Another policy the sultan advocated was sending expensive gifts, awards and medals to local tribal leaders.

Development of Separatist Movements It is evident that both the graduates of Western-style imperial schools who aspired to rule the Ottoman state as well as the non-Muslim merchants and graduates of Western-style missionary and minority schools who attempted to join the imperial body politic were not admitted to the sultan's autocratic rule. Muslim graduates could not translate their educational capital into economic and political capital and the non-Muslim merchants and graduate could not transform their economic and educational capital into political capital.[53] Especially the growing group of non-Muslim merchants, particularly in the Balkans that had increased interaction with Western liberal imperialism became increasingly frustrated by the discrepancy between their economic wealth and lack of political power and social prestige. It was therefore not surprising that they set on creating an alternate political structure as they agitated the Christian subjects against the Muslim landowners and led separatist movements against the Ottoman state. Their Western-educated co-religionists eventually provided the necessary narrative and vision legitimating such a political alternative. Hence as liberal imperialism increased merchant capital that was then shut off from investment in the

[51] İbrahim Sivrikaya 'Osmanlı İmparatorluğu İdaresindeki Aşiretlerin Eğitimi ve İlk Aşiret Mektebi (The Tribal Education under Ottoman Imperial rule and the First Tribal School.' *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi* XI/63 (1972), p. 17; Alişan Akpınar *Osmanlı Devletinde Aşiret Mektebi (Tribal School in the Ottoman State)* İstanbul 1997, pp. 25, 27.

[52] This was a very significant development because until then there had been a noticeably low -- if any -- people of Arab origin in the higher echelons of the Ottoman state. For instance, of the 215 grand viziers who had served until then, none had been of Arab origin. Yet in 1886, the number of Arab officers in the Ottoman military had reached 3,200. See Hasan Kayalı *Jön Türkler ve Araplar: Osmanlıcılık, Erken Arap Milliyetçiliği ve İslamcılık (1908 - 1918) (Young Turks and the Arabs: Ottomanism, early Arab Nationalism and Islamism, 1908-1918)* İstanbul 1998, pp. 21, 37-38.

[53] Merchant capital in domestic circulation provided several services as it became a surrogate banking institution for the state as well as a cash reserve for tax-farmers, corrupt pashas, and monopoly (*mukataa*) holders.

empire, and promoted Western-style education that escalated knowledge capital once again shut off from the imperial body politic, it served to fuel separatist aspirations.[54]

Especially significant in this context was the emergence of separatist movements in the Arab provinces of the empire that the sultan had attempted so hard to integrate into the Ottoman body politic. After the 1878 Ottoman defeat, Britain changed its foreign policy of protecting the lands of the Ottoman Empire to contain Russia's access to India, deciding instead to directly colonize the strategic places that guaranteed its access, a route comprising of Gibraltar-Malta-Cyprus-Aden-the Gulf of Basra. Such a policy change necessitated the cultivation of political ties with local rulers at the Arab provinces. British rule over Basra was largely predicated on the secret agreement made with Mubarak as Sabah, the amir of Kuwait, who promised not to sign any other agreement without the knowledge of the British. Britain signed similar agreements with the amirs of Qatar, Bahreyn and Oman. Ottoman statesman Tahsin Pasha notes that the British also focued on sustaining their influence in the region across the generations by inviting the sons of prominent local sheikhs to come to London to be educated there.[55] Hence in accordance with their new imperialist policy, the British started to agitate the ethnic elements within the Ottoman Empire to rebel. Already in 1839 the British had occupied Aden and started to penetrate north into Yemen. They then started sending agents to provoke the populace against Ottoman rule. The Yemen tribes rebelling against the sultan were also financed by the British.[56] The British state also attempted to undermine the caliphate of the Ottoman sultan in the 1880s, as British propaganda for the appointment of an ethnically Arab caliph commenced in the Arab-language newspapers published in London. Another British attempt was to return the caliphate to Egypt. It was assumed that if and when the caliphate was returned to Egypt that was already a British colony, then the British state could wield power over all world Muslims.[57] Such British agitation for an Arab caliph then spread to Beirut, Damascus, Aleppo, Baghdad among other cities and eventually became effective in leading the Arab populace to take a stand against the

[54] Another factor that needs to be noted, however, is that given the double-standard Western European liberal imperialism employed in protecting their own states and societies while advocating the abolition of all obstacles in the states and societies which they wanted to turn into captive markets and continuous sources of raw material. As a consequence, it is unclear if the Ottoman minorities would have been able to help save the Ottoman Empire even if they had been allowed to invest in it.

[55] Tahsin Paşa *Tahsin Paşa'nın Yıldız Hatıraları (Palace Memoirs of Tahsin Pasha)* İstanbul 1990, p. 349.

[56] İhsan Süreyya Sırma *Osmanlı Devleti'nin Yıkılışında Yemen İsyanları (The Yemen Rebellions in the Demise of the Ottoman Empire)* İstanbul 1994, pp. 76 -78.

[57] Max Roloff-Breslau *Arabien und seine Bedeutung für die Erstaerkung des Osmanenreiches* Leipzig 1915, pp. 13-4;

Ottoman state. By the year 1900, the British newspapers could openly advocate the bringing of the Arabian peninsula under British protection.

The Ottoman adoption of Western-style institutions to reform and curb separatist movements did not succeed. Combined with the especially British agitation in the Arabian peninsula to foster such movements, it once again led to political polarization within the empire as each social group started to pursue visions of their own independence and sovereignty. Eveen though the young, proto-nationalist Muslim Turkish officials were eventually able to establishe their republic, the Arab provinces remained under Western imperialist rule for yet another couple of decades. The latter development signified how the egalitarian ideals of liberal imperialism could agitate non-Western societies into rebellion but then refuse to bestow the promised sovereignty.

Cultural Polarization as a Consequence of the Ottoman Negotiation of Western European Liberal Imperialism

Perhaps the most understudied component of Western European liberal imperialism comprises its cultural dimension because the economic and political components are much more readily visible and studied in detail. Yet, following Edward Said, one also needs to bring into the analysis the much less articulated transformation that especially altered the organization of public space in non-Western contexts. Initially, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, industrial and technological developments in Western Europe assumed a publicly visible form in especially the major cities. As landless peasants migrated from the countryside to cities to engage in manufacturing, and as the bourgeoisie assumed increasing economic and political power, the urban landscape transformed to display the changes in the ensuing urban lifestyle, one now desired by all citizens. While factories and industrial plants often dominated the urban periphery, railroads and steamships connected them not only to the major urban centers but also to marketing destinations throughout the world. As railways and later subways escalated the pace of transportation, the quick circulating urban populace traveled through and frequently visited along the well-lit, clean, wide boulevards the museums, parks, public squares, dined in fashionable cafes and restaurants, shopped in department stores, banks, insurance companies and stayed in large, comfortable hotels. Urban populace thus gradually transformed into consuming citizens living a lifestyle that was distinctly different from that of the countryside. Residential

buildings also reflected the accumulated wealth of Western Europe as they became more formidable, often dwarfing the church spires that once dominated the medieval cities; installed elevators, central heating, separate rooms for bathing, sleep and entertainment made urban living more desirable. Through such transformations, liberal imperialism acquired a specific spatial meaning embodying 'civilized' spaces embedded with many technological innovations that visibly displayed Western European cultural superiority that separated it from the rest of the world. What also made this cultural dimension of liberal imperialism increasingly dominant was that it was also transportable elsewhere; any state and society could, with sufficient economic resources, reproduce at least the illusion of civilization and progress in their own backyard.

It is therefore not at all accidental that as the Ottoman state and society set in late eighteenth century to reform after the Western European model of progress, urban public spaces in general and at the capital in particular started to transform visibly mimicking their Western European counterparts. The neighborhood within the imperial capital where all the Western European embassies were located, namely *Pera*, provided the symbolic core of the transformation. First non-Muslim merchants representing Western European companies and then Muslim reformist officials who were unable to invest their wealth in industrial production started instead to construct ostentatious Western-style residences, shops, restaurants, hotels and banks in the vicinity. Well-lit wide streets, paved roads soon followed. These new, public 'splendid spaces' thus displayed for the entire Ottoman populace the new, civilized lifestyle liberal imperialism had to offer. As more and more non-Muslims and westernized Muslim officials moved into this Westernized sector, however, the imperial capital itself was gradually bifurcated into the old part of ancient, traditional Muslim neighborhoods on the one side and the new Westernized one on the other.

Origins: Emergence of a New Urban Lifestyle Just like their Western European counterparts, Ottomans too could participate and celebrate the new urban lifestyle. Yet in their case, this lifestyle was not organically produced but rather imported. As a consequence, the form dominated and determined the content as urban behavior was mimicked rather than internalized. As a consequence, fashion styles were often exaggerated out of proportion as locals brought in their own local interpretations. Having five chandeliers instead of the necessary sole one and numerous gilded dining sets rather than the needed one were interpreted as measures of 'super-Westernization.

Early nineteenth century witnessed important furnishing changes as the homes of the wealthy non-Muslims and Westernized Muslim officials started to fill up with furniture and accessories from Western European capitals like Paris and London. As these new cultural markers moved in, the Ottoman use of internal space changed: multi-purpose rooms of the past were replaced by rooms with a single purpose. Separate bedrooms, living rooms, dining rooms emerged, each with its specialized furniture. Yet the transition was not always easy; for instance, those initially unable to import Western-style beds instead layered multiple blankets and throws to create the illusion of such a bed. Next to a Western-style water closet, a traditional bath was often built for those unable to utilize the Western ways of hygiene. Debates as to which form of hygiene was 'better' followed soon thereafter. As the Westernized urban Ottoman stepped out at the Pera district, he could attend new spaces of entertainment like theaters, recital halls or operas, shop at the new stores displaying the latest Western goods, and have tea at a fashionable café that also carried the traditional Turkish coffee while reading the recently published Ottoman journals and newspapers. Even though Ottoman non-Muslims quickly led in producing local forms of such spaces, those belonging to Europeans or bringing foreign troupes from abroad were often considered more 'modern' than the local versions. Such operas started to be performed in the late 1830s and Western theater was introduced in 1840, first at foreign embassies and then at the public spaces specially built for them. Movies, for instance, arrived at the imperial capital in 1897, two years after its invention in France. This simultaneity in the cultural production of such public spaces in Western Europe and the Ottoman Empire challenges the Orientalist conception that such cultural innovations lagged behind. What differed between the Western and non-Western contexts was not the forms of the new innovations, but rather their content as well as their frequency. As these were not initially produced in the Ottoman Empire, they were re-negotiated in the local Ottoman context thereby generating new syntheses; such syntheses were also much fewer in number because they were not organically produced through domestic dynamics.

To gage how dramatic this transformation of engaging in conspicuous consumption in these new urban 'splendid spaces,' one needs to analyze what preceded it. During the earlier course of the empire, the sultan's household comprising his person, immediate palace members as well as those officials to whom he had delegated his authority comprised the imperial elite

who set the cultural boundaries of public behavior.[58] As Şerif Mardin aptly notes, conspicuous consumption in the empire traditionally consisted of mostly largess where those in positions of authority emanating from the sultan down bestowed their generosity to household members, especially in celebration of religious holidays, new appointments or when visiting each other. Hence the communitarian economic ethos of taking care of one's own large household retinue by displaying patronage through the bestowal of gifts predominated over individual consumption. As such, income was perceived accruing not through individual initiative, but rather from the office bestowed upon particular officials by the sultan. Such a perception emerged from the state practice of confiscating the wealth of those perceived as living a luxurious public life sometimes accompanied by their beheading for engaging in such culturally inappropriate behavior. Hence getting rich through individual initiative was a pretty perilous undertaking in the Ottoman Empire. It is therefore not at all surprising one of the first practices to be abolished with the new Western-style reforms was the security of preserving one's life and wealth from the ire of the sultan and his household. The first generation of reformist officials in the 1830s put these laws in place, but it was the second generation that enjoyed the modern lifestyle that started to emerge at the capital. And they partially did so because they habitually still could not undertake individual economic initiative by investing their wealth in industrial production. Instead, they built magnificent buildings and engaged in conspicuous consumption. They were accompanied in such endeavors by the newly emerging non-Muslim minority bourgeoisie of the empire who were likewise limited to representing Western European companies and engaging in all new public spaces now geared to conspicuous consumption. They did so because they were not deemed trustworthy by the state to undertake local industrial initiative by themselves and had to often form partnerships with Europeans. This brings about the issue of whether the emerging new urban lifestyle was more excessive than the Western European counterpart. Mardin debates if there was indeed 'superficial aping' and concludes affirmatively. Since the market forces in the empire never attained the autonomy, legitimacy and power base it did in Western Europe, he conjectures, the newly emerging bourgeoisie in especially the imperial capital tended to be superficial. And the reaction of the ruled, namely those who did not enjoy the benefits of the

[58] See Donald Quataert 'Clothing Laws, State, and Society in the Ottoman Empire, 1720-1829.' *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 29/3 (Aug., 1997): 403-425 for an extensive discussion, especially pages 403-9, 411-4, and 421. See also Şerif Mardin 'Super Westernization in Urban Life in the Ottoman Empire in the lAst Quarter of the Nineteenth Century.' Pp. 135-63 in *Religion, Society and Modernity in Turkey* Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2006, especially pp. 139-142, 144, 148, 151-2, 156 and 162.

sultan's authority, was also more dramatic than in Europe because the ruled no longer shared in the magnanimity of the rulers as they had under the previous communitarian ethos. As the rulers started to engage in individualized conspicuous consumption, the ruled did not economically benefit from this altered consumption pattern initiated by the penetration of European market forces. As a consequence, the entire Ottoman society was polarized, between the reformists engaging in new individualized forms of conspicuous consumption, and the conservatives reacting negatively to the loss of the former communitarian economic ethos. And the ire of the ruled was often directed not against the state officials who still had political power, but rather the non-Muslim minority bourgeoisie who could not transform their economic wealth to political power and who therefore remained frustrated and also open to attack by the ruled.

1829 Public Dress Code Perhaps the most visible cultural change that impacted the entire populace of the imperial capital was the gradual emergence of uniformly, Western-style attired urban dwellers who were no longer marked by the traditional social markers that had for centuries differentiated such social groups. Clothing laws had for centuries politically, economically and socially regulated societies throughout the world, including Europe. These attempted to dictate a visible hierarchy among the existing social groups since preserving the boundaries of such groups was so vital to conserve the societal order. In the case of Islam, Islamic dress had been used for centuries to symbolize purity, mark status or formal roles, and distinguish believer from nonbeliever. Traditionally Muslims were admonished to dress modestly in garments that did not reveal the body silhouette and extremities and that did not display the impiety brought upon by the pride and conceit wearing expensive garments and bejeweled accessories indicated. Likewise in the Ottoman Empire, clothing laws were promulgated to mark and sustain first the strict boundaries between the rulers and the ruled, and then the more permeable boundaries among the rulers. After all, such laws had to visibly display and reproduce the sultan's official designation of authority. The traditional attire for men and women comprised loose fitting trousers and a shirt, topped by a variety of jackets, vests, and long coats. The layering of the garments was an important cultural element in that the quality of fabrics in all layers signified wealth. Usually those officials attending formal occasions wore more layers with richer materials where additional layers indicated more wealth.

Even though such clothing laws gradually disappeared in Western Europe during the eighteenth century due to the advent of market forces, in the Ottoman Empire they remained in effect for yet another century. Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent (1520-66) was the first sultan to rigorously codify the Ottoman clothing laws, specifying in particular the attire and especially the headgear of his officials. It is culturally significant that there was no significant Ottoman legislation on clothing until the early eighteenth century when European market forces started to penetrate into the empire. Then, clothing laws started to be promulgated once again to reinforce existing markers, as Donald Quataert notes, namely those stressing the control of men over women, Muslims over non-Muslims and rulers over the ruled. Especially significant in this time period were the reinforcement of the clothing regulations pertaining to non-Muslims as they had been the first Ottoman social group to benefit from the increased interaction with Western Europe.

The escalating commercialization of the non-Muslims soon accompanied by the reformist officials complemented by the availability of cheaper imported fabrics eventually resulted in the 1829 promulgation by sultan Mahmud II of the Civil Dress Code. Mahmud II first commenced by regulating the attire of the new Western-style army he created in the aftermath of the 1826 abolition of the traditional Janissaries. Accepting the European practice with modern weapons and drill required another change; beards that were often a requisite symbolizing manliness were deemed unhygienic and, in artillery units, a fire hazard. They were therefore restricted, leading to the gradual emergence of especially clean-shaven officers. In his attempt to find a headgear that was different from the traditional Ottoman military headgear of turbans, the sultan could not adopt the European military caps, which had leather bills in front to protect against the glare of the sun, because they interfered with Muslim soldiers' touching their foreheads to the ground during daily prayers. He instead decided on the brimless cap called the fez, a raised, circular cap first introduced to the empire by the naval commander and his men serving in North Africa. The sultan initially allowed that a turban could be wrapped around this cap to appease those resisting the new headgear, but he was firm about dictating the attire of all of his officials who for the first time would dress exactly the same, thereby no longer signaling the differences in rank among them. All the sultan's officials had to don the same uniform consisting of the fez, white shirts, black vests or jackets and black

trousers.[59] Likewise, all his soldiers had to wear uniform Western-style tighter pants, tunics and boots. The clothing was no longer layered as it had once been and no one could theoretically differentiate the rank of one official from the other from clothing alone. By promulgating a civil code for attire for all his officials, the sultan once again symbolically unified them under his rule. And by also not putting in place such a code for the populace, he also effectively eliminated the traditional markers that differentiated the various social groups.

Perhaps the most significant elimination was the public distinction in clothing between the Muslim and non-Muslim subjects. In a manner that reflected the legal equality promised to his non-Muslim subjects by his reforms, the sultan thus ensured that no differences in attire between them and their traditionally more privileged Muslim counterparts. All officials had to wear the regulated uniforms, while all the subjects could wear whatever they chose, hopefully attires similar to those of the sultan's officials. As such, the sultan culturally renegotiated Ottoman identity. Reacting to the European market forces that had wreaked havoc with the strictly defined Ottoman dress code, he created another along the lines nevertheless set once again by the West where such legal distinctions had disappeared among the citizenry. The Ottoman subjects thus symbolically transformed into citizens as they too could choose their particular attire. By such a transformation, however, Ottoman society became even more dependent on Western Europe in that the escalating demand for the new reformed attire was once again largely met by Western European manufacturers.

Such a dramatic change in attire was accompanied by transformations in many other new public spaces of the Ottoman state. For instance, in the newly formed state ministries, desks and chairs replaced the couches and cushions. Likewise, bureaucratic correspondence, bookkeeping, and the collection of statistical data on the empire also changed along the lines set by Western Europe. Actually, the whole system of imperial government transformed as sultan Mahmud II created what then became known as the Porte, the center of government comprising of state ministries and consultative councils.[60] With the establishment of Western-style ministries, the new prime minister simply became a coordinating agency between the ministers and the sultan. The consultative office of the sheik-ul-islam, the chief religious official in the empire was also pushed outside the realm of temporal government. Mahmud II

[59] Only religious scholars were held exempt from these codes.
[60] Lewis, *The Emergence*, p. 87

also proclaimed in 1838 the Turkish penal codes generated by his once again newly established council on legal and judicial matters.[61] As one Western-style legal code after another pertaining to commercial, criminal, civil procedure was proclaimed, the legal boundaries of the sharia became gradually restricted solely to matters of family law such as marriage and inheritance. As the sharia was displaced, the vast numbers of Muslims engaged in religious education and legal adjudication as scholars, judges and students started to become increasingly disgruntled. The other significant transformations entail the following. The sultan introduced European protocol for receiving foreign diplomats, and once again but by the sultan's own initiative, the beards of all state officials were eventually trimmed, sometimes shaved completely.[62] Yet many retained a moustache to still mark their manliness. Before Mahmud's edict, Monday and Thursday used to be holidays; now only Thursday was recognized as being a holiday by government offices.[63] Also in 1832 hanging the Sultan's portrait became compulsory in government offices. The first Ottoman official newspaper, modeled on that of Mehmet Ali Pasha and entitled *Takvim-i Vekayi* (Chronicle of Events) appeared in 1831. Other newspapers followed, with it the virtual space where the reading public could debate issues pertaining to state and society.

Production of New Urban Public Spaces Along these significant cultural changes in the Ottoman state's use of public space, the civilian use of space also transformed in especially urban centers. Initially, Ottoman state officials met and entertained in their mansions; now, they participated in urban life as they visited and entertained each other at restaurants, cafes and similar places that were also technically -- though not economically -- accessible to the rest of the populace. Traditionally, public spaces especially the Muslim populace employed comprised of coffee houses, barbershops and other small shops and arcades often built in the vicinity of mosques to support mosque expenses, bakeries, bath houses, and places of worship.[64] The few inns, drinking halls and urban shops were often operated by non-Muslims; most of the food was

[61] Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, pp. 97-98.
[62] I Engelhart, *Türkiye ve Tanzimat: Devlet-i Osmaniyenin Tarih-i Islahatı*, trs. from French by A Resadi, Istanbul, 1328, p. 19; N. Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, Montreal, 1964, 122. Engelhart indicates that even the Grand Vizier who avoided using the European saddle fell from favor of Mahmud, p. 19.
[63] Lütfi, *Tarih*, volume III, pp. 55, 100. Lütfi states that initially government offices had to be open every day. Since the officials of the imperial treasury had traditionally had their holidays on Thursdays, Thursday was decided as a holiday for all government departments. Bernard Lewis further states that this practice had initially been adopted from France. Lewis, *Emergence*, p. 101.
[64] Quataert 2000, pp. 154-5, 160.

sold on the streets by itinerant peddlers who also offered their various services fixing utensils, buying used clothing and the like in a similar manner. The only places where the entire urban populace could publicly participate had been restricted to fairgrounds set up during religious holidays and places of public promenade often along stream valleys. The imperial capital had two such valleys, one named the Sweet Waters of Europe up the Golden Horn and the other the Sweet Waters of Asia on the other side of the Bosporus. With the advent of European market forces, the public space around the neighborhood where European embassies had once been located named Pera became increasingly fashionable instead. By the 1850s, the public area surrounding what had once been an abandoned cemetery entitled Grand Champs du Mort near Pera became the most pre-eminent place of public display. First non-Muslims moved in to build shops that imported European goods, furniture and accessories, then Western-style cafes, restaurants and hotels were opened. Finally, many Western-style residences were constructed in stone where the spacious flats had separate rooms, water closets, and elevators. The residents had instant access to the teeming urban life outside, frequently visiting these new heavens of conspicuous consumption. Such 'splendid spaces thus entirely redefined urban public space in the empire, transforming not only the use of space but also the attire, modes of behavior and interaction.

Development of a Fragmented Imperial Cultural Fabric The negotiation of new public spaces generated through Westernization led to societal polarization in the Ottoman empire, creating in the process 'traditional, backward' spaces as opposed to the Western ones. This chasm was most visibly observed in the three Ottoman imperial capitals throughout history, namely Bursa, Edirne and Istanbul. Contemporaneous memoirs of state officials capture this polarization well. As increasing numbers of Ottoman officials started to travel to Western European capital, they first started to observe and compare what they saw there with the imperial capital. A case in point is the information contained in the memoirs of Hayrullah Efendi who traveled to Vienna and Paris in the 1860s.[65] What especially struck him was the provision of urban services by the state that did not exist in the empire then. Hayrullah Efendi notes, for instance, that in Paris, there is urban administration and services provided to the populace like 'the collection of garbage, repair of roads, and the construction of sidewalks with three types of

[65] Hayrullah Efendi [1818-1866] *Avrupa Seyahatnamesi (European Travelbook)* Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 2002, p. xiv.

pipes running underneath for water, gas and sewage.' He adds that some roads are watered down during the summer and there are thousands of gas lamps illuminating the city at night. The expenses for all these, he points out, are collected from the populace in the form of a tax. The orderly boulevards lined with trees are interspersed with newspaper stands, public toilets and waiting carriages as well as an omnibus service for public transportation. The whole city is monitored with the help of 4000 security officials. Hayrullah Efendi compares what he sees to what exists in the empire at two points. Once concerns the large stores where consumer goods are so tastefully exhibited; 'on the streets, the goods are displayed beautifully in stores which have glass windows,' he points out only to continue that such stores 'do not exist in the empire where most are holes in the wall without glass windows.' The other comparison involves the coffee houses or cafes that were initially imported to Europe from the Ottoman Empire. Hayrullah Efendi states that 'the coffee houses in Vienna and Paris are clean unlike the ones in the Ottoman Empire.' Hence, public hygiene and display of goods seem to stand out in Hayrullah Efendi's comparison. In all, he ends up by wishing that what he observed in Paris and Vienna becomes available at the Ottoman imperial capital, a wish seconded by many other contemporaneous officials. Such a wish demonstrates how public comfort and its display became a significant attribute of European civilization and progress, one that could be readily copied in the Ottoman Empire. As such 'splendid spaces' did indeed emerge in the past and present imperial capitals, however, the urban polarization in the use of public space became increasingly dramatic, bringing with it a feeling of inferiority to Ottoman Muslims. The contemporaneous narratives on urban space cited below in the context of Istanbul, Bursa and Edirne demonstrate the degree of this polarization.

Imperial Capital of İstanbul Halid Ziya Uşaklıgil was a prominent Ottoman writer and novelist who also held many officials posts. He describes the differences between the Muslim and European quarters of Istanbul and the disparate lifestyles in each during the course of late nineteenth century as follows:[66]

> If a French or Italian company comes to Pera and…if you live in Vefa or Aksaray in [old] Istanbul and wanted to spend a couple of times a year in your deprived life an hour of respite, you would not find enough money in your purse to rent a carriage and pay the admission fee. Then you would have to trespass Istanbul's mud covered streets immersed in darkness to go across the Unkapanı bridge [on the Golden Horn separating the old and new neighborhoods], climb the hills and, half penitent by this time, enter the

[66] Halid Ziya Uşaklıgil [1869-1945] *Kırk Yıl: Anılar (Forty Years: Memories)* İstanbul: İnkılap, 1987, pp. 547-8.

> theater [exhausted]...You were still happy if you enjoyed art for two hours, forgetting all that trouble, difficulties, and your hurt personal pride. But as you return home soiled [in mud], staggering in the dark, something twists in your heart as you think and ache about the foreigners [Europeans], Greek Rums, Armenians, Jews [non-Muslim minorities] on the other side of the bridge leading a very pleasant life in their magnificent mansions, and on the other side the [Muslim] Turk who pulls the blanket of his deprived life over his head to sleep, awakening the following day to see the sun turbid once again. This was the life of the Turk [then]. And the degree of unhappiness and misery felt by the [Turkish Muslim] youth of that time could not at all be comprehended by the youth of today.

Uşaklıgil's account first marks the poverty of the Muslims who could rarely afford any of the modern amenities in the new, modernized neighborhoods populated by European foreigners and non-Muslims. He then describes the muddy streets of the old city covered in darkness, only to cross the bridge and enter into the well, paved, well-lit clean streets in the modern neighborhoods, thereby noting how the penetration of liberal imperialism dramatically altered the use of public space. Probably the most significant part of the account is the ensuing emotions such public chasm generates within Uşaklıgil. The comparison of the Western-style life with the traditional one wounds the 'pride of the Turk' and produces 'heart ache.' Turkish Muslims who have access to the modern quarters feel 'unhappy and miserable' as they compare their own lifestyles to what they observe. And this is the emotional impact of liberal imperialism once it has penetrated: feelings of inferiority emerge among the Muslim Turks as they deem their lives miserable in comparison.

These emotions are complemented by the shifting division of labor in Ottoman society that also advantages Europeans and non-Muslims over Muslims, thereby turning the traditional social order upside down. Fatih Kerimi, an Azeri journalist who stayed and reported from the imperial capital in the 1900's, describes the economic life at the imperial capital as being totally fragmented across professions as well as living spaces with the Turkish Muslim majority on the one side and non-Muslims on the other.[67] In comparing the Christian and Muslim neighborhoods, Kerimi points out further that it is as if 'one were moving from the trunk of a tree to its branches…as the roads keep getting narrower and unkempt.' Once again, the account points to a dramatic division of labor as impoverished Muslim Turks unsuccessfully engaged in petty trades are totally hegemonized by the enriched non-Muslims and Europeans who hold well-paying professions and who offer meticulous service. It is once again the comparison of the two

[67] Fatih Gilmanoğlu Kerimi [1870-1945] *İstanbul Mektupları (İstanbul Letters)* İstanbul: Çağrı, 2001, pp. 317-21.

that becomes heart-wrenching with 'darkness, dirtiness, dilapidation and foulness' of the Turkish Muslims on the one side and 'good organization, cleanliness, enterprising skills' of the non-Muslims and Europeans on the other. Once again this visible difference in public hygiene translates into 'inferiority' of the Muslim Turks as Kerimi interprets what he observes.

Elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire The same chasm is observed not only in Istanbul but also at the other parts of the empire. For instance at the former imperial capital of Edirne, Ottoman military official Rahmi Apak makes a similar observation pointing to the great chasm between the Muslim and non-Muslim lifestyles and living spaced in the city:[68] It is significant that in his narrative, Apak employs qualifiers like 'advanced' when describing non-Muslim neighborhoods as opposed to 'backwardness' when portraying non-Muslim ones. And such distinctions eventually penetrate the entire Ottoman imperial lands. For instance, Ottoman military official Faik Tonguç keeps a diary as his army regiment sets out toward the eastern front during World War I. He writes on 17 January 1915 that they spent their entire time on the road talking about the 'misery and neglect of the Turkish people.' They do so because they are constantly passing through various towns in Anatolia, where the level of underdevelopment of Muslim villages as opposed to non-Muslim ones is dramatic. He notes, for instance, that in Kayseri in central Anatolia, 'as everywhere else, the Christian neighborhoods were rather well kept, like the Çiftlik neighborhood in Samsun, Hisarönü at Ankara….In Erzurum as well only the Armenian neighborhood was well kept.'[69] Likewise, in recounting his childhood years in Burhaniye in Balıkesir, the Ottoman official Fevzi Güvemli first starts to notice how the Greek Rum neighborhood was so different from their Muslim one. He recounts that 'with imposing houses built of stone with no dust or mud on the streets where the residents were happy and noisy with gardens filled with flowers with music constantly emanating from their windows. We shivered when we looked at [their] vast church. Yet our [Muslim] neighborhood was just the opposite; since the streets had not been paved, the dust would rise on windy days into clouds upon clouds or turn into a mud pit during rain. Most of the houses were made of sun-dried brick, [thus] hidden behind mud walls.'[70]

---

[68] Rahmi Apak [1889-1969] *Yetmişlik bir Subayın Hatıraları (Memoirs of a Seventy Year old Colonel).* Ankara: TTK, 1998, pp. 14, 19.
[69] Faik Tonguç *Birinci Dünya Savaşında bir Yedeksubayın Anıları (The Memoirs of a Rserve Officer during World War I).* İstanbul: İş Bankası, 1999, pp. 22-3, 28.
[70] Fevzi Güvemli [1903-1972] *Bir Zamanlar Ordu: Anılar (Ordu Once upon a time: Memories)* Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1999, p. 5.

It is apt to conclude the essay with a final narrative that captures how the Muslim Turks were eventually going to act upon the public chasm that they so frequently observed. Ottoman official İsmail Habib Sevük captures the increasingly polarizing emotions such a dramatic difference generated as he visits with Mustafa Kemal during the first decades of the twentieth century the city of Mersin, recently taken back by the Turkish national forces from Allied occupation. The escalating Turkish nationalism to overcome the divide is evident in his observations and tone as he states: [71]

> [t]he street we walk on is paved, the houses on either side are all built of stone, clean and white. It is evident that there is wealth here, construction, and order among the populace displaying incredible enthusiasm…Still…we know that these houses are not ours. Even though the money that went into building these…houses came out of our pockets, we do not own the deed!...Why do I not feel like I am going on my own street? Look at those Christian women crying in their rich costumes…the sobs of some reach all the way to us. I think to myself, why do they cry, are their tears [like mine] because of joy?'

[71] İsmail Habib Sevük [1892-1954] *O Zamanlar: 1920-1923(Those Days, 1920-1923)* İstanbul: Cumhuriyet, 1937, p. 286.