

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

GENERAL (PUBLIC)

1. **Name**: Full name (include any former names used).

John Glover Roberts, Jr.

2. **Position**: State the position for which you have been nominated.

Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States

3. **Address**: List current office address. If state of residence differs from your place of employment, please list the state where you currently reside.

Office:

E. Barrett Prettyman Courthouse
333 Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001

Residence:

Maryland

4. **Birthplace**: State date and place of birth.

January 27, 1955
Buffalo, New York

5. **Marital Status**: (include maiden name of wife, or husband's name). List spouse's occupation, employer's name and business address(es). Please also indicate the number of dependent children.

Married to Jane Sullivan Roberts, July 27, 1996.
Spouse's maiden name: Jane Marie Sullivan
Spouse's occupation: Attorney
Spouse's employer: Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman L.L.P.
2300 N Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

Two dependent children.

6. **Education:** List in reverse chronological order, listing most recent first, each college, law school, and any other institutions of higher education attended and indicate for each the dates of attendance, whether a degree was received, and the date each degree was received.

Attended Harvard Law School, 1976-1979. Awarded J.D. *magna cum laude* June 7, 1979.

Attended Harvard College, 1973-1976 (entered with sophomore standing). Awarded A.B. *summa cum laude* June 17, 1976.

7. **Employment Record:** List in reverse chronological order, listing most recent first, all governmental agencies, business or professional corporations, companies, firms, or other enterprises, partnerships, institutions and organizations, non-profit or otherwise, with which you have been affiliated as an officer, director, partner, proprietor, or employee since graduation from college, whether or not you received payment for your services. Include the name and address of the employer and job title or job description where appropriate.

June 2003 – present: Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, 333 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20001.

July 2005: Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law Center Summer Program, Jeremy Bentham House, University College London, Endsleigh Gardens, London, WC1H OEG, Great Britain.

January 1993 – May 2003: Partner, Hogan & Hartson L.L.P., 555 13th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20004.

October 1989 – January 1993: Principal Deputy Solicitor General, United States Department of Justice, 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20530.

May 1986 – October 1989: Hogan & Hartson, 555 13th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20004. I joined the firm as an associate and was elected a general partner of the firm in October, 1987.

November 1982 – May 1986: Associate Counsel to the President, White House Counsel's Office, 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20500.

August 1981 – November 1982: Special Assistant to Attorney General William French Smith, United States Department of Justice, 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20530.

July 1980 – August 1981: Law clerk to then-Associate Justice William H. Rehnquist, Supreme Court of the United States, 1 First Street, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20543.

June 1979 – June 1980: Law clerk to Judge Henry J. Friendly, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 40 Foley Square, New York, N.Y. 20543. At the time, Judge Friendly also served as the Presiding Judge of the Special Railroad Reorganization Court, a three-judge district court.

Summer 1978: Law clerk, Carlsmith, Carlsmith, Wichman & Case (now Carlsmith Ball L.L.P.), 1001 Bishop Street, Suite 2200, Post Office Box 656, Honolulu, HI 96813.

Summer 1977: Law clerk, Ice, Miller, Donadio & Ryan (now Ice Miller), One American Square, Box 82001, Indianapolis, IN 46282.

8. **Military Service and Draft Status:** Identify any service in the U.S. Military, including dates of service, branch of service, rank or rate, serial number and type of discharge received. Please list, by approximate date, Selective Service classifications you have held, and state briefly the reasons for any classification other than I-A.

No military service.

Selective Service Number: 12-46-55-304. Registered at: Selective Service System, Indiana Local Board No. 46, 1200 Michigan Avenue, LaPorte, IN 46350.

05-16-73 1-H – Registrant not currently subject to processing for induction or alternate service.

Note: Beginning in 1972, all new registrants were classified 1-H and kept there until after the lottery drawing for their age group. For year of birth 1955, the lottery drawing was held on March 20, 1974. The highest number called for processing out of the 1-H classification was number 95 for year of birth 1955. The lottery number for date of birth January 27, 1955, was 323. Those registrants with lottery numbers above the processing number remained in class 1-H.

9. **Honors and Awards:** List any scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, academic or professional honors, honorary society memberships, military awards, and any other special recognition for outstanding service or achievement.

Harvard College honors:

William Scott Ferguson Prize, 1974, for “the outstanding essay submitted by a Sophomore concentrating in History.”

Edwards Whitaker Scholarship, 1974, awarded to first-year students who “show the most outstanding scholastic ability and intellectual promise as indicated by distinction in studies and general achievement.”

John Harvard Scholarship, 1974, 1975, 1976, “in recognition of academic achievement of the highest distinction.”

Detur Prize, 1976, based on cumulative academic record.

Election to Phi Beta Kappa, 1976.

Bowdoin Essay Prize, 1976, for “the best dissertation submitted in the English language.”

A.B. degree awarded *summa cum laude*, 1976. Honors thesis on British domestic politics, 1900-1914.

Harvard Law School honors:

Editor, *Harvard Law Review*, volumes 91-92. Managing Editor, volume 92.

J.D. degree awarded *magna cum laude*, 1979.

- 10. Bar Associations:** List all bar associations or legal or judicial-related committees, selection panels or conferences of which you are or have been a member, and give the titles and dates of any offices which you have held in such groups. Also, if any such association, committee or conference of which you were or are a member issued any reports, memoranda or policy statements prepared or produced with your participation, please furnish the committee with four (4) copies of these materials, if they are available to you. “Participation” includes, but is not limited to, membership in any working group of any such association, committee or conference which produced a report, memorandum or policy statement even where you did not contribute to it.

United States Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules, appointed October 1, 2000.

D.C. Circuit Judicial Conference, 1991, 1992, 1998, 2000, 2003, 2004, 2005.

Fourth Circuit Judicial Conference, 1995.

American Law Institute, elected October 1990.

American Academy of Appellate Lawyers, elected August 1998.

Edward Coke Appellate American Inn of Court, joined January 2001.

Supreme Court Historical Society, joined December 10, 1987.

State and Local Legal Center, Legal Advisory Board (unpaid advisor to non-profit organization) (resigned upon assuming the bench).

Georgetown University Law Center, Supreme Court Institute, Outside Advisory Board (unpaid advisor to non-profit organization) (resigned upon assuming the bench).

National Legal Center for the Public Interest, Legal Advisory Board (unpaid advisor to non-profit organization) (resigned upon assuming the bench).

11. Bar and Court Admission:

- a. List the date(s) you took the examination and the date you passed for all states where you sat for a bar examination. List any state in which you applied for reciprocal admission without taking the bar examination and the date of such admission or refusal of such admission.

District of Columbia Bar Examination administered July 28 and 29, 1981.

Admitted to the District of Columbia Bar on December 18, 1981.

- b. List all courts in which you have been admitted to practice, including dates of admission and any lapses in membership. Please explain the reason for any lapse of membership. Give the same information for administrative bodies which require special admission to practice.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals, December 18, 1981.

United States Court of Federal Claims, December 3, 1982.

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, December 3, 1982.

Supreme Court of the United States, March 2, 1987.

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, March 31, 1988.

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, October 17, 1988.

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, November 4, 1988.

United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, May 31, 1995.

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, November 3, 1995.

United States District Court for the District of Columbia, February 5, 1996.

United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, April 10, 1996.

United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, June 21, 1996.

United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, November 24, 1997.

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, June 3, 1998.

United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, February 5, 1999.

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, September 30, 1999

12. Memberships:

- a. List all professional, business, fraternal, scholarly, civic, charitable, or other organizations, other than those listed in response to Questions 10 or 11 to which you belong, or to which you have belonged, or in which you have participated since graduation from law school. Provide the dates of membership or participation, and indicate any office you held. Include clubs, working groups, advisory or editorial boards, panels, committees, conferences, or publications. Please describe briefly the nature and objectives of each such organization, the nature of your participation in each such organization, and identify an officer or other person from whom more detailed information may be obtained.

Phi Beta Kappa, National Academic Honor Society, Elected 1976. Contact: Doris Lawrence, (202) 265-3808.

American Judicature Society. According to its website, the society "is a nonpartisan organization with a national membership of judges, lawyers, and non-legally trained citizens interested in the administration of justice." I was a member from time-to-time during the 1990s, with lapses in membership. The Society extends membership to sitting judges. Contact: Laury Lieurance, Membership Coordinator, (515) 271-2285.

As detailed in the response to question 26, I served in 1999 on the Joint Project on the Independent Counsel Statute sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute and the Brookings Institution, co-chaired by former Senators George Mitchell and Robert Dole. Contact: Thomas E. Mann, (202) 797-6050, and Norman J. Ornstein, (202) 862-5893.

The Lawyers Club of Washington, Member since 1996. Social association of lawyers that meets for lunches and annual dinner. Contact: Patrick L. O'Donoghue, Esq., Secretary/Treasurer, (301) 652-6880.

The Metropolitan Club, Member since June 7, 1995. Contact: Sandra Howland, Controller, (202) 835-2500.

Robert Trent Jones Golf Club, Member since December 1992. Contact: Glenn Smickley, Chief Operating Officer, (703) 881-4450.

Palisades Pool. Neighborhood swimming pool. Family membership since 2003. Contact: Joyce Chung, (301) 320-6499.

Justice Advisory Council, December 2000-January 2001, a group of 75-90 individuals formed to advise the Bush-Cheney transition team on general issues relating to the Department of Justice. I am listed as a member, but to the best of my recollection did not participate in any of the Council's activities. Contact: Paul McNulty, (703) 299-3700.

Republican National Lawyers Association, association of Republican lawyers, joined February 18, 1991; last dues paid November 15, 1993; membership expired November 15, 1994. Contact: Michael Thielen, Executive Director, (703) 719-6335.

According to recent press reports, in 1997 I was listed in brochures as a member of the Washington Lawyers Steering Committee of the Federalist Society. The same reports indicate that one could be on that Committee without also being a member of the Society. I have no recollection of serving on that Committee, or being a member of the Society. I have participated in Society events, including moderating a panel around 1993 and more recently speaking before a lunch meeting of the Washington chapter on October 30, 2003.

- b. If any of these organizations of which you were or are a member or in which you participated issued any reports, memoranda or policy statements prepared or produced with your participation, please furnish the committee with four (4) copies of these materials, if they are available to you. "Participation" includes, but is not limited to, membership in any working group of any such association, committee or conference which produced a report, memorandum or policy statement even where you did not contribute to it. If any of these materials are not available to you, please give the name and address of the organization that issued the report, memoranda or policy statement, the date of the document, and a summary of its subject matter.

None, except for the Joint Project on the Independent Counsel Statute sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute and the Brookings Institution. Four copies of the report issued by the Joint Project are attached.

- c. Please indicate whether any of these organizations currently discriminate or formerly discriminated on the basis of race, sex, or religion — either through formal membership requirements or the practical implementation of membership policies. If so, describe any action you have taken to change these policies and practices.

None have from before the time I joined.

13. Published Writings:

- a. List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, letters to the editor, editorial pieces, or other material you have written or edited, including material published only on the Internet. Please supply four (4) copies of all published material to the Committee.

“The Takings Clause,” *Developments in the Law — Zoning*, 91 *Harvard Law Review* 1462 (1978) (unsigned student note).

Comment, “Contract Clause — Legislative Alteration of Private Pension Agreements,” 92 *Harvard Law Review* 86 (1978) (unsigned student note).

Comment, “First Amendment — Media Right of Access,” 92 *Harvard Law Review* 174 (1979) (unsigned student note).

“New Rules and Old Pose Stumbling Blocks in High Court Cases,” *Legal Times*, February 26, 1990 (also reprinted in various affiliated publications), co-authored with E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr.

“Article III Limits on Statutory Standing,” 42 *Duke Law Journal* 1219 (1993).

“Riding the Coattails of the Solicitor General,” *Legal Times*, March 29, 1993.

“The New Solicitor General and the Power of the Amicus,” *The Wall Street Journal*, May 5, 1993.

“The 1992-93 Supreme Court,” 1994 *Public Interest Law Review* 107.

“Forfeitures: Does Innocence Matter?” *Legal Times*, October 2, 1995.

“Thoughts on Presenting an Effective Oral Argument,” *School Law in Review* (1997).

“Oral Advocacy and the Re-emergence of a Supreme Court Bar,” 30 *Journal of Supreme Court History* 68 (2005).

- b. Please supply four (4) copies of any testimony, official statements or other communications relating, in whole or in part, to matters of public policy, that you have issued or provided or that others presented on your behalf to public bodies or public officials.

Aug. 23, 1993 I appeared before the House Republican Conference Task Force on Crime to discuss crime legislation. Four copies of the hearing transcript are attached.

June 11, 1999

I appeared before the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law of the House Judiciary Committee with former Senators George Mitchell and Robert Dole and former Solicitor General Drew Days to discuss the report of the Joint Project on the Independent Counsel Statute sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute and the Brookings Institution. Four copies of the hearing transcript and the report from the Joint Project are attached.

- c. Please supply four (4) copies, transcripts or tape recordings of all speeches or talks, including commencement speeches, remarks, lectures, panel discussions, conferences, political speeches, and question-and-answer sessions, by you which relate in whole or in part to issues of law or public policy. If you have a recording of a speech or talk and it is not identical to the transcript or copy, please supply four (4) copies of the recording as well. If you do not have a copy of the speech or a transcript or tape recording of your remarks, please give the name and address of the group before whom the speech was given, the date of the speech, and a summary of its subject matter. If you have reason to believe that the group has a copy or tape recording of the speech, please request that the group supply the committee with a copy or tape recording of the speech. If you did not speak from a prepared text, please furnish a copy of any outline or notes from which you spoke. If there were press reports about the speech, and they are readily available to you, please supply them.

Brookings Institution, October 3, 1983, Washington, D.C., on Giving Legal Advice to the President.

Indiana University School of Law, 1984 Harris Lecture series, January 20, 1984, Bloomington, IN, on Federal Court Jurisdiction.

Maryland Association of County Attorneys, December 7, 1989, on Appellate Advocacy.

District of Columbia Bar Association, Section on Administrative Law, September 19, 1990, Washington, D.C., on Supreme Court Environmental Cases.

American Bankruptcy Institute, December 7, 1991, Scottsdale, AZ, on Supreme Court Bankruptcy Cases.

American Academy of Appellate Lawyers, February 5, 1994, Kansas City, MO, on Supreme Court practice.

Elderhostel, Rockville, MD, November 14, 1996, on Supreme Court oral arguments.

D.C. Copyright Law Society, March 16, 1998, Washington, D.C., on *Feltner v. Columbia Pictures*.

Bureau of National Affairs, Supreme Court Constitutional Law Seminar, Washington, D.C., September 11, 1998, on Supreme Court oral arguments.

D.C. Bar Administrative Law Section, September 24, 1998, Washington, D.C., on *NCUA v. First National Bank & Trust Co.*

Alabama Bar Institute for Continuing Legal Education, 36th Annual Southeastern Corporate Law Institute, Point Clear, AL, April 24, 1999, on recent Supreme Court cases.

Arizona Bar Appellate Practice Section, June 25, 1999, on the certiorari process.

National Mining Association, Lake George, N.Y., September 10, 1999, on amicus briefs.

Republican National Lawyers Association, Washington, D.C., April 3, 2000, on cases pending before the Supreme Court.

Cosmetics, Toiletries, and Fragrances Association, Napa Valley, CA, April 26, 2000, on the First Amendment and commercial speech.

Symposium, Bicentennial Celebration of the Courts of the District of Columbia Circuit, Washington, D.C., March 9, 2001, Panelist on Constitutional Confrontations in the District of Columbia Circuit Courts. Proceedings published at 204 F.R.D. 499.

National Association of Legal Secretaries, Washington, D.C., July 28, 2001, on Supreme Court arguments.

Environmental Law Seminar, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA, January 17, 2002, on *Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency*.

John F. Kennedy School of Government, Masters Program visit to Washington, D.C., January 24, 2002, on Supreme Court practice.

American Academy of Appellate Lawyers, New Orleans, LA, February 8, 2002, on Supreme Court practice, with E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., and Seth Waxman.

Georgetown University Law School, Supreme Court Institute, May 16, 2002, Washington, D.C., 1992 Supreme Court law clerk program, on the 1992 Supreme Court term.

Brigham Young University and J. Reuben Clark Law School, Rex E. Lee Conference on the Office of Solicitor General of the United States, Provo, UT, September 12-13, 2002, with 19 other alumni of the Office. Proceedings transcribed and published at 2003 *BYU Law Review* 1 (2003) (copies attached).

Supreme Court Historical Society Annual Lecture, "Oral Advocacy and the Re-emergence of a Supreme Court Bar," June 7, 2004, published at 30 *Journal of Supreme Court History* 68 (2005) (copies attached).

Lecturer, Appellate Advocacy Course, District of Columbia Bar Continuing Legal Education Program, October 27, 2004, Washington, D.C. (notes attached).

Guest Speaker, U.S. Department of Justice Civil Division Awards Ceremony, December 7, 2004, Washington, D.C. (notes attached).

Wake Forest University School of Law, Jeff Rupe Memorial Lecture, February 25, 2005, Winston-Salem, N.C. (videotape available).

University of Virginia School of Law, Ola B. Smith Lecture, "What Makes the D.C. Circuit Different? A Historical View," April 20, 2005, Charlottesville, VA (audiocassette available).

Since 1995, I have addressed the Street Law/Supreme Court Historical Society program for high school teachers. Two sessions of the program are held annually in June, and I typically address both sessions. My remarks offer an introduction for the teachers on how the Supreme Court decides which cases to review and how it decides those cases on the merits.

Prior to joining the bench, I also regularly participated in press briefings sponsored by the National Legal Center for the Public Interest and the Washington Legal Foundation upon the opening of a new Supreme Court term or the Court's rising for the summer.

On no occasion did I speak from a prepared text. Notes or recordings are available only as indicated.

- d. Please list all interviews you have given to newspapers, magazines or other publications, or radio or television stations, providing the dates of these interviews and four (4) copies of the clips or transcripts of these interviews where they are available to you.

NPR, Morning Edition, Nov. 13, 2002, "Supreme Court to take up issue of whether or not Megan's Law violates constitutional rights of past sex offenders."

NPR, Morning Edition, Apr. 24, 2002, "U.S. Supreme Court hears case on whether a student can sue his college for releasing his records without his permission."

NPR, Morning Edition, Jan. 16, 2002, "Supreme Court to hear Illinois case concerning independent review board and HMO."

NPR, Morning Edition, Jan. 7, 2002, "Supreme Court to hear case challenging government's right to impose a moratorium on development."

NPR, All Things Considered, Nov. 7, 2001, "Supreme Court case on how impaired a person must be to be considered disabled under the Americans with Disabilities Act."

NPR, Morning Edition, July 11, 2000, "Decisions the Supreme Court reached this term."

NPR, Morning Edition, Oct. 6, 1999, "Racial discrimination case in Hawaii."

NPR, Weekend Edition, June 26, 1999, "Supreme Court's big decisions of the past week."

NPR, Talk of the Nation, June 24, 1999, "Recent decisions by the Supreme Court and their possible effects on states' rights and the rights of citizens."

PBS, MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour, July 2, 1997, "Focus — Supreme Court Watch."

NPR, Morning Edition, Mar. 27, 1996, "NFL antitrust case will impact all of sports industry."

PBS, MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour, June 12, 1995, "Focus — Affirmative Action."

PBS, MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour, Aug. 7, 1991, "Focus — Abortion Protest."

In addition to the foregoing more formal interviews, I have also occasionally been asked by media representatives to comment on particular legal developments. I have not maintained a file or listing of such requests or whether they resulted in any media report.

14. Public Office, Political Activities and Affiliations:

- a. List chronologically any public offices you have held, other than judicial offices, including the terms of service and whether such positions were elected or appointed. If appointed, please include the name of the individual who appointed

you. Also, state chronologically any unsuccessful candidacies you have had for elective office or unsuccessful nominations for appointed office.

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|---------------|---|
| 06/79 - 06/80 | Law Clerk to Judge Henry J. Friendly, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Appointed by Judge Henry J. Friendly. |
| 07/80 - 08/81 | Law Clerk to Justice William H. Rehnquist, Supreme Court of the United States. Appointed by Justice William H. Rehnquist. |
| 08/81 - 11/82 | Special Assistant to the Attorney General, United States Department of Justice. Appointed by Attorney General William French Smith. |
| 11/82 - 05/86 | Associate Counsel to the President, White House Counsel's Office. Appointed by President Ronald W. Reagan. |
| 10/89 - 01/93 | Principal Deputy Solicitor General, United States Department of Justice. Appointed by Attorney General Richard L. Thornburgh. |

- b. List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered, whether compensated or not, to any political party or election committee. Please supply four (4) copies of any memoranda analyzing issues of law or public policy that you wrote on behalf of or in connection with a presidential transition team.

Executive Committee, D.C. Lawyers for Bush-Quayle '88.

Lawyers for Bush-Cheney.

At the request of Benjamin Ginsberg and Ted Cruz, I went to Tallahassee in November 2000 to assist those working on behalf of George W. Bush on various aspects of the recount litigation. My recollection is that I stayed less than one week. I recall participating in a preparation session for another lawyer scheduled to appear before the Florida Supreme Court and generally being available to discuss issues as they arose. I returned to Tallahassee at some later point to meet with Governor Jeb Bush, to discuss in a general way the constitutional and statutory provisions implicated by the litigation.

15. Legal Career: Please answer each part separately.

- a. Describe chronologically your law practice and legal experience after graduation from law school including:

- i. whether you served as clerk to a judge, and if so, the name of the judge, the court and the dates of the period you were a clerk;

After graduation from law school, I served as a law clerk to Judge Henry J. Friendly, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 40 Foley Square, New York, N.Y. 10007. At the time, Judge Friendly also served as Presiding Judge of the Special Railroad Reorganization Court, a three-judge district court. I clerked for Judge Friendly from June 1979 to June 1980.

I next served as a law clerk to then-Associate Justice William H. Rehnquist, Supreme Court of the United States, One First Street, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20543. I served in that capacity from July 1980 to August 1981.

- ii. whether you practiced alone, and if so, the addresses and dates;

No.

- iii. the dates, names and addresses of law firms or offices, companies or governmental agencies with which you have been affiliated, and the nature of your affiliation with each.

After completing my clerkship with Justice Rehnquist, I accepted appointment as a Special Assistant to Attorney General William French Smith, United States Department of Justice, 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20530. I served in that capacity from August 1981 to November 1982.

I left the Department of Justice in November 1982 to accept an appointment as Associate Counsel to the President, White House Counsel's Office, 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20500.

I left the White House Counsel's Office in May 1986 to join the Washington law firm of Hogan & Hartson as an associate. I was elected a general partner of the firm in October 1987. Hogan & Hartson is now located at 555 13th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20004.

I resigned my partnership in the firm in October 1989 to accept an appointment as Principal Deputy Solicitor General, United States Department of Justice, 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20530.

I left the Solicitor General's Office in January 1993 to rejoin Hogan & Hartson as a partner. I resigned my partnership in May 2003 to assume the bench.

- b. Describe:

- i. the general character of your law practice and indicate by date when its character has changed over the years.

From 1986 until I joined the bench in 2003, I had an intensive federal appellate litigation practice, in both the private and public sectors, with an emphasis on Supreme Court litigation. During that period I orally argued 39 times before the Supreme Court, in addition to arguments before the United States Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Federal, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, as well as the District of Columbia and Maryland Courts of Appeals. The subject matter of these cases covered the full range of federal jurisdiction, including administrative law, admiralty, antitrust, arbitration, banking, bankruptcy, civil rights, constitutional law, environmental law, federal jurisdiction and procedure, First Amendment, health care law, Indian law, interstate commerce, labor law, and patent and trade dress law.

In addition to presenting oral argument and briefing the cases on the merits, my Supreme Court practice consisted of seeking and opposing Supreme Court review, seeking and opposing stays pending such review, preparing *amicus curiae* briefs on behalf of clients interested in pending Supreme Court matters, helping to prepare other counsel to argue before the Court, and counseling clients on the impact of specific Supreme Court rulings.

The court of appeals aspect of my federal appellate practice involved appearances in every federal circuit court of appeals, although the largest number of my court of appeals arguments were before the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. I did not specialize in any particular substantive area, but instead in the preparation of appellate briefs and the presentation of appellate oral argument.

The nature of my practice was essentially the same during my time at Hogan & Hartson and when I served as Principal Deputy Solicitor General, although of course during the latter period my sole client was the United States and its agencies and officers. As Principal Deputy Solicitor General, my duties included presenting oral argument before the Supreme Court and preparing and filing briefs on the merits on behalf of the United States, its agencies and officers, subject to the supervision of the Solicitor General and with the assistance of subordinates in the Office of the Solicitor General. I also supervised the preparation and filing of petitions for and briefs in opposition to certiorari, and engaged in an active motions practice seeking or opposing stays or other relief from the Supreme Court. In addition to this actual litigation before the Court, my duties included participating in the government's determination whether to appeal adverse decisions in the lower courts. Any such appeal, whether from a district court to an appellate court or from a circuit court to the Supreme Court, requires the approval of the Solicitor General. The same is true for any filing of a suggestion for rehearing en banc before a court of appeals.

Immediately prior to joining Hogan & Hartson for the first time in 1986, I served in counseling and advisory roles in the federal government. My duties as Associate Counsel to the President involved reviewing bills submitted to the President for signature or veto, drafting and reviewing executive orders and proclamations, and generally reviewing the full range of Presidential activities for potential legal problems. I participated in drafting

and reviewed various documents embodying Presidential action under certain trade, aviation, asset control, and other laws. I played a role in the Presidential appointment process, reviewing the Federal Bureau of Investigation background reports and ethics disclosures of prospective executive branch appointees.

My duties as Special Assistant to Attorney General William French Smith were also of an advisory nature, focusing on particular matters of concern to the Attorney General. I also served as a speechwriter and represented the Attorney General throughout the Executive Branch and before state and local law enforcement officials.

I was fortunate to have two appellate clerkships immediately after law school. Judge Henry J. Friendly is justly remembered as one of this Nation's truly outstanding federal appellate judges. The clerkship on the Supreme Court for then-Associate Justice Rehnquist the following year was an intensive immersion in the federal appellate process at the highest level.

- ii. your typical former clients and the areas, if any, in which you have specialized.

Clients of Hogan & Hartson for whom I rendered substantial legal services included large and small corporations, state and local governments, trade and professional organizations, nonprofit associations, and individuals. Such clients included, for example, the States of Alaska and Hawaii, the National Collegiate Athletic Association, Litton Industries, Inc., Gonzaga University, the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, the Credit Union National Association, Pulte Corporation, and Intergraph Corporation.

From October 1989 to January 1993, my sole client was the United States, its agencies and officers. With minor exceptions, the Office of the Solicitor General is the exclusive representative of the federal government before the Supreme Court. I accordingly represented a wide variety of departments, agencies, and other entities within the federal government. In doing so, I worked with each of the litigating divisions in the Department of Justice. Also included among my clients were individual officers of the United States or its agencies sued in *Bivens* actions.

My clients during my service as Associate Counsel to the President included the President of the United States and members of the White House staff. As Special Assistant to the Attorney General, my client was the Attorney General.

While in practice, I specialized in federal appellate litigation.

- c. Describe whether you appeared in court frequently, occasionally, or not at all. If the frequency of your appearances in court varied, describe such variance, providing dates.

I appeared in federal court frequently while in practice, arguing over 65 cases before the Supreme Court of the United States, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

Circuit, and various other federal circuit courts of appeals. The public service positions I held prior to 1986 did not involve court appearances, although my two clerkships necessarily afforded intensive exposure to the appellate process.

- i. Indicate the percentage of these appearances in:
 1. federal courts;
 2. state courts of record;
 3. other courts.

Federal courts: approx. 95 percent

State courts of record: approx. 5 percent

- ii. Indicate the percentage of these appearances in:
 1. civil proceedings;
 2. criminal proceedings.

Civil proceedings: approx. 95 percent

Criminal proceedings: approx. 5 percent

- d. State the number of cases in courts of record you tried to verdict or judgment (rather than settled), indicating whether you were sole counsel, chief counsel, or associate counsel.

As noted, my practice was primarily an appellate one, and my appearances in court were typically to argue appeals. I have personally argued over 65 cases leading to a final appellate judgment. I have, however, also appeared on occasion in trial courts.

- i. What percentage of these trials were:
 1. jury;
 2. non-jury.

One trial proceeding in which I served as an associate counsel was before a jury, although my participation in the case did not involve work before the jury itself.

- e. Describe your practice, if any, before the Supreme Court of the United States. Please supply four (4) copies of any briefs, amicus or otherwise, and, if applicable, any oral argument transcripts before the Supreme Court in connection with your practice. Give a detailed summary of the substance of each case, outlining briefly the factual and legal issues involved, the party or parties whom you represented, describe in detail the nature of your participation in the litigation and the final disposition of the case, and provide the individual name, addresses, and telephone numbers of co-counsel and of principal counsel for each of the other parties.

From 1986 until 2003, I appeared frequently before the Supreme Court, both as counsel of record and as co-counsel to others. The nature of this practice is described above in the response to question 15.b. During that period I orally argued 39 times before the Court in 38 separate matters. A description of each of these cases, and my participation, follows:

1. *Smith v. Doe*, 538 U.S. 84 (2003). This case involved a challenge to the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act, which required convicted sex offenders to register with law enforcement authorities and made offender information available to the public. The question presented was whether the application of the Act to offenders convicted before its enactment violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. Representing the petitioners, the Alaska Commissioner of Public Safety and the Alaska Attorney General, I argued that the Act was not punitive in nature and therefore did not implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion accepted this argument and upheld the constitutionality of the Act.

I shared oral argument with Theodore B. Olson, then Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530, (202) 514-2217, and now with Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher L.L.P., 1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036, (202) 955-8668, who appeared on behalf of the United States as *amicus curiae* in support of the petitioners. My co-counsel on the brief were Jonathan S. Franklin and Catherine E. Stetson of Hogan & Hartson L.L.P., 555 13th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20004, (202) 637-5600, Cynthia M. Cooper, 3410 Southbluff Circle, Anchorage, AK 99515, (907) 349-3483, and Bruce M. Botelho, then Alaska Attorney General, P.O. Box 110300, Juneau, AK 99811, (907) 465-3600. Mr. Botelho is now mayor of the City and Bureau of Juneau, 155 S. Seward Street, Juneau, AK 99801, (907) 586-5240. Principal counsel for the respondents were Verne E. Rupright of Rupright & Foster, 322 Main Street, Wasilla, AK 99654, (907) 373-3215, and Daryl L. Thompson of Daryl L. Thompson P.C., 841 I Street, Anchorage, AK 99501, (907) 272-9322.

2. *Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co.*, 537 U.S. 149 (2003). The Coal Act of 1992 calls on the Commissioner of Social Security to assign coal industry retirees to particular coal companies "before October 1, 1993," for the purpose of funding retiree benefits. The question presented was whether assignments made after the specified date were nonetheless valid, or whether retirees not assigned in time should be allocated pursuant to the formula for unassigned retirees. Representing respondents Peabody Coal Company and Eastern Associated Coal Corporation, I argued that the statute precluded the Commissioner from making belated assignments. Writing for the majority, Justice Souter rejected this argument, reasoning that the date in question was meant to spur the Commissioner to action but did not restrict the time in which she could act.

With me on the brief were Lorane F. Hebert of Hogan & Hartson L.L.P., 555 13th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20004, (202) 637-5600, and John R. Woodrum and W. Gregory Mott of Heenan, Althen & Roles L.L.P., 1110 Vermont Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005, (202) 887-0800. Jeffery S. Sutton, then of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, 1900 Huntington Center, 41 South High Street, Columbus, OH 43215, (614)

469-3855, and now a judge on the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 540 Potter Stewart U.S. Courthouse, 100 East Fifth Street, Cincinnati, OH 45202, (513) 564-7000, argued on behalf of respondents Bellaire Corporation, Nacco Industries, and North American Coal Corporation. Peter Buscemi of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius L.L.P., 1111 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20004, (202) 739-5190, represented petitioners United Mine Workers of America Combined Benefit Fund. Barbara B. McDowell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530, (202) 514-2217, represented petitioner Barnhart.

3. *Rush Prudential HMO Inc. v. Moran*, 536 U.S. 355 (2002). Under an Illinois statute, if a patient's primary care physician deems a procedure to be necessary but the patient's HMO disagrees, the patient is entitled to have the HMO's decision reviewed by an outside physician, and that outside physician's decision is binding on the HMO. The question before the Court was whether this independent review provision was pre-empted by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Representing the petitioner, I argued that the provision conflicted with ERISA's exclusive remedial scheme. Justice Souter's majority opinion disagreed, reasoning that the provision was protected by ERISA's savings clause.

I was assisted by Clifford D. Stromberg, Craig A. Hoover, Jonathan S. Franklin, and Catherine E. Stetson of Hogan & Hartson L.L.P., 555 13th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20004, (202) 637-5600, and James T Ferrini, Michael R. Grimm, Sr., and Melinda S. Kollross of Clausen Miller P.C., 10 South LaSalle Street, Chicago, IL 60603, (312) 855-1010. Respondent Debra Moran was represented by Daniel P. Albers of Barnes & Thornburg, 2600 Chase Plaza, 10 South LaSalle, Chicago, IL 60603, (312) 357-1313. Respondent the State of Illinois was represented by John P. Schmidt, Assistant Attorney General, 100 West Randolph Street, 12th Floor, Chicago, IL 60601, (312) 814-3312. Edwin S. Kneeder, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530, (202) 514-2217, argued on behalf of the United States as *amicus curiae* in support of the respondents.

4. *Gonzaga University v. Doe*, 536 U.S. 273 (2002). John Doe sought damages from Gonzaga University for the unauthorized release of personal information in violation of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA). The question presented was whether FERPA's provisions could be enforced by a suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a cause of action for the deprivation of "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." I represented the University and argued that FERPA did not create personal rights, and thus could not be so enforced. The Chief Justice's opinion for the majority accepted this argument and held that a Section 1983 action could not be maintained under these circumstances.

I shared oral argument with Patricia A. Millett, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530, (202) 514-2217, who appeared on behalf of the United States as *amicus curiae* in support of the University. With me on the briefs were Martin Michaelson, Alexander E. Dreier, and Lorane F. Hebert of Hogan & Hartson L.L.P., 555 13th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20004, (202) 637-5600, and

Charles K. Wiggins and Kenneth W. Masters of the Wiggins Law Office, 241 Madison Avenue, N. Bainbridge Island, WA 98110 (206) 780-5033. Beth S. Brinkmann of Morrison & Foerster L.L.P., 2000 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006, (202) 887-1544, represented respondent Doe.

5. *Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency*, 535 U.S. 302 (2002). The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency instituted temporary moratoria on development while devising a comprehensive land use plan. The question presented was whether the moratoria constituted a taking of property that required compensation under the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution. Representing the respondent Planning Agency, I argued that the enactment of temporary moratoria does not constitute a *per se* taking, and that the moratoria instead should be evaluated using a fact-specific inquiry set forth in prior Supreme Court opinions. Under that inquiry, there was no taking. The Court agreed, with Justice Stevens writing for the majority.

I shared oral argument with Theodore B. Olson, then Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530, (202) 514-2217, and now with Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher L.L.P., 1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036, (202) 955-8668, appearing on behalf of the United States as *amicus curiae* supporting the respondents. With me on the brief were E. Clement Shute, Jr., Fran M. Layton, and Ellison Folk of Shute, Mihaly & Weinberger L.L.P., 396 Hayes Street, San Francisco, CA 94102, (415) 552-7272, John L. Marshall, Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, P.O. Box 1038, Zephyr Cove, NV 89448, (775) 588-4547, and Richard J. Lazarus, 600 New Jersey Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20001, (202) 662-9129. The petitioners were represented by Michael M. Berger of Berger & Norton Law Corporation, 1620 26th Street, Suite 200, South Santa Monica, CA 90404, (310) 449-1000.

6. *Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams*, 534 U.S. 184 (2002). Respondent Williams sued her former employer under the Americans with Disabilities Act, for failing to provide her with a reasonable accommodation for carpal tunnel syndrome and related injuries. The question presented was whether the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which had ruled for Williams, had applied the proper standard in concluding that Williams's injuries qualified as a "major life impairment" under the Act. Representing petitioner Toyota, I argued that the Sixth Circuit erred in only considering the effect of the injuries on a specific set of work-related tasks, rather than on a wide range of life activities. Justice O'Connor's opinion for a unanimous Court accepted this argument and reversed and remanded the case so that the Sixth Circuit could apply the proper standard.

I shared oral argument with Barbara B. McDowell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530, (202) 514-2217, who appeared on behalf of the United States as *amicus curiae* supporting the petitioners. I was assisted by Christopher T. Handman and Catherine E. Stetson of Hogan & Hartson L.L.P., 555 13th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20004, (202) 637-5600, and Jeffrey A. Savarise, John A. West, and Katherine A. Hessenbruch of Greenebaum Doll & McDonald P.L.L.C., 3300 National City Tower 101, South Fifth Street, Louisville, KY 40202, (502) 589-4200.

Robert L. Rosenbaum of Rosenbaum & Rosenbaum P.S.C., 300 Lexington Building 201, West Short Street, Lexington, KY 40507, (859) 259-1321, represented the respondent.

7. *TraFFix Devices Inc. v. Marketing Displays Inc.*, 532 U.S. 23 (2001). Marketing Displays had patented a dual-spring base design that made road signs more resistant to wind, which TraFFix Devices copied and improved upon after Marketing Displays' patent expired. The question presented was whether the subject matter of a utility patent can be protected as trade dress after the patent expires. On behalf of TraFFix Devices, I argued that the ruling below was inconsistent with the basic "patent bargain" recognized by the Supreme Court: society grants a patent holder exclusive rights to his invention for a limited period of time, on the condition that the invention becomes public property when the patent expires. The Supreme Court agreed with this position in a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, and ruled that the sign stand could not qualify for trade dress protection.

Co-counsel with me were Gregory G. Garre, Hogan & Hartson L.L.P., 555 13th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20004, (202) 637-5600, and Jeanne-Marie Marshall and Richard W. Hoffmann, Reising, Ethington, Barnes, Kisselle, Learman & McCulloch, P.C., 201 W. Big Beaver, Suite 400, Troy, MI 48084, (248) 689-3500. I shared oral argument with Lawrence G. Wallace, then Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530, (202) 514-2217, appearing on behalf of the United States as *amicus curiae* supporting the petitioner. John A. Artz, Artz & Artz, P.C., 28333 Telegraph Road, Suite 250, Smithfield, MI 48034, (248) 223-9500, argued for the respondent.

8. *Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America, Dist. 17*, 531 U.S. 57 (2000). Eastern Associated Coal sued to vacate an arbitration award requiring it to reinstate a truck driver who had twice tested positive for marijuana. The question before the Court was whether the arbitration award should be set aside. Representing Eastern Associated Coal, I argued that the Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act of 1991 and implementing regulations reflected a well-defined public policy against employees performing safety-sensitive jobs under the influence of illegal drugs, and that the award should be set aside on the basis of that policy. Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, refused to vacate the award, holding that the Testing Act's complex remedial scheme counseled against courts divining a broader public policy from it.

With me on the brief were David G. Leitch and H. Christopher Bartolomucci of Hogan & Hartson L.L.P., 555 13th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20004, (202) 637-5600, Ronald E. Meisburg of Heenan, Althen & Roles, 1110 Vermont Avenue, N.W., Suite 400, Washington, D.C. 20005, (202) 887-0800, and Anna M. Dailey and Donna C. Kelly Hennen of Althen & Roles, 1380 One Valley Square, P.O. Box 2549, Charleston, W.V. 25329, (304) 342-8960. Mr. Leitch is now General Counsel of Ford Motor Company, One American Road, Dearborn, MI 48126, (313) 322-7453. The respondents were represented by John R. Mooney of Mooney, Green, Gleason, Baker, Gibson, & Saindon P.C., 1920 L St., N.W., Suite 400, Washington, D.C. 20036, (202) 783-0010. Malcolm L. Stewart, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice,

Washington, D.C. 20530, (202) 514-2217, argued on behalf of the United States as *amicus curiae* in support of the respondents.

9. *Rice v. Cayetano*, 528 U.S. 495 (2000). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld a Hawaiian statute providing that only Native Hawaiians could vote for the trustees who administered certain trusts established to benefit Native Hawaiians. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether such a restriction constituted racial discrimination in violation the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. On behalf of the State, I argued that the classification was based on trust beneficiary status rather than race, and that the classification was also permissible because Congress had recognized the political status of Native Hawaiians as an indigenous people. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, rejected these arguments and struck down the statute.

On the brief with me were Gregory G. Garre and Lorane F. Hebert of Hogan & Hartson L.L.P., 555 13th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20004, (202) 637-5600, and Attorney General Earl L. Anzai and Deputy Attorneys General Girard D. Lau, Dorothy Sellers, and Charleen M. Aina of the State of Hawaii, 425 Queen Street, Honolulu, Hawaii 96813, (808) 586-1360. Counsel for petitioner was Theodore B. Olson, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, 1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036, (202) 955-8500. Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530, (202) 514-2217, argued on behalf of the United States as *amicus curiae* urging affirmance.

10. *National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Smith*, 525 U.S. 459 (1999). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had ruled that Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 — which applies only to organizations that receive federal financial assistance — applied to the NCAA, because it received dues from entities that receive federal financial assistance. The issue on the merits was what it meant to “receiv[e] Federal financial assistance” under the terms of the statute. On behalf of the NCAA, we argued that according to Supreme Court precedent, coverage under the statute is limited to direct recipients of federal funding — those who knowingly entered into a bargain by accepting the funding. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, the Supreme Court agreed with this position and reversed the Third Circuit.

Appearing on the briefs with me were Martin Michaelson, Gregory G. Garre, and Lorane F. Hebert of Hogan & Hartson L.L.P., 555 13th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20004, (202) 637-5600, John J. Kitchin and Robert W. McKinley of Swanson, Midgley, Gangwere, Kitchin & McLarney, 922 Walnut Street, Suite 1500, Kansas City, MO 64106, (816) 842-6100, and Elsa Kircher Cole, General Counsel, National Collegiate Athletic Association, One NCAA Plaza, 700 West Washington Street, Indianapolis, IN 46204, (317) 917-6222. Representing the respondent was Carter Phillips, Sidley & Austin, 1722 Eye Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006, (202) 736-8000. Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530, (202) 514-2217, argued on behalf of the United States as *amicus curiae* supporting the respondent.

11. *Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television Inc.*, 523 U.S. 340 (1998). A district court granted summary judgment against petitioner Feltner in a copyright infringement suit. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner had a right to have his claim determined by a jury. I represented the petitioner, and argued that both the Copyright Act and the Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution guaranteed a right to jury trial in copyright infringement cases. Writing for eight Justices, Justice Thomas rejected my Copyright Act argument, but agreed that the Seventh Amendment created a right to jury trial in such cases and remanded the case to district court so that a jury trial could be held.

I was assisted by David G. Leitch and Jonathan S. Franklin of Hogan & Hartson L.L.P., 555 13th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20004, (202) 637-5600. Principal counsel for the respondent was Henry J. Tashman of Davis Wright Tremaine L.L.P., 1000 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 600, Los Angeles, CA 90017, (213) 633-6800.

12. *National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.*, 522 U.S. 479 (1998). The National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) interpreted the Federal Credit Union Act to allow credit unions to be composed of multiple, unrelated employee groups, each having a common bond of occupation. The questions before the Court were whether commercial banks had standing to challenge the NCUA's interpretation, and, if so, whether that interpretation was permissible. I represented petitioners, Credit Union National Association and AT&T Family Federal Credit Union, and argued that commercial banks lacked prudential standing because they were outside the "zone of interest" protected by the statute, and that the NCUA's interpretation was reasonable and entitled to deference. Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas disagreed, holding that commercial banks did have prudential standing and that the NCUA's interpretation was impermissible because the Act required *all* members of credit unions to share the *same* common bond.

With me on the briefs were Jonathan S. Franklin of Hogan & Hartson L.L.P., 555 13th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20004, (202) 637-5600, Brenda S. Furlow, Credit Union National Association, Inc., 5710 Mineral Point Road, Box 431, Madison, WI 53701, (608) 231-4348, and Paul J. Lambert, Teresa Burke, and Gerard F. Finn of Bingham, Dana, & Gould L.L.P., 1200 19th Street, N.W., Suite 400, Washington, D.C. 20036, (202) 778-6150. Petitioner National Credit Union Administration was represented by Seth P. Waxman, then Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530, (202) 514-2217, and now with Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering, Hale & Dorr, 2445 M Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037, (202) 663-6800. Respondents were represented by Michael S. Helfer of Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering, Hale & Dorr, 2445 M Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037, (202) 663-6000.

13. *Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government*, 522 U.S. 520 (1998). An Alaskan native village attempted to levy a business tax against a state contractor hired to construct a school on village property. The question before the Court was whether the land owned by the village — an expanse of 1.8 million acres — constituted "Indian Country," such that the village was its sovereign with taxing authority. Representing the

State of Alaska, I argued that Congress alone can recognize an area as “Indian Country,” and that Congress had made no such recognition in awarding the land to the village in the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Thomas agreed and held that the village lacked the authority to impose the tax.

I was assisted by Gregory G. Garre of Hogan & Hartson L.L.P., 555 13th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20004, (202) 637-5600, and Bruce M. Botelho, then Attorney General, Barbara J. Ritchie, Deputy Attorney General, and D. Rebecca Snow and Elizabeth J. Barry, Assistant Attorneys General, State of Alaska Department of Law, P.O. Box 110300, Juneau, AK 99811, (907) 465-3600. Mr. Botelho is now mayor of the City and Bureau of Juneau, 155 S. Seward Street, Juneau, AK 99801, (907) 586-5240. Respondents were represented by Heather R. Kendall-Miller, Native American Rights Fund, 310 K Street, Suite 708, Anchorage, AK 99501, (907) 276-0680.

14. *Jefferson v. City of Tarrant, Alabama*, 522 U.S. 75 (1997). Petitioners sued the City of Tarrant for wrongful death in a fire. The question presented was whether the City could be held liable, given the interaction between the Alabama wrongful death statute and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The former had been interpreted to allow only punitive damages and the latter does not allow plaintiffs to sue municipalities for punitive damages. Representing the City, I argued that the United States Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case, because the Alabama Supreme Court had not yet rendered a final judgment in the matter. Writing for eight Justices, Justice Ginsburg agreed and dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.

I was assisted by Gregory G. Garre and H. Christopher Bartolomucci of Hogan & Hartson L.L.P., 555 13th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20004, (202) 637-5600, and Wayne Morse, John W. Clark, Jr., and David W. McDowell of Clark & Scott P.C., 3500 Blue Lake Drive, Suite 350, Birmingham, AL 35248, (205) 967-9675. Dennis G. Pantazis of Gordon, Silberman, Wiggins & Childs P.C., 1400 SouthTrust Tower, Birmingham, AL 35203, (205) 328-0640, represented the petitioners.

15. *Adams v. Robertson*, 520 U.S. 83 (1997). Alabama state courts approved a class action lawsuit and settlement agreement in a case against Liberty Life Insurance Company, without providing individual class members the right to exclude themselves from the class or the settlement. The question before the Court was whether that approval violated the class members’ Due Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Representing the respondent, I argued that the United States Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case, as the question presented had been neither raised nor decided by the Alabama Supreme Court. In a unanimous, *per curiam* opinion, the Supreme Court agreed and dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.

With me on the brief were David G. Leitch, Gregory G. Garre, and Amy Folsom Kett of Hogan & Hartson L.L.P., 555 13th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20004, (202) 637-5600, Michael R. Pennington, James W. Gewin, and James W. Davis of Bradley, Arant, Rose & White, 1400 Park Place Tower, Birmingham, AL 35203, (205) 521-8391, and

William C. Barclift and Edgar M. Elliott, III, Liberty National Life Insurance Company, P.O. Box 2612, Birmingham, AL 35202, (205) 325-2778. Respondent Charlie Robertson was represented by Paul M. Smith of Jenner & Block, 601 Thirteenth Street, N.W., Twelfth Floor, Washington, D.C. 20005, (202) 639-6000. The petitioners were represented by Norman E. Waldrop, Jr., of Armbrrecht, Jackson, DeMouy, Crowe, Holmes & Reeves L.L.C., P.O. Box 290, Mobile, AL 36601, (334) 405-1300.

16. *First Options of Chicago Inc. v. Kaplan*, 514 U.S. 938 (1995). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated an arbitral award in a case involving debts to First Options of Chicago, a stock-clearing company. The questions presented were what standard a trial court should use in reviewing an arbitrator's conclusion that the parties had agreed to arbitration, and what standard a court of appeals should use in reviewing that trial court's ruling confirming the award. Representing respondent Manuel Kaplan — one of the parties against whom the arbitrator had ruled — I argued that the first issue should be reviewed *de novo* and that the second issue should be reviewed according to ordinary appellate review standards. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Breyer agreed and affirmed the Third Circuit's decision.

My co-counsel on the brief were David G. Leitch of Hogan & Hartson L.L.P., 555 13th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20004, (202) 637-5600, and Donald L. Perelman and Richard A. Koffman of Fine, Kaplan & Black, 1845 Walnut Street, Philadelphia, PA 19103, (215) 567-6565. Respondent Carol Kaplan was represented by Gary A. Rosen of Connolly Epstein Chicco Foxman Engelmyer & Ewing, 1515 Market Street, 9th Floor, Philadelphia, PA 19102, (215) 851-8426. The petitioner was represented by James D. Holzhauser of Mayer, Brown & Platt, 190 South LaSalle Street, Chicago, IL 60603, (312) 782-0600.

17. *Jerome B. Grubart Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.*, 513 U.S. 527 (1995). The respondent, which owned a barge involved in construction on the banks of the Chicago River, sought to limit its liability for damages that occurred when the river flooded into a set of tunnels beneath the City of Chicago. The question presented was whether federal courts had admiralty jurisdiction over the case. Representing the respondent, I argued that they did, as the barge was a "vessel on navigable waters" under the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, and as Great Lakes' allegedly negligent actions posed a threat to maritime commerce. Justice Souter's opinion for the majority accepted this argument and reinstated the case in district court.

With me on the brief were David G. Leitch of Hogan & Hartson L.L.P., 555 13th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20004, (202) 637-5600, and Duane M. Kelley and Jack J. Crowe of Winston & Strawn, 35 West Wacker Drive, Chicago, IL 60601, (312) 558-5600. Petitioner Jerome G. Grubart was represented by Ben Barnow of Barnow and Hefty P.C., 105 W. Madison St., Ste. 2200, Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 621-2000. Petitioner City of Chicago was represented by Lawrence Rosenthal, Deputy Corporation Counsel, Room 610, City Hall, Chicago, IL 60602, (312) 744-5337.