COMMUNITY IN CONSERVATION
THEORETICAL
AGRICULTURE FOREST WATERSHED TENURE
AGRICULTURE
Altieri,
MA, MK Anderson, et al. (1987). “Peasant agriculture and the conservation of
crop and wild plant resources.” Conservation Biology 1: 49-58.
Barlow,
C and SK Jayasurija (1986). “Stages of development in smallholder tree crop
agriculture.” Development and Change 17: 635-658.
Brookfield,
H and C Padoch (1994). “Appreciating agrodiversity: a look at the dynamism and
diversity of indigenous farming practices.” Environment 36(5): 6-11,
37-45.
Brush,
S (1975). “The concept of carrying capacity for systems of shifting
cultivation.” American Anthropologist 77: 799-811.
Chapman,
D and R Barker (1991). “Environmental protection, resource depletion, and the
sustainability of developing country agriculture.” Economic Development and
Cultural Change 39(4): 723.
Croll,
E and Parker (1992). Bush Base and Forest Farm: Culture, Environment and
Development. London, Routledge.
Falconer,
J and JEM Arnold (1988). Forests, Trees and Household Food Security.
London, Overseas Development Institute.
Gliessman,
S (1992). “Agroecology in the tropics - achieving a balance between land-use
and preservation.” Environmental Management 16(6): 681-689.
Agroecology is the application
of ecological concepts and principles to the design and management of
sustainable agricultural systems. An agroecological approach to agriculture has
special importance in the humid tropics where agricultural development and the
preservation of tropical forests are most often in direct conflict. It is
proposed that a more sustainable approach to development is needed, where
agroecosystems depend on low external inputs, function more on the use of
locally available and renewable resources, have benign impacts on the environment,
and are based on the knowledge and culture of the local inhabitants. Examples
of traditional agroecosystem management in Mesoamerica that can provide this
basis are presented. The preservation of both biological and cultural diversity
are integral to the long-term sustainable management of natural resources in
the tropics. (Source)
Goodman,
D and M Watts (1994). “Reconfiguring the rural or fording the divide?
Capitalist restructuring and the global agro-food system.” Journal of
Peasant Studies 22(1): 1-49.
Headland,
TN and LA Reid (1989). “Hunter-gatherers and their neighbors from prehistory to
the present.” Current Anthropology 30(1): 43-65.
Thrup,
LA, S Hecht, et al. (1997). The Diversity and Dynamics of Shifting Cultivation:
Myths, Realities and Policy Implications. Washington DC, World Resources
Institute.
White,
TA (1993). Integrating Sustainability into Agroforestry Projects: A Workshop
Framework for NGO Program Managers. Washington, USAID.
FOREST:
Altieri,
MA, MK Anderson, et al. (1987). “Peasant agriculture and the conservation of
crop and wild plant resources.” Conservation Biology 1: 49-58.
Ascher,
W (1995). Communities and Sustainable Forestry in Developing Countries.
San Francisco, Institute for Contemporary Studies Press.
Balick,
MJ (1994). Ethnobotany, drug development and biodiversity
conservation-exploring the linkages. in Ethnobotany and the Search for New
Drugs. G Prance, Ed. Chichester, Wiley and Sons.
Barlow,
C and SK Jayasurija (1986). “Stages of development in smallholder tree crop
agriculture.” Development and Change 17: 635-658.
Brondizio,
E, E Moran, et al. (1996). “Land cover in the Amazon estuary: linking of the
thematic mapper with botanical and historical data.” Photogrammetric
Engineering & Remote Sensing 62: 921-929.
Brookfield,
H and C Padoch (1994). “Appreciating agrodiversity: a look at the dynamism and
diversity of indigenous farming practices.” Environment 36(5): 6-11,
37-45.
Brush,
S (1975). “The concept of carrying capacity for systems of shifting
cultivation.” American Anthropologist 77: 799-811.
Chapman,
D and R Barker (1991). “Environmental protection, resource depletion, and the
sustainability of developing country agriculture.” Economic Development and
Cultural Change 39(4): 723.
Croll,
E and Parker (1992). Bush Base and Forest Farm: Culture, Environment and
Development. London, Routledge.
Falconer,
J and JEM Arnold (1988). Forests, Trees and Household Food Security.
London, Overseas Development Institute.
Gliessman,
S (1992). “Agroecology in the tropics - achieving a balance between land-use
and preservation.” Environmental Management 16(6): 681-689.
Agroecology is the application
of ecological concepts and principles to the design and management of
sustainable agricultural systems. An agroecological approach to agriculture has
special importance in the humid tropics where agricultural development and the
preservation of tropical forests are most often in direct conflict. It is
proposed that a more sustainable approach to development is needed, where
agroecosystems depend on low external inputs, function more on the use of
locally available and renewable resources, have benign impacts on the
environment, and are based on the knowledge and culture of the local
inhabitants. Examples of traditional agroecosystem management in Mesoamerica
that can provide this basis are presented. The preservation of both biological
and cultural diversity are integral to the long-term sustainable management of
natural resources in the tropics. (Source)
Goodman,
D and M Watts (1994). “Reconfiguring the rural or fording the divide?
Capitalist restructuring and the global agro-food system.” Journal of
Peasant Studies 22(1): 1-49.
Headland,
TN and LA Reid (1989). “Hunter-gatherers and their neighbors from prehistory to
the present.” Current Anthropology 30(1): 43-65.
Thrup,
LA, S Hecht, et al. (1997). The Diversity and Dynamics of Shifting Cultivation:
Myths, Realities and Policy Implications. Washington DC, World Resources
Institute.
White,
TA (1993). Integrating Sustainability into Agroforestry Projects: A Workshop
Framework for NGO Program Managers. Washington, USAID.
IRRIGATION/WATERSHED:
Coward,
EW (1979). “Principles of social organization in an indigenous irrigation
system.” Human Organization 38(1): 28-35.
Edwards,
D, F Rosensweig, et al. (1993). Designing and Implementing Decentralization
Programs in the Water and Sanitation Sector.
Lynch,
BD (1985). Community Participation and Local Organization for Small-Scale
Irrigation.
Narayan,
D (1993). Participatory evaluation: Tools for managing change in water and
sanitation. Washington, D.C., World Bank.
Describes the design of
participatory monitoring and evaluation activities in the water supply and
sanitation sector. Draws on experience
gained during the past fifteen years in more than twenty countries. Examines the value of participatory
evaluation and how it differs from traditional evaluation. Provides a complete
framework of indicators for measuring progress in water supply and sanitation programs.
Sets out three key objectives of water supply and sanitation
programs--sustainability, effective use, and replicability--and for each
provides a basis for selecting
indicators and subindicators, targets, data required, what to monitor or
evaluate, and methods of data collection. Discusses indicators and methods for
assessing perceived change in the social, economic, health, and environmental
conditions of a community and stresses the importance of assessing whether
project resources and benefits are reaching women. (Econlit)
Ostrom,
E (1992). Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing Irrigation Systems.
San Francisco, ICS.
COMMUNITY IN CONSERVATION
THEORETICAL LAND TENURE/PROPERTY RIGHTS/COMMONS:
Agrawal,
A (1994). “I don't need it but you can't have it: politics on the commons.” Pastoral
Development Network 36a(July): 36-55.
Alcorn,
J (1994). Tenurial rights and community based conservation. in Natural
Connections: Perspectives in Community-based Conservation. D Western and RM
Wright, Ed. Washington DC, Island Press.
Anderson,
CL and E Swimmer (1997). “Some empirical evidence on property rights of first
peoples.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 33(1): 1-22.
Why did the Western Apache allow
individuals to own land, the Tzeltal only permit household ownership, and the
Yucatec Maya share access within the community? This paper seeks to test a
hypothesis of access rights across indigenous peoples, asserting that the
choice of private, shared, or open access rights maximizes the resource's net
value, rather than reflecting innate preferences for different property
systems. This empirical work contributes to the literature with observations on
over 40 early American groups. The cross-sectional study reveals how access
rights differed across communities in response to the property's physical
characteristics and community characteristics that affected the deadweight,
governance, and exclusion costs of establishing and maintaining different
access regimes. (Author)
Arnold,
JEM (1993). “Management of forest resources as common property.” Commonwealth
Forestry Review 72(3): 157-161.
Baland,
J and J Platteau (1998). “Wealth inequality and efficiency in the commons, part
II: the regulated case.” Oxford Economic Papers - New Series 50(1): 1-22.
Does more inequality lead to
more efficiency in the management of common property resources? To answer this
question, an attempt is made to develop relevant theoretical models and to
articulate them with empirical evidence drawn mainly from social science
studies. The paper is divided into two parts. In this, the second part, it is
shown that inequality tends to amplify the distributive effects of regulation
when the latter is carried out through the use of second best instruments. As a
result efficiency gains from regulation must decrease as inequality increases,
for all users to gain from such regulation. (Econlit)
Berkes,
F, Ed. (1989). Common Property Resources: Ecology and Community Based
Sustainable Development. London,
Bellhaven.
Berkes,
F, D Feeny, et al. (1990). “The benefits of the commons.” Nature
340(13): 91-93.
Blaikie,
P and H Brookfield (1987). The degradation of common property and society. in Land
Degradation and Society. P Blaikie, Ed. New York, Methuen Press.
Bromley,
D, Ed. (1992). Making the Commons Work: Theory, Practice and Policy. San
Francisco, Institute for Contemporary Studies.
Bromley,
DW and M Cernea (1989). The Management of Common Property Natural Resources:
Some Conceptual and Operational Fallacies. Washington, World Bank.
Chan,
AH (1988). “Adapting natural resources management to changing societal needs
through evolving property rights.” Review of Social Economy 46(1): 46.
Dahlman,
C (1980). The Open Field System and
Beyond: A Property Rights Analysis of an Economic Institution. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Fortmann,
L and J Bruce (1988). Whose Trees? Proprietary Dimensions of Forestry.
Boulder, Westview Press.
Gibbs,
CJN and DW Bromley (1989). Institutional arrangements for management of rural
resources: Common-property regimes. in Common Property Resources: Ecology
and Community Based Sustainable Development. F Berkes, Ed. London,
Bellhaven: 22-32.
Grima,
APL and F Berkes (1989). Natural resources: access, rights-to-use and
management. in Common Property Resources: Ecology and Community Based
Sustainable Development. F Berkes, Ed. London, Bellhaven: 33-54.
Juma, C
and JB Ojwang (1996). In Land We Trust: Environment, Private Property and
Constitutional Change. London, Zed Books.
McCay, BJ
and JM Acheson (1987). The Question of the Commons: The Culture and Ecology
of Communal Resources. Tucson, University of Arizona Press.
McKean,
M (1992). “Success on the commons: a comparative examination of institutions
for common property resource management.” Journal of Theoretical Politics
4(3): 247-282.
National
Research Council (1986). Proceedings of the Conference on Common Property
Resource Management. Conference on Common Property Resource Management.
Ostrom,
E and E Schlager (1995). The formation
of property rights. in Rights to Nature: Ecological, Economic, Cultural and
Political Principles of Institutions for the Environment. S Hanna, C Folke
and K Maler, Ed. Washington DC, Island Press.
Ostrom,
E (1992). “Community and the endogenous solution of commons problems.” Journal
of Theoretical Politics 4(3): 343-352.
Runge,
C (1986). “Common property and collective action in economic development.” World Development 14(5): 623-635.
Ruttan,
L (1998). “Closing the commons: Cooperation for gain or restraint?” Human
Ecology 26(1): 43-66.
Research concerning the value of
communal resource management is limited in two respects. First, while many
studies present evidence that communal management is common among traditional
societies, a strong theoretical basis is lacking to explain why individuals
participate in monitoring and sanctioning efforts. Second, few studies have
actually demonstrated resource conservation. There are several ecological and
economic reasons for thinking that groups may find it harder to design
appropriate conservation measures than to prevent free-riding. However, if
groups can surmount these problems, communal management may have advantages
over privatization or government control. These arguments are illustrated using
results from a pilot study of the communal management of mother-of-pearl shell
(Trochus niloticus) in the Kei Islands of Eastern Indonesia. It is found that
villagers successfully cooperate to defend access to and regulate their own
harvest of trochus. In doing so, they are able to prevent fi ee-riding, and to
provide themselves with a long-term source of cash income. However, it is here
argued that their aim is "gain rather than restraint." (Journal)
Schlager,
E, W Blomquist, et al. (1994). “Mobile flows, storage, and self-organized
institutions for governing common-pool resources.” Land Economics 70(3):
294- 317.
Common-pool resources (CPR) are
treated as if they were fully described by two characteristics-difficulty of
exclusion and subtractability of yield. We focus upon two additional
characteristics, mobile flows and storage in the resource. In examining CPR
settings involving fisheries, irrigation systems, and groundwater basins, we
find that users of these resources pursue different strategies and design
different institutional arrangements depending upon whether the resource is
characterized by mobile flows and/or storage. From this evidence, we develop a
typology of CPRs that is useful for understanding and anticipating resource
users' strategies in confronting and solving common-pool problems. (Source)
Schlager,
E and E Ostrom (1992). “Property rights regimes and natural resources: A
conceptual analysis.” Land Economics
68(3): 249-262.
The term "common-property
resource" is an example of a term repeatedly used to refer to property
owned by a government or by no one. It is also used for property owned by a
community of resource users. Such usage leads to confusion in scientific study
and policy analysis. In this paper we develop a conceptual schema for arraying
property-rights regimes that distinguishes among diverse bundles of rights
ranging from authorized user, to claimant, to proprietor, and to owner. We
apply this conceptual schema to analyze
findings
from a variety of empirical settings including the Maine lobster industry.
(SSCI)
Singleton,
S and M Taylor. (1992). “Common property, collective action and community.” Journal
of Theoretical Politics 4(3): 309-324.
Swepston,
L and R Plant (1985). “International standards and the protection of the land
rights of indigenous and tribal populations.” International Labour Review
124(1): 91.
The fundamental right of
indigenous and tribal populations to land and natural resources must be
safeguarded if they are to survive as distinct cultural groups, or simply
survive- at all. The article describes
the problems encountered by these
populations owing to continuing pressure on their lands, and discusses
the way in which international standards do and should attempt to protect their
rights. It analyses the existing ILO convention and Recommendation on the
subject, and suggests what changes might be made to meet the needs of these
people today. (SSCI)
Uphoff,
N and J Langholz (1998). “Incentives for avoiding the Tragedy of the Commons.” Environmental
Conservation 25(3): 251-261.
Efforts to protect vulnerable
environmental resources have focused largely on legal prohibitions and
sanctions or on economic rewards or penalties. The role and importance of
social and cultural factors have been much less considered. While theoretical
arguments have addressed whether state institutions must be involved in
resource protection, or whether private incentives can be manipulated to
achieve desired outcomes, this preoccupation with either public sector or
private sector solutions to the problems of environmental conservation has
caused a neglect of social values and community consensus. The analysis offered
here seeks to enlarge the debate from being two-sided to three-cornered.
(Journal)