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Philosophy Research Papers on Cognitive
Architecture
Eric Lormand, University of Michigan
My work on cognitive architecture is about the
hypothesis that human cognitive processes employ a language of thought (LOT)--a system of
mental representation which supports syntactically complex mental symbols, physically
realized in brains. Connectionism and holism are my focus
with regards to this issue.. Some philosophers have thought that inferential holism (and
related phenomena) present serious theoretical difficulties for "classical"
research programs in artificial intelligence and cognitive psychology—this is the
root of the philosophers’ "frame problem"--and propose
"connectionist" approaches instead.
List of cognitive architecture papers on this site
Name |
Description |
Date/Status |
| Classical and Connectionist Models |
Offers a
formulation of the LOT hypothesis which eliminates various obscurities in standard
formulations, and discusses some interesting conceptual issues
for philosophy of mind presented by connectionism—about what makes something a
representation or a computation, about what makes a representation language-like or
syntactic, about what makes a process an inference rather than an association, etc.
(73K) |
Chapter 0 of Classical and Connectionist Models of Cognition, MIT
Ph.D. dissertation, 1990 |
| Connectionist Languages of Thought |
Suggests directions for
empirical comparisons of classical LOT models (including many connectionist models) and
those connectionist models which do not implement a LOT. Argues that nonclassical
connectionist models are unlikely to succeed as general accounts of cognition, but that
they have promise as part of an account of the (alleged) inferential processes guiding
skillful activity, which are unconscious, rapid, and holistically sensitive to a vast
range of potentially relevant conditions. Argues that Fodor and
Pylyshyn's argument against radical connectionism fails, and provides a better argument.
(101K) |
in preparation, from Chapter 1 of Classical and Connectionist Models
of Cognition, MIT Ph.D. dissertation, 1990 |
| Connectionist Content |
Shows how
representations in nonclassical connectionist models, despite having no syntactic or
semantic structure, can realize genuinely propositional attitudes (and can therefore
undergo genuinely inferential processes). Develops a notion of a
"simple proposition" as the content of simple connectionist nodes. (103K) |
Chapter 2 of Classical and Connectionist Models of Cognition, MIT
Ph.D. dissertation, 1990 |
| The Holorobophobe's Dilemma |
Argues that classical
models can themselves be applied to holistically sensitive inference, in the face of
various objections which philosophers have advanced under the name of the "frame
problem". Shows how the frame problem can be disarmed
without serious revisions to LOT research programs, and in particular without appeal to
"connectionism" as an alternative. (76K) |
The Robot's Dilemma Revisited, Ford & Pylyshyn (eds), from Chapter 3
of Classical and Connectionist Models of Cognition, MIT Ph.D. dissertation, 1990 |
| Frame Problem |
Very brief and introductory overview of the problem and solutions.
(7K) |
MIT Encyclopedia
of Cognitive Science--Frame Problem entry |
Relations to meaning
papers
Some nuances in "Connectionist Content" have been
superceded by the papers on meaning holism and meaning atomism, though the basic idea remains.
Also, the main reason that contents are
holistically interconnected is that inferential dispositions are holistically
interconnected (and that inferential role is a component
of content). Another issue about cognitive architecture and inferential holism that
relates directly to content is the distinction (if any) between perception and cognition.
This is important for distinguishing among various "modules" or
"systems" relative to which something is a semantic "atom" (see section 4 of "Atomist").
Relations to consciousness
papers
The distinction (if any) between perception and cognition is also important for
distinguishing inner perception from inner-directed thought (see
section 6 of "Stopgap").
I hope you enjoy this stuff; please send comments to lormand@umich.edu.
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