Mark S. Mizruchi
Network Analysis of Corporate Political Action
Codebook

Note: The data set, in **miz57.dat**, contains 41 variables. Although many of the variables are integers, each appears here in f8.3 format. The data file includes 1,596 dyadic observations. These observations contain the upper right-triangle cells of a 57*57 firm by firm matrix. Each variable therefore could be thought of as cells of a matrix. Most of the variables are relational, but some are the attributional characteristics of firms i and j that went into computation of the relational variables. I did not include every single such attributional variable, but I can retrieve specific ones on request. I provide very brief descriptions of the variables here. For a full discussion, see Mark Mizruchi, *The Structure of Corporate Political Action* (Harvard University Press, 1992), especially Chapter 5. The book also contains an appendix with additional data. Virtually every analysis in the book, with the exception of those involving industry political success in Chapter 8, can be reproduced with the data from this file. The industry-level data are available on request. The list of firm ID numbers and names is in the file **id.dat**.

Collection of these data was funded by the National Science Foundation, grants SES-8619230, SES-8858669, and SES-9196148. For further information, contact Mark Mizruchi at mizruchi@umich.edu, (734) 764-7444, or http://www-personal.umich.edu/~mizruchi/.

Variables (names used in the book precede the description here, in caps):

1. Company i's ID

2. Company j's ID

3. Number of candidates to whom i made contributions

4. Number of candidates to whom j made contributions

5. number of candidates who received contributions from both i and j

6. SIMILARITY. The basic similarity of contribution pattern score, computed as variable 5, divided by the geometric mean of variables 3 and 4.

7. The Pearson product-moment correlation version of the similarity score, where N = 2,279, the number of candidates who received contributions from the 57 firms. See p. 145 of the book for the full formula, as applied to contributions to opposing candidates.

8. PROXIMITY. A dummy variable indicating whether firms i and j had their headquarters in the same state (0=no, 1=yes)

9. SAME PRIMARY INDUSTRY. A dummy variable indicating whether firms i and j operated in the same primary two-digit industry (0=no, 1=yes) [NOTE: These are

Fortune magazine's two-digit codes. I converted those that did not match the corresponding SIC codes to SIC codes in Table A.1 of the Appendix to the book (pp. 258-259). Here I use the Fortune codes.]

10. COMMON INDUSTRIES. The number of common two-digit industries in which i and j operated, divided by the geometric mean of the number of industries in which i and j operated individually.

11. MARKET CONSTRAINT. The factor score representing a linear combination of the three different measures of constraint used in previous studies (see pp. 104-108 of the book). It is used as an indicator of the extent to which firms i and j constrain each other.

12. COMMON STOCKHOLDERS. The natural logarithm of the number of stockholders that own at least 0.5 percent of the stock of firms i and j.

13. DIRECT INTERLOCKS. Number of individuals who sit simultaneously on the boards of directors of firms i and j.

14. INDIRECT INTERLOCKS. Number of leading banks and insurance companies that have interlocks with firms i and j. See pp. 108-109 of the book for explanation.

15. ASYMMETRY OF CONSTRAINT. Factor score representing a linear combination of the ratio of the larger to the smaller of the three measures of constraint, with .001 added to the smaller value. See pp. 107-108 of the book for explanation.

16. CAPITAL INTENSITY. Difference score of the logarithms (base e) of the ratios of firms i and j's assets to employees.

17. REGULATED INDUSTRIES. A dummy variable indicating whether both firms had their primary operations in heavily regulated industries. See pp. 111 of the book.

18. DEFENSE CONTRACTS. A dummy variable indicating whether both firms received defense contracts from the government.

19. BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE. A dummy variable indicating whether the CEOs of both firms were members of the Business Roundtable.

20. SIMILARITY OF IDEOLOGY. Natural logarithm of the difference in ideology scores between firms i and j. See pp. 133-135 of the book.

21. SIMILARITY OF PARTY. Natural logarithm of the difference in the proportion of contributions that firms i and j made to Democratic candidates.

22. OPPOSITION. Pearson correlation based on number of times firms i and j contributed to candidates who opposed one another in the general election.

23. TESTIMONY AGREEMENT. Indicator of the extent to which firms i and j took the same positions in Congressional hearings. A value of 1 means firms i and j agreed more

often than they opposed one another. A score of 0 indicates that they agreed and opposed each other an equal number of times. A score of -1 indicates that they opposed one another more often than they agreed. See pp. 166-169 of the book.

24. Fortune code for firm i's primary two-digit industry. See Table A.1 in the Appendix to the book for the firm's two-digit SIC code.

25. Fortune code for firm j's primary two-digit industry.

26. Number of different two-digit industries in which firm i operates.

27. Number of different two-digit industries in which firm j operates.

28. Number of two-digit industries in which firms i and j both operate. Variable 10 above can be derived from variables 26-28.

29. Number of candidates in the general election to whom firm i contributed.

30. Number of candidates in the general election to whom firm j contributed.

31. Number of candidates receiving contributions from firm i whose general election opponent received contributions from firm j. Variable 22 above can be derived from variables 29-31.

32. Fortune size rank of firm i.

33. Fortune size rank of firm j.

34. Four-firm concentration ratio of firm i's primary industry.

35. Four-firm concentration ratio of firm j's primary industry.

36. Firm i's mean ideology score.

37. Firm j's mean ideology score.

38. Proportion of candidates receiving contributions from firm i who were Democrats.

39. Proportion of candidates receiving contributions from firm j who were Democrats.

40. Dummy variable indicating whether firm i received defense contracts.

41. Dummy variable indicating whether firm j received defense contracts.