David Backer

I. State Formation

II. States, Markets, and Development

III. Political Regimes and Political Transitions

IV. Interest Groups and Collective Action

V. Legal Institutions

I. State Formation (next section)


  • Anderson, B. 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso.
  • Bartlett, R. 1993. The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization and Cultural Change. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  • Bates, R. 1983. "The Centralization of African Societies", in Essays on the Political Economy of Rural Africa, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 21-49.
  • Cohen, Y., B. Brown and A.F.K. Organski. "The Paradoxical Nature of State-Making: The Violent Creation of Order," American Political Science Review 75 (December 1981): 901-10.
  • Spruyt, H. 1994. The Sovereign State and Its Competitors. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  • Tilly, C. 1990. Coercion, Capital and the European States. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell (pp. 1-5, 14-95, 187-191).

 

II. States, Markets, and Development (next section)


Modernization Theory


  • Deutsch, K. 1971(1961). "Social Mobilization and Political Development", in J. Finkle and R. Gable (eds.), Political Development and Social Change (pp. 384-401).
  • Huntington, S. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

 

Dependency Theory


  • Baran, P. 1952. "On the Political Economy of Backwardness", Manchester School of Social and Economic Studies, vol. XX, no. 1 (January 1952): 66-84.
  • Gershenkron, A. 1961. Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (introduction, chapter 1, conclusion).
  • Gunder Frank, A. 1966. "The Development of Underdevelopment", Monthly Review, Sept. 1966: 17-31.

 

Neoclassical Approaches


  • Bhagwati, J. 1982. "Directly Unproductive, Profit-Seeking Activities," Journal of Political Economy 90, No. 5 (1982): 988-1002.
  • Krueger, A. 1980. "The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking Society," Ch. 4 in J. Buchanan, R. Tollison and G. Tullock (eds.), Towards a Theory of the Rent Seeking Society. College Station: Texas A&M Press (pp. 51-70).


State-Centered Approaches


  • Evans, P. 1995. Embedded Autonomy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Paperbacks.
  • Nordlinger, E. 1987. "Taking the State Seriously", in Understanding Political Development, Myron Weiner and Stanley Huntington (eds.), Prospect Hights, IL: Waveland Press.

 

New Institutionalism


  • Bates, R. 1981. Markets and States in Tropical Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press.
  • Levi, M. 1989. Of Rule and Revenue. Berkeley: University of California Press (introduction, chapter 1).
  • North, D. 1981. Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

 

III. Political Regimes and Political Transitions (next section)


  • Bates, R. 1994. "The Impulse to Reform in Africa," in Jennifer Widner (ed.), Economic Change and Political Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
  • Dahl, R. 1971. Polyarchy: Patricipation and Opposition. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
  • Di Palma, G. 1990. To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (introduction, chapter 1, and conclusion).
  • Huntington, S. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press (introduction and chapters 1-4).
  • O'Donnell, G and P. Schmitter. 1986. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press (pp. 3-72).
  • Olson, M. 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy and Development," American Political Science Review 87(3): 567-76.
  • Przeworski, A. 1992. Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: (introduction and 1-99).
  • Przeworski, A., M. Alvarez, J.A. Cheibub and F. Limongi. 1996. "What Makes Democracies Endure?" Journal of Democracy 7(1): 39-55.
  • Putnam, R. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

 

IV. Interest Groups and Collective Action (next section)



Interest Groups

  • Bates, R. and A. Krueger. 1993. Political and Economic Interactions in Economic Policy Reform. Oxford: Blackwell. (chapters 1 and 10)
  • Cameron, D. 1988. "Distributional Coalitions and other Sources of Economic Stagnation," International Organization 42 (Autumn 1988): 561-603.
  • Rogowski, R. 1989. Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
  • Hirschman, A. 1970. Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (chapters 1-4).


Collective Action

  • Olson, M. 1982. The Rise and Decline of Nations. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press (chapter 1).
  • Scott, James. 1985. Weapons of the Weak. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press (chapters 1,2,8).
  • Tarrow, S. 1994. Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (pp. 1-169).

V. Legal Institutions (back to top)


Courts

  • Jacob, H., E. Blankenburg, H. Kritzer, D. Provine, and J. Sanders. 1996. Courts, Law and Politics in Comparative Perspective. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press (chapters 1 and 7).
  • Shapiro, M. 1981. Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press (chapter 1).

 

Constitutional Engineering


  • Horowitz, D. 1991. A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press (pp. 163-282).
  • Lijphart, A. 1977. Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press (chapters 1-2).

 

Alternative Forms of Dispute Resolution


  • Bates, R. 1983. "The Preservation of Order in Stateless Societies", in Essays on the Political Economy of Rural Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (pp. 7-20).
  • Ellickson, R. 1991. Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (introduction, chapters 1-3, 8, 10-13, 15-16).

 

 

State Formation = 6

States, Markets, and Development = 12

Political Regimes and Political Transitions = 9

Interest Groups and Collective Action = 7

Legal Institutions = 6

Total = 40