Resurrection and Appropriation: Reputational Trajectories, Memory Work, and the Political Use of Historical Figures[1]

Robert S. Jansen
University of California—Los Angeles

The Zapatistas and Sandinistas both invoked historical figures in their rhetoric, but they did so in very different ways. This variation is explained by a model of path-dependent memory work that is sensitive to how previous memory struggles enable and constrain subsequent uses of historical figures. Specifically, previous struggles produce distinct reputational trajectories that condition the potential utility of different modes of memory work. The cases illustrate two reputational trajectories, which are situated within a broader field of mnemonic possibilities. This article offers a provisional baseline for comparing contested memory projects and supplies a framework for analyzing the opportunities and constraints by which reputational trajectories condition memory work. It builds on a recent processual emphasis in the collective memory literature and suggests that the contentious politics literature needs to historicize its conception of culture and take seriously the operation of constraints on symbolic work.

In late 1974, a Sandinista commando unit appeared in a wealthy Managua neighborhood to interrupt a private party honoring the U.S. ambassador. At that time they released a statement in which they praised Augusto

César Sandino's 1933 defeat of the U.S. Marines and hailed his popular rebellion as the foundation for their movement (FSLN 1979). Nineteen years later in southern Mexico, at the dawn of the Zapatista revolt, Sub-comandante Marcos charged that President Salinas had betrayed Emiliano Zapata's revolutionary agrarian vision by accepting NAFTA and went on to prophesize that Zapata—who "didn't die"—"must return" (Marcos 2001, pp. 31, 32, 35–36).

These movements were part of a broader wave of revolutionary activity that swept Latin America in the second half of the 20th century. Time and again, movement leaders invoked the heroes of rebellious pasts. Representations of figures ranging from Simón Bolívar to Agustín Farabundo Martí cropped up in a variety of public spaces—from graffiti to manifestoes—as the rhetorical tactic entered into the repertoires of insurgent groups (Tilly 1978, pp. 151–59; 1986).[2] Hobsbawm (1983, p. 13) observed that movements have often "backed their innovations by reference to a 'people's past,' . . . to traditions of revolution . . . and to [their] own heroes and martyrs." This is in part because of the legitimizing power that such references can provide. To succeed, contenders "must strip the incumbent government of moral authority and cloak their own movement with that aura, shifting the loyalties of the . . . population to their movement" (Wickham-Crowley 1989, p. 143). The use of historical figures is an important tactic that movement leaders have employed in trying to accomplish this task.

The Sandinista National Liberation Front of Nicaragua (FSLN, the *Sandinistas*) and the Zapatista National Liberation Army of Chiapas, Mexico (EZLN, the *Zapatistas*), invoked, even in the names they adopted, the earlier revolutionary figures of Sandino and Zapata. In many ways, the historical materials that the movements had to work with were remarkably similar. Sandino and Zapata were (roughly) contemporaries and were active for similar lengths of time, Sandino from 1926 until 1934 and Zapata from 1910 until 1919. Both were charismatic leaders of regional, peasant-based guerilla armies in times of civil war. Both enjoyed popular support in their day, but were also labeled bandits by some. Significantly, both were assassinated by political opponents at the pinnacles of their rebellious careers. At the same time, there are arguable similarities between the FSLN and the EZLN. Both were late-20th-century leftist movements, the Sandinistas active from the early 1960s until their 1979 success and the Zapatistas from their 1994 public emergence until today. Both invoked their figures in communications with movement constituencies,

[2] Such appearances of historical figures in politics have not escaped the notice of scholars of Latin America. See, e.g., Centeno (2002, chap. 4), Child (2005), de la Fuente (2001, pp. 25–26, 32–33, 252), Dunkerley (2000, pp. 69–74), and Martin (1993).

and in both cases the political agenda and revolutionary situation of the figure differed from the context into which it was deployed. Finally, both movements have been politically and culturally successful, relative to other Latin American movements.[3] Given these similarities, standard approaches to culture in contentious politics might expect the figures to have been used in similar ways to accomplish similar ends in the two cases.

Contrary to this expectation, however, the Sandinistas and Zapatistas used their figures quite differently: the Zapatistas used Zapata primarily to engage in symbolic struggle with the state, whereas the Sandinistas used Sandino to elaborate their revolutionary ideology. Zapatista comuniqués rarely discuss Zapata in detail. They almost never present more than a few biographical lines, and references invoking Zapata are typically either brief allusions to commonly known events or poetic tales that obscure the figure altogether. When the Zapatistas invoke Zapata, it is most often to challenge the state's legitimacy by discrediting its official claim to him while claiming his legacy for themselves. In contrast, the Sandinistas used Sandino, via extended treatments of his life and thought, as a vehicle for developing their revolutionary ideology and strategy. Some of their pamphlets collect Sandino's writings, while others provide detailed biographical accounts or justify the Sandinista program with Sandino's quoted speech. In fact, historical descriptions of the figure are often so closely intertwined with ideological proposals or typifications of the ideal revolutionary that it is difficult to separate them.

What accounts for this variation in how similar movements used such similar historical figures?[4] I argue that the cases differ in terms of the

[3] Probably the most important *difference* between the two movements is their situation in what Skocpol (1979) has called "world time": the Sandinistas were active before the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, the Zapatistas after. In an ideal world, it would be possible to control for this difference. But while this difference undoubtedly had an impact on the "revolutionary models" pursued by the two movements, it is not clear that it can account for the divergence in their use of historical figures specifically. As elaborated below, both movements still had chief ideologues, both attempted to accomplish similar rhetorical ends, and both drew on historical figures as a symbolic resource for accomplishing those ends. While the cases may not be comparable for all purposes, they are comparable for the purposes of this article.

[4] This article does not attempt to assess or explain the popular resonance of the symbolic figures as used by the recent movements. (On "resonance," see Schudson [1989a].) It would be presumptuous to assume that the representations of the figures were always received in the way the producers intended. Fox (2003), for example, has documented the unreceptiveness of Romanian students to nationalist state rhetoric and projects. Likewise, Stamatov (2002), in his study of Verdi's putatively nationalist operas, has argued that the political meaning of cultural objects is not in the object itself but a result of work done by "interpretive activists." Thus an account of reception would constitute an important and complementary project, but it would be a separate one, requiring the collection of different data and the application of different analytic methods. I argue that it remains important to explain variation in how movement leaders

reputational trajectories of the two figures, and thus in terms of the inherited conditions that movement leaders had to work with. To specify these dynamics of historical constraint, I develop a model of path-dependent memory work that is sensitive to the ways in which previous memory projects condition subsequent uses of historical figures. Ultimately, different inherited conditions—resulting from different histories of use in past memory projects—simultaneously enable and constrain options for memory work. The Mexican and Nicaraguan cases represent two different modes of memory work: the former is an instance of what I term *appropriation by capture*, while the latter is one of *resurrection*.[5] After examining these two modes of memory work in detail, I extend the path-dependent model to explore other modes of memory work, which are illustrated by example. In the end, this analysis highlights the operation of systematic opportunities for and constraints on how movements use culture—more specifically, historical symbolism—to achieve political ends.

THE SEDIMENT OF HISTORY IN SYMBOLIC STRUGGLE

Culture in Contentious Politics

Scholars of contentious politics have increasingly emphasized culture in recent years.[6] In part, this shift results from the empirical claim that movements since the mid-1960s have been increasingly organized around cultural agendas (Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar 1998).[7] At the same time, it is the result of a theoretical and methodological recognition that research on social movements and revolution would benefit from increased cultural sensitivity (Johnston and Klandermans 1995, p. vii). Most attempts to bring cultural analysis into the study of contentious politics have been interested in culture for what it can say about the interpretation of grievances (Moore 1978; Gamson 1992, esp. pp. 31–58; Snow et al. 1986) and

used historical figures, and it is to this question that the scope of this article is limited. Such a focus on the production of cultural objects (see Griswold 1987) need *not* imply the faulty assumptions that meaning is "in" the object or that the intentionality of producers is equivalent to audience reception.

[5] The Zapatistas appropriated Zapata from the state party, while the Sandinistas resurrected Sandino from relative obscurity.

[6] See, for example, Foran (1997), Goldstone (1991), Goodwin (1994), Hunt (1984), Jasper (1997), Johnston and Klandermans (1995), McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (1997), Sewell (1980), and Sewell (1985). For a review of recent work on politics and culture, see Berezin (1997).

[7] Pichardo (1997) is a useful review. For a historical critique of this "novelty" argument, see Calhoun (1993).

for its role as a resource to be used by political activists (Pfaff and Yang 2001; Swidler 1986).

The most sustained attention to culture in the social movements field has come from studies of frames and framing processes.[8] The framing perspective, first elaborated by Snow et al. (1986), was designed to bring together resource mobilization and social psychological perspectives by highlighting the ideational dynamics between social movement organizations and potential movement participants. In addition to its positive role in reinvigorating the study of culture in politics, this perspective rightly argues that the interpretation of grievances is key to movement participation and that this interpretation is an ongoing accomplishment (Snow et al. 1986).

While the framing approach is useful for answering certain sorts of questions about particular topics, however, it has limitations. First, it often overestimates the ideational options open to activists. "In [its] focus on calculation and persuasion," it fails to notice the extent to which activists are constrained by the discursive fields they are trying to manipulate (Steinberg 1999, pp. 742, 772). Second, much of the framing literature reifies its (metaphorical) frames as things-in-the-world to be taken hold of, rearranged, and used by the activist, and to be isolated, identified, and cataloged by the analyst. This misconstrued ontological status undercuts the oft-stated aim (Benford 1997; Benford and Snow 2000, p. 614; Snow et al. 1986) of viewing fram*ing* as a process.[9] It also contributes to an ahistorical perspective on frames, symbols, and their uses. Third, the perspective is limited by its lack of subtlety relative to other culturalist approaches.[10] As Berezin (1997, p. 375) has observed: "The problem with frame analysis is that while its boundedness appeals to those who started out as structuralists, it is overly rigid to those who have a more fine-grained sense of cultural and historical analysis." Lastly, many limitations of the framing perspective can be traced to the fact that it is designed first and foremost to explain patterns of mobilization (see, e.g., Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1988, 1992). While such an emphasis is often necessary, participation need not be seen as the *only* important dependent variable. A restrictive focus on mobilization can blind the analyst to other important dimensions of the phenomenon, an understanding of which

[8] For a review of this perspective's rise to prominence, see Benford and Snow (2000).

[9] Of course there are exceptions. Notable is Johnston (1995), who is particularly sensitive to the ontological status and "location" of frames when outlining his methodology of "micro-frame analysis." Benford (1997, pp. 414–20) similarly discusses how a descriptive "cataloging" bias in framing research often leads to reification and a distraction from framing processes.

[10] See for example Steinberg's (1998) argument for the superiority of a discursive approach.

may contribute to a more complete picture of a movement's culture, social dynamics, or interactions with allied or opposing groups.

As it currently stands, this literature does not provide the tools to explain why the Zapatistas and Sandinistas used their historical figures so differently. Over 20 years ago, Maines, Sugrue, and Katovich (1983) noted that social movement theories had failed to recognize how the past is a crucial symbolic resource for groups in political contestation. The same might be said of the field today. While studies of contentious politics have long recognized that how a contender acts at one moment "changes the conditions which are relevant to the next round of action" (Tilly 1978, p. 229), this dictum has rarely been applied to *cultural* conditions. The literature still suffers from an ahistorical perspective on culture that neglects the presence of the past in symbolic struggles. Conversely, the literature on memory and commemoration, with its attempts to integrate the relational *and historical* dimensions of meaning making, can help students of contentious politics to historicize their conceptions of culture.[11] This is essential, not only because the use of history can "generate political resources," but also because such use is constrained by different modes of remembering (Polletta 1998, p. 482).

Memory and Commemoration

The literature on memory and commemoration spans a range of topics, including memory in everyday life (Connerton 1989, chap. 1; Halbwachs 1992; Olick 1999*a*; Prager 1998; Zerubavel 2003*b*), the development of national memories (Bodnar 1992; Ducharme and Fine 1995; Schwartz 1982, 1991, 1996; Schwartz, Zerubavel, and Barnett 1986; Zerubavel 2003*a*), and the politics of memory (Polletta 1998; Sandage 1993; Schudson 1992; Scott 1996; Zolberg 1998).[12] These domains of inquiry are clearly interrelated, but to a certain extent they also represent preoccupations with different empirical questions. The first area is concerned with the relationship between collective and individual memory, the second with the origins, functions, and semiotic textures of national memory, and the third with the ways in which groups attempt to use memory to achieve

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[11] Olick (2003*a*, pp. 14–15) discusses recent innovations in memory studies as contributing to a "historicizing project" of making historical social science more genuinely historical.

[12] For useful reviews see Olick and Robbins (1998), Zelizer (1995), and Zerubavel (1996).

specified ends.[13] As the task at hand is to explain variation in how movements use historical figures in moments of conflict, I deal primarily with the last set of concerns.

Work on the politics of memory includes studies of monuments, memorials, and museums (Scott 1996; Vinitzky-Seroussi 2002; Young 1989; Zolberg 1998), ceremony and ritual (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983), remembered events (Schudson 1992), and the reputations of public figures (Connelly 1977; Fine 2001; Lang and Lang 1988; Polletta 1998; Verdery 1999). Such studies typically argue that history is a cultural object (Berezin 1997, p. 373) subject to the "memory work" (Schwartz 1996, p. 911; Zelizer 1995, p. 226) of specific "agents of memory" (Vinitzky-Seroussi 2002, p. 46). Because cultural objects are polyvocal (Hall 1982; Sewell 1999), and because memory work necessarily involves selection and exclusion (Ducharme and Fine 1995; Hobsbawm 1972; Lang and Lang 1988, p. 79), memory is a potential site of struggle (Olick and Robbins 1998, p. 79). Agents of memory often participate in "mnemonic battles" over how to interpret the past, who should be remembered, and the form that a historical narrative ought to take (Zerubavel 1996, pp. 295–97). This itself constrains agents of memory, as "people's ability to reconstruct the past . . . is limited by the crucial social fact that other people within their awareness are trying to do the same thing" (Schudson 1989*b*, p. 112).

For both functionalist and constructivist reasons, the collective memory literature has focused on the context in which commemoration is undertaken (Halbwachs 1992; Lang and Lang 1988; Lowenthal 1998; Mead 1929; Schwartz 1982; Zerubavel 1996; Zhang and Schwartz 2003). But what is important for those interested in the politics of memory is not only *that* the past depends in some way on the present, but that specific constructions of the past have a *use value* for certain actors in the present (Fine 2001, p. 76; Maines, Sugrue, and Katovich 1983; Zelizer 1995, pp. 226–30). Agents of memory recognize—along with scholars—that the ability to "key" the present to the past is a potentially valuable resource and that the past can provide a useful model for present and future activities (Maines, Sugrue, and Katovich 1983; Schwartz 1996, pp. 910–11). The ability to align "past, present, and future in some meaningful way" can be a useful tool for "defend[ing] different aims and agendas" (Zelizer 1995,

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[13] In many excellent studies, including some listed here, these concerns overlap and animate each other. I parse the literature in this (somewhat artificial) way, however, to point out that many putatively theoretical conflicts in the field of memory studies are false debates, in that they are not oriented to commonly defined objects of dispute. For example, to suggest that a political group uses the past instrumentally (as studies of the politics of memory often do) is not equivalent to making an instrumental*ist* argument that *the past in general* is nothing more than the constructed product of self-interested manipulation (although it is often taken as such).

pp. 226–27) and for legitimating the elites who advocate them (Jedlowski 2001, p. 34). This potential usefulness encourages the development of "memory projects" (Irwin-Zarecka 1994, chap. 8), and the term "politics of memory" ultimately describes the competition of multiple memory projects in a given field over the same cultural object.

Given that agents of memory develop such memory projects, the question of "malleability"—of the extent to which the past can be made over by instrumental "invention" or is rather constrained by actual history—has become central (Olick and Robbins 1998, pp. 128–30; Schwartz 1991). Hobsbawm and Ranger's (1983) classic edited volume on "invented" tradition is typically taken as the paradigmatic example of the instrumentalist position. The premise of the collection is captured in Hobsbawm's (1983, p. 1) introductory remark that "'Traditions' which appear or claim to be old are often quite recent in origin and sometimes invented."[14] The work chronicles the recent origins of seemingly old traditions and demonstrates their importance for legitimizing institutions and action, as well as for building social cohesion through a sense of nationness and common history (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983, pp. 9, 12, 15–16, 98–100, 263–65).

But consensus is solidifying against unqualified instrumentalist positions (Olick 2003b). Recently, a growing number of authors have emphasized the restrictions that the "actual past" places on present-day memory work (see, e.g., Centeno 2002, chap. 4; Schudson 1989b; Smith 1986). While typically recognizing the constructed nature of history, and so in part conceding to the "invention" premise, they argue that "Collective memory . . . cannot completely override history" (Prager 2001, p. 2225). Schudson (1989b, pp. 106–7) argues that the past is "highly resistant to efforts to make it over" and that the "available materials" set limits on constructions. Brubaker and Feischmidt (2002) likewise make a case for the resilience of history, in their study of sesquicentennial celebrations of the 1848 revolutions, by showing that the Slovak and Romanian attempts to use the past were less successful than the Hungarian because of a paucity of usable materials or lively commemorative traditions. In a slightly different vein, Wagner-Pacifici and Schwartz (1991) show how the content of commemorated events—in this case the Vietnam War's unpopularity and status as a military defeat—goes a long way toward explaining the mnemonic practices surrounding those events.

The poles of this debate have been greatly exaggerated, and it is generally accepted that both positions are at least partially correct—memory work is limited both by the context in which it is undertaken and by the available past. Both positions accede to general constructivist premises and, as Schwartz (1996, p. 909) points out, take the past as the dependent

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[14] Although note his use of the qualifiers "often" and "sometimes."

variable, as "a product of institutionally based pools of interests, resources, and experiences." The persistent questions concern the *degree* of malleability of the past (Schwartz 1996, p. 909) and variation in *how* (i.e., in what respects under what conditions) the past is malleable.

Recently, an increasing number of scholars have transcended the opposition between instrumental invention and the resilience of history by discussing memory and commemoration as processual (Olick 1999*b*; Olick and Levy 1997; Olick and Robbins 1998, p. 134; Zelizer 1995). Such a focus acknowledges both that attempts at invention are rampant and that these are somehow constrained by the past. Rather than seeing memory making as an unmediated dialectic of past and present (in which the past affects a present which interprets the past),[15] however, those who emphasize process see memory making as cumulative, "continually evolving across many points in time and space," and "conducted amidst the ruins of earlier recollection" (Zelizer 1995, pp. 218–20). Not only do the "actual materials" constrain commemoration, but earlier representations constrain those that follow (Olick 1999*b*; Schwartz 1991). A processual focus thus looks for constraint on invention *not* in the give and take between past and present but in the intermediate temporal space *connecting* past and present. This article is an attempt to build on such scholarship by supplying a framework for analyzing the constraints on and opportunities for memory work that arise as a result of previous memory projects.

A Model of Path-Dependent Memory Work

Political struggle over historical figures is mnemonic struggle. In order to explain variation in the use of such figures, then, it is important to capture the historical/processual dimensions of memory work discussed above. This can be done by viewing a historical figure's reputational trajectory as a path-dependent series of "presents"—each with its own memory dynamics—in which symbolic shifts at one moment (a "critical juncture," to use the language of path analysis) set the terrain for later moments of contestation. By comparing similar cases, it is possible to identify differences in reputational trajectories that might not otherwise be apparent and to control for a range of causal factors.

That memory making is an ongoing process does not mean that it is in a continual state of flux. While representational struggles take place constantly at the microinteractional level, what is striking at the macrolevel is the relative *stability* of symbolic meaning over time (Fine 2001, p. 87; Sewell 1999, pp. 55–58; Zhang and Schwartz 2003, pp. 102–3). That is, only rarely do representational struggles result in significant shifts in

[15] Cf. Jedlowski 2001, p. 30.

the dominant values assigned to symbols. This means that when asking more macrolevel questions about memory work, as this article does, it is useful to focus on the distinct moments of change—on the symbolic shifts or "turning points" (Abbott 1997)—that punctuate more stable periods of symbolic continuity. That reputational trajectories take on this narrative structure at a macrohistorical level renders a path-dependent model particularly appropriate.[16] According to this model, reputational trajectories are punctuated by critical junctures whose outcomes—which are not predetermined—have enduring consequences, solidify, become institutionalized, and create new sets of historically given conditions with which later actors must work (see Aminzade 1992; Collier and Collier 1991; Mahoney 2000, 2001; Sewell 1996).

Because memory work is path dependent in this way, "reputational entrepreneurs" (Fine 2001) are never working with a blank slate. Rather, they encounter constraints and opportunities inherited as the sediment of a past populated by its own memory projects. To specify these received constraints and opportunities for a given case, it is useful to identify certain attributes of the historical figure as it is contextually situated *before* the memory work of later reputational entrepreneurs. A symbolic figure received from a history of past mnemonic struggle can potentially vary along three axes: its salience in society, its valence, and its imputed ownership.[17]

Salience.—The salience of memory is a central concern of the memory literature (Spillman 2003). Memory of a historical figure can be more or less salient within a given social milieu; that is, there can be already-existing memory of the figure (positive or negative) or that figure can have been forgotten.[18] To take an example from American history, memories of both George Washington and Benedict Arnold are more salient than those of Chester Arthur (the twenty-first president of the United States). Memory studies tend to focus on memories that have achieved high levels of salience. But the absence of salience—having been forgotten (or never remembered in the first place)—can be equally important (Augé 2004; Esbenshade 1995; Renan [1882] 1996) and "is just as socially constructed as memory itself" (Irwin-Zarecka 1994, p. 116). This variable is important

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[16] A few scholars have begun to discuss memory work as path dependent in a similar, though not identical, sense (Olick 1999*b*, 2003*c*; Olick and Levy 1997).

[17] This is not to argue absolutely that these are the only axes along which inherited symbolic conditions might be broken down. The merit of this conceptualization should be judged by its usefulness for explaining empirical cases.

[18] Of course, salience is not an attribute of the figure itself, but rather describes that figure as it is perceived within certain sectors of society. I use the term to mean salient *for intended audiences*. The same caveat applies to the valence and ownership variables.

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because, as will be demonstrated, figures received from history with different levels of salience are useful for different sorts of memory projects.[19]

Valence.—The significance of different historical figures can vary in subtle and complex ways, but it is nonetheless the case that the reputations of some "have become solidified as almost entirely positive" (Fine 2001, p. 9). While the attributed meanings of figures like Washington and Lincoln, or for that matter Jesus and Confucius, have changed over time, they have been persistently positive for certain audiences (Pelikan 1985; Schwartz 1991, 2000; Zhang and Schwartz 2003). Conversely, other figures have become tarnished by "difficult reputations"—a process that is as much the result of active work as is the construction of positive reputations (Fine 2001). The negative reputations of Adolf Hitler, Benedict Arnold, and Warren Harding have all, for very different reasons, become firmly entrenched (Fine 2001). Of course, not all figures are remembered as intensely positive or negative—some fall into a middle category of neutrality or ambivalence.[20] A historical figure, then, can have a positive, negative, or neutral/ambivalent valence within a given milieu, and this valence—like varying levels of salience—makes figures useful to reputational entrepreneurs in different ways.

Ownership.—Specific symbols often become battle grounds for groups attempting to gain supremacy by naturalizing the association between that symbol and their systems of meaning (Hall 1982, pp. 74–76; see also Martin 1993; Stamatov 2002, p. 347; Wagner-Pacifici 1996, pp. 304–5). One common way in which this often plays out is in battles over the *ownership* of certain symbols. In the case of historical figures, at issue is which group can legitimately be said to descend from or represent the essence of a given figure. For example, Populists in the 1890s nurtured an association with Jefferson while Progressives later claimed Hamilton's legacy (Peterson 1960, pp. 257–60, 333–47). There are three possible received ownership arrangements: a figure might be associated with the protagonist, with the antagonist, or with neither. I use the terms "protagonist" and "antagonist" for lack of a better way to describe the competing parties—the "us" and "them"—within a political field.[21] Association with neither means that the figure is associated with a less relevant third

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[19] For the sake of analytical clarity, and because of data limitations, I am relying on a simplified understanding of salience. As discussed in the conclusion, "salience" might be disaggregated in a number of useful ways.

[20] For this article, I describe reputations as "ambivalent" when their valence varies among social groups. A different meaning of "ambivalence"—ambivalent for specific individuals—might be explored as well.

[21] I do not intend to imply a difference in character between the two, but only to indicate the positioning of each vis-à-vis the other.

party or not linked to any social actor at all. Ownership status, like a figure's salience and valence, conditions the usefulness of a given figure.

Different combinations of values on these three variables present reputational entrepreneurs with different sets of inherited symbolic conditions. A figure might, for example, be received from history as highly salient, positively valued, and owned by the state—as the Zapata figure was encountered by the Zapatistas. Reputational entrepreneurs can then attempt to alter the values of any or all of these variables through memory work. For example, while memory work is often aimed at *enhancing* the salience of a figure, it can also diminish it, as occurred in the Nicaraguan case discussed below. Further, a figure's valence might be the object of memory work, as illustrated by recent revisionist portrayals of Christopher Columbus (Fine 2001, pp. 8–9). Finally, ownership can be contested: in the U.S. Civil War, both the North and the South tried to claim Washington's legacy, and both supporters and opponents of the Vietnam War justified their positions in the name of Lincoln (Schwartz 1991, p. 224; 1996, p. 920).

In sum, a figure's reputation can be seen as varying along three dimensions (salience, valence, and ownership), and the term "reputational trajectory" describes the changing values of those dimensions over time. In most cases, reputations remain more or less stable. But at certain critical moments, the memory work of reputational entrepreneurs successfully alters the configuration of values on the three dimensions, thus shifting the reputational trajectory and the symbolic materials that will be inherited by later reputational entrepreneurs.[22] While contemporary contextual considerations indeed influence the representational choices of reputational entrepreneurs, their options are constrained by the chosen figure's reputational trajectory, which limits the scope of its potential utility. This is what is meant by the description of figures' reputational trajectories as path dependent. More specifically, it is a figure's potential political utility for a given actor at a given point in time that is path dependent in the sense described here.

Paying attention to path-dependent reputational trajectories encourages the analyst to identify critical symbolic shifts—themselves the result of active memory work—that create new conditions for later reputational entrepreneurs. A comparative research design imposes rigor on the analysis by narrowing the range of explanatory factors while highlighting reputational paths not taken. As I will demonstrate with the Mexican and Nicaraguan cases, the outcomes of earlier mnemonic struggles become a

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[22] It is important to note in this respect that a "reputational trajectory" should not be viewed as some sort of self-generating, autonomous cultural force, but rather as the result of (often continuous) active memory work.

part of the later symbolic terrain, providing reputational entrepreneurs with unique sets of inherited conditions that shape the usefulness of given figures in distinct settings.

METHODS

For the reasons discussed above, understanding the uses of Zapata and Sandino by the recent eponymous movements requires a long historical view. Accordingly, I define the cases under study as *Zapata's reputational trajectory* and *Sandino's reputational trajectory*. These cases begin during the figures' lifetimes and end in 2000 and 1979, respectively.[23]

My analysis focuses on three historical moments within the broader cases. First, I examine how the figures were represented during their own lifetimes. As discussed above, reputational entrepreneurs have little to work with without the original materials, and these materials (and their initial symbolic significance) place limitations on later memory work. Second, I analyze critical junctures in the reputational trajectories of the figures. These junctures are identified by scanning the period *after* the initial events, yet *before* the most recent memory work, to determine which (if any) memory projects or representational struggles shifted the salience, valence, or ownership of the figure decisively enough to shape the conditions falling to later representational entrepreneurs. My analysis of these first two historical moments relies on secondary sources. While I have already noted that this article does not address the popular resonance of the most recent representations of the figures, the historical literatures provide sufficient information to make inferences about the symbols' salience, valence, and attributed ownership going into the contemporary period.

Only after this historical analysis do I turn to the third moment: the recent uses of the figures. In this analysis, I describe how the Zapatistas and Sandinistas used their figures and demonstrate how these uses were both enabled and constrained by the inherited symbolic conditions. This discussion is based on a systematic review of primary documents. For Zapatista representations of Zapata, I analyze Zapatista communiqués released between the January 1994 public emergence of the movement and December 2000. During this period, 332 communiqués were released. Of these, 39 make at least some reference to Zapata and were analyzed

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[23] I limit my Mexican case to 2000 to avoid complications arising from the PRI's 2001 fall from power. And while the Sandinista government's use of Sandino after its 1979 revolutionary success is interesting in its own right, I limit my Nicaraguan case to the earlier period to avoid complications arising from postsuccess shifts in the use of Sandino's image (see Palmer 1988, p. 109; Sheesley 1991, pp. xxii–xxiii).

in full.[24] For Sandinista representations of Sandino, I analyze the writings of Carlos Fonseca Amador—one of three founding members of the FSLN.[25] Fonseca's complete writings were compiled by the Nicaraguan state, after the success of the revolution, in the two-volume set, *Obras*. Thirty-eight of the documents in this set were unmistakably intended for public consumption—primarily pamphlets and short manifestos. Of these, 29 make at least some reference to Sandino and were analyzed in full.[26]

THE REPUTATIONAL TRAJECTORIES OF ZAPATA AND SANDINO

Both Zapata and Sandino enjoyed ambivalent receptions during their lifetimes, but their reputational trajectories quickly diverged. Zapata was appropriated by the state party after his assassination, whereas a defamation campaign and subsequent censorship left Sandino largely forgotten for nearly a quarter of a century following his. This divergence created very distinct opportunities for and constraints on later Zapatista and Sandinista memory work and accounts for the different ways in which the movements' reputational entrepreneurs invoked their revolutionary forebears. (The data presented in this section are summarized in table 1.)

[24] These communiqués are archived at http://www.ezln.org/documentos/index.html. All translations from Sandinista and Zapatista documents are mine, except where otherwise noted.

[25] While other Sandinista writers also discussed Sandino, there is a consensus among scholars and Sandinistas alike that Fonseca's characterization of Sandino was overwhelmingly definitive for the movement (Borge 1984; Cabezas 1985; Camacho Navarro 1991; Hodges 1986; Nolan 1984; Palmer 1988; Wheelock 1984; Whisnant 1995; Zimmerman 2000).

[26] The Zapatista communiqués and Fonseca's writings are comparable bodies of material, at least for the purposes of the question posed by this article. Both were produced by movement leaders during periods of political activity and were intended for movement members, the national populace, and to garner international support. While the Zapatistas' use of the Internet has provided unprecedented access to international audiences, all communiqués were released to Mexican newspapers before being posted to the World Wide Web (Paulson 2001). Most focus on quite specific domestic issues and assume a domestic contextual knowledge. Those passages addressed to international audiences typically present demands, attack neoliberalism, and call for international solidarity, while invocations of Zapata appear to be addressed primarily to domestic audiences with prior knowledge of the figure. Finally, while Zapatista communiqués have been shorter and more numerous than Sandinista pamphlets, this is a result of political and technological opportunity. The Sandinistas had no access to conventional media because of political repression and so published longer statements when alternate avenues presented themselves. This difference has little bearing on *how* the movements used their figures.

TABLE 1
REPUTATIONAL TRAJECTORIES

	Zapata	Sandino
Historical moment 1:	Zapata seen as both hero and bandit while alive	Sandino seen as both hero and bandit while alive
Salience	High	High
Valence	Ambivalent	Ambivalent
Ownership	Antistate forces	Antistate forces
Historical moment 2:	State appropriates Zapata after his death	Somoza slanders Sandino after his death and censors further representation of him
Salience	High (state reinforces salience)	Low (state diminishes salience)
Valence	Positive (state valorizes figure)	Negative (state devalues figure)
Ownership	State (state claims figure)	Antistate forces (state reinforces ownership)
Historical moment 3:	Zapata used to attack state legitimacy and legitimate Zapatista movement	Sandino used as a vehicle for developing Sandinista ideology and strategy
Salience	High (Zapatistas reinforce salience)	High (Sandinistas increase salience)
Valence	Positive (Zapatistas reinforce valence)	Positive (Sandinistas valorize figure)
Ownership	Antistate forces (Zapatistas claim figure)	Antistate forces (Sandinistas reinforce ownership)

Historical Moment 1: Initial Representations of the Figures

In 1911, a movement led by Francisco Madero toppled the 30-year regime of Mexican dictator Porfirio Díaz.[27] Emiliano Zapata, a mestizo peasant and popular village chief, participated in the uprising assuming that large haciendas would be forced to return communal lands to villages.[28] When agrarian reform was not forthcoming, his peasant movement again rebelled and proposed their *Plan de Ayala*, a program for land redistribution and condemnation of Madero. After Madero's death in a 1913 coup, a new revolution developed—led in the south by Zapata, in the north by Venustiano Carranza and Francisco "Pancho" Villa, and in the west by Alvaro Obregón. Obregón took Mexico City in 1914. After a revolutionary convention failed to unite the various factions, Carranza and Obregón

[27] The following paragraph draws on Aguilar Camín and Meyer (1993), Cosío Villegas (1961), Hodges and Gandy (2002), Johnson (1968), McLynn (2000), O'Malley (1986), Riding (1985), and Womack (1968).

[28] Wealth in Morelos—Zapata's primary sphere of operations—was highly concentrated. By the end of the nineteenth century, its 37 haciendas and 24 mills were distributed among only 17 *criollo* families (Riding 1985, p. 42).

took control by force.[29] Carranza was elected president in February 1917, and a new constitution that significantly increased the power of the executive was adopted shortly thereafter. Zapata, still in revolt, was double-crossed and killed in April 1919 by a general secretly allied with Carranza.

Political opponents and local elites—worried by his attacks on private property and disdainful of his lower-class origins— vilified both Zapata and his army. In a 1912 congressional report, Madero called Zapata's "amorphous agrarian socialism" a "sinister vandalism" (Aguilar Camín and Meyer 1993, p. 25). A 1914 propaganda campaign against Zapata in Mexico City newspapers painted his men as "crazed, peyote-drugged, genocidal war criminals" (McLynn 2000, p. 222). In a 1915 manifesto, provisional president Eulalio Gutiérrez denounced Zapata as an unjust military dictator unfaithful to the revolution (Johnson 1968, pp. 275–76). Such portrayals reverberated in a Mexico City press brimming with exaggerated stories of "atrocities" committed by the "bloodthirsty hordes" inspired by Zapata's "false doctrines" (Johnson 1968, pp. 83–84, 262; Knight 1986, pp. 262, 317, 383; McLynn 2000, p. 109; O'Malley 1986, p. 42). Likewise, local landlords and merchants complained of Zapata's socialist pretensions and, afraid of a "caste war," made no distinction between the terms "Zapatista" and "bandit" (Knight 1986, pp. 9, 262, 352–53). Upon Zapata's assassination, Carrancista newspapers "rejoiced at the finish of 'the Famous Attila'" (Womack 1968, p. 327).

For others, however, Zapata was a respected leader and stalwart representative of the landless. He was a trusted member of his native village and was regionally renowned for his horsemanship and flamboyant style (McLynn 2000, pp. 47–49; O'Malley 1986, p. 42). Zapata's redistributive agenda captured the hearts of southern peasants, and as his fame grew, so did the legends around him (Hodges and Gandy 1983, p. 27; McLynn 2000, pp. 38, 91). As early as 1911, a Mexico City congressman remarked: "Emiliano Zapata is no longer a man, he is a symbol" (José María Lozano quoted in McLynn 2000, p. 115). According to Johnson (1968, p. 338), Zapata's 1919 assassination was the death of a messiah for southern peasants. Depending on the reference group, then, Zapata was both a hero and villain during his lifetime.

Initial representations of Nicaragua's Augusto César Sandino were similarly ambivalent.[30] Seven years after Zapata's death, in 1926, Sandino

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[29] For accounts of the revolutionary convention held at Aguascalientes in October of 1914, see Hodges and Gandy (2002, pp. 26–27), Johnson (1968, pp. 245–54), McLynn (2000, pp. 256–63), and Womack (1968, pp. 214–19). In recent years, the convention has been symbolically important to the EZLN.

[30] This paragraph draws on Baylen (1951, 1954), Hodges (1986), Schroeder (1993), and Selser (1981).

armed his first band to join a liberal revolt against the reigning conservative party. When the liberals and conservatives agreed to peace in 1927, under pressure of U.S. occupation, Sandino refused to capitulate. He instead reorganized his "crazy little army" into the Defending Army of Nicaragua's National Sovereignty and proceeded to wage a guerrilla war against the U.S. Marines.[31] When the Marines withdrew in January 1933 after securing their influence over the Nicaraguan National Guard, Sandino and the newly elected President Sacasa quickly reached a cease-fire agreement. This agreement, however, left the new National Guard commander—General Anastasio Somoza García—dissatisfied. Sandino was assassinated in February 1934, on Somoza's orders, following a meeting with Sacasa to negotiate further disarmament.[32] Somoza's election to the presidency in January 1937, after leading a *coup* against Sacasa, initiated a 42-year presidential dynasty that would include both of his sons.[33]

Sandino's opponents publicly decried both the morality and legality of his rebellion. Early on, liberal party leaders questioned his radicalism (Hodges 1986). When Sandino refused to accept the U.S.-brokered peace of 1927, the Marines branded him an outlaw, and the U.S. State Department tried to impede his recognition as a legitimate political belligerent (Baylen 1951, pp. 405–7; Camacho Navarro 1991, p. 33). Sandino's domestic opponents were then quick to adopt this mode of negative characterization (Baylen 1951, p. 405). The image of Sandino-as-bandit was shared in certain civilian sectors, often tinted by fear and racial prejudice, and newspapers echoed the elite view of Sandino's rebels as lower-class savages ravaging the countryside (Schroeder 1993, pp. 502–6).[34]

But Sandino also had a loyal following. He made a name for himself

[31] The moniker "crazy little army" was bestowed by the Chilean poet laureate Gabriela Mistral.

[32] Sandino's assassination was part of a three-pronged attack on Sandino and his supporters that also included the assassination of his brother and the destruction of his army and their families at their Wiwilí cooperative (Hodges 1992, p. 156; Selser 1981, pp. 177–78). For an account of the political violence that followed Sandino's assassination, see Schroeder (1993). It is worth noting that the historical record of Sandino's assassination and the immediate aftermath remains quite contested. This is interesting in itself, in that it highlights the unavailability of details about the events at the time they were unfolding.

[33] Somoza García held the presidency, with brief interruptions, from 1937 until his assassination in 1956. He was succeeded by his first son, Luis Somoza Debayle, who held power either directly or through puppets until 1967 when the second son, Anastasio Somoza Debayle, assumed the post. Anastasio Somoza Debayle's son was being primed to carry on the family dynasty when the Sandinistas triumphed in 1979.

[34] Throughout the rebellion, most major newspapers and party organs were stridently anti-Sandinista, as were all the leading families—liberal and conservative alike—in the region where Sandino was most active (Baylen 1954, p. 119; Schroeder 1993, pp. viii, 499, 502).

early on in the liberal rebellion as his column enjoyed multiple victories and surpassed others in size and renown (Hodges 1986, p. 11). Aware that his role as a charismatic guerrilla leader required the "projection of a mythicized persona," Sandino changed his middle name to César (after the Roman emperor), referred to himself as "the one called" to defend Nicaraguan ideals, cast himself as the "Great Liberator," and drew on the imagery of David and Goliath (Baylen 1951, pp. 402, 404, 410; Macaulay 1967, p. 49; Schroeder 1993, p. 18; Whisnant 1995, p. 349).[35] In interviews with his first biographer, Sandino represented himself as a nationalist with populist leanings (Hodges 1992, p. 1). He described himself in simple terms: as a "humble artisan," a "mechanic, with my hammer in my hand," and a "*campesino* fighting for the autonomy of our people" (Sandino quoted in Whisnant 1995, p. 350). This self-presentation resonated with Sandino's troops and civilian admirers, who revered him as a father and, at times, even a mystic prophet or redemptive Christ figure (Schroeder 1993, pp. vi, 16; Whisnant 1995, p. 350).[36] Indeed, the myth of Sandino took on national proportions during his lifetime (Baylen 1951, p. 410; Palmer 1988, p. 93; Schroeder 1993, p. 17; Weber 1981, p. 15). By the time of his death, Sandino had established himself as a well-known charismatic leader with a devoted following.

In sum, both Zapata and Sandino enjoyed widespread renown during their lifetimes, either as hero or bandit. That is, to use the terminology introduced above, both figures were *highly salient* and of *ambivalent valence*. How they would be remembered ultimately would depend on the outcomes of later representational struggles. That is, the potential legacy of each figure was initially an open question.

Historical Moment 2: Critical Junctures

With the institutionalization of the Mexican Revolution, Zapata was transformed from a perpetual enemy of the state into one of its principal symbols. After Zapata's death, his forces were no longer a serious military threat, and peasant pressure to enforce constitutional provisions for land redistribution abated (Johnson 1968, p. 333; Riding 1985, p. 182). Obregón succeeded Carranza in 1920, bringing centrist populism and political stability (Hodges and Gandy 2002, pp. 32–33). In a 1928 effort to overcome factionalism, Obregón's successor, Plutarco Elías Calles, founded what

[35] Hodges (1992, p. 6) notes that Sandino at times even transposed his first and middle names, signing his name César Augusto (Caesar Augustus).

[36] Many have recounted Sandino's father's lamentation that redeemers always die crucified (Baylen 1951, p. 403; Macaulay 1967, p. 255; Selser 1981, p. 177; Whisnant 1995, pp. 350, 496).

would eventually be known as the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and pronounced everyone within the government a member (Riding 1985, pp. 51–52).[37] This new state party was intended to be a "pragmatic coalition of interests"—making concessions to dissatisfied Zapatistas, Villistas, and Carrancistas—that would replace individuals with institutions (Aguilar Camín and Meyer 1993, pp. 256–57; Fuentes 1996, pp. 68–73). President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–40) assured the stability of this system by organizing peasants, workers, and the middle class into corporations within the party while implementing broad social reforms (Fuentes 1996, pp. 70–71; Yashar 1999, pp. 80–84).[38] This effectively demobilized the peasantry while turning the state party into a powerful instrument of the presidency (Bartra 1985, p. 65; Riding 1985, pp. 55, 181).

This new state-party system came to draw heavily on the memories and symbols of the revolution. As the rebellious fervor died down in Morelos, the Mexico City government began to see Zapata as a viable revolutionary symbol and shifted its official characterization of him in a positive direction (Martin 1993, pp. 450–52; O'Malley 1986, pp. 44–45). At the second anniversary of Zapata's assassination, the government sponsored a memorial in Morelos (O'Malley 1986, p. xii). Calles began his 1924 presidential campaign with a pilgrimage to Zapata's tomb, where he swore to carry on the man's program (Hodges and Gandy 1983, p. 51). In 1930, Zapata was honored in a state-sponsored Mexico City memorial for the first time, and in 1931 Zapata's name was inscribed in gold letters on the wall of the congressional chamber of deputies alongside those of Madero, Carranza, and Villa (Riding 1985, p. 15). The government developed an annual tradition in which the Agrarian Reform Minister would lay a wreath at Zapata's statue in Cuautla—ritualistically reinforcing its pledge to bring justice to the peasantry (Riding 1985, p. 180). To commemorate Zapata's 100th birthday, the government tried (but met

[37] Calles's National Revolutionary Party became the Party of the Mexican Revolution in 1938, and finally the PRI in 1946. The party held power in Mexico from 1929 until the election of National Action Party (PAN) candidate Vicente Fox in December 2001.

[38] Cárdenas instituted the most sweeping application of Article 27 of the new constitution that the country has seen to date. Article 27 declares that the interests of the state or nation supersede those of individuals or groups, providing a formal legal basis for agrarian reform (Cosío Villegas 1961, p. 28; Hodges and Gandy 2002, pp. 35–36). Under Cárdenas, around 46 million acres of land were distributed as communal *ejidos*, benefiting some 750,000 families (Aguilar Camín and Meyer 1993, p. 143; Riding 1985, p. 54). Cárdenas also implemented measures to arm the peasantry, in an effort to protect against the attacks of large landholders, and nationalized foreign railroad and oil companies (Aguilar Camín and Meyer 1993, p. 142; Riding 1985, p. 54). President Salinas's 1992 amendment of Article 27—which cleared the way for NAFTA by officially ending agrarian reform and allowing the privatization of campesino land—was an important factor leading to the 1994 Zapatista rebellion (Johnston 2000, p. 473; Stephen 1997b, pp. 15, 21–22).

with opposition and failed) to transfer his remains from Cuautla to Mexico City to lie beside Carranza at the Monument of the Revolution (Harvey 1998, pp. 131–32).

In this way, Zapata became a symbol of the increasingly solid Mexican state. A "hero cult" emerged as the figure was incorporated into the hagiography of the regime (O'Malley 1986, p. 7). This helped state leaders to develop a stable ideology and language, and ultimately to establish official versions of the revolution and claim to be its legitimate continuation (Aguilar Camín and Meyer 1993, pp. 159–61; Cosío Villegas 1961, p. 24; Martin 1993, pp. 442, 450; O'Malley 1986, pp. 3–4; Riding 1985, pp. 69–70; Stephen 1997*a*, p. 42). At the same time, the institutionalization of Zapata precluded future Zapata-style innovation—it guaranteed the rightness of the present while delegitimating political change (Aguilar Camín and Meyer 1993, pp. 159–60; Martin 1993, pp. 443, 449; O'Malley 1986, p. 7; Riding 1985, p. 57).

In Nicaragua, Somoza employed a very different strategy for dealing with his enemy's legacy. Rather than appropriating Sandino, Somoza defamed him while censoring further representation. The result was that Sandino's myth would be short lived and his image would be obscured for the quarter century following his death.

President Sacasa's quick political management upon Sandino's assassination—he declared a state of siege, censored telegraphic communications, and suspended newspaper publication—averted the immediate threats of either a popular uprising or National Guard coup (Baylen 1954, pp. 129–32).[39] These efforts, along with Somoza's public presentations of "evidence" against Sandino, rendered politically feasible a full amnesty for Sandino's murderers by August 1934 (Baylen 1954). Somoza would take advantage of this window of calm to solidify his own authority.

Although he ridiculed Sandino's revolutionary ideas, Somoza recognized them as a political threat (Hodges 1992, p. 156). For Somoza, it was crucial that Sandino not be remembered as a hero; he had to be either forgotten entirely or remembered only as a criminal (Whisnant 1995, p. 355). When two notable figures published books sympathetic to Sandino and critical of his National Guard, Somoza responded with his own bi-

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[39] Selser (1981, p. 174) attributes the continued dearth of press coverage *after* censorship was lifted to news agencies' interest in avoiding the implication of U.S. complicity. Alternatively, sparse coverage may have resulted from the anti-Sandinista attitudes of major newspapers noted by Schroeder (1993), or from discretion exercised by editors for the sake of political stability (Baylen 1954, p. 132).

ography of Sandino, *El verdadero Sandino o el calvario de las Segovias*
(Camacho Navarro 1991, pp. 46–49).[40]

In his preface, Somoza is unequivocal: "The writers that have elevated
Sandino as one of the most radiant figures of the American Continent
have done so on the wings of fantasy and in a deliberate attempt to forge
a hero as a symbol . . . [but] they could not forge it with the legend,
because in the light of truth he fell from his pedestal" (Somoza García
[1936] 1976, p. 4).[41] Somoza's biography of Sandino was a deliberate
attempt to "read him out of the culture" (Whisnant 1995, p. 357). Ac-
cording to Selser (1981, p. 182), it was designed to justify the crimes
committed against him and to prevent his martyrdom. The layout of the
biography, utilizing graphically violent pictures and Photostats of San-
dino's wartime correspondence, is designed to be emotionally provocative
and unquestionably authoritative.[42] Somoza represents Sandino and his
men as deviants from the dominant Nicaraguan values of traditional
Catholicism and liberal progressivism. He depicts Sandino as demented,
despotic, ignorant, communistic, and violent (Camacho Navarro 1991, p.
51; Whisnant 1995, p. 357). He describes Sandino's army as a "ferocious
band" intent on destruction and pillaging and his followers as crazed
killers, rapists, and thieves, as illiterate, drunken, soulless, and uncultured
(Schroeder 1993, p. 501; Whisnant 1995, p. 357). Sandinismo is represented
as brigandage, false patriotism, fanatical bolshevism, and lower-class so-
cial pathology (Schroeder 1993, p. 499).[43] Because of Somoza's strict cen-
sorship regime, *El verdadero Sandino* was for years the only book avail-
able on Sandino in Nicaragua (Zimmerman 2000, p. 59).

Somoza's project was successful. He won public support and guar-
anteed little popular opposition during his rise to power (Camacho Na-
varro 1991, pp. 58–59). Sandino's movement disappeared from the po-

[40] Sofonías Salvatierra (1934), minister of agriculture and work under Sacasa, wrote
Sandino: o la tragedia de un pueblo. National Guard Lieutenant Abelardo Cuadra
Vega ([1934] 1976) wrote *Hombre del Caribe*. The title of Somoza's (1936) biography
translates to *The True Sandino or the Calvary of the Segovias*. Selser (1981) attributes
its actual writing to Somoza's chief of staff and former counterfeiting comrade Camilo
González. The biography has been "overwhelmingly rejected as a caricature and fal-
sification of the historical Sandino" (Hodges 1992, p. 2).

[41] This accusation is doubly biting, as one of Sandino's more famous political manifestos
was entitled "Light and Truth" (reprinted in English in Conrad 1990, pp. 361–62), and
these themes, reflecting his theosophical beliefs, were common throughout Sandino's
writings. (For analysis of these theosophical beliefs, see Hodges [1986, 1992].)

[42] On the construction of authority in *El verdadero Sandino*, see Schroeder (1993, pp.
497–501).

[43] Ducharme and Fine (1995, p. 1311) call this sort of memory work *demonization*,
which is "a process in which ambiguities of moral character are erased, so that the
commemorated figure is seen as fully, intensely, and quintessentially evil."

litical scene, and he was remembered as little more than a bandit (Hodges 1986, p. 161; Palmer 1988, p. 94). While opposition groups did occasionally invoke the memory of Sandino-as-patriot, such provocative uses of Sandino's image were uncommon because of government censorship (Camacho Navarro 1991, pp. 60, 76; Palmer 1988, p. 93).[44] Somoza's success at neutralizing Sandino's image lay in his ability first to consolidate the negative discourses around the figure into one authoritative version and then to paint competing accounts as inauthentic, seditious, and consequently illegal. Over time, memory of Sandino—as patriot *or* bandit— dissipated. For a quarter of a century, the myth of Sandino was for all intents and purposes lost.

Comparing state responses to Zapata and Sandino at these critical junctures draws out a crucial difference between the cases: the enemies of the figures used very different strategies of memory work to defuse popular unrest upon their deaths. In Mexico, the state gradually appropriated Zapata in a series of stages paralleling the institutionalization of the revolution. That is, it reinforced Zapata's salience, clarified his valence as unambiguously positive, and claimed ownership of him. In Nicaragua, Somoza defamed Sandino with authoritative "evidence" while forbidding further representation of him. That is, he devalued Sandino while diminishing his salience, but left his ownership uncontested. Both methods were successful. Zapata was transformed from a perpetual enemy of the state into one of its principal symbols, and Sandino's symbolic power was effectively defused for a generation.

Historical Moment 3: Recent Uses of the Figures

The divergence in how the Mexican state and Somoza chose to deal with the postmortem threats posed by Zapata and Sandino meant that later reputational entrepreneurs would confront very different inherited conditions when attempting to use the figures. The result was that the Zapatistas found Zapata useful primarily for engaging in symbolic struggle with the state while the Sandinistas found Sandino useful primarily for elaborating their revolutionary ideology and strategy.

The EZLN is the latest in a line of movements to challenge the PRI's pretensions to an exclusive claim on Mexico's revolutionary heritage (Bartra 1985; Aguilar Camín and Meyer 1993; Cosío Villegas 1961; Hodges

[44] In 1946 Somoza was forced to respond to one such effort by instituting a Society for the Investigation of the True History of Sandinism, with the stated intention of neutralizing the fanciful figure of Sandino (Camacho Navarro 1991, pp. 67–70). For a detailed account of the sporadic uses of Sandino by opposition groups between 1934 and 1959, and of Somoza's responses, see Camacho Navarro (1991, pp. 59–77).

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and Gandy 2002, pp. 108–19; Johnson 1968, p. 384; Schulz 1998, p. 594; Stephen 1997*b*). Although its organizational origins in already-politicized peasant groups are uncertain, it is clear that the EZLN was founded in 1983, that it quickly removed to the Lacandón jungle of southeastern Mexico, and that its membership and bases of support were composed primarily of Chiapan indigenous peasants (Collier 1994, pp. 53, 81–82; Harvey 1998; Higgins 2000, pp. 360–61).[45] The EZLN had been an open secret for several years when it rebelled on January 1, 1994 (Collier 1994, pp. 53–54; Schulz 1998, p. 593). Calling for a new constitution, the Zapatistas seized Chiapan towns, attacked an army base and nearby penitentiary, kidnapped a former governor, and addressed the populace in a series of communiqués (Collier 1994, pp. 1–2).[46] In other communiqués that followed, the EZLN regularly drew on the dominant culture of the Mexican Revolution, including the image of Zapata. In response, the Mexican government has worked to reclaim Zapata and restore him to the "pantheon of state heroes" (Long 1999, pp. 102–4) while repeatedly charging the Zapatistas with misrepresenting the nation's revolutionary past.

Because state leaders had successfully appropriated Zapata through an ongoing series of memory projects, the Zapatistas encountered in Zapata a figure that was already highly salient and positively valued. While this alone might have made things easier for the Zapatistas, it also meant that the figure was embedded in the broader web of state symbolism and naturalized meanings. This would make the Zapatista project to claim Zapata extremely difficult, but it would also provide unique opportunities.

The Zapatistas attempted to claim ownership of Zapata by identifying a common tradition of struggle.[47] Demonstrating what is often a cyclical conception of time, one document declares that "the Zapatistas of 1994 and those of 1910 are the same."[48] Another states that the Zapatistas "are the stubborn history that repeats itself so that it won't repeat itself again,

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[45] There is general agreement that the EZLN was founded by a detachment of urban leftists (members of the FLN, a clandestine organization that launched guerillas in Mexico's southern jungles in the 1970s [Harvey 1998; Hodges and Gandy 2002; Stephen 1997*b*]). Collier (1994) and Harvey (1998) both offer helpful analyses of the milieu of competing peasant groups active in Chiapas prior to the EZLN's founding.

[46] The Zapatistas are perhaps most well known for their creative use of communication technologies—such as fax, video, and the Internet—to present materials to the conventional press and directly to supporters (Parra 1995, pp. 69–70; Schulz 1998, p. 603). As Johnston (2000) points out, however, it is important not to lose sight of either the Zapatistas' use of violent force or of the economic issues that are at the heart of Zapatista demands. The Zapatistas use innovative technology and political symbolism to accomplish actual political, economic, and social ends.

[47] EZLN 1994*a*, 1995*a*, 1996*d*, 1998*b*.

[48] EZLN 1995*b*.

the gaze behind that enables us to walk ahead."[49] A common theme is that Zapata never died or has been born again and that the EZLN is heir to his heritage.[50] Zapata is represented as the historic commander of the present-day Zapatistas, and they as his children.[51] Slightly differently, as one document states: "We, the insurgents, have been given an inheritance by yesterday's transgressors of the law, delinquents of the past, those persecuted before, by . . . Emiliano Zapata."[52] This sentiment is echoed in declarations that "Emiliano Zapata died, but not his fight nor his thought" and that "Zapata is alive, and in spite of everything, the struggle continues."[53] The EZLN thus claims to carry the mantle of Zapata by virtue of its renewed struggle, and such a claim can go a long way toward certifying the revolutionary credentials of a movement.

But while the Zapatistas did claim an association with Zapata in this way, they did not use the biography of the figure as a vehicle for the development of movement ideology and strategy. Undoubtedly, they used Zapata to frame *some* of their issues, but they did so only rarely and in a vague way. The communiqués refer to Zapata's vision "that the land was for everyone" and insist "that Article 27 . . . be retaken in the spirit of Emiliano Zapata."[54] But most invocations are even less detailed than this, extolling only vague virtues and goals. The Zapatistas take up Zapata's rallying cry of "Land and Liberty!"[55] The documents refer to Zapata in representations of the movement as peasant based and "for the poor," and while calling for freedom, rights, "sovereignty of the people," truth, "freedom of life and thought," inclusiveness, dignity, shelter, land, work, bread, health, education, independence, and "a just peace."[56] As the Zapatista rhetoric became increasingly framed in terms of indigenous rights (Wimmer 2002, p. 114), brief references identifying Zapata with such issues became more common: "[Zapata's] banner of Land and Liberty is raised today by the workers of the field, by the landless peasants, by the impoverished of the ejidos, by the small and medium landholders, and by those who are the last in riches and in life, the first in misery and in death: the Mexican indigenous."[57] References to ideas like "democracy"

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[49] EZLN 1996*d*. Also, EZLN 1994*f*, 1998*b*.

[50] EZLN 1994*c*, 1994*d*, 1995*a*, 1995*c*, 1996*a*, 1996*d*, 1996*e*, 1997*b*, 1998*a*, 1999*a*, 1999*b*, 1999*c*, 2000*b*.

[51] EZLN 1996*c*, 1996*e*, 1997*b*, 1997*d*, 1998*a*, 2000*b*.

[52] EZLN 1995*c*.

[53] EZLN 1995*a*, 1996*a*, 1997*b*.

[54] EZLN 1994*c*, 1996*b*, 1996*e*, 1999*c*, 2000*a*.

[55] EZLN 1994*b*. Also, EZLN 1994*c*, 1994*d*, 1995*a*, 1996*b*, 1996*e*, 1997*b*, 1999*c*.

[56] EZLN 1994*a*, 1994*e*, 1995*a*, 1996*d*, 1996*e*, 1997*b*, 1998*b*, 1999*c*.

[57] EZLN 1996*e*. Also, EZLN 1995*a*, 1997*b*, 1998*a*, 1998*b*, 1999*b*, 1999*c*, 1999*d*, 2000*b*.

are sometimes made in conjunction with an indirect allusion to Zapata: "His name summons a fight for justice, the cause of democracy, the thought of liberty."[58] But all of this remains extremely abstract. Because official characterizations of Zapata were so well entrenched prior to the EZLN's emergence, it would have been a monumental task to rework them as a vehicle for ideological development, and so the Zapatistas did not pursue this line of symbolic work.

For this same reason, however, the figure of Zapata was a strategic site for critiquing the legitimacy of the Mexican state. Very common in the Zapatista communiqués are attempts to dislodge the symbol from the state's grasp. First, official narratives of Zapata's life and death are questioned by asserting that the standard history is not the "real story."[59] One communiqué, for example, prefaces a discussion of Zapata with a rejection of the standard emphasis on his heroic exploits (Marcos narrating):

> I begin to talk about the times of Zapata and Villa and the revolution and the land and the injustice and hunger and ignorance and sickness and repression and everything. And I finish by saying "so we are the Zapatista Army of National Liberation." I wait for some sign from Old Man Antonio who never took his eyes from my face. "Tell me more about that Zapata" he says after smoke and a cough. I start with Anenecuilco, then with the Plan de Ayala, the military campaign, the organization of the villages, the betrayal at Chinameca. Old Man Antonio continued to stare at me until I finished. "It wasn't like that" he says. I'm surprised and all I can do is babble. "I'm going to tell you the real story of Zapata."[60]

In other instances, the documents more overtly question the government's honesty in representing Zapata.[61] One explains how "the evil government proposes to erase [the true] history."[62] Some discussions are more veiled. For example, Zapata is often described in the communiqués as the bearer of "the word" of truth. The following statement plays on this motif: "Many words walk in the world. Many worlds are made. Many worlds are made for us. There are words and worlds which are lies and injustices. There are words and worlds which are truths and truthful."[63] The implicit argument of the full communiqué is that the *world* constructed by the Mexican government is untruthful and consequently incapable of carrying the true *word* of "Zapata." Rather than listen to the official narrative, the

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[58] EZLN 1995*a*. Also, EZLN 1994*c*, 1994*e*, 1997*b*, 1998*b*, 1999*c*.

[59] EZLN 1994*f*, 1995*a*, 2000*b*.

[60] EZLN 1994*f*, English translation available online.

[61] EZLN 1994*c*, 1997*a*.

[62] EZLN 1996*a*.

[63] EZLN 1996*a*, English translation available online.

reader is encouraged, in another communiqué, to disregard the lying, criminal government and to listen rather to the voice of children, women, the elderly, and the poor—that is, to the legitimate representatives of revolutionary ideas.[64]

These critiques of the government's historical honesty tie directly into attacks on the legitimacy of a state and party that claims a revolutionary lineage. One communiqué boldly declares that "the federal government has usurped the legitimacy—left to us by its heroes—of the Mexican Revolution."[65] In another example, the Mexican government is depicted as maintaining the *foreign* legacy of neoliberalism rather than Zapata's *domestic* revolutionary legacy.[66] Connections are often drawn between Zapata's assassination and the indulgences of current state officials. The documents remind readers that Zapata died by "treachery," "falsehood," and "deception," and at Carranza's orders.[67] They then argue for a stark continuity between Carranza and the current state elites by virtue of the "long dictatorship" of the PRI.[68] Finally, current elites are painted as the rich and self-indulgent carriers of Carranza's treason, as evidenced by their "betrayal" of Article 27 of the 1917 constitution: "After 80 years of fighting, the same accounts are still pending and the same betrayals keep coming. . . . Those who killed [Zapata] today debase themselves with riches and blood in huge government palaces selling our riches and land, and so destroy the great Mexican nation. . . . 80 years later, the same who betrayed and killed Zapata are in power."[69] Such attacks often conclude with a flourish, with defiant declarations like: "Here [in Chiapas] Zapata still lives. Try to assassinate him again."[70]

The most common, explicit, and analytically interesting references to Zapata in the Zapatista communiqués are statements like these that dispute the state's claim to the figure. Such dissociative moves serve a dual purpose: they simultaneously make the symbol available for Zapatista use and help to build a critique of the "revolutionary" state. Although unlikely to achieve anything like a total redirection of the revolutionary legacy, each antagonistic reference is a quick jab at the state's legitimacy. Such uses were only possible because of the state's initial appropriation of the figure.

Although there are many similarities between the original Zapata and

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[64] EZLN 1996*c*.

[65] EZLN 1994*e*.

[66] EZLN 1996*a*.

[67] EZLN 1994*b*, 1995*a*, 1999*c*, 2000*b*.

[68] EZLN 1994*c*, 1994*d*, 1996*d*, 1996*e*, 1997*b*, 1997*c*, 1999*c*.

[69] EZLN 1999*c*. Also, EZLN 1997*a*, 1997*b*.

[70] EZLN 1994*b*. Also, EZLN 1994*c*.

Sandino, divergent reputational trajectories meant that the Sandinistas would encounter very different inherited conditions. Thanks to Somoza's defamation campaign 25 years prior, most Central American leftist groups—including the Nicaraguan Socialist Party—dismissed Sandino by the late 1950s (Borge 1984, p. 20; Nolan 1984, p. 17; Palmer 1988, p. 95). A small group of militant Marxist students, however, saw in the figure a potentially "resonant myth" and "symbol of the national popular collective will" that could galvanize the revolutionary opposition (Guevara 1997, p. 344; Palmer 1988). Carlos Fonseca first learned of Sandino through Somoza's own *El verdadero Sandino*, and his interest was reinforced upon visiting Cuba in 1959, where he discovered that the figure was respected by that revolution's leaders (Zimmerman 2000, pp. 59, 61).[71] Somoza's picture of Sandino-as-communist was of particular interest to the Nicaraguan students, and they began a clandestine study of internationally published texts on the figure (Hodges 1986, pp. 163–64). They pieced together a revolutionary history until it could be said that Sandino "was resurrected . . . as political mentor and cultural hero" (Whisnant 1995, p. 346). The *Frente* was founded in 1961, and the adjective *Sandinista* was added to its name in 1963, at Fonseca's insistence (Hodges 1986, p. 165). In 1961, an early, mimeographed version of Fonseca's carefully edited compilation of Sandino's writings, *Ideario político del general Augusto César Sandino*, began to circulate among FSLN militants.[72] It was the first of many documents in which Fonseca would present a systematic conception of Sandino.[73]

Somoza never claimed ownership of Sandino, but instead tried to defuse his memory. For this reason, the Sandinistas did not enjoy the same opportunity for dialogical legitimacy struggles that the Zapatistas did. In fact, only very rarely did they invoke Sandino when attacking the Somoza regime.

Another difference between the cases is that Sandino did not enjoy a state-made positive reputation, but rather—to the extent that he was remembered at all—suffered the lingering effects of Somoza's slanderous

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[71] The Cuban Revolution had a profound impact on the students (Hodges 1986). When Sandino appeared in the rhetoric of that revolution, it completed for the students a feedback loop of Nicaraguan revolutionary ideas. They saw in Cuba "a modern, perfected form of Sandinism which had drawn from Marxism a clear vision of its goals and methods" (Weber 1981, p. 20). Borge (1984, p. 28) remembers: "For us, Fidel was the resurrection of Sandino, the answer to our doubts, the justification for our heretical dreams."

[72] *The Political Thought of General Augusto César Sandino* (Fonseca 1982*l*).

[73] Hodges (1992) has shown that the Sandinistas were selective in their portrait of Sandino. He argues that the Sandinistas purveyed "a sanitized image of their hero's ideology" to present the figure in a positive light (Hodges 1992, p. 186).

portrayal. For this reason, Fonseca devoted some energy to revaluing the figure. The documents dispute Somoza's depiction of Sandino and claim that "the Yankee master and his pawns tried to slander Sandino's name."[74] Fonseca interprets the chronology of Sandino's military struggle in a way that directly contradicts Somoza's account: he highlights Sandino's refusal to accept the 1927 peace agreement as the key event legitimating his actions, reversing Somoza's charge of illegality by claiming that Sandino, in continuing to fight, was not an outlaw but a patriot.[75] He then emphasizes Sandino's readiness for peace upon the Marines' departure and accuses Somoza of complicity in what he describes as the traitorous murder of a valiant patriot who had agreed to peace, going so far as to speak of Sandino's "crucifixion" and the "genocide" of his army.[76] Sandinista pamphlets characterize Sandino as a national hero and highlight his moral authority, humility, honesty, sobriety, and spirit of sacrifice.[77] In fact, Fonseca reverses the accusation of banditry by contrasting "Sandino's honesty" with the "vandalism of the invader" as he twice recounts the story of Sandinista troops recovering a gold chalice that a U.S. Marine had stolen from a local church.[78] Fonseca is also careful to note—contra Somoza's account—that Sandino was literate and intelligent and enjoyed popular support.[79]

The major obstacle to the Sandinistas' use of Sandino, however, was not Somoza's negative depiction of him, but the general amnesia (i.e., lack of salience) that it, and subsequent censorship, produced. Because Sandino was not a salient figure, the Sandinistas could not simply *claim* his legacy but rather had to paint a picture of what that legacy actually

[74] Fonseca 1982*y*, p. 65. Also, Fonseca 1982*e*, pp. 100, 101, 103, 151, 157; 1982*y*, p. 54.

[75] Fonseca 1982*e*, p. 156; 1982*f*, p. 350; 1982*h*, p. 364; 1982*q*, p. 79; 1982*w*, pp. 371, 381; 1982*y*, p. 47. Somoza's narrative identifies three stages in Sandino's identity (Camacho Navarro 1991, pp. 69–70): (1) Before the 1927 peace agreement, Sandino was a valiant and noble soldier fighting for the liberal party. (2) After 1927, when he refused to acquiesce to the plan as other liberal generals had, Sandino became a terrorist chieftain uninterested in peace. (3) After Sandino's death, he was the muse of misguided writers elaborating a fabulous legend.

[76] Fonseca 1982*a*, p. 249; 1982*b*, p. 39; 1982*d*, pp. 412–13, 415, 417–22; 1982*e*, pp. 143, 145–47, 153, 155–58, 160; 1982*f*, p. 351; 1982*g*, p. 233; 1982*n*, pp. 25–26; 1982*o*, p. 272; 1982*p*, p. 65; 1982*q*, p. 80; 1982*r*, pp. 393–94, 395; 1982*u*, pp. 385, 390; 1982*w*, pp. 383–84; 1982*y*, pp. 24, 82–83, 85.

[77] Fonseca 1982*d*, pp. 412, 419, 424; 1982*e*, pp. 107, 122, 134, 141, 143; 1982*h*, p. 364; 1982*k*, p. 241; 1982*l*, pp. 194–99; 1982*n*, p. 26; 1982*u*, p. 385, 389; 1982*v*, p. 247; 1982*w*, pp. 368, 374, 377, 380; 1982*x*, p. 103; 1982*y*, pp. 21–22, 47, 49–50, 55, 61, 63–65, 76, 78, 81, 83.

[78] Fonseca 1982*w*, p. 374; 1982*y*, p. 55.

[79] Fonseca 1982*d*, p. 416; 1982*e*, p. 141; 1982*w*, pp. 381, 383; 1982*y*, pp. 42, 44, 64, 78.

was. The young Nicaraguan radicals had to lead a mass, public remembrance—involving rediscovery, reinterpretation, and re-presentation—in order for the symbol to be of any use to them. To this end, Fonseca assembled collections of Sandino's writings, wrote elaborate biographical accounts of the figure, and peppered his own ideological writings with Sandino's quoted words. While this was an enormous undertaking, it also meant that Fonseca enjoyed the opportunity to present extended treatments of Sandino's life and thought from a Sandinista perspective.

The Sandinista documents situate both Sandino's and the FSLN's rebellions within a unified tradition of *lucha popular*, or popular struggle. They place the FSLN at the start of a reinvigorated phase of a continuous rebellion, which is described as a process of fits and starts to be learned from and improved upon at each step.[80] In declaring that "the [FSLN's] war of the people's guerillas against the National Guard is the continuation of the fight that . . . Sandino sustained against the Yankee invaders," Fonseca directly equates the political repression of the later Somoza regime with that of the U.S. Marines and clarifies that the people's fight remains the same.[81] The 25 years of silence after Sandino's death can then be described as merely a lull in an ongoing conflict.[82] Occasional flare-ups of subversive activity in the interim and the involvement of veterans of Sandino's army in the FSLN are marshaled as evidence of continuity through this latency period.[83] According to Fonseca, when a new generation of Nicaraguan youth rekindled the popular struggle in the late 1950s, Sandino was reborn.[84] As Fonseca explains, "[19]58 finally brought huge assemblies of students and for the first time in years the name of Augusto César Sandino returned to echo in Nicaragua, after a quarter century of darkness, of paralysis, of atrophy of the Nicaraguan popular movement."[85] Critical to this rebirth was a theoretically informed evaluation of Sandino's "political limitations."[86] Through such evaluation,

[80] Fonseca 1982*p*, p. 57.

[81] Fonseca 1982*n*, p. 28. Also, Fonseca 1982*b*, pp. 40–41; 1982*p*, p. 65; 1982*q*, pp. 94–95; 1982*w*, p. 368; 1982*x*, pp. 97, 108; 1982*z*, p. 251.

[82] Fonseca 1982*d*, p. 424; 1982*o*, p. 272; 1982*q*, p. 84; 1982*s*, pp. 130, 131.

[83] Fonseca 1982*j*, p. 221; 1982*r*, pp. 395, 397; 1982*w*, pp. 383–84.

[84] Fonseca 1982*e*, p. 166; 1982*f*, p. 357; 1982*j*, p. 217; 1982*n*, p. 38; 1982*s*, p. 127; 1982*y*, p. 85; 1982*z*, p. 251.

[85] Fonseca 1982*j*, p. 217.

[86] Fonseca concludes that Sandino was limited by a lack of ideological development and correct political strategy. Further, the campesino composition of his army meant that he lacked an adequate urban front and that his troops and officers often lacked political sophistication. Fonseca also notes political repression and Latin America's inexperience in dealing with imperialism as inhibiting factors. While concluding that Sandino's rebellion could not have continued, however, Fonseca is clear in praising

Sandino's example became a "path" for the FSLN to follow.[87] The FSLN's adherence to Sandino's path provided the new generation with theoretical lessons, but it also justified and lent meaning to their revolutionary actions. FSLN participants became descendants, sons, and orphans of Sandino.[88] The historical Sandino likewise became a precedent, inspiration, and guide, the "precursor of the new age that the subjugated peoples now forge."[89]

There are striking parallels between the Zapatista and Sandinista attempts to key their present struggles to previous rebellious episodes, but the Sandinistas were able—because of Sandino's lack of salience—to elaborate this link and use it as a vehicle for developing their own revolutionary theory. Fonseca's interpretation of the figure is developed in tandem with his elaboration of FSLN ideals: many specific Sandinista proposals, strategies, and positions are framed in terms of Sandino, and Sandino's biography is framed in turn by the FSLN ideology. Fonseca's first step in this direction is to situate the figure on par with other revolutionary thinkers. At one point he states that the FSLN is inspired by the "righteous ideal of Karl Marx, Augusto César Sandino and Ernesto Che Guevara, an ideal of national liberation and socialism, of sovereignty, of land and work, of liberty and justice"; at another point he refers to Marx, Sandino, Guevara, and Camilo Torres together as "the great revolutionaries of history."[90] Fonseca emphasizes the friendship between Sandino and his Salvadoran contemporary, Agustín Farabundo Martí, while arguing that their falling out had been overblown.[91] He similarly points out various references to Sandino in the rhetoric of the Cuban Revolution, marking the historical Sandino as a precursor to the Cuba-era wave of Latin American insurgency while simultaneously identifying the reborn and reevaluated Sandino as a result of the renewed revolutionary activity.[92]

Sandino for exploiting to the fullest what the concrete conditions of the situation presented and for preserving with clarity the social ideals that were often blunted in other Latin American rebellions (Fonseca 1982*b*, p. 42; 1982*n*, p. 37; 1982*q*, pp. 82–83; 1982*s*, p. 124; 1982*w*, p. 378; 1982*y*, pp. 22–23).

[87] Fonseca 1982*w*, p. 368. Also, Fonseca 1982*c*, p. 257; 1982*e*, p. 167; 1982*r*, p. 401.

[88] Fonseca 1982*i*, p. 260; 1982*n*, p. 38; 1982*r*, pp. 395, 396; 1982v, p. 247.

[89] Fonseca 1982*w*, p. 368. Also, Fonseca 1982*b*, pp. 42, 46; 1982*e*, pp. 110, 164; 1982*k*, p. 241; 1982*s*, pp. 131, 137.

[90] Fonseca 1982*m*, pp. 264–65; 1982*p*, p. 66. Also, Fonseca 1982*c*, p. 257; 1982*d*, p. 426; 1982*j*, p. 227; 1982*m*, p. 263; 1982*t*, pp. 268–69; 1982*w*, p. 368.

[91] Latin American leftists who had dismissed Sandino as a revolutionary figure made much ado about the broken relationship between Sandino and the communist Farabundo Martí. (See Fonseca 1982*e*, pp. 120, 126, 134, 155; 1982*h*, p. 365; 1982*p*, p. 68; 1982*w*, p. 379; 1982*x*, p. 111; 1982*y*, pp. 70, 81.)

[92] Fonseca 1982*e*, p. 166; 1982*r*, p. 398; 1982*w*, p. 384; 1982*y*, p. 21.

This paves the way for Fonseca to discuss the contemporary relevance of Sandino's ideas. The documents situate the FSLN "under the banner of Sandino," call for emulation of his rebel determination ("We fight like he fought, sincerely, without sparing any sacrifice"), and predict FSLN success because the movement "is supplied by the ideas of Augusto César Sandino, ideas that daily unite all Nicaraguans of clean conscience."[93] Fonseca stresses Sandino's and the FSLN's shared concern with national sovereignty, including control over natural resources and political autonomy.[94] For example, he highlights Sandino's demand for revision of the Bryan-Chamorro treaty (which granted the United States sole rights to build a canal through Nicaragua) and denunciation of all "treaties that harm the dignity and sovereignty of the nation."[95] While the documents assert that "the popular interests are, clearly, represented by Sandino," Fonseca stresses that Sandino was more than a populist nationalist.[96] As he notes: "There are people, blinded by prejudice, who try to deny Sandino's preoccupation with welding the struggle for national independence with the struggle to achieve a society without class enemies. The truth is that sympathy for a social revolution pulses in Sandino's written documents."[97] Fonseca emphasizes Sandino's "identification with social ideas bordering on socialism" and twice notes reports of the singing of "The International" in Sandino's camp.[98] He labors over his presentation of Sandino's class analysis, and in so doing elaborates his own broad understanding of class conflict that unites workers and campesinos under a collectivist and anti-imperialist banner. In one document Fonseca explains that Sandino identified with the "world proletariat" and told his army he foresaw "a future proletarian explosion," while in another he declares that the current "cracking of the foundations of imperialist domination . . . is the 'proletarian explosion' Augusto César Sandino dreamed of."[99] Other documents identify Sandino as a "worker of campesino origin" and use this as an opportunity to argue that the FSLN must draw on both (i.e., proletarian and peasant) bases of support.[100]

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[93] Fonseca 1982*e*, pp. 154–55; 1982*n*, p. 38. Also, Fonseca 1982*a*, pp. 248, 250; 1982*e*, pp. 99, 101; 1982*w*, p. 371; 1982*y*, p. 49.

[94] Fonseca 1982*a*, p. 250; 1982*w*, pp. 377–78; 1982*y*, pp. 49–50, 63, 68, 69, 78–79.

[95] Fonseca 1982*w*, p. 380.

[96] Fonseca 1982*y*, p. 81. Also, Fonseca 1982*h*, p. 364; 1982*p*, p. 68; 1982*v*, p. 247; 1982*w*, pp. 368, 371, 378; 1982*y*, p. 68.

[97] Fonseca 1982*p*, p. 68.

[98] Fonseca 1982*e*, p. 126; 1982*w*, p. 378.

[99] Fonseca 1982*d*, p. 426; 1982*e*, pp. 126, 130.

[100] Fonseca 1982*w*, p. 368; 1982*y*, pp. 42, 44. Also, Fonseca 1982*d*, p. 419; 1982*e*, pp. 92–94, 120, 139; 1982*s*, p. 137; 1982*w*, pp. 369, 372, 377–78; 1982*y*, pp. 43, 47, 49–50, 65, 69, 70.

Fonseca identifies two enduring categories of opposition: the "country-selling oligarchs" and the "Yankee invaders."[101] In the documents these two fronts imply two consistent responses: collectivization and unified international resistance.[102] On the point of international resistance, Fonseca emphasizes in particular Sandino's calls for Latin American solidarity against "imperialism" and quotes him as saying: "It wouldn't be strange to encounter me and my army in whichever Latin American country the invader fixes his plans of conquest."[103] Finally, Fonseca takes from Sandino his justification for the necessity of guerilla tactics—given Nicaragua's physical, political, and economic geography—to accomplish these goals.[104] He also takes Sandino's example as proof that such tactics can be successful in Nicaragua.[105]

The Sandinistas used their figure primarily to develop their ideology and strategy. Because of Sandino's lack of salience, the Sandinistas were able to frame their agenda explicitly in terms of the figure and vice-versa. Sandinista documents describe Sandino's army and the FSLN in remarkably similar terms—as guerilla movements dedicated to improving the lot of the poor through a broad, nationalist, anti-imperialist class struggle. Such an association meant that Sandinista ideals and strategies could be defended by detailed historical example. It also meant that, unencumbered by competing uses of Sandino, the FSLN was free to develop the symbol in tandem with their own movement such that remembrance of Sandino would imply recognition of the FSLN. (See table 2 below for a summary of themes found in the recent uses of the figures.)

RESURRECTION AND APPROPRIATION

These cases illustrate how different reputational trajectories produce different inherited conditions that vary according to a historical figure's salience, valence, and ownership. These conditions present different opportunities and constraints for reputational entrepreneurs that influence how they use their figures. Confronting different inherited conditions, the Zapatistas employed a strategy of memory work that rendered Zapata

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[101] Fonseca 1982*a*, p. 250; 1982*e*, pp. 98, 100, 126, 144, 147, 164, 167; 1982*f*, p. 358; 1982*h*, p. 364; 1982*t*, p. 267; 1982*u*, p. 385; 1982*v*, p. 247; 1982*w*, pp. 368, 371, 377, 378, 381–82; 1982*y*, pp. 21, 42, 43, 47–50, 63, 68–69, 70, 79.

[102] Fonseca 1982*e*, pp. 103, 109, 112–14, 115, 116, 117, 120, 139, 166; 1982*w*, pp. 372, 378–79; 1982*y*, pp. 21, 49, 69, 74.

[103] Fonseca 1982*w*, p. 379; 1982*y*, p. 74. Also, Fonseca 1982*e*, pp. 112, 113.

[104] Fonseca 1982*b*, pp. 53–54; 1982*w*, pp. 368, 369.

[105] Fonseca 1982*b*, pp. 53–54; 1982*w*, p. 373; 1982*x*, p. 105; 1982*y*, p. 63.

TABLE 2
RECENT USES OF THE FIGURES, SUMMARY OF THEMES

	Zapata	Sandino
Domant use of figure	Zapata used to attack state legitimacy and legitimate Zapatista Movement	Sandino used as a vehicle for developing Sandinista ideology and strategy
Themes	Zapatistas assert continuity with the figure's revolutionary struggle (and thus that they are rightful heirs to revolutionary legitimacy)	Sandinistas claim that Somoza had misrepresented the figure
	Zapatistas use the figure only *vaguely* to frame *some* movement issues (e.g., "land and liberty," indigenous rights, democracy)	Sandinistas argue that the figure was a moral, popular national hero
	Zapatistas question the veracity of state representations of the figure	Sandinistas assert continuity with the figure's revolutionary struggle (and identify it as a source of substantive strategic lessons)
	Zapatistas use the figure to attack the state's legitimacy and revolutionary credentials	Sandinistas use the figure *explicitly* to frame *most* movement issues (claiming that—like the Sandinistas—Sandino was anti-imperialist, antioligarchical, and socialist)

useful primarily as a weapon in legitimacy struggles, while the Sandinista strategy made their figure useful for elaborating revolutionary theory.[106]

The Zapatista use of Zapata exemplifies a mode of memory work that I will refer to as *appropriation by capture*.[107] The figure of Zapata, as initially encountered by the Zapatistas, was highly salient, viewed positively, and claimed by an opposing group (the Mexican state). *Appropriation by capture* is the attempt by reputational entrepreneurs, given these inherited conditions, to contest the existing ownership claim while associating the figure with their own group (leaving salience and valence unaltered).

The Mexican state's ownership of Zapata was the EZLN's greatest asset *and* its greatest liability in using the figure. If the Zapatistas could

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[106] This should not be read as suggesting that the options of either movement were *more* or *less* path dependent than those of the other, but rather that these options differed according to similar path-dependent logics.

[107] The modifier is added to distinguish this from *appropriation from milieu* (discussed below).

occasionally succeed in claiming Zapata as their own and calling into question the state's naturalized association with him, they would inevitably strike blows to the regime's "revolutionary" credentials. This possibility only existed because of the competing ownership claim. Further, as Zapata already enjoyed widespread recognition and a positive valence thanks to the state's previous memory projects, the Zapatistas stood to bolster the legitimacy and appeal of their own movement if they could establish a successful tie to the figure. At the same time, however, high levels of salience limited the freedom of Zapatista reputational entrepreneurs to interpret Zapata in new ways. They could not present extended treatments of Zapata's life and thought that might contradict popular knowledge. Because of this limitation, the Zapatistas could not use Zapata to develop their movement ideology and strategy in the way that the Sandinistas did.

The Sandinista use of Sandino exemplifies a mode of memory work that I will refer to as *resurrection*. Fonseca encountered in his newly discovered Sandino a forgotten (nonsalient) figure. *Resurrection* is the attempt by reputational entrepreneurs to revive and reconstruct the memory of such a figure.

Since Sandino had been forgotten, Sandinista reputational entrepreneurs enjoyed considerable interpretive freedom. They took advantage of a relatively blank slate to develop their own image of the figure and their young movement ideology concurrently, such that the two would be inextricably linked. That is, the Sandinistas were free to shape their forgotten figure in ways helpful to the development of their movement because they did not need to devote much energy to overcoming preexisting symbolic attachments and meanings. However, Sandino's status as nonsalient also had its drawbacks. First, the Sandinistas faced the immense task of making a forgotten symbol known to a large audience. Second, the figure was initially of little rhetorical value—the rhetorical value had to be *made* as the figure was made known. Third, because Sandino was not associated with the Somoza regime, movement leaders were unable to use the figure to chip away at the legitimacy of the state.

This is not to say that the reputational entrepreneurs in these cases could not have *attempted* to do whatever they wished with the figures, but rather that their choices were strongly influenced by previous and competing uses. This is demonstrated more sharply by positing the counterfactuals: Could the Zapatistas have used their figure, as the Sandinistas did, to develop a coherent revolutionary theory constantly in dialogue with the figure's biography? Could the Sandinistas have used their figure, as the Zapatistas did, to attack the state's presumptions to represent "the people" and their history? Surely they could have tried. But the Zapatistas would have confronted well-established understandings of the "authentic"

Zapata—linked to the state and all of its representational resources—that would have been extremely difficult to overcome in reworking the figure for their own ideological purposes, and the Sandinistas' efforts would have been severely hampered by the regime's lack of preexisting ownership claim and by a lack of popular memory of the figure.

MODES OF MEMORY WORK

Appropriation by capture and *resurrection* are two common modes of memory work that correspond to two common sets of inherited symbolic conditions, which themselves result from different reputational trajectories. They are by no means, however, the only possible modes of memory work, nor are the corresponding sets of inherited conditions the only possible starting points. Rather, reputational trajectories might lead to any number of values on the three variables (salience, valence, and ownership), providing conditions that make different memory work options more or less likely to be pursued. The purpose of this section is to move one step beyond the two modes of memory work discussed above by exploring the full range of memory work possibilities, in order to provide a framework both for hypothesis generating and for further case comparison and analysis.

Before continuing, it is worth noting the factors that such a discussion holds constant. First, it presupposes the existence of a politically situated reputational entrepreneur, of an audience of potential adherents, and of a historical figure that the reputational entrepreneur is interested in representing. Second, it presupposes that the reputational entrepreneur has the cultural competency and material capacity to engage in memory work. Finally, it assumes that the reputational entrepreneur is savvy enough to assess the existing salience, valence, and imputed ownership of the figure in question and to consider memory work options more or less reasonably.

To begin, it is useful to consider possible combinations of the three variables—which together constitute the inherited conditions—as they might be received from different reputational trajectories. By doing so, it is possible to map the conceptual space within which the two primary historical cases are situated.

As discussed above, a symbolic figure, received from the past as a product of previous memory work, can be inherited as: salient or not; of positive, negative, or neutral/ambivalent valence; and owned by the protagonist, antagonist, or neither. These values can combine in any number of possible ways. I refer to any particular set of inherited conditions as a combination of values. For example, one combination would describe a figure that is salient, positively valued, and associated with the *protag-*

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onist. A second combination would describe a figure that is salient, positively valued, and associated with the *antagonist*. Table 3 presents all possible combinations.

There is one complicating factor, however: the relationship of the salience variable to the other two variables. If a figure is *not* salient, it makes no sense to inquire as to its valence, since "valence" implies an assessing audience. Likewise, it is meaningless to ask about the ownership of a nonsalient figure, as "ownership" implies not "actual ownership" (it is unclear what this would even mean) but commonly recognized ownership. In sum, if a figure is not salient, there can be no recognition of its valence or ownership. Thus, while the first nine possible combinations of values presuppose a salient figure, the remaining possibilities collapse into a single (tenth and final) combination of values representing simply a nonsalient figure.[108] The Zapatistas confronted the second combination of values: memory of Zapata was highly salient and the figure had a positive valence, but it was associated with (or owned by) the Zapatistas' antagonist, the state party. The Sandinistas confronted the tenth combination: memory of Sandino had been obliterated. Upon further investigation, it might be discovered whether certain of these combinations of values are more common than others in empirical reality. All, however, are logically possible.

Having established this initial starting point, it is now possible to consider the modes of memory work that correspond to different sets of inherited symbolic conditions. Reputational entrepreneurs confront one of the 10 combinations of values when they approach a given figure, depending on that figure's past reputational trajectory. They can then conceivably attempt to transform the values of any of the three variables through memory work. For example, they might leave the salience and ownership of a figure alone and simply attempt to enhance or decrease its valence, or they might leave ownership as is and try to change both the figure's valence and its salience.

While this is simple enough in theory, the implications are, at first, mind boggling. If reputational entrepreneurs can potentially encounter one of 10 initial starting points, and if they may then attempt to transform any of the three variables (or any combination of them), the result is 162 logically possible modes of memory work.[109]

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[108] Put differently: there are in actuality 18 logically possible combinations of values, but I have collapsed the final nine into one since a value "not salient" renders the other two variables meaningless.

[109] To elaborate: since there are 18 logically possible combinations of values (suspending for a moment the "salience" qualification), combinations one through nine can each be transformed in 17 possible ways (i.e., in the direction of each of the other 17 combinations). From the starting points of combinations one through nine, then, there

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TABLE 3
Possible Combinations of Inherited Symbolic Conditions

Combination	Salience	Valence	Ownership	Immediate Implication
1	S	+	P	Advantageous
2	S	+	A	Threatening
3	S	+	0	Neutral
4	S	−	P	Threatening
5	S	−	A	Advantageous
6	S	−	0	Neutral
7	S	0	P	Neutral
8	S	0	A	Threatening
9	S	0	0	Neutral
10	N	NA	NA	Neutral

Note.—S = salient; N = not salient. + = positive valence; − = negative valence; 0 = neutral or ambivalent valence. P = protagonist; A = antagonist; 0 = other.

On further reflection, however, this number becomes more manageable. Many of these possible modes of memory work can be discounted out of hand because they would clearly work against the protagonist's interests. For example, it would make no sense for a group encountering a figure that is highly salient, viewed negatively, and clearly associated with their opposition to attempt to claim the figure for themselves while maintaining the valence as negative (although this is a "logically possible" option). In fact, only 49 of the 162 possible modes of memory work would be in the protagonist's favor.[110] Further, within this narrower field of 49 modes of favorable memory work, some would require significantly more effort than others. For example: it would be substantially more difficult for reputational entrepreneurs confronting a salient, positively valued figure that their group already "owns" to devalue that figure and assert an association between it and their antagonist than it would be simply to maintain the already positive status quo (though both strategies would be beneficial if successful). It is reasonable to assume that reputational entrepreneurs are savvy enough to distinguish between more and less costly modes of memory work, and at a certain point of diminishing returns simply to choose a more promising figure than to expend unreasonable effort on a monumental memory project. In the end, only a handful of the logically possible modes of memory work occur with any notable

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are a total of 153 (i.e., 9 × 17) possible transformations, or modes of memory work. Because combination 10 begins with a nonsalient figure (with values of "NA" on the other variables), there are only nine modes of memory work possible from this starting point—for a total of 162 in all. Tables enumerating the possible modes of memory work for each initial combination of values are available upon request from the author.

[110] Tables identifying these 49 are available upon request from the author.

frequency in reality, and each of these comes with its own advantages and disadvantages.

In order to clarify these points, I will discuss briefly each of the 10 possible starting points and the memory work options that follow from them. As noted in the final column of table 3, three of the initial combinations of values represent a *threat* to the protagonist if left unaltered, two are initially *advantageous* even without modification, and the remaining five are *neither* an immediate threat nor advantageous. I will discuss these initial starting points and the corresponding modes of memory work in this order, relying on the enumeration given in table 3 to identify the different combinations of values.

Three of the combinations represent a liability or threat to the protagonist if the status quo remains unaltered. The first of these is combination 2, in which a salient figure is viewed positively and owned by the antagonist. The Zapatistas, confronting this situation, opted to do memory work on the ownership variable. But that was not their only option. An example from American history demonstrates this point. At the time of Warren Harding's death he was well liked by many and could have potentially enjoyed a positive legacy beneficial to conservative Republicans (Fine 2001, chap. 2). Democrats and progressive Republicans thus confronted combination 2. Their response, however, was to make selective use of details from Harding's administration to tar the figure's reputation and, by extension, to attack conservative Republicans. This defamation strategy is an alternate way of responding to the same set of conditions that the Zapatistas encountered. There are trade-offs between the two options. If the figure remains associated with the antagonist, successful defamation amounts to a critique of that group. Even if unsuccessful, defamation may be useful insofar as it showcases (for choice audiences) a critical stance. On the other hand, unsuccessful attempts at defamation may backfire and damage the protagonist's legitimacy. The Zapatista strategy of *appropriation by capture* can delegitimate an opponent while actually bringing new symbolic resources into the protagonist's camp (something that defamation does *not* do). Since the inherited conditions are threatening from the outset, most modes of memory work possible from combination 2 promise to benefit the protagonist in some way.[111] But the two just exemplified seem to be the most compelling options. A third option, which might be called *erasure*, would be to reduce the salience of the antagonist's positive figure. The choice between approaches depends on what reputational entrepreneurs want to accomplish, their

[111] The same can be said for the other most threatening combination of values—the fourth. In fact, these two combinations account for 31 of the 49 modes of memory work that are beneficial to the protagonist.

representational resources, and their perception of the doability of alternate strategies.

Another initially threatening combination is the fourth, wherein a salient figure is viewed negatively and associated with the protagonist. Reputational entrepreneurs might under these conditions try to revalue the tarnished figure (turning a liability into an asset) or else to diminish its salience, but this is often easier said than done. Another response, which might be termed *repudiation*, is for the protagonist to disavow ownership of the figure. Harding's supporters, for example, having lost their position of power, were unable to redeem Harding's reputation and so instead opted to abandon the figure rather than risk sinking with it (Fine 2001, chap. 2). Khrushchev's repudiation of Stalin provides another example, as would the efforts of an organization that had previously engaged in terrorist tactics to repudiate select figures from its past upon entering the sphere of "normal politics." But while *repudiation* may be useful as a way to respond to a symbolic liability, and it may also be a way for a certain faction to distinguish itself from others within a splintering protagonist's group, it also entails at least some loss of symbolic resources and continuity.

The eighth combination—wherein a salient figure is viewed neutrally or ambivalently and associated with the antagonist—is also threatening, but in a less immanent way. That is, while not a present threat, the figure might become threatening with a minimal amount of memory work by the antagonist. This is the situation that Somoza confronted in Sandino and that the Mexican state confronted in Zapata (both figures were initially salient and viewed ambivalently). As described above, Somoza responded to this potential threat by pursuing a dual strategy of censorship (diminishing salience) and defamation, whereas the Mexican state revalued and claimed ownership of Zapata. Both strategies defused a potential threat and were useful in different ways. Somoza was able to build his legitimacy (in part) *in opposition to* a "bandit" while the Mexican state was able to build its own (in part) *through* a "hero."

Just as some initial combinations are threatening, two are immediately advantageous and entail no need to alter the status quo. In the first of these, combination 1 (in which a salient, positively valued figure is associated with the protagonist), the only potentially positive mode of memory work would involve devaluing the figure and associating it with the antagonist. This option is clearly less compelling than simply working to maintain (or to elaborate) the already favorable status quo. Such activity can be seen in Aaron Copland's World War II–era composition "Lincoln Portrait," in which his task "was to invigorate, not to change, conceptions that the public already held" (Schwartz 1996, p. 918). As Zhang and Schwartz (2003, p. 104) note, a certain cultural power comes with sym-

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bolism that is stable over time. At the same time, such stable reputations have drawbacks as well: they are less interpretively "open" and do not afford the same sort of relational leverage as do figures involved in ownership contests. The second advantageous combination is the complementary scenario, the fifth (in which a salient, negatively valued figure is associated with the antagonist). Again, the only potentially positive alteration of this situation would be simultaneously to redeem and claim the figure. But this is a much less appealing option than simply reinforcing (or enhancing) the current state of affairs through standard critique.

The remaining five combinations begin at more neutral starting points. A common initial state of affairs is for the figure to be salient and viewed positively but owned neither by the protagonist nor the antagonist (combination 3). The first favorable (but relatively unrealistic) mode of memory work possible from such a starting point is to devalue the figure while associating it with the antagonist. The only other favorable response, closely related to *appropriation by capture*, might be called *appropriation from milieu*—the appropriation of a salient and positive figure from a source other than the antagonist. This process often involves subtle shifts in meaning, as in the case of Lincoln's appropriation by the Civil Rights movement. Sandage (1993, p. 136) describes how, as the Civil Rights movement appropriated "Lincoln's memory and monument as political weapons," the "public meanings of the hero and his shrine" changed in complex ways. At other times, shifts in meaning associated with appropriation result from more self-conscious reinterpretation. In discussing Mao's early appropriation of Confucius, Zhang and Schwartz (2003) introduce Western audiences to the Chinese concept of "critical inheritance," a term used to describe a particular form of appropriation in which reputational entrepreneurs, claiming an association with a given figure, identify the positive and negative aspects of that figure in an attempt to divorce the legitimizing weight of the figure from its specific ideological content.[112]

Another neutral starting point is a figure that is salient and negatively valued, but associated with neither the protagonist nor the antagonist (combination 6). Again, only two favorable strategies are possible. The first would be to maintain the negative valence and work to associate the figure with the antagonist. The other involves claiming the figure while revaluing it. Fine (2001, chap. 3) discusses how reputational entrepreneurs (choosing the latter strategy) transformed the radical abolitionist John Brown into a martyr immediately following his execution for attacking the federal arsenal at Harpers Ferry in 1859. As Fine (2001, p. 122) notes,

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[112] In the framework set out by this article, "critical inheritance" is a subtype of *appropriation from milieu*.

the attacking of a federal facility is not in most circumstances a cause for praise, and so "To have impact Brown the man had to be constructed [valence] and linked to a set of policies [ownership]."

Combinations 7 (in which a salient, neutrally valued figure is associated with the protagonist) and 9 (in which a salient, neutrally valued figure is associated with neither the protagonist nor the antagonist) are similar. In both cases, the only two favorable memory work options are those that have become familiar by now: to increase the figure's valence and associate it with the protagonist or to decrease its valence and associate it with the antagonist. Like other modes of memory work, these two strategies will be useful in different ways and will be more or less difficult to pull off effectively.

The tenth and final combination (a nonsalient figure) has already been discussed. While conceivably it would be possible to increase such a figure's salience with the goal of portraying it negatively and associating it with the antagonist, such a strategy seems less likely than *resurrection*. An example of millennial proportions is the Shah of Iran's resurrection of Cyrus the Great after 2500 years (Lewis 1975, chap. 1). A more modest example is that of anarchist Emma Goldman, who was rescued from collective amnesia and rehabilitated by activists of the late 1960s (Frankel 1996). Radical feminists resurrected Goldman, revaluing the figure and claiming her as theirs: "Goldman was excavated from historical oblivion—practically dehistoricized—to instruct a young generation of women activists. Her resurrection involved virtually no nostalgia. Goldman's new disciples believed that she could assist the women to conquer their future. This leap from history to the future, so typical of revolutionary movements, paralleled the way radical feminist writers of the early 1970s looked to the past in general" (Frankel 1996, p. 920). Frankel's discussion of the resurrection of "Red Emma" has striking parallels to the Sandinista case and illustrates the usefulness of looking for patterns in how and to what end historical figures are invoked.

These examples are meant to demonstrate the variety of possible modes of memory work in a systematic way and to elucidate further the primary historical cases by specifying under which conditions the memory work options might have been different. To recapitulate: reputational trajectories—themselves the result of a history of past memory work—provide reputational entrepreneurs with a limited set of symbolic conditions that both constrain and enable particular options for memory work.

CONCLUSION

The framework outlined above is meant only as a starting point in the effort to identify the path-dependent constraints and opportunities conditioning the use of historical figures. The sort of abstraction employed here has its limitations (as noted by Olick 1999*b*, p. 400). First, while the three variables have been kept simple for the sake of analytic clarity, reality is more complex. The salience of memory is a continuous and not dichotomous phenomenon. Further, it might be broken down into more specific subcategories.[113] Valence might also be treated in subtler ways.[114] And the dynamics of ownership are more complicated when a political field consists of more than two competing parties. Also, as all three variables describe not qualities inherent in a figure itself but rather a figure as perceived by a certain audience, the problem of multiple audiences (Fine 2001, chap. 5; Vinitzky-Seroussi 2002) complicates and might be addressed by future research. Finally, there is a certain artificiality to postulating the independence of the three variables. For example, memory work that attempts to neutralize a figure's valence and to dissociate it from all groups might have the unintended consequence of reducing its salience as well, or if a negatively viewed group were to attempt to claim ownership of a positively viewed figure in order to boost its own stature, such memory work might backfire and result in a devaluation of the figure instead of a revaluation of its claimant. Such dynamics warrant closer attention in future studies.

Second, memory projects in the real world can be multifaceted and dynamic, concerning multiple historical figures, involving multiple or factionalized actors and audiences, and changing over time. In the early 20th century, for example, reputational entrepreneurs of the Progressive Movement appropriated a relatively uninspiring and only marginally salient Alexander Hamilton from conservative Republicans and, through successful memory work, transformed him into a "vivacious" figure with a positive valence (Peterson 1960, pp. 334–47). At the same time, they worked to devalue the memory of Thomas Jefferson, who had recently been associated with other branches of reformism and was considerably more salient and valued than Hamilton within reformist circles.[115] Over

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[113] Schudson (1989*a*) provides a useful starting point by disaggregating what I here call "salience" into retrievability, rhetorical force, resonance, institutional retention, and resolution.

[114] Fine (2001, p. 10), for example, breaks his "difficult reputations" down into three subcategories: negative, contested, and subcultural.

[115] Gertrude Atherton's 1902 historical romance, *The Conqueror*, portrayed Hamilton as "Alexander the Great" while Jefferson's character was "the most despicable in history" (Peterson 1960, pp. 334–35).

time, however, with Woodrow Wilson's revaluation of Jefferson, Hamilton's reputation again diminished among Progressives, and he was, after World War I, returned to the Republicans. Finally, with the Depression, Hamilton's reputation "fell disastrously" for all audiences (Peterson 1960, p. 346). While the framework outlined in this article is a useful starting point for breaking down the above narrative into its component parts and for assessing the historical and relational dynamics constraining reputational entrepreneurs at each step, it should be applied thoughtfully. In its analytic minimalism, for instance, the framework describes memory work undertaken by already-existing groups with established interests. But it is important to be sensitive to the ways in which mnemonic struggle itself can play a role in constituting or redefining groups and their interests (Olick and Levy 1997)—just as the rethinking of Hamilton was in many respects a *constitutive* element of factional dynamics within Progressivism.

Third, this framework does not take into account the institutional position and access to resources of reputational entrepreneurs. Fine (2001, pp. 22, 63) argues that reputational entrepreneurs need (1) interested motivation, (2) narrative facility, and (3) institutional placement to make their representations "stick." Because the Mexican and Nicaraguan cases did not vary significantly in these respects, and because this study does not focus on audience reception, I have not addressed this issue in depth.[116] I hypothesize that consideration of differences in position and resources is key for explaining *which* of the *available* memory work strategies reputational entrepreneurs pursue in a given situation and which memory projects ultimately succeed. Of course, an examination of the success or failure of memory work would require a measure of memory entrepreneurship that is independent of the measure of successful memory work—something that the present article does not provide.

What this article does provide is a model of path-dependent memory work that can serve as a provisional baseline for generating hypotheses and for comparing and analyzing contested memory projects. The application of this framework to the Mexican and Nicaraguan cases explains why they used their figures so differently: a captured figure is first and foremost a potential weapon in legitimacy struggles, while a resurrected figure is most useful for developing movement ideology and strategy. The potential usefulness of the figures was shaped by the inherited conditions that reputational entrepreneurs had to work with, which themselves resulted from previous memory projects. In this way, the reputational en-

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[116] It is worth noting, however, that this same lack of variation is what enabled the identification of constraints on memory work that are prior to the question of differential power to represent.

trepreneurs were doubly constrained. First, ongoing histories of use, comprising quite divergent reputational trajectories, produced different sets of inherited conditions that limited the field of possible memory projects. Second, within this narrowed field of options, some modes of memory work were more doable than others, and each made the figure useful only in certain respects. As was shown, these dynamics of historical constraint are not specific to the two cases investigated, but are generic to memory work in contentious settings.[117] These findings bear significantly on movement leaders' power to do certain things with certain symbols at particular points in time.

While the topic of this article has been the use of historical figures—and so the examples have been drawn from this genre of memory work—there is no reason to think that the concepts deployed here could not be equally applicable to the use of other historically freighted symbols. Memory work on historical events, for instance, seems to proceed according to a familiar logic. The 1995 attempt by a right-wing faction of Russia's Liberal Democratic Party to reframe the October Revolution as an illegal *coup d'état* by a political clique of adventurers rather than as a people's revolution (see Corney 2003) could be seen as an attempt to reverse the valence (and possibly the salience) of a symbolic event while leaving its association with the group's antagonist unaltered. The attempt by political opponents in post-Franco Spain to forget the events of the Spanish Civil War so that "adversaries [would] not turn the past into a political weapon" (Aguilar 2003, p. 134) and the attempts of revisionist historians to deny the existence of the Holocaust (Irwin-Zarecka 1994, pp. 119–20) are two examples of memory projects aimed at diminishing the salience of certain remembered events. Finally, the 1927 "recovery" of memory of the siege of Masada by Yitzhak Lamdan and others (Lewis 1975, chap. 1; Schwartz, Zerubavel, and Barnett 1986) has many parallels to the resurrections of Sandino, Cyrus the Great, and Emma Goldman discussed above.

This article reinforces the growing consensus in the politics of memory literature that memory work, while governed by relational dynamics in the present, is heavily constrained by the past. But rather than simply substituting resilient historical materials for savvy cultural entrepreneurs, it foregrounds memory projects enacted in the interim *between* the original materials and the uses of history in question. It does this, building on a recent processual emphasis in the memory literature, by specifying a model of path-dependent memory work in which reputational trajectories are the product of multiple memory projects, each altering the inherited conditions confronting subsequent reputational entrepreneurs. By identifying

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[117] Whether the framework presented here, or some variant of it, is applicable beyond settings of multiple parties engaged in political contestation remains an open question.

three specific dimensions of these conditions—the figure's salience in society, its valence, and its imputed ownership—it is possible to map the ways in which certain lines of memory work are enabled, and others foreclosed, by previous memory projects, and how this makes specific figures useful to reputational entrepreneurs in highly variable ways.[118]

This article also highlights limitations of the framing perspective and calls for the contentious politics literature to pay increased attention to the historicity of culture and the operation of constraints on symbolic work. Framing's focus on mobilization as the dependent variable would lead it to overlook the usefulness of the Mexico-Nicaragua comparison altogether, as both movements were relatively successful. Its lack of historical focus would lead it to miss the primary axis of variation between the cases—the divergent reputational trajectories—and thus the reason why the figures were used so differently by the movements.[119] The contentious politics literature needs to recognize that "the pasts which we carry around with us" (Mead 1929, p. 237) are a constituent and constraining element of present cultural politics and that they can be a "precious resource" for mobilizing and legitimizing action and for claiming authority (Irwin-Zarecka 1994, p. 67). To this end, it proved illuminating to consider contributions that the memory and commemoration literature could bring to the study of contentious politics.

Posing the problem of the variable use of historical figures opens up a field of related questions. One set concerns symbolic resonance and the garnering of support. Do responses to certain historical reconstructions vary across different strata or groups within society, leading to support

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[118] While this model is influenced by Olick's (1999*b*) groundbreaking work on path dependence in memory, it differs from his use of the term. Olick is concerned primarily with explaining discrete (though path-dependently linked) commemorative representations. Such commemorations take shape as they do, he argues, because commemorators (consciously or unconsciously) internalize and draw on memory of past commemorations. My model, somewhat differently, explains the potential political utility of historical figures by taking into account their changing reputational trajectories and the opportunities and constraints that these present to reputational entrepreneurs. Olick's approach is thus simultaneously more specific and more general: more specific in that it relies on a Bakhtinian understanding of "genre memory" as its central mechanism of path dependence; more general in that in doing so it delves into broader cultural processes than this article addresses. The two approaches are not in contradiction, because Olick's focus is on a cultural mechanism by which those representing the past internalize an understanding of previous memory projects—something that this article does not explicitly address.

[119] The framework employed here also disaggregates the framing concept somewhat, since framing is not coterminous with one of the three variables but rather describes a range of activities that span them. That is, framing activities might be devoted to raising a figure's salience, changing its valence, or establishing ownership claims. These are distinct tasks, and it is useful to keep them analytically separate.

in some cases, indifference in others, and active resistance in still others? To what extent is reconstructed history understood in the way intended or systematically "misinterpreted" in certain sectors? A second set concerns political culture. In what ways, if at all, does the use of historical figures contribute to an emergent and internally consistent "movement culture," and what does this tell us about how information and meanings are transmitted within and beyond the movement? In what other ways do the histories of cultural objects and the construction of historicity play into social movement dynamics? This article has taken an initial step in the direction of such questions by identifying systematic constraints on and opportunities for representation that are prior to (although not independent of) issues of reception.[120]

The use of historical figures is one aspect of a larger explanation of political outcomes; I do not suggest that uses or *mis*uses explain movement success or failure. However, it may very well be the case that success depends in part on movement legitimacy and the delegitimation of the competition, on adherent loyalty and animation to action, on a favorable definition of the situation, on a sense of the possibility of success and a positive perception of political opportunities, and on an ideology that makes common sense and that seems grounded in domestic conditions and history. The political use of historical figures is one of many ways in which movements may work toward these ends, and as such the tactic demands analysis on its own terms. But beyond being one of many tools for doing legitimacy work, the use of historical figures can be, for the analyst, a window into a movement's culture and approach to political contestation. Building a more holistic sense of a movement in this way—which may sometimes require postponing the desire to explain differential success—can be ultimately helpful, a few steps removed, for explaining not just the fact of mobilization, success, or failure, but for giving a more complete account of the quality of these outcomes.

[120] A further step, after establishing the conditions of both representation *and* reception, would be to explore how successful or unsuccessful resonance—or the *perception* of resonance—contributes to the modification of movement leaders' rhetorical strategies over time, in a feedback loop of self-correction. (This step might usefully draw on Olick's [1999*b*] work on the path dependence of genre memory.)

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