

their legitimate activities. * * * The schools and colleges established by Americans are carrying on their work and many of those that had been closed are reopening."

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In conclusion, I may say that the new spirit of the Near East must be met sympathetically, not by arms, not by attempts at dictatorship or by meddlesome interventions, but by candor, directness, and just appreciation of nationalistic aims and by a firm but friendly insistence upon the discharge of those international obligations, the recognition of which affords the only satisfactory basis for the intercourse of nations. In this way the Orient and Occident may find ground for cooperation and for the maintenance of peace sustained by the reciprocal advantages of cultural relations.

RICHARD WASHBURN CHILD

United States Ambassador to Italy and Special Representative at the
First Session of the Lausanne Conference

*(From an Address before The Council on Turkish American-Relations,
at New York, May 12, 1925)*

During those thirteen weeks in which the foundation of the treaty was laid, I had a great deal to do with the Turkish delegation. Let me say right here that no member of the Turkish delegation ever stated to me an intention which they did not carry out. That is more than I can say of some others. I think Ismet Pasha is unequalled by anybody that I ever came in contact with as a battler. Toward the end of the first session, when the principal delegates were present and Lord Curzon was present, fortunately, because the United States had somewhat of a detached position, my room was the only means by which the two could come together. That came about from our isolation.

One evening, when things were looking pretty black and it looked as if the conference was going to blow up, Ismet Pasha came down to hear Lord Curzon, of whom I was very fond, give him a lecture on the subject of capitulations. Lord Curzon was a master of oral English, but on this occasion he outdid himself. I have never heard a better advocate, or one who was provided with a better prepared forensic statement. He talked in my study for an hour. He went into the capitulations historically and ended up with the last outrage upon a British lieutenant or somebody in Constantinople. It was a gorgeous performance, and he had evidently put a great deal of preparation into it, and all the time he was speaking Ismet Pasha looked at him with great earnestness, apparently absorbing all the things that he was saying. There was an interpreter present who was interpreting what Lord Curzon was saying. When Curzon was through, Ismet Pasha said, "Your Lordship, I am a Turkish general, and I have not been outside of my

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY

own country to any great extent and, naturally, I am not skilled in diplomatic affairs as you are. I wonder if you will not repeat what you said."

Now let us be businesslike about this: The Allies came together and made a treaty with Turkey—a peace treaty. Since we have never declared war on Turkey it was difficult for us to make a peace treaty and, although I was an observer, I was a full delegate in every sense of the word, except that I was not able to make a treaty of peace with a country with which we were not at war. The Allies could not be interrupted in their business of making a peace treaty. I could not rise in the conference and say, "I object to this treaty of peace and its terms," unless there was something in it which I found offended the rights of the United States or the rights of humanity, and I did that sometimes. When the treaty of peace was made it was perfectly impossible, and it is now impossible for us to expect better terms than the Allies procured. If the Allies were not in unity in dealing with the Turks, that may be our misfortune, but the result on the whole, I think, was a pretty good result.

From the very beginning it seemed to me that, although the Turks may have been unreasonable, on the whole their purposes, their inspiration, the things they were striving for, were admirable.

Here was a nation which during that conference turned toward the United States time and time again, and some of the attaches of the delegation said to me, "Oh, yes, we have a muddy capital, but we understand that Washington was very muddy when it became the capital of the United States; yes, we have a desire for independence and we understand that the United States had it; yes, we know that there is a great deal of clamor in the United States for a National Armenian Home, and when you are ready to set aside the State of Pennsylvania for the North American Indians we will meet you with that."

As to the capitulations, I felt from almost the very beginning that, although we could not do anything about it, and it was a very embarrassing situation, nevertheless, capitulations would have to go, and behind that judgment there was the whole picture of years and years of a judicial ingress in the life of the Turkish nation and of an old worn-out system which came from the days when Venice and Genoa were loaning money to Turkey, and as a consequence of which, up to the present, a territory in a very delicate part of the world found itself, because of the capitulations, open to all kinds of intrigue.

The capitulations were the basis of foreign interference in Turkey. I thought, and I think now, that the world is better because they got rid of them. There were days when I could not say so very strongly, but I felt it. It is a bad thing to have a dangerous corner of the world a place for international log-rolling and, of

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course, in the next few months, between this time and the time that Congress may take up this question, if you talk to anybody about the subject, let all of us say in our own way what I have just said, that it is a good thing for the world in general that the doorway of intrigue has been closed.

Of course, there will be those who say, "What is the advantage to us of making this treaty?" I speak of this because Senators have asked me what would be the advantage to us. Well, I think it is true that all the business, the religious, educational and social interests that are in Constantinople—and I was in Constantinople only three or four months ago—I think they are all solidly back of the ratification of the treaty, and I think that is something that ought to be told to everyone who wants to talk with you about the treaty.

Finally, let me point out to you that we had two pretty large and important by-products in dealing with the Turks. One of them was the freedom of the Black Sea, as I choose to call it, and in that fight between Russia and the Allies as to whether the Black Sea should be a Russian lake or should be free to the commerce of the world, it was the United States that settled the matter. It was a real game, and I assume when Turkey made answer and responded to our urgings, that Turkey expected that we were going to make a treaty with her of some kind later on.

The second thing of great importance as a by-product was the extension of the open-door policy in the Near East. We, at least, got in that first conference a record—the British and French are on record in favor of an open-door policy—and that amounts to an agreement for the open-door in the Near East.

After all, the negotiations at Lausanne, so far as the United States is concerned, if they are approved by the ratification of the treaty, express a rather simple foreign policy. It is so simple that when I hear people say that the United States has no foreign policy, I like to tell them about it: *We should steal nothing from others and others should steal nothing from us; we do not like others who steal from others.*

HERBERT HOOVER

Secretary of Commerce

In the following letter to the Secretary of State, Secretary Hoover called the Department's attention to the importance from the viewpoint of American Commerce of the prompt ratification of the treaty with Turkey:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

December 29, 1924.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I want to call your attention to the importance, from the viewpoint of American Commerce, of the prompt ratification of the treaty with Turkey, concluded at Lausanne on August 6, 1923. Whatever differences of opinion there may have been with regard to the desirability of