South African Environmental Justice struggles
against "toxic" petrochemical industries in South Durban: The Engen Refinery
Case
This case study explores the South Durban
community's struggle against disproportionate exposure to a hazardous environment
and sulphur dioxide pollution, and at the same time, being faced with "clear
and present" health hazards linked to petrochemical industrial production.
To unpack the environmental justice challenges facing post-apartheid South
Africa, the case study examines the role played by the South Durban Community
Environmental Alliance in articulating environmental injustices and poor environmental
responsibility of the petrochemical industry in South Africa.
Table of Contents
Problem
Key Actors
Strategies
Lessons and recommendations
References
Problem
Environmental justice struggles in contemporary
South Africa have their foundation in struggles against t he legacy of apartheid
politics and spatial planning discourse and practice. Analysis of post-apartheid
South Africa requires framing issues within a historical context; taking into
account a painful history that left deep social, economic, political, and
ecological (environmental) scars. It is through recognizing the impact of
apartheid that one is be able to unpack contemporary environmental justice
struggles and how they are closely tied to socio-political injustice. Durning
(1990) states that Apartheid was not only an example of political injustice
but it was also the most glaring example of environmental injustice (apartheid).
Apartheid left deep scars on the environment, and its legacy continue to pose
“numerous hazards to public health and people’s daily lives” (Heeten Kalan,
South African Exchange Program on Environmental Justice). The zoning strategy
of apartheid and its “racialized” separate development philosophy resulted
in black South Africans being coerced to live in overcrowded “Bantustans”
and townships located “downwind or downstream from industrial complexes” (Heeten
Kalan). Consequently, the black South African communities are overburdened
by both disparate exposure to industrial pollution and socioeconomic deprivation.
They live in extreme poverty and work in hazardous conditions.
This case study offers lessons and roadmaps
on the racialized nature of environmental injustice in South Africa, and demonstrates
the “conscious” intent of apartheid politicians and top public officials to
locate polluting industries close low-income black South African townships
(an vice versa). It is little surprise that low-income communities in
south Durban continue inhale “the deadly fumes of environmental injustice
in South Africa” (ibid.). They bear the public health costs of environmental
injustice associated with the petrochemical industry. These health costs include
high levels of asthma, severe chest complaints, and cancer.
It is against this background that the South
Durban Community Environmental Alliance is fighting for environmental justice
in post-apartheid South Africa. According to Sven “Bobby” Peek, a South African
environmental justice activist,
“Communities must not relent in their struggle
against environmental injustices and racism and should not let obstacles of
industrial and state power foil their quest for the ideal environment.”
http://www.goldmanprize.org/recipients/recipients.html
Pictorial Depiction of Petrochemical pollution
in Durban:
Large-scale pollution: South African refineries
produce approximately 82 tons of sulphur dioxide gas daily. [Mail & Guardian,
April 28, 2000]
South Durban
South Durban is the industrial hub of Durban,
KwaZulu-Natal Province. It is “home” to one of the two biggest oil refineries
in South Africa. South Durban has the largest concentration of petrochemical
industries in the country, and it refines approximately 60 percent of South
Africa’s petroleum. Apart from being overwhelmed with petrochemical companies,
the South Durban industrial basin is also home to “waste water treatment works,
numerous toxic waste landfill sites, an airport, a paper manufacturing plant
and a multitude of chemical process industries” (Sven Peek). In total, the
South Durban area contains over 120 industries, including the two oil refineries.
This petrochemical basin has been dubbed the “Durban poison” which disproportionately
overburdens low-income communities with environmental stress (pollution) and
public health costs.
The discussion of South Durban industrial
basin must take into account the apartheid legacy, particularly spatial planning
and its impact on black communities (people of color). It was no coincidence
that black communities (generic racial term for Indian, Colored and African
communities) reside close to “toxic” industries and inhale fumes of environmental
injustice. The South Durban basin has a population of approximately 285 000
people, and the black communities comprise an overwhelming majority of this
population. The low-income communities are located in the following residential
townships, Wentworth, Merebank, and Bluff.
However, apartheid urban planning ensured
that these three racial groups lived apart (segregated) while maintaining
separate residential development for white communities. The development of
South Durban as an industrial hub, starting in the 1930s, involved collaboration
between local industrialists (business people) and the white government (regime).
Most of south Durban was deliberately zoned for industrial development, and
black communities were forcibly removed to make way for industrial complexes
(Desmond D’Sa, environmental justice activist with South Durban Community
Environmental Alliance). Apartheid spatial planning deliberately sited black
residential areas near dirty industries in order to facilitate easy access
to cheap labor, and generally these black townships were located within close
proximity of toxic dumps, sewerage treatment plants, polluting industries,
etc. (Mark Douglas Whitaker, 2001). [http://csf.Colorado.edu/envtecsoc/2001/msg00373.html].
In addition, black communities were forced to live downstream and downwind
from industrial complexes. Coupled with overcrowding in black townships, black
communities had to bear with extreme poverty, poor and inhumane working and
socioeconomic conditions. The question that one might be asking at the
moment is that what had apartheid spatial planning got to do with environmental
justice? It is certainly a valid concern. In this case I seek to demonstrate
that apartheid was a clear example of environmental injustice that was coupled
with human rights abuses, socioeconomic, and public health violations. Its
legacy presents post-apartheid South Africa with a mammoth task of redressing
these injustices. According to Heeten Kalan, “Apartheid has left an indelible
scar on the environment, which in turn has resulted in numerous hazards to
public health and people’s daily lives” [http://www.afsc.org/pwork/0599/0514.htm].
It is analytical paralysis to ignore the
impact of apartheid on contemporary problems and challenges facing the new
South Africa. I advance that that racial analysis forms the core of an examination
of South African problems, and its omission renders the discussion a “half-baked
cake.” In my opinion, whatever discussion about current problems experienced
by post-apartheid South Africa has its roots on the environmental question;
environment being broadly defined. Apartheid, even though premised on advancing
white superiority in all spheres of society, tapped into the environment to
secure resources for promoting “separate development” that would largely benefit
the white community. It thus stimulated environmental scarcity for black communities,
and consequently creating conditions for conflict in society [refer to Valerie
Percival & Thomas Homer-Dixon, 1995. “Environmental scarcity and violent
conflict: the case of South Africa.”]. Thus the environmental (ecological)
legacy of apartheid is grim, and will surely influence sociopolitical and
economic conditions of post-apartheid South Africa for decades [Percival &
Homer-Dixon, 1995].
In the previous paragraphs, I present the
grim picture of apartheid and its impact on sociopolitical and economic conditions
in South Africa. The institutionalization of apartheid in 1948 gave way to
social and political conflict around environmental resources. One could also
argue that institutions and structures (social and political) of apartheid
served to allocate environmental resources (thus dealing with issues of environmental
scarcity) and the containment of conflict (certainly a function of the struggle
between social groups competing for the environmental resources). Percival
& Homer-Dixon (1995) clearly state that “the social and ecological legacies
of apartheid will continue to affect the ability of both state and society”
to meet the expectations, aspirations and needs of a democratic South African
population. Such struggles around environmental resources still continue in
post-apartheid South Africa, and thus the question of environmental scarcity
is critical to our understanding of environmental justice.
The South Durban Community Environmental
Alliance (SDEA) represents the growing commitment of local communities seeking
environmental justice and redress of past injustices associated with apartheid.
The case will demonstrate how the local communities in South Durban have galvanized
their resources to shift the balance of power, patterns of socio-political
interaction, accountability and social responsibility of corporate interests.
I will show how the South Durban low-income communities perceive the social
impact of environmental scarcities (in this case, lack of clean air and a
healthy environment) and their attempt to correct environmental injustice.
The ability of South Durban low-income communities to perceive environmental
injustice and seek redress is a major achievement since it creates an impetus
for challenging the status quo. In my opinion, grievance-generation, which
is closely associated with a commonly identified problem, promotes community
mobilization for action.
Key actors
The South African Government, be at the
national, provincial, and/or local level, has a critical responsibility in
ensuring that no community is unfairly exposed to health hazards and unclean
environment. The South African Constitution (Article 24) guarantees every
person the right to an environment that is not “detrimental” or “harmful”
to health.
It is important that we examine the environmental
legislation that provides the framework for dealing with environmental pollution
in South Africa. Prior to the enactment of The National Environmental Management
Act (January 1998), the Air Pollution Prevention Act (1965) served as the
key legislative mechanism for enforcing pollution limits. However, this piece
of legislation is outdated and not consistent with environmental law developments
taking place within the rest of the world. It allows South African oil refineries
to produce as much as 82 tons of sulphur dioxide a day while Scandinavian
countries limit such gas emissions to approximately two tons. The central
problem with South African environment legislation is the lack of clearly
defined legislation to control air pollution [Paul Kirk, Mail & Guardian
April 28, 2000]. There is essentially no legally binding air pollution regulation
in South Africa, and pollution control is facilitated through non-binding
“guidelines”. Thus, in the absence of a regulatory or enforcement government
agency, polluting industries rely on their own good will or community pressure
to ensure environmental responsibility.
President Nelson Mandela, Mr. Holomisa,
the Deputy Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Mr. Martin Lloyd,
the Chief Pollution Officer at the Department of Environmental Affairs and
Tourism, Dr. Trevor Chorn, the Director-General of Transport and Energy were
national government representatives involved in the Engen case. At the provincial
and municipal levels, the Environmental Manager of the City of Durban and
the City Medical Officer of Health participated in the resolution of the Engen
case. These public officials got involved in the Engen case through political
pressure, either explicitly or implicitly, from the community.
Map of Durban, South Africa.
.
http://www.durban.gov.za/visitors/about/maps/index.htm
Durban is the largest city of the KwaZulu-Natal
province. The province has a population of over 8 million people. Black people
(Indian, colored, and Africans) constitute approximately 86% and the whites
14% of the population. Durban has a population of approximately 2,3 million,
and most blacks live in formal low-income townships or rapidly growing informal
settlements.
Strategies
This case study focuses on the three residential
communities of Merebank, Wentworth and Bluff that live immediately adjacent
to the Engen refinery. It reveals the communities' struggle for environmental
justice and better environment responsibility and accountability by the Engen
Refinery. The case shows also a strong desire by communities to “enforce”
environmental responsibility in the absence of clear environmental regulation
and law enforcement by the national and/or provincial government. With increasing
incidence of respiratory problems, cancer and other health-related complications
among community members, the Merebank Ratepayers Association presented a memorandum
in 1990 to the refinery management complaining about the industrial pollution.
However, the management was unresponsive to the “problem areas” identified
by the local community. With the transition to democratic elections in 1994,
Engen recognized the need to take into account the changing political mood
in the country. It decided to initiate consultation arrangements with local
communities on how to improve on environmental management. This process earmarked
a critical departure by the refinery management from its “fortress mentality.”
According to Sven Peek, Engen had to revisit its relation with local community.
Late 1994 national politics favored consultation with locally affected communities.
Thus ENGEN made its first serious attempt after apartheid to step from behind
its "fortress isolation” by initiating a Community Awareness and Emergency
Response (CAER) Committee.
· Consultative
forum
The CAER, even though initiated by Engen,
was a response to community pressure on the refinery management to be responsive
to their concerns regarding industrial pollution. Engen management wanted
to have control over community representatives invited to participate in CAER
Committee. From Engen’s perspective, the CAER committee was essentially a
framework for discussion between the refinery and local communities, and it
was not expected to come up with any legally binding regulations on pollution.
Furthermore, Engen’s consultants set the agenda for CAER Committee meetings/discussions.
However, the communities challenged Engen’s assertion that its consultant
be the chairperson of the Committee, and rather demanded their right to set
the agenda, to elect the chairperson, and select their own representatives
to the CAER Committee. Thus the communities’ ability to affirm their control
over the consultation process gave them some political leverage in determining
which issues had to be addressed by the Committee.
· Shifting
political leverage
The community attempted to use the consultation
forum, CAER Committee, to exert pressure on Engen to agree to release extensive
information on emissions and remedy pollution. The community representatives
wanted Engen to agree to a sulphur dioxide emission reduction plan. The South
Durban communities of Wentworth and Berebank had identified release of information
and emission reduction as their two key priorities. Engen recognized the political
danger of fully disclosing its emission information to the local communities
given that the information could easily serve as a public relations weapon
against it. With the planned visit by President Mandela to dedicate Engen’s
expansion, the refinery felt the need to improve its public relations by pointing
out its consultation arrangements with local communities. At the same time,
the community representatives viewed President Mandela’s impending visit as
a political leverage to push Engen to commit to a plan (binding agreement)
on pollution reduction. Thus in March 1995, the community representatives
of the Merebank, Bluff, and Wentworth drafted a Good Neighbor Agreement, which
was also reviewed by their lawyer. The Good Neighbor Agreement draft proposed
the following: It called for (1) Engen to release a broad list of information;
(2) workplace monitoring, energy conservation, and environmental planning;
(3) to pledge to specific plans to reduce emissions of sulphur and carbon
oxides, noxious odors, and the production of toxic chemicals; (4) to increase
emergency planning and reporting, conduct safety audits, reduce flare pollution,
noise and traffic… and (5) to implement affirmative action to address racial,
ethnic, and gender discrimination [Sven Peek, www.katu-network.fi/Artikkelit/kirja2/tekstit/Peek.htm].
Community representatives were interested in having Engen legally commit to
the Good Neighbor Agreement before the President’s visit, and in return they
would publicly praise Engen Refinery. Unfortunately, Engen management resisted
making a legally binding commitment to the Agreement, and subsequently the
negotiation broke at the time of President Mandela’s official visit to Engen
refinery expansion dedication. However, the President encountered local community
demonstrators in front of the Engen refinery when he visited the plant.
This demonstration brought the Engen refinery in the national spotlight. President
Mandela then met privately with the community, and on 28th March
1995 he decided a joint meeting with Engen management, various Ministers and
community representatives to facilitate resolution to the Engen-south Durban
community conflict around environmental pollution. This meeting resulted in
further meetings between Engen Management and senior government officials.
In May 1995, Engen agreed to re-negotiate the Good Neighbor Agreement with
local communities before the Deputy Minister of Environmental Affairs &
Tourism, Mr. Holomisa. This “Indaba” was convened and it was dubbed the “South
Durban Multi-Stakeholder Environmental Management Meeting.”
· Engen’s
reluctance to accept the Good Neighbor Agreement
Engen perceived the terms of the Good Neighbor
Agreement draft as unacceptable given their tone for legal commitment. The
community representatives had built in a series of legally binding specifics
in the Good Neighbor Agreement since they sought Engen’s commitment to release
information, to reduce emissions of sulphur compounds by an agreed upon percent
within a specified time period, and safeguard the local communities. However,
Engen primarily disagreed about reducing sulphur dioxide emissions. Engen’s
contention on sulphur dioxide emission reduction was that it was not violating
the country’s Air Pollution Control Act since its emission was within the
legally acceptable levels. Even though the emission records of Engen refinery
revealed that the plant’s emissions were approximately 10 times higher than
would be legally permissible in similar refineries in the United States, it
technically was not violating any pollution control guidelines. Thus, on technical
grounds, Engen did not see the need to unilaterally and proactively reduce
its emissions in the absence of environmental law stipulations. The loophole
in environmental law and regulation creates opportunities for industrial abuse
of the environment. The apartheid government allowed industrial development
to grow with limited regard for environmental effects. Unfortunately post-apartheid
South Africa has largely permitted this scenario to continue with its failure
to keep up with environmental developments in developed economies. Even the
National Environmental Management Act (1998) stipulates that industries need
to take “reasonable measures” to avoid, to minimize, and to rectify pollution
or environmental degradation. It however fails to ultimately challenge “sources
of environmental harm and damage located in the existing mode of production”
[Patrick Bond and Robyn Stein, “Environmental and Water Management Law in
Post-Apartheid South Africa”].
Engen insisted on an alternative agreement
with local communities regarding the reduction of sulphur dioxide emissions.
Instead of embracing the Good Neighbor Agreement drafted by the local community
representatives, Engen proposed the Bluff Valley Model for the reduction of
emissions. This model did not require an investment in cleaner production
technology to reduce sulphur dioxide emissions but rather called for reasonable
emission reductions only during cold weather conditions (for example winter
season) that might cause excessive ambient sulphur dioxide concentrations.
· Cooperative
environmental governance: rhetoric or reality?
In early December 1995, Engen management
held a secret meeting with Durban City Medical Officer of Health and the Department
of Environmental Affairs and Tourism. The two communities of Wentworth and
Bluff discovered it, and tension grew and they decided to blockade entrance
to those attending the meeting. Having realized the political costs of excluding
local community representatives from the meeting, Engen then invited them
to attend. However, the community refused to participate in retaliation to
their initial exclusion. The community’s refusal to participate in the Engen
meeting raised questions about its legitimacy and sincerity in tackling pollution
issues and involving local communities in its processes. The community lobbied
President Mandela and Deputy Minister Holomisa to facilitate further negotiations
and press Engen to address community grievances.
Engen responded by inviting the CAER Committee
to the refinery where it presented its data on ambient sulphur dioxide levels.
The impression that it sought to create was that the refinery had significantly
reduced emissions to pre-expansion levels and thus it made no business sense
for Engen to invest R1 million per stack to monitor actual sulphur dioxide
emissions. Ironically, Engen used monitoring data generated during the summer
of 1996 at the Wentworth monitoring station to plot the graph of ambient sulphur
dioxide levels. Given good wind/air circulation in January, the data revealed
very low concentration. This was certainly a clear attempt by Engen to “fool”
local communities by misrepresenting the true picture of petrochemical pollution
by deliberately not accounting for the winter inversion. A community representative
felt insulted by Engen management attempt to manipulate the data to suit its
claims on emission reduction. The community members and representatives had
thus managed to educate themselves in issues of environmental justice and
complexities of industrial pollution. During this period community members
kept putting pressure on the Engen to revisit its position regarding the Good
Neighbor Agreement by broadening political space for consultation and negotiation.
They appealed to higher levels of national government through letters. This
strategy managed to bring the Deputy Minister of Environment to convene a
meeting between Engen management, community representatives (accompanied by
their consultants), and government officials (Director General of Transport
and Energy, and Chief Air Pollution Officer at the Department of Environmental
Affairs and Tourism [DEAT]) in February 1996. At this meeting, the community
insisted that Engen significantly reduce its sulphur dioxide emissions (to
8 tons per day) but these requests were met with resistance. The core issue
was that Engen did not see any violation of air pollution regulation, after
all its “emissions of perhaps 40 tons per day were considerably below the
72 tons permitted by DEAT” (Sven Peek). The differential perception of environmental
standards between Engen and the local community representatives inevitably
resulted in a deadlock. Certainly, there was no agreed upon standard that
did not rely primarily on air pollution control laws. The government itself
lagged behind in terms to reviewing or amending its air pollution control
laws to suit international standards. Even though, constitutionally, it had
the responsibility to protect the community’s right to a clean, healthy environment,
it was constrained legally to enforce environmental standards that were beyond
legal stipulation. The main viable alternative was for DEAT to propose amendments
to the current air pollution laws in order to lower the amount of sulphur
dioxide emissions permitted. Even Engen management was aware of the legal
loopholes in the environmental laws in South Africa, and its Chief Executive
Officer (Mr. Angel) argued that his refinery would comply if DEAT’s standards
changed. (Sven Peek). Unfortunately, the involvement of senior government
officials failed to break the deadlock, and Engen convincingly stated its
case on technical ground. In terms of air pollution regulations on sulphur
dioxide emissions, Engen was not violating stipulated emission permit. Engen
also called an independent expert panel to ascertain the emissions of other
petrochemical companies and the public health effects of emissions. The community
was skeptical of an “independent” expert panel comprising e most panelists
that were perceived as sympathetic to Engen and its Bluff Valley Model. However
the independent expert panel never materialized.
· Community
resolve and the formation of the South Durban Community Environmental Alliance
Engen had shown, by the spring of 1996,
that it was not prepared to succumb to both local community demands and political
pressure to significantly reduce sulphur dioxide emissions. At the same time,
the communities of Wentworth, Berebank and Bluff were experiencing further
divisions within community ranks. This potentially threatened community cohesion
and mobilization against the Engen refinery. Recognizing this possible rapture
in community mobilization and support, community representatives called, in
November 1996, a broad meeting with all community based organizations that
were negotiating with Engen and it was agreed that a community environmental
coalition should be formed to spearhead environmental struggles. The South
Durban Community Environmental Alliance (SDCEA) was product of community resolve
to spearhead environmental justice struggles in South Durban. Thus, it allowed
local communities in South Durban to speak with a single voice on environmental
issues, and this would ultimately provide them with a vantage point on fighting
the petrochemical industries in Durban. Under the single banner of SDCEA,
the South Durban communities were able to mount pressure on industries in
the valley to reduce sulphur dioxide pollution. SDCEA broadened its environmental
struggles beyond the Engen refinery, and targeted other industries. Some industries
were receptive to SDCEA request on emission reduction and pollution control,
and therefore they made emission reduction commitments. SDCEA was able to
broaden the arena for conflict and built an alliance with other receptive
industries. Thus SDCEA increased, indirectly, pressure on Engen through its
alliance with other industries that had signed on to the agreement on pollution
reduction. Such indirect pressure ultimately paid off in 1998 when Engen agreed
to a reduction in “pollution permit levels by 65% over five years starting
from 1999” [Sven Peek, www.katu-network.fi/Artikkelit/kirja2/tekstit/Peek.htm].
Engen refinery claims that it is taking positive measures in improving its
environmental management [http://www.engen.co.za/content/news/refinery.htm].
Certainly this marks a positive shift in Engen’s attitude towards the local
community, and it opens up new avenues for negotiations on environmental issues.
Lessons
and Recommendations
This case study reveals the germination
of a unique form of environmental justice movement in South Africa. It ties
the environmental justice struggle to industrial development and planning.
Of particular interest to the author is community resolve to fighting environmental
injustice by mobilizing local resources. It was through a painstaking learning
experience and reliance on endogenous resources that the South Durban community
was able to formulate a viable local environmental justice movement.
1)
The case represent a clear case of
environmental racism linked to apartheid spatial planning that essentially
shifted the cost of petrochemical industries to poor black communities [http://allafrica.com/stories/200108240466.html]
2)
Environmental injustice in post-colonial
Africa requires a critical examination of colonial/apartheid systems as social
structures of accumulation, and how contemporary black communities continue
to bear both the environmental and public health costs of these repressive
systems. The case shows that environmental struggles in South Africa are linked
to some form of environmental scarcity (e.g., clean environment, improved
air quality, access to land, improved working and living conditions). Apart
from being an example of political injustice, colonialism and/or apartheid
also represent glaring example of environmental injustice [http://www-personal.umich.edu/~jrajzer/nre/apartheid.html]
3)
The South Durban community recognized
the pitfalls within South Africa’s environmental laws and air pollution regulations.
The community representatives thus called upon technical and legal experts
to help them understand the technical questions. However, they did not rely
on litigation (legal action) to make their case against Engen. They sought
a more qualitative-orientated approach to consultation with Engen. This required
transparency and negotiating in good faith. Unfortunately, Engen management
held meetings with government officials without extending invitation to community
representatives. Such meetings lacked legitimacy from the local community.
In my opinion, negotiations have high chances of success when issues are discussed
in a transparent manner and no party is left to surprises.
4)
The government officials had little
to bring to the table. The community expected government to protect their
right to a healthy environment. Unfortunately, government’s environmental
legislation and regulations are outdated. For example, The Atmospheric Pollution
Prevention Act (No. 45 of 1965) serves as the main law governing air pollution.
Unfortunately, it is outdated and in need of major review to be in line with
international standards [http://www.groundwork.org.za/oil_refineries.htm].
Consequently, government officials did not have the legal backing to coerce
Engen to implement improved environmental practices and air pollution control
since the refinery was operating within the prescribed emission permit.
5)
Bringing an environmental issue to
public attention is critical for increasing leverage and broadening the arena
for conflict. The local community capitalized on President Mandela’s visit
to Engen Refinery to capture publicity on their environmental struggle. Thus
they were able to gain access simultaneously to political leadership and the
media.
6)
The community has also stepped into
the environmental enforcement gap by building low-cost (inexpensive) bucket
air sampling devices to monitor air pollution trends in South Durban. The
“Bucket Brigade” is an initiative of SDCEA, and it aims to educate and equip
local communities with simple technical skills on monitoring air pollution.
However, the extent to which such “empirical” data is effective in legal action
against the polluter is really debatable and/or questionable given the bias
towards scientific results.
Personal reflections: The struggle continues! It is important that environmental
justice activists continue telling stories of real people fighting environmental,
social, and economic injustices throughout the world. As "we breathe the air
of freedom let us hope that we do not choke on hidden fumes” (Albie Sachs).
Sometimes, these fumes are not hidden BUT clear and present danger. It is
distressing to learn that, in post-apartheid South Africa, low income (black)
communities continue to inhale “the deadly fumes of environmental injustice”
[Heeten Kalan, http://www.afsc.org/pwork/0599/0514.htm]
associated with environmentally unfriendly industrial production technologies.
References
Bond, P. & Stein, R. “Environmental
and water management law in post-apartheid South Africa.” Municipal Services
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Bullard, R. D. “Environmental racism shifts
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Durning, A. B. “Apartheid’s environmental
toll.” [http://fast.antenna.nl/wise/387-8/apart.html]
Engen. “What’s new: Engen refinery.” [http://www.engen.co.za/content/news/refinery.htm]
Groundwork. “Oil refineries, your health
and the environment – what you need to know.” [http://www.groundwork.org.za/oil_refineries.htm]
Peek, S. “Conflict and cooperation in Durban’s
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N.B. This article greatly informed this case study. It provides a brilliant
descriptive detail of the environmental struggles linked to the South Durban
petrochemical basin.
Peek, S. “South Africa: toxic and nuclear
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Percival, V. & Homer-Dixon, T. “Environmental
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