6.38 Assertion

Keywords: assert, assertability, dis, credibility, assertion, asserting, rely, bank, speech, norm, stakes, barn, reasoning, ponens, low

Number of articles: 20
Weighted number of articles: 22.99942

A scatterplot showing the raw number of articles that are in the epistemology subtopic assertion each year from 1945-2013. The average value is 0.29, and the median value is 0. It reaches a peak value of 4 in 2012, and has a minimum value of 0 in 1946.

Figure 6.157: Raw number of articles in topic 38, assertion.

A scatterplot showing the weighted number of articles that are in the epistemology subtopic assertion each year from 1945-2013. The average value is 0.34, and the median value is 0.05. It reaches a peak value of 3.87 in 2012, and has a minimum value of 0 in 1950.

Figure 6.158: Weighted number of articles in topic 38, assertion.

A scatterplot showing the proportion of philosophy articles that are in the epistemology subtopic assertion each year from 1945-2013. The average value is 0.1%, and the median value is 0.0%. It reaches a peak value of 0.9% in 2012, and has a minimum value of 0.0% in 1950.

Figure 6.159: Percentage of philosophy articles in topic 38, assertion.

A scatterplot showing the percentage of epistemology articles that are in the epistemology subtopic assertion each year from 1945-2013. The average value is 0.7%, and the median value is 0.2%. It reaches a peak value of 5.0% in 2012, and has a minimum value of 0.0% in 1950.

Figure 6.160: Percentage of epistemology articles in topic 38, assertion.

Characteristic Articles

  1. Declan Smithies, 2012, “The Normative Role of Knowledge,” Noûs 46:265–88.
  2. Jessica Brown, 2008, “Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning,” Noûs 42:167–89.
  3. John Turri, 2010, “Epistemic Invariantism and Speech Act Contextualism,” Philosophical Review 119:77–95.
  4. George Sher, 1980, “What Makes a Lottery Fair?,” Noûs 14:203–16.
  5. Thomas M. Crisp, 2005, “Hawthorne on Knowledge and Practical Reasoning,” Analysis 65:138–40.
  6. Matthew Weiner, 2005, “Must We Know What We Say?,” Philosophical Review 114:227–51.
  7. Matthew A. Benton, 2012, “Assertion, Knowledge and Predictions,” Analysis 72:102–5.
  8. Jonathan E. Adler, 2009, “Another Argument for the Knowledge Norm,” Analysis 69:407–11.
  9. Igal Kvart, 2006, “A Probabilistic Theory of Knowledge,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72:1–43.
  10. Jessica Brown, 2012, “Assertion and Practical Reasoning: Common or Divergent Epistemic Standards?,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84:123–57.

Highly Cited Articles

  1. Keith Derose, 2002, “Assertion, Knowledge, and Context,” Philosophical Review 111:167–203. (0.4570552)
  2. Matthew Weiner, 2005, “Must We Know What We Say?,” Philosophical Review 114:227–51. (0.7883659)
  3. Igor Douven, 2006, “Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility,” Philosophical Review 115:449–85. (0.4888275)