6.39 Disagreement

Keywords: peer, disagreement, weight, methods, equal, project, mistake, equally, feldman, forming, judge, subjects, higher, method, defeater

Number of articles: 21
Weighted number of articles: 17.53203

A scatterplot showing the raw number of articles that are in the epistemology subtopic disagreement each year from 1945-2013. The average value is 0.31, and the median value is 0. It reaches a peak value of 3 in 2007, and has a minimum value of 0 in 1946.

Figure 6.161: Raw number of articles in topic 39, disagreement.

A scatterplot showing the weighted number of articles that are in the epistemology subtopic disagreement each year from 1945-2013. The average value is 0.26, and the median value is 0. It reaches a peak value of 2.75 in 2013, and has a minimum value of 0 in 1950.

Figure 6.162: Weighted number of articles in topic 39, disagreement.

A scatterplot showing the proportion of philosophy articles that are in the epistemology subtopic disagreement each year from 1945-2013. The average value is 0.1%, and the median value is 0.0%. It reaches a peak value of 0.6% in 2013, and has a minimum value of 0.0% in 1950.

Figure 6.163: Percentage of philosophy articles in topic 39, disagreement.

A scatterplot showing the percentage of epistemology articles that are in the epistemology subtopic disagreement each year from 1945-2013. The average value is 0.5%, and the median value is 0.0%. It reaches a peak value of 4.0% in 2013, and has a minimum value of 0.0% in 1950.

Figure 6.164: Percentage of epistemology articles in topic 39, disagreement.

Characteristic Articles

  1. Michael Thune, 2010, “‘Partial Defeaters’ and the Epistemology of Disagreement,” The Philosophical Quarterly 60:355–72.
  2. Ruth Weintraub, 2013, “Can Steadfast Peer Disagreement be Rational?,” The Philosophical Quarterly 63:740–59.
  3. David Christensen, 2007, “Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News,” Philosophical Review 116:187–217.
  4. Michael Bergmann, 2000, “Externalism and Skepticism,” Philosophical Review 109:159–94.
  5. Joshua Schechter and David Enoch, 2006, “Meaning and Justification: The Case of Modus Ponens,” Noûs 40:687–715.
  6. Han Van Wietmarschen, 2013, “Peer Disagreement, Evidence, and Well-Groundedness,” Philosophical Review 122:395–425.
  7. David Enoch, 2010, “Not Just a Truthometer: Taking Oneself Seriously (but not Too Seriously) in Cases of Peer Disagreement,” Mind 119:953–97.
  8. David Enoch and Joshua Schechter, 2008, “How are Basic Belief-Forming Methods Justified?,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76:547–79.
  9. Adam Elga, 2007, “Reflection and Disagreement,” Noûs 41:478–502.
  10. Nathan L. King, 2012, “Disagreement: What’s the Problem? or a Good Peer is Hard to Find,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85:249–72.

Highly Cited Articles

  1. Adam Elga, 2007, “Reflection and Disagreement,” Noûs 41:478–502. (0.9422557)
  2. John Turri, 2010, “On the Relationship Between Propositional and Doxastic Justification,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80:312–26. (0.3428573)